CWE-180
AllowedIncorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The product validates input before it is canonicalized, which prevents the product from detecting data that becomes invalid after the canonicalization step.
51 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CHQ7-94J8-CJ28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 21:30Summary
Jupyter Enterprise Gateway has a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root).
This can be bypassed. It is possible to launch kernels with a prohibited UID and/or GID by using a specially crafted KERNEL_UID or KERNEL_GID value.
The feature is described in the documentation:
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L103-L107
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L88-L92
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/deploy-kubernetes.md?plain=1#L769
Details
The prohibited_uids and prohibited_uids are set based of the OS env var EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS and EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS, and default to the string 0.
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L29-L30
The checks https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L113 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L119 look for the user supplied KERNEL_UID / KERNEL_GID string in the prohibited_uids / prohibited_gids strings. These checks can be bypassed by including whitespace, for example the string 0 (trailing space).
The user supplied string is used in the Kubernetes manifest at https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L35 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L38 where they are parsed as an integer in the Jinja2 template - which will ignore the whitespace.
PoC
How it is meant to work
Trying 0 gets denied, as expected.
xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL_POD_NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL_UID": "0", "KERNEL_GID": "0"}'
HTTP/1.1 403 Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!
Content-Length: 94
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:57:09 GMT
Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
{
"reason": "Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!",
"message": ""
}
Exploit bypassing the checks
Using 0 with a trailing space, bypasses the check.
xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL_POD_NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL_UID": "0 ", "KERNEL_GID": "0 "}'
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Length: 172
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:15:19 GMT
Location: /api/kernels/17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40
Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
{
"id": "17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40",
"name": "python_kubernetes",
"last_activity": "2025-07-14T14:15:21.468155Z",
"execution_state": "starting",
"connections": 0
}
The pod is successfully scheduled.
Inspecting the container we can see it is running as root:
kubectl exec -it pod/bdawg -- bash
(base) root@bdawg3:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)
If we had not supplied the KERNEL_UID / KERNEL_GID the container would have been running as UID:GID 1000:100 (jovyan:users).
Impact
This input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a hostPath R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.
Organisations running Jupyter Enterprise Gateway to host Jupyter Kernels on at least Kubernetes clusters (I've tested this), and possibly on any other supported container orchestration systems or systems that utilise the KERNEL_UID and KERNEL_GID variables with the EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS and EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS feature.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyter_enterprise_gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:30:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nJupyter Enterprise Gateway has a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root).\nThis can be bypassed. It is possible to launch kernels with a prohibited UID and/or GID by using a specially crafted `KERNEL_UID` or `KERNEL_GID` value.\n\nThe feature is described in the documentation: \n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L103-L107\n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L88-L92\n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/deploy-kubernetes.md?plain=1#L769\n\n### Details\n\nThe `prohibited_uids` and `prohibited_uids` are set based of the OS env var `EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS` and `EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS`, and default to the string `0`.\n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L29-L30\n\nThe checks https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L113 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L119 look for the user supplied `KERNEL_UID` / `KERNEL_GID` string in the `prohibited_uids` / `prohibited_gids` strings. These checks can be bypassed by including whitespace, for example the string `0 ` (trailing space).\n\nThe user supplied string is used in the Kubernetes manifest at https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L35 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L38 where they are parsed as an integer in the Jinja2 template - which will ignore the whitespace.\n\n### PoC\n\n\n#### How it is meant to work\n\nTrying `0` gets denied, as expected.\n\n```bash\nxh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:=\u0027{\"KERNEL_POD_NAME\":\"bdawg\", \"KERNEL_UID\": \"0\", \"KERNEL_GID\": \"0\"}\u0027\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 403 Kernel\u0027s UID value of \u00270\u0027 has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!\nContent-Length: 94\nContent-Type: application/json\nDate: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:57:09 GMT\nServer: TornadoServer/6.4.1\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n```\n\n```json\n{\n \"reason\": \"Kernel\u0027s UID value of \u00270\u0027 has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!\",\n \"message\": \"\"\n}\n```\n\n#### Exploit bypassing the checks\n\nUsing `0 ` with a trailing space, bypasses the check.\n\n```bash\nxh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:=\u0027{\"KERNEL_POD_NAME\":\"bdawg\", \"KERNEL_UID\": \"0 \", \"KERNEL_GID\": \"0 \"}\u0027\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 201 Created\nContent-Length: 172\nContent-Type: application/json\nDate: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:15:19 GMT\nLocation: /api/kernels/17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40\nServer: TornadoServer/6.4.1\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n```\n\n```\n{\n \"id\": \"17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40\",\n \"name\": \"python_kubernetes\",\n \"last_activity\": \"2025-07-14T14:15:21.468155Z\",\n \"execution_state\": \"starting\",\n \"connections\": 0\n}\n```\n\nThe pod is successfully scheduled.