CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
15956 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R546-H3FF-Q585
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-13 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-13 21:20Directory traversal attack in minion file cache creation. The master's default cache is vulnerable to a directory traversal attack. Which could be leveraged to write or overwrite 'cache' files outside of the cache directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "salt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3006.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3006.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "salt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3007.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3007.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22238"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-13T21:20:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-13T07:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal attack in minion file cache creation. The master\u0027s default cache is vulnerable to a directory traversal attack. Which could be leveraged to write or overwrite \u0027cache\u0027 files outside of the cache directory.",
"id": "GHSA-r546-h3ff-q585",
"modified": "2025-06-13T21:20:12Z",
"published": "2025-06-13T09:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/4b30218edf1a979855ea191d72b30c89f4a5a582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saltproject.io/en/3006/topics/releases/3006.12.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saltproject.io/en/3007/topics/releases/3007.4.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Salt vulnerable to directory traversal attack in minion file cache creation"
}
GHSA-R54P-XV62-5QWW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 15:31Easyndexer 1.0 contains an arbitrary file download vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to download sensitive files by manipulating the file parameter. Attackers can send POST requests to showtif.php with arbitrary file paths in the file parameter to retrieve system files like configuration and initialization files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25178"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T13:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Easyndexer 1.0 contains an arbitrary file download vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to download sensitive files by manipulating the file parameter. Attackers can send POST requests to showtif.php with arbitrary file paths in the file parameter to retrieve system files like configuration and initialization files.",
"id": "GHSA-r54p-xv62-5qww",
"modified": "2026-03-06T15:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-06T15:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/easyndexer-arbitrary-file-download-via-showtifphp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R56Q-VV3C-6G9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-10-19 20:16 – Updated: 2021-10-19 18:06Impact
The tough library, prior to 0.12.0, does not properly sanitize delegated role names when caching a repository, or when loading a repository from the filesystem. When the repository is cached or loaded, files ending with the .json extension could be overwritten with role metadata anywhere on the system.
AWS would like to thank https://github.com/jku for reporting this issue.
Patches
A fix is available in version 0.12.0.
Workarounds
No workarounds to this issue are known.
References
https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-wjw6-2cqr-j4qr
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tough"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41150"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-10-19T18:06:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-19T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe tough library, prior to 0.12.0, does not properly sanitize delegated role names when caching a repository, or when loading a repository from the filesystem. When the repository is cached or loaded, files ending with the .json extension could be overwritten with role metadata anywhere on the system.\n\nAWS would like to thank https://github.com/jku for reporting this issue.\n\n### Patches\nA fix is available in version 0.12.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds to this issue are known.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-wjw6-2cqr-j4qr \n",
"id": "GHSA-r56q-vv3c-6g9c",
"modified": "2021-10-19T18:06:09Z",
"published": "2021-10-19T20:16:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/awslabs/tough/security/advisories/GHSA-r56q-vv3c-6g9c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/python-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-wjw6-2cqr-j4qr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/awslabs/tough/commit/1809b9bd1106d78a51fbea3071aa97a3530bac9a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/awslabs/tough"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper sanitization of delegated role names"
}
GHSA-R57C-9749-HR2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:33 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:33Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Windows PowerShell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69807"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:19:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Windows PowerShell allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-r57c-9749-hr2p",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:33:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69807"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R57G-MC79-8HJ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 17:21 – Updated: 2026-10-21 17:21Affected version / file / line
Version: djust v1.1.4 (latest release, published 2026-09-23). File: python/djust/mcp/server.py:354-433 (MCP tool find_handlers_for_template). Confirmed identical on the commit used for triage, a7e4fafd1667b4db0b1465652d4a63cb17117a07.
Description
@mcp.tool()
def find_handlers_for_template(template_path: str) -> str:
"""
Args:
template_path: Either a logical template name (e.g.
'demos/counter.html' — what you'd pass to `render`) OR
an absolute filesystem path. Both are searched.
"""
...
resolved_path: str | None = None
if os.path.isabs(template_path) and os.path.isfile(template_path):
resolved_path = template_path
else:
... # logical-name resolution via Django's template loader
...
with open(resolved_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
source = f.read()
handler_names_in_template = sorted({m.group(2) for m in dj_event_attr_re.finditer(source)})
When template_path is an absolute path to an existing file, it is used directly, with no confinement to the project/template directories — no realpath() + prefix check, no allowlist. open(resolved_path, ...) then reads the file.
