CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
16016 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PX75-CVX6-HF5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:43 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:43Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in GF-3XPLORER 2.4 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang_sel parameter to (1) updater.php and (2) thumber.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-6475"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-12-20T20:46:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in GF-3XPLORER 2.4 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang_sel parameter to (1) updater.php and (2) thumber.php.",
"id": "GHSA-px75-cvx6-hf5m",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:43:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:43:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6475"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26936"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PX7W-6P2F-6X8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:32Unquoted Windows search path vulnerability in the client in Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) 11.x before 11.0.7.4 and 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 and Endpoint Protection Small Business Edition 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted program in the %SYSTEMDRIVE% directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-5011"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-01-10T16:47:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unquoted Windows search path vulnerability in the client in Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) 11.x before 11.0.7.4 and 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 and Endpoint Protection Small Business Edition 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted program in the %SYSTEMDRIVE% directory.",
"id": "GHSA-px7w-6p2f-6x8x",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:32:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:32:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-5011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/90226"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory\u0026pvid=security_advisory\u0026year=\u0026suid=20140109_00"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PX84-GP9Q-G6W9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-30 09:30 – Updated: 2024-02-05 21:30Directory Traversal vulnerability in Qiyu iFair version 23.8_ad0 and before, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via uploadimage component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-30T09:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in Qiyu iFair version 23.8_ad0 and before, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via uploadimage component.",
"id": "GHSA-px84-gp9q-g6w9",
"modified": "2024-02-05T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2024-01-30T09:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.yuque.com/for82/vdzwqe/sc8ictw8poo8v5gl"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PX85-F4Q5-JH77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 16:31 – Updated: 2026-10-22 16:31Summary: The Storybook dev server exposes its WebSocket authentication token to any client that can load its HTML pages. Any host on a LAN can open a Storybook app by IP address, and therefore obtain the token. The WebSocket can be used to inject code into story files or to create new files. Under the right circumstances, an attacker can execute code on the machine of a developer connected on the same LAN.
Who is impacted?
You are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server whilst connected on an untrusted local network, or to a WiFi access point posing as a trusted network. The impact of this advisory is more important if you have the Vitest addon installed and are using an old version of Vitest.
You are not impacted if:
- You run a dev server in an environment that other devices on your network cannot reach (e.g. a container that does not publish the Storybook port, or publishes it only on
127.0.0.1) - You run a dev server whilst connected to a trusted local network
- You serve a built version of Storybook on your machine
Recommended actions
Upgrade Storybook
Storybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur.
Upgrade to a patched version listed below before running storybook dev again. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix.
- 11.0.0-alpha.6
- 10.6.2
- 9.1.21
- 8.6.19
Review potentially breaking changes
Due to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users' workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, this document explains how to fall back to the previous behavior.
Storybook now only listens on 127.0.0.1 by default
By default, the Storybook dev server no longer binds to all network interfaces on your machine. It only binds to the loopback address 127.0.0.1. You can still open it at http://localhost:6006. This prevents other devices on the same network from seeing your Storybook server.
To share a Storybook with others, consider publishing it to Chromatic (free). To share it on a LAN without exposing the dev server, build a static Storybook with storybook build and serve the output folder with any static file server.
To share a live Storybook running in dev mode, you can use the --host CLI option to bind to the LAN IP you want to share Storybook on, e.g. storybook dev --host 192.168.0.110. Host and origin validation stays enabled with this option. If you use --host 0.0.0.0 instead, also set core.allowedHosts to the hostnames you will use. Without it, host and origin validation is disabled, and Storybook shows a warning and asks you to confirm before it starts.
Consider using a firewall to restrict incoming packets to known colleague IPs, and avoid using --host on an untrusted WiFi network.
The Vitest addon now disables browser.api.allowWrite and browser.api.allowExec
Storybook no longer allows code running in Vitest Browser mode to write to the developer’s machine or execute other processes. In the unlikely scenario that you rely on this capability in your tests, you can manually re-enable these APIs in your Vitest config.
The saveStoryRequest event validates input more strictly
Storybook strengthened input validation in saveStoryRequest, so addons and the Storybook UI can now only write serialized args and story titles. It is no longer possible to exploit input validation weaknesses to e.g. write play functions with a custom addon.
If you develop an addon that writes or edits files on users’ behalf, reach out to the Storybook team to get advice on security best practice.