\n\nInspecting the container we can see it is running as `root`:\n\n```bash\nkubectl exec -it pod/bdawg -- bash\n```\n\n```\n(base) root@bdawg3:~# id\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)\n```\n\nIf we had not supplied the `KERNEL_UID` / `KERNEL_GID` the container would have been running as UID:GID `1000:100` (`jovyan:users`).\n\n### Impact\n\nThis input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a `hostPath` R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.\n\nOrganisations running Jupyter Enterprise Gateway to host Jupyter Kernels on at least Kubernetes clusters (I\u0027ve tested this), and possibly on any other supported container orchestration systems or systems that utilise the `KERNEL_UID` and `KERNEL_GID` variables with the `EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS` and `EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS` feature.",
"id": "GHSA-chq7-94j8-cj28",
"modified": "2026-06-03T21:30:10Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T21:30:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-chq7-94j8-cj28"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/releases/tag/v3.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jupyter Enterprise Gateway: ContainerProcessProxy._enforce_prohibited_ids Bypass"
}
GHSA-F3MV-W3V5-88QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-21 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-05 00:00A vulnerability in multiple Atlassian products allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to bypass Servlet Filters used by first and third party apps. The impact depends on which filters are used by each app, and how the filters are used. This vulnerability can result in authentication bypass and cross-site scripting. Atlassian has released updates that fix the root cause of this vulnerability, but has not exhaustively enumerated all potential consequences of this vulnerability. Atlassian Bamboo versions are affected before 8.0.9, from 8.1.0 before 8.1.8, and from 8.2.0 before 8.2.4. Atlassian Bitbucket versions are affected before 7.6.16, from 7.7.0 before 7.17.8, from 7.18.0 before 7.19.5, from 7.20.0 before 7.20.2, from 7.21.0 before 7.21.2, and versions 8.0.0 and 8.1.0. Atlassian Confluence versions are affected before 7.4.17, from 7.5.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and version 7.21.0. Atlassian Crowd versions are affected before 4.3.8, from 4.4.0 before 4.4.2, and version 5.0.0. Atlassian Fisheye and Crucible versions before 4.8.10 are affected. Atlassian Jira versions are affected before 8.13.22, from 8.14.0 before 8.20.10, and from 8.21.0 before 8.22.4. Atlassian Jira Service Management versions are affected before 4.13.22, from 4.14.0 before 4.20.10, and from 4.21.0 before 4.22.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26136"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-20T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in multiple Atlassian products allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to bypass Servlet Filters used by first and third party apps. The impact depends on which filters are used by each app, and how the filters are used. This vulnerability can result in authentication bypass and cross-site scripting. Atlassian has released updates that fix the root cause of this vulnerability, but has not exhaustively enumerated all potential consequences of this vulnerability. Atlassian Bamboo versions are affected before 8.0.9, from 8.1.0 before 8.1.8, and from 8.2.0 before 8.2.4. Atlassian Bitbucket versions are affected before 7.6.16, from 7.7.0 before 7.17.8, from 7.18.0 before 7.19.5, from 7.20.0 before 7.20.2, from 7.21.0 before 7.21.2, and versions 8.0.0 and 8.1.0. Atlassian Confluence versions are affected before 7.4.17, from 7.5.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and version 7.21.0. Atlassian Crowd versions are affected before 4.3.8, from 4.4.0 before 4.4.2, and version 5.0.0. Atlassian Fisheye and Crucible versions before 4.8.10 are affected. Atlassian Jira versions are affected before 8.13.22, from 8.14.0 before 8.20.10, and from 8.21.0 before 8.22.4. Atlassian Jira Service Management versions are affected before 4.13.22, from 4.14.0 before 4.20.10, and from 4.21.0 before 4.22.4.",
"id": "GHSA-f3mv-w3v5-88qp",
"modified": "2022-08-05T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-07-21T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BAM-21795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BSERV-13370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CRUC-8541"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CWD-5815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/FE-7410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JSDSERVER-11863"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F7VP-7XGX-4W4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:05 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:05Impact
SetCookie::matchesDomain() gives every subdomain of a cookie Domain that cookie unless it recognizes the Domain as an IP literal or a numeric host, and it decides that from the domain's own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. On 7.15, hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.0x1 go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as 127.0.0.1, so closing them completes the rule GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w (CVE-2026-59883) set out to establish, which cited the WHATWG IPv4 parser and so already admitted a 0x part. A percent-escaped Domain keeps that scope on both branches for a different reason: percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so 192.168.0.%31 and 127.0.0.1%2e are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before it resolves and reads them as 192.168.0.1 and 127.0.0.1. The escape must fall in the rightmost label on 8.0.0, which already catches a decimal, octal or 0x part there, but not on 7.15, where %31%32%37.0.0.0x1 also reads as 127.0.0.1; 8.0.0 is affected in the percent spelling alone.
Both directions of the defect are reproduced over a real socket. A cookie stored for Domain=0x7f000001 is placed in the Cookie header of a request to evil.0x7f000001, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from evil.0x7f000001 setting Domain=0x7f000001 is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state.
Exploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in it. No public DNS delegation provides such a name, so the exposure is to private, split-horizon and container zones. Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookies, that keep a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or that address origins only by ordinary names are not affected.