This is inconsistent with the sibling tool in the same file (loaddata, ~line 290-303), which explicitly rejects paths outside the project directory for its own path-like parameter:
candidate = os.path.realpath(...)
if base_dir and not candidate.startswith(os.path.realpath(str(base_dir))):
return json.dumps({"error": f"fixture path '{p}' resolves outside the project directory", ...})
find_handlers_for_template has no equivalent check for template_path before the open() call.
Impact
An MCP client with access to this tool (available whenever the Django project is running the MCP server via python manage.py djust_mcp — no separate opt-in flag gates this specific tool beyond that) can read the contents of any file on disk that the process has read permission to and that exists, by passing an absolute path — e.g. /etc/passwd, application .env files, SSH keys, or any other sensitive file reachable by the server process's user.
Mitigating factor (reduces this from High to Medium): the tool does not return the raw file content. It runs one fixed regex (dj-(?:click|submit|change|input|keydown|keyup)\s=\s'"['"]) against the content and returns only the matched handler-name strings, plus confirmation that the file exists and is readable (an existence/readability oracle on its own, independent of the regex match). If the targeted file happens to contain text matching that HTML-attribute-like pattern (plausible for config files, logs, or any text file with key="value"-shaped content), those substrings are returned in full — so the read is not purely blind, but it is not a general-purpose arbitrary-file-read primitive either.
Proof of Concept / Reproduction Traced via direct source read; no live Django project was exercised for this report (would require a full djust project scaffold, which was out of scope for this pass — see limitation below).
- MCP client calls: find_handlers_for_template(template_path="/etc/passwd")
- server.py ~line 393:
if os.path.isabs(template_path) and os.path.isfile(template_path): resolved_path = template_pathresolved_path == "/etc/passwd", unchanged, unconfined - server.py ~line 430:
with open(resolved_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f: source = f.read()/etc/passwd is now fully read intosource - The regex dj_event_attr_re.finditer(source) is applied to the real /etc/passwd content. /etc/passwd will not match this specific pattern, so the response would report an empty handler list plus "file exists and was read" - which already confirms the path-confinement bypass (compare with passing a nonexistent absolute path, which correctly returns "Template file not found").
- On a target where the absolute path points to a file that DOES contain
text shaped like
dj-click="..."(e.g. a copied HTML fragment, a stray config value, or a crafted file placed by the attacker via another vector), the matched substrings are returned verbatim in the JSON response - full-content disclosure of just those substrings, not the whole file.
Suggested Fix
Apply the same confinement loaddata already uses, before the os.path.isfile check:
if os.path.isabs(template_path):
candidate = os.path.realpath(template_path)
if base_dir and not candidate.startswith(os.path.realpath(str(base_dir))):
return json.dumps({
"error": f"template path '{template_path}' resolves outside the project directory",
"resolved": candidate,
"project_dir": str(base_dir),
})
if os.path.isfile(candidate):
resolved_path = candidate
Limitations
Not exercised against a live Django/djust project — this is a source-level trace of the exact executed branch (os.path.isabs + os.path.isfile + open()), not an end-to-end runtime capture. Did not verify whether any MCP-host-level confirmation/approval step (some MCP clients prompt the user before a tool call with a suspicious-looking path argument) would intercept this in practice - the vulnerability is in the server's own missing server-side guard regardless of client-side UX.
Disclosure Timeline
2026-09-24: found during audit, confirmed via source trace to the open() sink; classified Medium due to the response-content limitation (matched substrings only, not raw file content). Please check the log file, and apply CVE once the fix is made.
log:
10 14:53:20.185935 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/case/project/templates/nonexistent_inside_project.html", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
10 14:53:20.187205 write(1, "{\"error\": \"Could not resolve tem"..., 204) = 204
...