Disclosure timeline
On August 19th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing that the WebSocket token can be stolen by an attacker sharing a LAN with a Storybook dev server.
The disclosure identified several actions an attacker can do. An attacker can bypass input validation to write a payload in a story file.
They can then trigger a test run via the WebSocket. If the Vitest addon is installed, the payload can exploit a Vitest API to write other files, with more exploit logic to the user’s filesystem.
Depending on the exploit content, where the file is written, and what software the developer uses, that exploit could then be executed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "storybook"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "storybook"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "storybook"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "storybook"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-alpha.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/core-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/experimental-addon-test"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/addon-vitest"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/addon-vitest"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/addon-vitest"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-alpha.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/addon-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@storybook/addon-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0-alpha.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-22T16:31:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T18:17:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Summary:** The Storybook dev server exposes its WebSocket authentication token to any client that can load its HTML pages. Any host on a LAN can open a Storybook app by IP address, and therefore obtain the token. The WebSocket can be used to inject code into story files or to create new files. Under the right circumstances, an attacker can execute code on the machine of a developer connected on the same LAN.\n\n## Who is impacted?\n\nYou are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server whilst connected on an untrusted local network, or to a WiFi access point posing as a trusted network. The impact of this advisory is more important if you have the Vitest addon installed and are using an old version of Vitest.\n\nYou are not impacted if:\n\n- You run a dev server in an environment that other devices on your network cannot reach (e.g. a container that does not publish the Storybook port, or publishes it only on `127.0.0.1`)\n- You run a dev server whilst connected to a trusted local network\n- You serve a built version of Storybook on your machine\n\n## Recommended actions\n\n### Upgrade Storybook\n\nStorybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur. \n\nUpgrade to a patched version listed below before running `storybook dev` again. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix.\n\n- 11.0.0-alpha.6\n- 10.6.2\n- 9.1.21\n- 8.6.19\n\n### Review potentially breaking changes\n\nDue to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users\u0027 workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, this document explains how to fall back to the previous behavior.\n\n#### Storybook now only listens on `127.0.0.1` by default\n\nBy default, the Storybook dev server no longer binds to all network interfaces on your machine. It only binds to the loopback address `127.0.0.1`. You can still open it at `http://localhost:6006`. This prevents other devices on the same network from seeing your Storybook server.\n\nTo share a Storybook with others, consider publishing it to Chromatic (free). To share it on a LAN without exposing the dev server, build a static Storybook with `storybook build` and serve the output folder with any static file server.\n\nTo share a live Storybook running in dev mode, you can use the `--host` CLI option to bind to the LAN IP you want to share Storybook on, e.g. `storybook dev --host 192.168.0.110`. Host and origin validation stays enabled with this option. If you use `--host 0.0.0.0` instead, also set `core.allowedHosts` to the hostnames you will use. Without it, host and origin validation is disabled, and Storybook shows a warning and asks you to confirm before it starts.\n\nConsider using a firewall to restrict incoming packets to known colleague IPs, and avoid using `--host` on an untrusted WiFi network.\n\n#### The Vitest addon now disables `browser.api.allowWrite` and `browser.api.allowExec`\n\nStorybook no longer allows code running in Vitest Browser mode to write to the developer\u2019s machine or execute other processes. In the unlikely scenario that you rely on this capability in your tests, you can manually re-enable these APIs in your Vitest config.\n\n#### The `saveStoryRequest` event validates input more strictly\n\nStorybook strengthened input validation in `saveStoryRequest`, so addons and the Storybook UI can now only write serialized args and story titles. It is no longer possible to exploit input validation weaknesses to e.g. write `play` functions with a custom addon.\n\nIf you develop an addon that writes or edits files on users\u2019 behalf, reach out to the Storybook team to get advice on security best practice.\n\n## Disclosure timeline\n\nOn August 19th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing that the WebSocket token can be stolen by an attacker sharing a LAN with a Storybook dev server.\n\nThe disclosure identified several actions an attacker can do. An attacker can bypass input validation to write a payload in a story file.\n\nThey can then trigger a test run via the WebSocket. If the Vitest addon is installed, the payload can exploit a Vitest API to write other files, with more exploit logic to the user\u2019s filesystem.\n\nDepending on the exploit content, where the file is written, and what software the developer uses, that exploit could then be executed.",
"id": "GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77",
"modified": "2026-10-22T16:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T16:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/security/advisories/GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/pull/36726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/243c06bf8f1e2f09446c44868ea100261e1374da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/3be03ec6f11f4616471cebc3fc65c13e1bf8c178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/5540f03b209cc56c66f56a9c7cb4b2ee5b883ce5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/a9ef9345d73224c73e0b81dc2701ec5b465ea9bb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/d9b09e332510a88689c71ecc081bbbc2d072476e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/commit/df3fed468c9b4830605f00068c4bc6b7e1e215ed"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/releases/tag/v10.6.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/releases/tag/v11.0.0-alpha.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/releases/tag/v8.6.19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/storybookjs/storybook/releases/tag/v9.1.21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Storybook dev server vulnerable to code injection from the local network"
}
GHSA-PX8R-9QV3-6525
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-06 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-08 18:31Directory Traversal vulnerability in Jeewms v.3.7 and before allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the cgformTemplateController component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27765"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-05T23:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in Jeewms v.3.7 and before allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the cgformTemplateController component.",
"id": "GHSA-px8r-9qv3-6525",
"modified": "2024-08-08T18:31:18Z",
"published": "2024-03-06T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/erzhongxmu/JEEWMS/issues/I8YN90"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PX9H-X66R-8MPC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-13 16:29 – Updated: 2021-08-25 21:08Impact
Access to sensitive information available from classpath.