Patches
This is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, which hold a cookie Domain containing a % byte to an exact match against the request host. 7.15.2 additionally holds to an exact match a Domain whose every dot-separated part is decimal, octal or hexadecimal, a rule wide enough that 0x100000000, a name to libcurl, loses subdomain matching too; 8.0.0 already recognizes a 0x-prefixed rightmost label. One class stays open: an IDN-capable transport reads a fullwidth-digit Domain such as 127.0.0.1 as 127.0.0.1 while Guzzle matches it by suffix, and these patches do not close that. Versions before 7.15.2 and version 8.0.0 are affected, 8.0.0 in the percent spelling alone.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, do not share one CookieJar between an origin addressed by a numeric or percent-escaped spelling and any other host ending in that spelling. Use a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or address such an origin by its canonical dotted-decimal form, writing 127.0.0.1, which released versions already hold to an exact match, rather than 0x7f000001 or 127.0.0.%31. Rejecting a request URI host that contains a percent escape, before you hand the URI to Guzzle and on every redirect hop, closes that spelling, and rejecting a non-ASCII byte closes the fullwidth one, but nothing outside the jar closes the hexadecimal one.
Do not use filter_var() with FILTER_VALIDATE_IP to decide whether a domain is an address: it rejects 0x7f000001 and 127.0.0.%31, which a transport reads as 127.0.0.1.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.15.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`SetCookie::matchesDomain()` gives every subdomain of a cookie `Domain` that cookie unless it recognizes the `Domain` as an IP literal or a numeric host, and it decides that from the domain\u0027s own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. On `7.15`, hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as `0x7f000001` and `0177.0.0.0x1` go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as `127.0.0.1`, so closing them completes the rule `GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w` (`CVE-2026-59883`) set out to establish, which cited the WHATWG IPv4 parser and so already admitted a `0x` part. A percent-escaped `Domain` keeps that scope on both branches for a different reason: percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so `192.168.0.%31` and `127.0.0.1%2e` are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before it resolves and reads them as `192.168.0.1` and `127.0.0.1`. The escape must fall in the rightmost label on `8.0.0`, which already catches a decimal, octal or `0x` part there, but not on `7.15`, where `%31%32%37.0.0.0x1` also reads as `127.0.0.1`; `8.0.0` is affected in the percent spelling alone.\n\nBoth directions of the defect are reproduced over a real socket. A cookie stored for `Domain=0x7f000001` is placed in the `Cookie` header of a request to `evil.0x7f000001`, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from `evil.0x7f000001` setting `Domain=0x7f000001` is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state.\n\nExploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in it. No public DNS delegation provides such a name, so the exposure is to private, split-horizon and container zones. Applications that do not use Guzzle\u0027s cookies, that keep a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or that address origins only by ordinary names are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in `7.15.2` and `8.0.1`, which hold a cookie `Domain` containing a `%` byte to an exact match against the request host. `7.15.2` additionally holds to an exact match a `Domain` whose every dot-separated part is decimal, octal or hexadecimal, a rule wide enough that `0x100000000`, a name to libcurl, loses subdomain matching too; `8.0.0` already recognizes a `0x`-prefixed rightmost label. One class stays open: an IDN-capable transport reads a fullwidth-digit `Domain` such as `127.0.0.\uff11` as `127.0.0.1` while Guzzle matches it by suffix, and these patches do not close that. Versions before `7.15.2` and version `8.0.0` are affected, `8.0.0` in the percent spelling alone.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, do not share one `CookieJar` between an origin addressed by a numeric or percent-escaped spelling and any other host ending in that spelling. Use a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or address such an origin by its canonical dotted-decimal form, writing `127.0.0.1`, which released versions already hold to an exact match, rather than `0x7f000001` or `127.0.0.%31`. Rejecting a request URI host that contains a percent escape, before you hand the URI to Guzzle and on every redirect hop, closes that spelling, and rejecting a non-ASCII byte closes the fullwidth one, but nothing outside the jar closes the hexadecimal one.\n\nDo not use `filter_var()` with `FILTER_VALIDATE_IP` to decide whether a domain is an address: it rejects `0x7f000001` and `127.0.0.%31`, which a transport reads as `127.0.0.1`.",
"id": "GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r",
"modified": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/3aeea0406aab88cbbd86531313d7cebf8ae149a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/744101956d78b7c1384d0cbf379db13e859167bf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/8.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Guzzle: Noncanonical cookie domain keeps subdomain scope"
}