10 14:53:20.191831 write(1, "=== ATTACK: absolute path OUTSID"..., 57) = 57
10 14:53:20.194864 write(1, "target path:", 12) = 12
10 14:53:20.198521 write(1, "/case/outside/evil_content.html", 31) = 31
10 14:53:20.202290 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/case/outside/evil_content.html", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0
10 14:53:20.203762 write(1, "exists on disk (from the contain"..., 42) = 42
10 14:53:20.207224 write(1, "True", 4) = 4
10 14:53:20.210392 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/case/outside/evil_content.html", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0
10 14:53:20.211721 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/case/outside/evil_content.html", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0
10 14:53:20.213284 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/case/outside/evil_content.html", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
10 14:53:20.215202 newfstatat(3, "", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, AT_EMPTY_PATH) = 0
10 14:53:20.216994 ioctl(3, TCGETS, 0x7ffd68e26aa0) = -1 ENOTTY (Inappropriate ioctl for device)
10 14:53:20.221797 read(3, "<html><body>\n<!-- This file live"..., 186) = 185
10 14:53:20.223610 read(3, "", 1) = 0
10 14:53:20.224913 close(3) = 0
Maintainer assessment
The djust MCP server (manage.py djust_mcp, python -m djust.mcp) only serves stdio to the MCP client that launched it, as the same OS user, on the developer's machine; there is no network listener. The realistic caller is a local AI agent acting on untrusted input. The tool returns only dj-*-attribute-shaped substrings and an existence answer, not file contents. We therefore rate this Low (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N, 3.3).
Affected: every release with the tool, 0.9.0 – 1.0.9, 1.1.0 – 1.1.6, 1.2.0 – 1.2.3, 1.3.0rc4 – 1.3.0rc7.
Patches
Fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.7, 1.2.4 and 1.3.0rc8. find_handlers_for_template reads an absolute path only when it resolves (symlinks and .. followed) inside a directory the template loaders serve or inside BASE_DIR, and answers any other absolute path like a missing template. The seed_fixtures guard compared paths with a string prefix (so /app-data passed for a BASE_DIR of /app) and skipped the check when BASE_DIR was unset; it now compares whole path components and refuses without BASE_DIR. Both use one containment helper.
Workarounds
Run the MCP server only in projects whose agent you trust with file access, or pass logical template names only.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0.dev0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.3.0rc7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0.dev0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.0rc8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113731"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T17:21:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T22:19:30Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Affected version / file / line\nVersion: djust v1.1.4 (latest release, published 2026-09-23). File: python/djust/mcp/server.py:354-433 (MCP tool find_handlers_for_template). Confirmed identical on the commit used for triage, a7e4fafd1667b4db0b1465652d4a63cb17117a07.\n\n### Description\n```\n@mcp.tool()\ndef find_handlers_for_template(template_path: str) -\u003e str:\n \"\"\"\n Args:\n template_path: Either a logical template name (e.g.\n \u0027demos/counter.html\u0027 \u2014 what you\u0027d pass to `render`) OR\n an absolute filesystem path. Both are searched.\n \"\"\"\n ...\n resolved_path: str | None = None\n if os.path.isabs(template_path) and os.path.isfile(template_path):\n resolved_path = template_path\n else:\n ... # logical-name resolution via Django\u0027s template loader\n ...\n with open(resolved_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\") as f:\n source = f.read()\n handler_names_in_template = sorted({m.group(2) for m in dj_event_attr_re.finditer(source)})\n```\nWhen template_path is an absolute path to an existing file, it is used directly, with no confinement to the project/template directories \u2014 no realpath() + prefix check, no allowlist. open(resolved_path, ...) then reads the file.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the sibling tool in the same file (loaddata, ~line 290-303), which explicitly rejects paths outside the project directory for its own path-like parameter:\n```\ncandidate = os.path.realpath(...)\nif base_dir and not candidate.startswith(os.path.realpath(str(base_dir))):\n return json.dumps({\"error\": f\"fixture path \u0027{p}\u0027 resolves outside the project directory\", ...})\n```\nfind_handlers_for_template has no equivalent check for template_path before the open() call.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client with access to this tool (available whenever the Django project is running the MCP server via python manage.py djust_mcp \u2014 no separate opt-in flag gates this specific tool beyond that) can read the contents of any file on disk that the process has read permission to and that exists, by passing an absolute path \u2014 e.g. /etc/passwd, application .env files, SSH keys, or any other sensitive file reachable by the server process\u0027s user.\n\nMitigating factor (reduces this from High to Medium): the tool does not return the raw file content. It runs one fixed regex (dj-(?:click|submit|change|input|keydown|keyup)\\s*=\\s*[\u0027\"]([^\u0027\"]+)[\u0027\"]) against the content and returns only the matched handler-name strings, plus confirmation that the file exists and is readable (an existence/readability oracle on its own, independent of the regex match). If the targeted file happens to contain text matching that HTML-attribute-like pattern (plausible for config files, logs, or any text file with key=\"value\"-shaped content), those substrings are returned in full \u2014 so the read is not purely blind, but it is not a general-purpose arbitrary-file-read primitive either.