Patches
Patched version: 1.6.7 and 2.8.2
Commit 1.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009
Commit 2.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/c81479de67036993f406ccdec23990b44b0bec32
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
References
Latest 1.x version: 1.6.6
Arbitrary class path resource access 1
When sharing a File System directory as in:
assets("/static/**", Paths.get("static"));
The class path is also searched for the file (org.jooby.handlers.AssetHandler.loader):
jooby/AssetHandler.java at 1.x · jooby-project/jooby · GitHub
private static Loader loader(final Path basedir, final ClassLoader classloader) {
if (Files.exists(basedir)) {
return name -> {
Path path = basedir.resolve(name).normalize();
if (Files.exists(path) && path.startsWith(basedir)) {
try {
return path.toUri().toURL();
} catch (MalformedURLException x) {
// shh
}
}
return classloader.getResource(name);
};
}
return classloader::getResource;
}
If we send /static/WEB-INF/web.xml it will fail to load it from the file system but will go into classloader.getResource(name) where name equals /WEB-INF/web.xml so will succeed and return the requested file. This way we can get any configuration file or even the application class files
If assets are configured for a certain extension we can still bypass it. eg:
assets("/static/**/*.js", Paths.get("static"));
We can send:
http://localhost:8080/static/io/yiss/App.class.js
Arbitrary class path resource access 2
This vulnerability also affects assets configured to access resources from the root of the class path. eg:
assets("/static/**");
In this case we can traverse static by sending:
http://localhost:8080/static/..%252fio/yiss/App.class
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in jooby * Email us at support@jooby.io
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.jooby:jooby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jooby:jooby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7647"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-12T20:27:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAccess to sensitive information available from classpath. \n\n### Patches\nPatched version: 1.6.7 and 2.8.2\n\nCommit 1.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009\n\nCommit 2.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/c81479de67036993f406ccdec23990b44b0bec32\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### References\n\nLatest 1.x version: 1.6.6\n\n#### Arbitrary class path resource access 1\nWhen sharing a *File System* directory as in:\n\n``` java\nassets(\"/static/**\", Paths.get(\"static\"));\n```\n\nThe class path is also searched for the file (`org.jooby.handlers.AssetHandler.loader`):\n[jooby/AssetHandler.java at 1.x \u00b7 jooby-project/jooby \u00b7 GitHub](https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/blob/1.x/jooby/src/main/java/org/jooby/handlers/AssetHandler.java)\n\n``` java\n private static Loader loader(final Path basedir, final ClassLoader classloader) {\n if (Files.exists(basedir)) {\n return name -\u003e {\n Path path = basedir.resolve(name).normalize();\n if (Files.exists(path) \u0026\u0026 path.startsWith(basedir)) {\n try {\n return path.toUri().toURL();\n } catch (MalformedURLException x) {\n // shh\n }\n }\n return classloader.getResource(name);\n };\n }\n return classloader::getResource;\n }\n```\n\nIf we send `/static/WEB-INF/web.xml` it will fail to load it from the file system but will go into `classloader.getResource(name)` where name equals `/WEB-INF/web.xml` so will succeed and return the requested file. This way we can get any configuration file or even the application class files\n\nIf assets are configured for a certain extension we can still bypass it. eg:\n\n```java\nassets(\"/static/**/*.js\", Paths.get(\"static\"));\n```\n\nWe can send:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/static/io/yiss/App.class.js\n```\n\n#### Arbitrary class path resource access 2\nThis vulnerability also affects assets configured to access resources from the root of the class path. eg:\n\n```java\nassets(\"/static/**\");\n```\n\nIn this case we can traverse `static` by sending:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/static/..%252fio/yiss/App.class\n```\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [jooby](https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/issues)\n* Email us at [support@jooby.io](mailto:support@jooby.io)",