GHSA-FPJ5-PCGC-34G7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-21 00:00 – Updated: 2024-10-03 18:30A vulnerability in multiple Atlassian products allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause additional Servlet Filters to be invoked when the application processes requests or responses. Atlassian has confirmed and fixed the only known security issue associated with this vulnerability: Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) bypass. Sending a specially crafted HTTP request can invoke the Servlet Filter used to respond to CORS requests, resulting in a CORS bypass. An attacker that can trick a user into requesting a malicious URL can access the vulnerable application with the victim’s permissions. Atlassian Bamboo versions are affected before 8.0.9, from 8.1.0 before 8.1.8, and from 8.2.0 before 8.2.4. Atlassian Bitbucket versions are affected before 7.6.16, from 7.7.0 before 7.17.8, from 7.18.0 before 7.19.5, from 7.20.0 before 7.20.2, from 7.21.0 before 7.21.2, and versions 8.0.0 and 8.1.0. Atlassian Confluence versions are affected before 7.4.17, from 7.5.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and version 7.21.0. Atlassian Crowd versions are affected before 4.3.8, from 4.4.0 before 4.4.2, and version 5.0.0. Atlassian Fisheye and Crucible versions before 4.8.10 are affected. Atlassian Jira versions are affected before 8.13.22, from 8.14.0 before 8.20.10, and from 8.21.0 before 8.22.4. Atlassian Jira Service Management versions are affected before 4.13.22, from 4.14.0 before 4.20.10, and from 4.21.0 before 4.22.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-20T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in multiple Atlassian products allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause additional Servlet Filters to be invoked when the application processes requests or responses. Atlassian has confirmed and fixed the only known security issue associated with this vulnerability: Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) bypass. Sending a specially crafted HTTP request can invoke the Servlet Filter used to respond to CORS requests, resulting in a CORS bypass. An attacker that can trick a user into requesting a malicious URL can access the vulnerable application with the victim\u2019s permissions. Atlassian Bamboo versions are affected before 8.0.9, from 8.1.0 before 8.1.8, and from 8.2.0 before 8.2.4. Atlassian Bitbucket versions are affected before 7.6.16, from 7.7.0 before 7.17.8, from 7.18.0 before 7.19.5, from 7.20.0 before 7.20.2, from 7.21.0 before 7.21.2, and versions 8.0.0 and 8.1.0. Atlassian Confluence versions are affected before 7.4.17, from 7.5.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and version 7.21.0. Atlassian Crowd versions are affected before 4.3.8, from 4.4.0 before 4.4.2, and version 5.0.0. Atlassian Fisheye and Crucible versions before 4.8.10 are affected. Atlassian Jira versions are affected before 8.13.22, from 8.14.0 before 8.20.10, and from 8.21.0 before 8.22.4. Atlassian Jira Service Management versions are affected before 4.13.22, from 4.14.0 before 4.20.10, and from 4.21.0 before 4.22.4.",
"id": "GHSA-fpj5-pcgc-34g7",
"modified": "2024-10-03T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2022-07-21T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BAM-21795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BSERV-13370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CRUC-8541"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CWD-5815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/FE-7410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JSDSERVER-11863"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G966-83W7-6W38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-12 15:29 – Updated: 2026-02-12 22:07Summary
FrankenPHP’s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding .php) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path.
Because strings.ToLower() in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., Ⱥ expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect SCRIPT_NAME and SCRIPT_FILENAME, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI.
Details
The vulnerability resides in the splitPos() function and its usage within splitCgiPath(). The logic attempts to find the script extension (e.g., .php) in a case-insensitive manner by lowercasing the path:
lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
idx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))
return idx + len(split)
The issue is that the returned idx represents a byte offset within lowerPath. However, splitCgiPath() uses this index to slice the original path:
fc.docURI = path[:splitPos]
fc.pathInfo = path[splitPos:]
fc.scriptName = strings.TrimSuffix(path, fc.pathInfo)
fc.scriptFilename = sanitizedPathJoin(fc.documentRoot, fc.scriptName)
This logic relies on the assumption that len(strings.ToLower(path)) == len(path). This assumption is false for certain Unicode characters. For example, the character Ⱥ (U+023A) requires 2 bytes in UTF-8 (0xC8 0xBA), but its lowercase equivalent ⱥ (U+2C65) requires 3 bytes (0xE2 0xB1 0xA5).
If the path contains such characters before the .php extension, the index calculated on lowerPath will be larger than the corresponding visual point in the original path. When applied to the original path, the split occurs at the wrong byte offset. This can cause the server to treat a larger portion of the path as the script name, effectively allowing an attacker to manipulate SCRIPT_FILENAME.
PoC
The following Go program demonstrates the discrepancy between the byte index in the lowercased string versus the original string.
- Save the following as
poc.go:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
func splitPos(path string, split string) int {
lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
idx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))
if idx < 0 {
return -1
}
return idx + len(split)
}
func main() {
// U+023A: Ⱥ (UTF-8: C8 BA). Lowercase is ⱥ (UTF-8: E2 B1 A5), longer in bytes.
// We construct a path where the byte expansion shifts the index.
path := "/ȺȺȺȺshell.php.txt.php"
split := ".php"
pos := splitPos(path, split)
fmt.Printf("orig bytes=%d\n", len(path))
fmt.Printf("lower bytes=%d\n", len(strings.ToLower(path)))
fmt.Printf("splitPos=%d\n", pos)
// Current Unsafe Behavior:
fmt.Printf("orig[:pos] (Calculated Script)=%q\n", path[:pos])
fmt.Printf("orig[pos:] (Calculated PathInfo)=%q\n", path[pos:])
// Expected Safe Behavior:
want := strings.Index(path, split) + len(split)
fmt.Printf("expected splitPos=%d\n", want)
fmt.Printf("expected orig[:]=%q\n", path[:want])
}
- Run the PoC:
go run poc.go
- Output:
orig bytes=26
lower bytes=30
splitPos=22
orig[:pos]="/ȺȺȺȺshell.php.txt"
orig[pos:]=".php"
expected splitPos=18
expected orig[:]="/ȺȺȺȺshell.php"
In this example, FrankenPHP would identify /ȺȺȺȺshell.php.txt as the PHP script to execute, ignoring the fact that the actual file extension in the file system might be .txt.