\n\nProof of Concept / Reproduction\nTraced via direct source read; no live Django project was exercised for this report (would require a full djust project scaffold, which was out of scope for this pass \u2014 see limitation below).\n\n1. MCP client calls: find_handlers_for_template(template_path=\"/etc/passwd\")\n2. server.py ~line 393:\n ```\n if os.path.isabs(template_path) and os.path.isfile(template_path):\n resolved_path = template_path\n ```\n resolved_path == \"/etc/passwd\", unchanged, unconfined\n3. server.py ~line 430:\n ```\n with open(resolved_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\") as f:\n source = f.read()\n ```\n /etc/passwd is now fully read into `source`\n4. The regex dj_event_attr_re.finditer(source) is applied to the real\n /etc/passwd content. /etc/passwd will not match this specific pattern, so\n the response would report an empty handler list plus \"file exists and was\n read\" - which already confirms the path-confinement bypass (compare with\n passing a nonexistent absolute path, which correctly returns\n \"Template file not found\").\n5. On a target where the absolute path points to a file that DOES contain\n text shaped like `dj-click=\"...\"` (e.g. a copied HTML fragment, a stray\n config value, or a crafted file placed by the attacker via another\n vector), the matched substrings are returned verbatim in the JSON\n response - full-content disclosure of just those substrings, not the\n whole file.\n\n### Suggested Fix\nApply the same confinement loaddata already uses, before the os.path.isfile check:\n```\nif os.path.isabs(template_path):\n candidate = os.path.realpath(template_path)\n if base_dir and not candidate.startswith(os.path.realpath(str(base_dir))):\n return json.dumps({\n \"error\": f\"template path \u0027{template_path}\u0027 resolves outside the project directory\",\n \"resolved\": candidate,\n \"project_dir\": str(base_dir),\n })\n if os.path.isfile(candidate):\n resolved_path = candidate\n```\n### Limitations\nNot exercised against a live Django/djust project \u2014 this is a source-level trace of the exact executed branch (os.path.isabs + os.path.isfile + open()), not an end-to-end runtime capture.\nDid not verify whether any MCP-host-level confirmation/approval step (some MCP clients prompt the user before a tool call with a suspicious-looking path argument) would intercept this in practice - the vulnerability is in the server\u0027s own missing server-side guard regardless of client-side UX.\n\n### Disclosure Timeline\n2026-09-24: found during audit, confirmed via source trace to the open() sink; classified Medium due to the response-content limitation (matched substrings only, not raw file content).\nPlease check the log file, and apply CVE once the fix is made.\n\n```\nlog:\n10 14:53:20.185935 openat(AT_FDCWD, \"/case/project/templates/nonexistent_inside_project.html\", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)\n10 14:53:20.187205 write(1, \"{\\\"error\\\": \\\"Could not resolve tem\"..., 204) = 204\n ...\n10 14:53:20.191831 write(1, \"=== ATTACK: absolute path OUTSID\"..., 57) = 57\n10 14:53:20.194864 write(1, \"target path:\", 12) = 12\n10 14:53:20.198521 write(1, \"/case/outside/evil_content.html\", 31) = 31\n10 14:53:20.202290 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, \"/case/outside/evil_content.html\", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0\n10 14:53:20.203762 write(1, \"exists on disk (from the contain\"..., 42) = 42\n10 14:53:20.207224 write(1, \"True\", 4) = 4\n10 14:53:20.210392 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, \"/case/outside/evil_content.html\", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0\n10 14:53:20.211721 newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, \"/case/outside/evil_content.html\", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, 0) = 0\n10 14:53:20.213284 openat(AT_FDCWD, \"/case/outside/evil_content.html\", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3\n10 14:53:20.215202 newfstatat(3, \"\", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0777, st_size=185, ...}, AT_EMPTY_PATH) = 0\n10 14:53:20.216994 ioctl(3, TCGETS, 0x7ffd68e26aa0) = -1 ENOTTY (Inappropriate ioctl for device)\n10 14:53:20.221797 read(3, \"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\\n\u003c!-- This file live\"..., 186) = 185\n10 14:53:20.223610 read(3, \"\", 1) = 0\n10 14:53:20.224913 close(3) = 0\n```\n## Maintainer assessment\nThe djust MCP server (`manage.py djust_mcp`, `python -m djust.mcp`) only serves stdio to the MCP client that launched it, as the same OS user, on the developer\u0027s machine; there is no network listener. The realistic caller is a local AI agent acting on untrusted input. The tool returns only `dj-*`-attribute-shaped substrings and an existence answer, not file contents. We therefore rate this Low (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N, 3.3).\n\nAffected: every release with the tool, 0.9.0 \u2013 1.0.9, 1.1.0 \u2013 1.1.6, 1.2.0 \u2013 1.2.3, 1.3.0rc4 \u2013 1.3.0rc7.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.7, 1.2.4 and 1.3.0rc8. `find_handlers_for_template` reads an absolute path only when it resolves (symlinks and `..` followed) inside a directory the template loaders serve or inside `BASE_DIR`, and answers any other absolute path like a missing template. The `seed_fixtures` guard compared paths with a string prefix (so `/app-data` passed for a `BASE_DIR` of `/app`) and skipped the check when `BASE_DIR` was unset; it now compares whole path components and refuses without `BASE_DIR`. Both use one containment helper.\n\n## Workarounds\nRun the MCP server only in projects whose agent you trust with file access, or pass logical template names only.",
"id": "GHSA-r57g-mc79-8hj2",
