CWE-129
AllowedImproper Validation of Array Index
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
873 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P8MF-QGVP-6754
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42Possible out of bounds while accessing global control elements due to race condition in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-22T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Possible out of bounds while accessing global control elements due to race condition in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice \u0026 Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking",
"id": "GHSA-p8mf-qgvp-6754",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/february-2021-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-P8QX-H547-FJW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 23:27 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:27Summary
SshBlockCipher implementations (AES-CBC, AES-CTR, 3DES-CBC, etc.) report needs_mac() == true, meaning they are documented/intended to always be paired with a separate integrity MAC. However, key-exchange negotiation only checks needs_mac() inside the fallback branch of MAC algorithm selection (used when no common MAC algorithm exists). If both peers' preferred MAC lists simply contain none and it is successfully negotiated through the normal selection path, nothing rejects pairing none with a cipher that requires a MAC. Once negotiated, a single crafted packet from either peer causes cipher::read() to shrink an already-allocated buffer below the number of bytes it is about to index, causing a Rust slice-index-out-of-range panic and killing that connection's task.
Details
In russh/src/cipher/mod.rs, read() for a block cipher:
1. Reads packet_length_to_read_for_block_length() bytes up front (16 bytes for any SshBlockCipher) into buffer.buffer.
2. Decrypts the first block to recover the plaintext packet-length field len.
3. Computes buffer.len = len + cipher.tag_len().
4. Calls buffer.buffer.resize(buffer.len + 4, 0).
5. Immediately indexes buffer.buffer[16..] (via the constant used for the first block read) to continue decrypting/reading the rest of the packet.
When the negotiated MAC is none, tag_len() == 0. If the attacker (or a MITM holding the session key, or simply the accepting peer testing a hostile client) sends a packet whose decrypted length field is 0, then buffer.len = 0 and resize(0 + 4, 0) shrinks the buffer that was already grown to 16 bytes in step 1 down to 4 bytes. The subsequent slice operation buffer.buffer[16..] then panics with range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4.
The file already defines a MINIMUM_PACKET_LEN constant, but it is only consulted on the write/padding side, never on the read path — so nothing prevents an incoming packet from declaring a length shorter than the bytes already buffered.
Negotiation gap: negotiation.rs's Select MAC-selection logic only special-cases needs_mac() when negotiation would otherwise fail (no common MAC), substituting none only if the cipher does not need one. It never re-validates the case where none is a common/successfully-negotiated MAC on both sides regardless of what the chosen cipher requires. So an application (or a malicious peer, since negotiation is attacker-influenced on one side) that includes none in its own preferred MAC list — while still allowing the default CTR/CBC cipher suite — ends up with an invalid, panic-inducing combination that the library itself should refuse.
PoC
- Configure one side's
Preferredconfig to includemac::NONEin the MAC list (this is a supported, non-default configuration exposed by the crate's publicPreferredAPI — used e.g. for legacy/interop compatibility), while leaving the default cipher list (which includesaes256-ctr/aes256-cbc) untouched. - Complete a normal key exchange; negotiation lands on
{cipher: aes*-ctr (or -cbc), mac: none}becausenoneis present and preferred/common on both sides, and nothing during negotiation rejects this pairing. - From the peer, send one transport packet whose decrypted packet-length field is
0(trivial to construct once the session keys are known to that peer, or for the peer that legitimately owns the connection to simply hand-craft, e.g. a modified client for testing). cipher::read()on the receiving side panics:range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4.- Because each connection is handled in its own
tokio::spawn'ed task (see the per-connectionselect!loop that calls intocipher::read()), the panic unwinds only that task by default, but it unconditionally terminates that SSH connection/session — a working, currently-unauthenticated, already-established connection is killed with no attacker interaction beyond the one crafted packet, and the check runs on every inbound packet including pre-auth ones.
Impact
Denial of service: a remote peer that can influence MAC preference negotiation (or a MITM in possession of the session key) can crash any individual SSH connection/session that ends up negotiating a block cipher together with mac=none, with a single crafted packet, pre-authentication. This does not affect the process as a whole (panic is scoped to that connection's task under panic=unwind), and does require a non-default configuration that permits none as a preferred MAC — hence Low severity.
Suggested fix
In the MAC-selection logic in negotiation.rs, reject (or force substitution of) mac::NONE whenever the negotiated cipher's needs_mac() is true, regardless of how none came to be selected — not only in the "no common MAC" fallback branch. Defensively, cipher::read() could also refuse to shrink a buffer below the number of bytes already consumed for the length-field block, returning a protocol error instead of resizing blindly.