Impact*
This is a Security Boundary Bypass and Path Confusion vulnerability.
In setups where users can upload files (e.g., avatars, text files) that are stored within the document root or a reachable path, an attacker can upload a file containing malicious PHP code with a safe extension (e.g., payload.txt). By crafting a request with specific Unicode characters, the attacker can force FrankenPHP to calculate the SCRIPT_FILENAME as ending in payload.txt, while the request appears to contain .php to the internal router logic.
This results in the execution of non-PHP files as PHP scripts, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Patched Versions
- This issue is fixed in FrankenPHP version 1.11.2.
Workarounds
- Ensure that user-uploaded files are stored outside of the public document root.
- Implement strict WAF rules to reject requests containing specific multi-byte Unicode characters in the URL path if an upgrade is not immediately possible.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dunglas/frankenphp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-12T15:29:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-12T20:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFrankenPHP\u2019s CGI path splitting logic improperly handles Unicode characters during case conversion. The logic computes the split index (for finding `.php`) on a lowercased copy of the request path but applies that byte index to the original path.\n\nBecause `strings.ToLower()` in Go can increase the byte length of certain UTF-8 characters (e.g., `\u023a` expands when lowercased), the computed index may not align with the correct position in the original string. This results in an incorrect `SCRIPT_NAME` and `SCRIPT_FILENAME`, potentially causing FrankenPHP to execute a file other than the one intended by the URI.\n\n### **Details**\n\nThe vulnerability resides in the `splitPos()` function and its usage within `splitCgiPath()`. The logic attempts to find the script extension (e.g., `.php`) in a case-insensitive manner by lowercasing the path:\n\n```go\nlowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)\nidx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))\nreturn idx + len(split)\n```\n\nThe issue is that the returned `idx` represents a byte offset within `lowerPath`. However, `splitCgiPath()` uses this index to slice the **original** `path`:\n\n```go\nfc.docURI = path[:splitPos]\nfc.pathInfo = path[splitPos:]\nfc.scriptName = strings.TrimSuffix(path, fc.pathInfo)\nfc.scriptFilename = sanitizedPathJoin(fc.documentRoot, fc.scriptName)\n```\n\nThis logic relies on the assumption that `len(strings.ToLower(path)) == len(path)`. This assumption is false for certain Unicode characters. For example, the character `\u023a` (U+023A) requires 2 bytes in UTF-8 (`0xC8 0xBA`), but its lowercase equivalent `\u2c65` (U+2C65) requires 3 bytes (`0xE2 0xB1 0xA5`).\n\nIf the path contains such characters before the `.php` extension, the index calculated on `lowerPath` will be larger than the corresponding visual point in the original `path`. When applied to the original path, the split occurs at the wrong byte offset. This can cause the server to treat a larger portion of the path as the script name, effectively allowing an attacker to manipulate `SCRIPT_FILENAME`.\n\n### **PoC**\n\nThe following Go program demonstrates the discrepancy between the byte index in the lowercased string versus the original string.\n\n1. Save the following as `poc.go`:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"strings\"\n)\n\nfunc splitPos(path string, split string) int {\n lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)\n idx := strings.Index(lowerPath, strings.ToLower(split))\n if idx \u003c 0 {\n return -1\n }\n return idx + len(split)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n // U+023A: \u023a (UTF-8: C8 BA). Lowercase is \u2c65 (UTF-8: E2 B1 A5), longer in bytes.\n // We construct a path where the byte expansion shifts the index.\n path := \"/\u023a\u023a\u023a\u023ashell.php.txt.php\"\n split := \".php\"\n\n pos := splitPos(path, split)\n\n fmt.Printf(\"orig bytes=%d\\n\", len(path))\n fmt.Printf(\"lower bytes=%d\\n\", len(strings.ToLower(path)))\n fmt.Printf(\"splitPos=%d\\n\", pos)\n\n // Current Unsafe Behavior:\n fmt.Printf(\"orig[:pos] (Calculated Script)=%q\\n\", path[:pos])\n fmt.Printf(\"orig[pos:] (Calculated PathInfo)=%q\\n\", path[pos:])\n\n // Expected Safe Behavior:\n want := strings.Index(path, split) + len(split)\n fmt.Printf(\"expected splitPos=%d\\n\", want)\n fmt.Printf(\"expected orig[:]=%q\\n\", path[:want])\n}\n```\n\n2. Run the PoC:\n\n```console\ngo run poc.go\n```\n\n3. **Output:**\n\n```text\norig bytes=26\nlower bytes=30\nsplitPos=22\norig[:pos]=\"/\u023a\u023a\u023a\u023ashell.php.txt\"\norig[pos:]=\".php\"\nexpected splitPos=18\nexpected orig[:]=\"/\u023a\u023a\u023a\u023ashell.php\"\n```\n\nIn this example, FrankenPHP would identify `/\u023a\u023a\u023a\u023ashell.php.txt` as the PHP script to execute, ignoring the fact that the actual file extension in the file system might be `.txt`.