"id": "GHSA-px9h-x66r-8mpc",
"modified": "2021-08-25T21:08:32Z",
"published": "2020-05-13T16:29:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/security/advisories/GHSA-px9h-x66r-8mpc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-IOJOOBY-568806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-IOJOOBY-568806,"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGJOOBY-568807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGJOOBY-568807,"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "path traversal in Jooby"
}
GHSA-PX9P-PQ43-98FR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-12 21:31IBM i Access Client Solutions 1.1.2.0 through 1.1.9.13 is vulnerable to zip slip path traversal exploit when importing a configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T21:17:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM i Access Client Solutions 1.1.2.0 through 1.1.9.13 is vulnerable to zip slip path traversal exploit when importing a configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-px9p-pq43-98fr",
"modified": "2026-08-12T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-12T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7282954"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PXCC-8665-PHX8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 22:29 – Updated: 2026-06-26 22:29Summary
YARD's static cache lookup reads a request path before the router's path cleanup runs. When a server is configured with a document root, a traversal path such as /../yard-cache-secret.html is joined against that root and can return a readable sibling .html file outside the intended static tree.
The potential security risk seems low, as only html-ending files can be read, but still the risk of reading arbitrary html files is a confiendtiality issue in itself, which is why we decided to report. Please let us know if this is out of your project's scope.
Details
The --docroot CLI option stores the configured directory in server_options[:DocumentRoot] at lib/yard/cli/server.rb:198, and adapter initialization copies that value into adapter.document_root at lib/yard/server/adapter.rb:76. For Rack requests, RackAdapter#call builds a request object from the Rack environment at lib/yard/server/rack_adapter.rb:58 and passes it to router.call(request) at lib/yard/server/rack_adapter.rb:60. Router#call then stores the incoming request at lib/yard/server/router.rb:55 and invokes check_static_cache before normal routing at lib/yard/server/router.rb:56. Inside check_static_cache, the only initial guard is that adapter.document_root is present at lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:35; the cache path is built from File.join(adapter.document_root, request.path.sub(/\.html$/, '') + '.html') at lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:36, without cleaning .. components first. If that resolved path is a regular file, File.file? accepts it at lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:38 and the file bytes are returned as a 200 HTML response at lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:40. The later route sanitizer in final_options uses File.cleanpath(...).gsub(...) at lib/yard/server/router.rb:181 and lib/yard/server/router.rb:182, but a static-cache hit returns before that code is reached.
PoC
bash ./poc/run.sh
expected output:
run 1: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint='YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL'
run 2: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint='YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL'
run 3: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint='YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL'
The YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL fingerprint is emitted only after the PoC observes a 200 static-cache response whose body contains the sibling file outside the configured document root. A setup failure, syntax failure, or cache miss would not print this oracle and would not demonstrate this traversal read.