"modified": "2026-10-21T17:21:15Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T17:21:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-r57g-mc79-8hj2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/commit/45a5045793ebe7c9c2df86b0ad34275af6822619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/commit/744bccf699c65c815d9379b36236a7c5592a339b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/commit/85eed7caaf620bdb08986f2f3bb79432c0d3d715"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/commit/a62caf6b4ef540ad688d4dfdfa407ff914c78728"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.1.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.2.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.3.0rc8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djust: Arbitrary absolute-path file read in the find_handlers_for_template MCP tool"
}
GHSA-R587-WFM5-V67Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:47 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:47Directory traversal vulnerability in the DeviceStorage API in Mozilla FirefoxOS before 1.2.2 allows attackers to bypass the media sandbox protection mechanism, and read or modify arbitrary files, via a crafted application that uses a relative pathname for a DeviceStorageFile object.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-1507"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-03-19T10:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the DeviceStorage API in Mozilla FirefoxOS before 1.2.2 allows attackers to bypass the media sandbox protection mechanism, and read or modify arbitrary files, via a crafted application that uses a relative pathname for a DeviceStorageFile object.",
"id": "GHSA-r587-wfm5-v67q",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:47:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:47:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-1507"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=940684"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2014/mfsa2014-25.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/bulletinapr2016-2952098.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-R58C-F4XC-GQW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-30 06:33 – Updated: 2023-12-05 18:30Insecure Permissions vulnerability in GL.iNet AX1800 version 4.0.0 before 4.5.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the upload API function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47464"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-30T05:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insecure Permissions vulnerability in GL.iNet AX1800 version 4.0.0 before 4.5.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the upload API function.",
"id": "GHSA-r58c-f4xc-gqw4",
"modified": "2023-12-05T18:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-11-30T06:33:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gl-inet/CVE-issues/blob/main/4.0.0/Arbitrary%20File%20Creation%20Through%20API%20upload.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R594-RF5Q-R69H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 03:32 – Updated: 2026-10-12 03:32A security flaw has been discovered in westboy CicadasCMS up to 2431154dac8d0735e04f1fd2a3c3556668fc8dab. This impacts the function TemplateController.save of the file /system/cms/template/save of the component Backend Template Editor. The manipulation results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-108790"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T03:17:18Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A security flaw has been discovered in westboy CicadasCMS up to 2431154dac8d0735e04f1fd2a3c3556668fc8dab. This impacts the function TemplateController.save of the file /system/cms/template/save of the component Backend Template Editor. The manipulation results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-r594-rf5q-r69h",
"modified": "2026-10-12T03:32:56Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T03:32:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wawyw/cve_report/blob/main/CicadasCMS_1.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-108790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/959802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/416569"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/416569/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R599-42XM-MQR6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:54 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:54Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in Wonder CMS 2014 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a crafted theme.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-8704"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-17T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in Wonder CMS 2014 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a crafted theme.",
"id": "GHSA-r599-42xm-mqr6",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:54:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:54:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rossmarks.uk/portfolio.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R5CM-75CC-9F2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 18:31NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux contains a vulnerability where a user could cause files outside the model repository to be read, written to, or modified by providing a path in the model name to the Triton MLflow plugin. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47487"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T18:16:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux contains a vulnerability where a user could cause files outside the model repository to be read, written to, or modified by providing a path in the model name to the Triton MLflow plugin. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-r5cm-75cc-9f2g",
"modified": "2026-08-04T18:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5860"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47487"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.