\n\n### Impact*\n\nThis is a **Security Boundary Bypass** and **Path Confusion** vulnerability.\n\nIn setups where users can upload files (e.g., avatars, text files) that are stored within the document root or a reachable path, an attacker can upload a file containing malicious PHP code with a safe extension (e.g., `payload.txt`). By crafting a request with specific Unicode characters, the attacker can force FrankenPHP to calculate the `SCRIPT_FILENAME` as ending in `payload.txt`, while the request appears to contain `.php` to the internal router logic.\n\nThis results in the execution of non-PHP files as PHP scripts, leading to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.\n\n### **Patched Versions**\n\n* This issue is fixed in FrankenPHP version **1.11.2**.\n\n### **Workarounds**\n\n* Ensure that user-uploaded files are stored outside of the public document root.\n* Implement strict WAF rules to reject requests containing specific multi-byte Unicode characters in the URL path if an upgrade is not immediately possible.",
"id": "GHSA-g966-83w7-6w38",
"modified": "2026-02-12T22:07:57Z",
"published": "2026-02-12T15:29:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/php/frankenphp/security/advisories/GHSA-g966-83w7-6w38"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/php/frankenphp/commit/04fdc0c1e8fde94e2c1ad86217e962c88d27c53e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/php/frankenphp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/php/frankenphp/releases/tag/v1.11.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FrankenPHP\u0027s unicode case-folding length expansion causes incorrect split_path index (SCRIPT_NAME/PATH_INFO confusion) in FrankenPHP"
}
GHSA-M9GQ-CMCJ-P62X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:31Varnish Cache before 8.0.1 and Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12, in certain unchecked req.url scenarios, mishandle URLs with a path of / for HTTP/1.1, potentially leading to cache poisoning or authentication bypass.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34475"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T20:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Varnish Cache before 8.0.1 and Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12, in certain unchecked req.url scenarios, mishandle URLs with a path of / for HTTP/1.1, potentially leading to cache poisoning or authentication bypass.",
"id": "GHSA-m9gq-cmcj-p62x",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34475"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vinyl-cache.org/security/VSV00018.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q4QF-9J86-F5MH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 18:44 – Updated: 2026-05-13 15:20Summary
Rack::Static#applicable_rules evaluates several header_rules types against the raw URL-encoded PATH_INFO, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that header_rules were intended to apply.
In deployments that rely on Rack::Static to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path.
Details
Rack::Static#applicable_rules matches rule types such as :fonts, Array, and Regexp directly against the incoming PATH_INFO. For example:
when :fonts
/\.(?:ttf|otf|eot|woff2|woff|svg)\z/.match?(path)
when Array
/\.(#{rule.join('|')})\z/.match?(path)
when Regexp
rule.match?(path)
These checks operate on the raw request path. If the request contains encoded characters such as %2E in place of ., the rule may fail to match even though the file path is later decoded and served successfully by the static file server.
For example, both of the following requests may resolve to the same file on disk:
/fonts/test.woff
/fonts/test%2Ewoff
but only the unencoded form may receive the headers configured through header_rules.
This creates a canonicalization mismatch between the path used for header policy decisions and the path ultimately used for file serving.
Impact
Applications that rely on Rack::Static header_rules to apply security-relevant headers to static files may be affected.
In affected deployments, an attacker can request an encoded variant of a static file path and receive the same file without the intended headers. Depending on how header_rules are used, this may bypass protections such as clickjacking defenses, content restrictions, or other response policies applied to static content.
The practical impact depends on the configured rules and the types of files being served. If header_rules are only used for non-security purposes such as caching, the issue may have limited security significance.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack that applies
header_rulesto a decoded path consistently with static file resolution. - Do not rely solely on
Rack::Staticheader_rulesfor security-critical headers where encoded path variants may reach the application. - Prefer setting security headers at the reverse proxy or web server layer so they apply consistently to both encoded and unencoded path forms.