Impact
A remote unauthenticated HTTP client who can reach a YARD documentation server with DocumentRoot/--docroot enabled can request .html paths containing parent-directory components and receive readable matching files outside the configured document root. The required guards are narrow: adapter.document_root must be set, the traversed target must exist as a regular readable file, and the target must be reachable through the implementation's forced .html suffix. Those requests bypass the later final_options path cleanup because the cache check runs first. The resulting severity class is information disclosure: response bodies can contain off-root .html file contents, but this path does not show write access, code execution, or arbitrary files without the .html constraint.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "yard"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.44"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49342"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T22:29:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T20:16:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nYARD\u0027s static cache lookup reads a request path before the router\u0027s path cleanup runs. When a server is configured with a document root, a traversal path such as `/../yard-cache-secret.html` is joined against that root and can return a readable sibling `.html` file outside the intended static tree. \n\nThe potential security risk seems low, as only html-ending files can be read, but still the risk of reading arbitrary html files is a confiendtiality issue in itself, which is why we decided to report. Please let us know if this is out of your project\u0027s scope.\n\n### Details\nThe `--docroot` CLI option stores the configured directory in `server_options[:DocumentRoot]` at `lib/yard/cli/server.rb:198`, and adapter initialization copies that value into `adapter.document_root` at `lib/yard/server/adapter.rb:76`. For Rack requests, `RackAdapter#call` builds a request object from the Rack environment at `lib/yard/server/rack_adapter.rb:58` and passes it to `router.call(request)` at `lib/yard/server/rack_adapter.rb:60`. `Router#call` then stores the incoming request at `lib/yard/server/router.rb:55` and invokes `check_static_cache` before normal routing at `lib/yard/server/router.rb:56`. Inside `check_static_cache`, the only initial guard is that `adapter.document_root` is present at `lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:35`; the cache path is built from `File.join(adapter.document_root, request.path.sub(/\\.html$/, \u0027\u0027) + \u0027.html\u0027)` at `lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:36`, without cleaning `..` components first. If that resolved path is a regular file, `File.file?` accepts it at `lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:38` and the file bytes are returned as a `200` HTML response at `lib/yard/server/static_caching.rb:40`. The later route sanitizer in `final_options` uses `File.cleanpath(...).gsub(...)` at `lib/yard/server/router.rb:181` and `lib/yard/server/router.rb:182`, but a static-cache hit returns before that code is reached.\n\n### PoC\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28185421/poc.zip)\n\n```bash\nbash ./poc/run.sh\n```\nexpected output:\n```text\nrun 1: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint=\u0027YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL\u0027\nrun 2: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint=\u0027YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL\u0027\nrun 3: exit=0 timed_out=False duration=0.08s matched=True phase=oracle fingerprint=\u0027YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL\u0027\n```\n\nThe `YARD_STATIC_CACHE_PATH_TRAVERSAL` fingerprint is emitted only after the PoC observes a `200` static-cache response whose body contains the sibling file outside the configured document root. A setup failure, syntax failure, or cache miss would not print this oracle and would not demonstrate this traversal read.\n\n### Impact\nA remote unauthenticated HTTP client who can reach a YARD documentation server with `DocumentRoot`/`--docroot` enabled can request `.html` paths containing parent-directory components and receive readable matching files outside the configured document root. The required guards are narrow: `adapter.document_root` must be set, the traversed target must exist as a regular readable file, and the target must be reachable through the implementation\u0027s forced `.html` suffix. Those requests bypass the later `final_options` path cleanup because the cache check runs first. The resulting severity class is information disclosure: response bodies can contain off-root `.html` file contents, but this path does not show write access, code execution, or arbitrary files without the `.html` constraint.",
"id": "GHSA-pxcc-8665-phx8",
"modified": "2026-06-26T22:29:29Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T22:29:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lsegal/yard/security/advisories/GHSA-pxcc-8665-phx8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lsegal/yard/commit/f78c19f0dd33a407085b4ed181bb60c0aa0078b4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lsegal/yard"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "YARD static cache reads raw traversal paths before router sanitization"
}
GHSA-PXCM-P7GG-3VMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-02 09:32 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The LA-Studio Element Kit for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.8.1 via the 'map_style' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5349"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-02T05:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The LA-Studio Element Kit for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.8.1 via the \u0027map_style\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-pxcm-p7gg-3vmx",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:30Z",
"published": "2024-07-02T09:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5349"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3108501/lastudio-element-kit/trunk/includes/addons/google-maps.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2e29a67b-2b67-4cd5-a5ae-a931900c75cd?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PXCW-HX23-FX3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:01 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:01Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the management console in Symantec Messaging Gateway (SMG) 9.5.x allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) logFile parameter in a logs action to brightmail/export or (2) localBackupFileSelection parameter in an APPLIANCE restoreSource action to brightmail/admin/restore/download.do.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-4347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-12-05T11:57:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the management console in Symantec Messaging Gateway (SMG) 9.5.x allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) logFile parameter in a logs action to brightmail/export or (2) localBackupFileSelection parameter in an APPLIANCE restoreSource action to brightmail/admin/restore/download.do.",
"id": "GHSA-pxcw-hx23-fx3r",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:01:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:01:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-4347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/56789"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory\u0026pvid=security_advisory\u0026year=2012\u0026suid=20120827_00"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.