- Normalize or reject encoded path variants for static content at the edge, where feasible.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0.beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-02T18:44:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T17:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Rack::Static#applicable_rules` evaluates several `header_rules` types against the raw URL-encoded `PATH_INFO`, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that `header_rules` were intended to apply.\n\nIn deployments that rely on `Rack::Static` to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Static#applicable_rules` matches rule types such as `:fonts`, `Array`, and `Regexp` directly against the incoming `PATH_INFO`. For example:\n\n```ruby\nwhen :fonts\n /\\.(?:ttf|otf|eot|woff2|woff|svg)\\z/.match?(path)\nwhen Array\n /\\.(#{rule.join(\u0027|\u0027)})\\z/.match?(path)\nwhen Regexp\n rule.match?(path)\n```\n\nThese checks operate on the raw request path. If the request contains encoded characters such as `%2E` in place of `.`, the rule may fail to match even though the file path is later decoded and served successfully by the static file server.\n\nFor example, both of the following requests may resolve to the same file on disk:\n\n```text\n/fonts/test.woff\n/fonts/test%2Ewoff\n```\n\nbut only the unencoded form may receive the headers configured through `header_rules`.\n\nThis creates a canonicalization mismatch between the path used for header policy decisions and the path ultimately used for file serving.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that rely on `Rack::Static` `header_rules` to apply security-relevant headers to static files may be affected.\n\nIn affected deployments, an attacker can request an encoded variant of a static file path and receive the same file without the intended headers. Depending on how `header_rules` are used, this may bypass protections such as clickjacking defenses, content restrictions, or other response policies applied to static content.\n\nThe practical impact depends on the configured rules and the types of files being served. If `header_rules` are only used for non-security purposes such as caching, the issue may have limited security significance.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack that applies `header_rules` to a decoded path consistently with static file resolution.\n* Do not rely solely on `Rack::Static` `header_rules` for security-critical headers where encoded path variants may reach the application.\n* Prefer setting security headers at the reverse proxy or web server layer so they apply consistently to both encoded and unencoded path forms.\n* Normalize or reject encoded path variants for static content at the edge, where feasible.",
"id": "GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh",
"modified": "2026-05-13T15:20:50Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T18:44:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34786"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2026-34786.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rack:: Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded paths"
}
GHSA-QCJM-VMRX-V935
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-29 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-29 15:30The cohttp package before 6.3.0 for OCaml allows directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-29T15:17:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The cohttp package before 6.3.0 for OCaml allows directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-qcjm-vmrx-v935",
"modified": "2026-08-29T15:30:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-29T15:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mirage/ocaml-cohttp/pull/1145"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/RE:M/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V2WJ-Q39Q-566R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-06 18:03 – Updated: 2026-04-07 22:16Summary
The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using
--hostorserver.hostconfig option) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by
server.fs.allow - the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by
server.fs.deny
Details
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by server.fs.deny (e.g., .env, *.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline are appended.
PoC
- Start the dev server:
pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort - Confirm that
server.fs.denyis enforced (expect 403):curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20 - Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200):
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39364"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T18:03:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T20:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe contents of files that are specified by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match the following conditions are affected:\n\n- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))\n- the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by [`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow)\n- the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)\n\n### Details\n\nOn the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by `server.fs.deny` (e.g., `.env`, `*.crt`) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as `?raw`, `?import\u0026raw`, or `?import\u0026url\u0026inline` are appended.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Start the dev server: `pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort`\n2. Confirm that `server.fs.deny` is enforced (expect 403): `curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20`\n \u003cimg width=\"3944\" height=\"1092\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecb9f2e0-e08f-4ac7-b194-e0f988c4cd4f\" /\u003e\n3. Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200):\n \u003cimg width=\"2014\" height=\"373\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76bc2a6a-44f4-4161-ae47-eab5ae0c04a8\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r",
"modified": "2026-04-07T22:16:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-06T18:03:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a9a3df299378d9cbc5f069e3536a369f8188c8ff"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries"
}
GHSA-V5MV-P594-2X33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:07 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:07Impact
In affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In http://127.0.0.%31/ the URI host is one filter_var() rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31.
An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. The cookie middleware extracts Set-Cookie against the URI Guzzle produced, not the authority contacted, so for a raw divergent URI the cookie is stored under the URI host as written. Where Guzzle rewrote that URI but left a divergent Host, or where the caller supplied one, the cookie is stored under the canonical name and replayed by ordinary later requests to it. With a third-party UriInterface, a host of blocked.example.com@127.0.0.1 reaches 127.0.0.1 through all three handlers and generates Authorization: Basic from userinfo the application never wrote.
Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. Applications that only fetch URIs they construct themselves are not affected, and an exact allowlist of canonical names ordinarily fails closed; the exposure is to denylists, private-range and IP-literal checks, and any check that treats an unresolvable name as safe. The raw Unicode class needs an IDNA transformation somewhere: either a libcurl built with IDN support or Guzzle's own idn_conversion, off by default on both branches, which rewrites the URI in Client::buildUri() before a handler sees it and leaves a prebuilt request's explicit Host as written, while a request the client builds derives that header from the rewritten URI and produces no divergence. Noncanonical numeric spellings such as 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.1 remain accepted after the patch and reach whatever the transport reads them as, loopback or a routable public host, and the cURL and stream handlers can differ, so a check comparing a host against an address as text stays bypassable. Guzzle does not offer SSRF protection, and neither cache poisoning nor cross-tenant compromise was established.
Patches
This is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, which validate the request host in all three built-in handlers before any network I/O. A URI host is rejected for a byte outside 0x21 to 0x7E, a percent escape, a URI authority delimiter, unbalanced brackets, or numeric-looking parts followed by a trailing dot. That last rule is deliberately conservative and also refuses out-of-range forms libcurl keeps as names, such as 256.0.0.1.. An explicit Host header must be printable ASCII, and on 7.15.2 free of percent escapes. The client also regenerates a derived Host when it rewrites the request URI. Versions before 7.15.2 and version 8.0.0 are affected.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, constrain the host yourself before handing a URI to Guzzle, and constrain any explicit Host header separately, on every redirect hop. The URI rule assumes $uri is a validated GuzzleHttp\Psr7\Uri, so re-parse a third-party UriInterface with new Uri((string) $uri) first.
$host = $uri->getHost();
if (
preg_match('/\A[\x21-\x7E]*\z/D', $host) !== 1
|| strpbrk($host, '%@/?#\\') !== false
|| substr($host, -1) === '.'
) {
throw new RuntimeException('Refusing to fetch this URI host.');
}
if (
preg_match('/\A[\x21-\x7E]*\z/D', $hostHeader) !== 1
|| strpos($hostHeader, '%') !== false
) {
throw new RuntimeException('Refusing to send this Host header.');
}
It differs from the patch in both directions: it refuses example.com., which the patch accepts, and it does not canonicalize 127.1 or 0x7f000001. Reparsing the URI separates a valid port from the host and rejects malformed bracket forms, so the snippet checks the host component alone. idn_conversion => true is not an access control, since IDNA maps 127。0。0。1 onto 127.0.0.1 and direct handler use bypasses it, and Uri::getHost() is not an SSRF boundary: it is the host as written, not the host a transport connects to. Where the destination matters, resolve the host and check the addresses, and use a separate cookie jar for untrusted origins.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.15.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-436",
"CWE-918",
"CWE-941"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T21:07:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application\u0027s checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle\u0027s own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts `Set-Cookie` against the URI Guzzle produced, not the authority contacted, so for a raw divergent URI the cookie is stored under the URI host as written. Where Guzzle rewrote that URI but left a divergent `Host`, or where the caller supplied one, the cookie is stored under the canonical name and replayed by ordinary later requests to it. With a third-party `UriInterface`, a host of `blocked.example.com@127.0.0.1` reaches `127.0.0.1` through all three handlers and generates `Authorization: Basic` from userinfo the application never wrote.\n\nExploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. Applications that only fetch URIs they construct themselves are not affected, and an exact allowlist of canonical names ordinarily fails closed; the exposure is to denylists, private-range and IP-literal checks, and any check that treats an unresolvable name as safe. The raw Unicode class needs an IDNA transformation somewhere: either a libcurl built with IDN support or Guzzle\u0027s own `idn_conversion`, off by default on both branches, which rewrites the URI in `Client::buildUri()` before a handler sees it and leaves a prebuilt request\u0027s explicit `Host` as written, while a request the client builds derives that header from the rewritten URI and produces no divergence. Noncanonical numeric spellings such as `127.1`, `2130706433`, `0x7f000001` and `0177.0.0.1` remain accepted after the patch and reach whatever the transport reads them as, loopback or a routable public host, and the cURL and stream handlers can differ, so a check comparing a host against an address as text stays bypassable. Guzzle does not offer SSRF protection, and neither cache poisoning nor cross-tenant compromise was established.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in `7.15.2` and `8.0.1`, which validate the request host in all three built-in handlers before any network I/O. A URI host is rejected for a byte outside `0x21` to `0x7E`, a percent escape, a URI authority delimiter, unbalanced brackets, or numeric-looking parts followed by a trailing dot. That last rule is deliberately conservative and also refuses out-of-range forms libcurl keeps as names, such as `256.0.0.1.`. An explicit `Host` header must be printable ASCII, and on `7.15.2` free of percent escapes. The client also regenerates a derived `Host` when it rewrites the request URI. Versions before `7.15.2` and version `8.0.0` are affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, constrain the host yourself before handing a URI to Guzzle, and constrain any explicit `Host` header separately, on every redirect hop. The URI rule assumes `$uri` is a validated `GuzzleHttp\\Psr7\\Uri`, so re-parse a third-party `UriInterface` with `new Uri((string) $uri)` first.\n\n```php\n$host = $uri-\u003egetHost();\n\nif (\n preg_match(\u0027/\\A[\\x21-\\x7E]*\\z/D\u0027, $host) !== 1\n || strpbrk($host, \u0027%@/?#\\\\\u0027) !== false\n || substr($host, -1) === \u0027.\u0027\n) {\n throw new RuntimeException(\u0027Refusing to fetch this URI host.\u0027);\n}\n\nif (\n preg_match(\u0027/\\A[\\x21-\\x7E]*\\z/D\u0027, $hostHeader) !== 1\n || strpos($hostHeader, \u0027%\u0027) !== false\n) {\n throw new RuntimeException(\u0027Refusing to send this Host header.\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nIt differs from the patch in both directions: it refuses `example.com.`, which the patch accepts, and it does not canonicalize `127.1` or `0x7f000001`. Reparsing the URI separates a valid port from the host and rejects malformed bracket forms, so the snippet checks the host component alone. `idn_conversion =\u003e true` is not an access control, since IDNA maps `\uff11\uff12\uff17\u3002\uff10\u3002\uff10\u3002\uff11` onto `127.0.0.1` and direct handler use bypasses it, and `Uri::getHost()` is not an SSRF boundary: it is the host as written, not the host a transport connects to. Where the destination matters, resolve the host and check the addresses, and use a separate cookie jar for untrusted origins.",
"id": "GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33",
"modified": "2026-08-03T21:07:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T21:07:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/3aeea0406aab88cbbd86531313d7cebf8ae149a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/744101956d78b7c1384d0cbf379db13e859167bf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/8.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks"
}
Mitigation MIT-20
Strategy: Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-3: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters
Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
CAPEC-71: Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.