For credit/changelog purposes, please use: Yazan Balawneh, Cystack.ps
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.63.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "russh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.63.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T19:17:24Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`SshBlockCipher` implementations (AES-CBC, AES-CTR, 3DES-CBC, etc.) report `needs_mac() == true`, meaning they are documented/intended to always be paired with a separate integrity MAC. However, key-exchange negotiation only checks `needs_mac()` inside the *fallback* branch of MAC algorithm selection (used when no common MAC algorithm exists). If both peers\u0027 preferred MAC lists simply contain `none` and it is successfully negotiated through the normal selection path, nothing rejects pairing `none` with a cipher that requires a MAC. Once negotiated, a single crafted packet from either peer causes `cipher::read()` to shrink an already-allocated buffer below the number of bytes it is about to index, causing a Rust slice-index-out-of-range panic and killing that connection\u0027s task.\n\n### Details\nIn `russh/src/cipher/mod.rs`, `read()` for a block cipher:\n1. Reads `packet_length_to_read_for_block_length()` bytes up front (16 bytes for any `SshBlockCipher`) into `buffer.buffer`.\n2. Decrypts the first block to recover the plaintext packet-length field `len`.\n3. Computes `buffer.len = len + cipher.tag_len()`.\n4. Calls `buffer.buffer.resize(buffer.len + 4, 0)`.\n5. Immediately indexes `buffer.buffer[16..]` (via the constant used for the first block read) to continue decrypting/reading the rest of the packet.\n\nWhen the negotiated MAC is `none`, `tag_len() == 0`. If the attacker (or a MITM holding the session key, or simply the accepting peer testing a hostile client) sends a packet whose *decrypted* length field is `0`, then `buffer.len = 0` and `resize(0 + 4, 0)` **shrinks** the buffer that was already grown to 16 bytes in step 1 down to 4 bytes. The subsequent slice operation `buffer.buffer[16..]` then panics with `range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4`.\n\nThe file already defines a `MINIMUM_PACKET_LEN` constant, but it is only consulted on the *write*/padding side, never on the read path \u2014 so nothing prevents an incoming packet from declaring a length shorter than the bytes already buffered.\n\nNegotiation gap: `negotiation.rs`\u0027s `Select` MAC-selection logic only special-cases `needs_mac()` when negotiation would otherwise *fail* (no common MAC), substituting `none` only if the cipher does not need one. It never re-validates the case where `none` is a common/successfully-negotiated MAC on both sides regardless of what the chosen cipher requires. So an application (or a malicious peer, since negotiation is attacker-influenced on one side) that includes `none` in its own preferred MAC list \u2014 while still allowing the default CTR/CBC cipher suite \u2014 ends up with an invalid, panic-inducing combination that the library itself should refuse.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure one side\u0027s `Preferred` config to include `mac::NONE` in the MAC list (this is a supported, non-default configuration exposed by the crate\u0027s public `Preferred` API \u2014 used e.g. for legacy/interop compatibility), while leaving the default cipher list (which includes `aes256-ctr`/`aes256-cbc`) untouched.\n2. Complete a normal key exchange; negotiation lands on `{cipher: aes*-ctr (or -cbc), mac: none}` because `none` is present and preferred/common on both sides, and nothing during negotiation rejects this pairing.\n3. From the peer, send one transport packet whose decrypted packet-length field is `0` (trivial to construct once the session keys are known to that peer, or for the peer that legitimately owns the connection to simply hand-craft, e.g. a modified client for testing).\n4. `cipher::read()` on the receiving side panics: `range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4`.\n5. Because each connection is handled in its own `tokio::spawn`\u0027ed task (see the per-connection `select!` loop that calls into `cipher::read()`), the panic unwinds only that task by default, but it unconditionally terminates that SSH connection/session \u2014 a working, currently-unauthenticated, already-established connection is killed with no attacker interaction beyond the one crafted packet, and the check runs on every inbound packet including pre-auth ones.\n\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service: a remote peer that can influence MAC preference negotiation (or a MITM in possession of the session key) can crash any individual SSH connection/session that ends up negotiating a block cipher together with `mac=none`, with a single crafted packet, pre-authentication. This does not affect the process as a whole (panic is scoped to that connection\u0027s task under `panic=unwind`), and does require a non-default configuration that permits `none` as a preferred MAC \u2014 hence Low severity.\n\n### Suggested fix\nIn the MAC-selection logic in `negotiation.rs`, reject (or force substitution of) `mac::NONE` whenever the negotiated cipher\u0027s `needs_mac()` is `true`, regardless of *how* `none` came to be selected \u2014 not only in the \"no common MAC\" fallback branch. Defensively, `cipher::read()` could also refuse to shrink a buffer below the number of bytes already consumed for the length-field block, returning a protocol error instead of resizing blindly.\n\nFor credit/changelog purposes, please use: Yazan Balawneh, Cystack.ps",
"id": "GHSA-p8qx-h547-fjw9",
"modified": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-p8qx-h547-fjw9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/2885385abfee279092a41d80c6cb6ac367353159"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.63.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "russh: negotiating a MAC-requiring block cipher (CTR/CBC) with mac=none causes a slice-index-out-of-range panic"
}
GHSA-P94H-62MP-HVFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:11improper validation of array index in WiFi driver function sapInterferenceRssiCount() leads to array out-of-bounds access in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3576"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-12T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "improper validation of array index in WiFi driver function sapInterferenceRssiCount() leads to array out-of-bounds access in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-p94h-62mp-hvfr",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:11:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:11:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2018-05-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/05/11/may-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P9JJ-JRC5-WM74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:14 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:14An issue was discovered in Adobe Acrobat and Reader: 2017.012.20098 and earlier versions, 2017.011.30066 and earlier versions, 2015.006.30355 and earlier versions, and 11.0.22 and earlier versions. The vulnerability is a result of untrusted input that is used to calculate an array index; the calculation occurs in the printing functionality. The vulnerability leads to an operation that can write to a memory location that is outside of the memory addresses allocated for the data structure. The specific scenario leads to a write access to a memory location that does not belong to the relevant process address space.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16391"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-09T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Adobe Acrobat and Reader: 2017.012.20098 and earlier versions, 2017.011.30066 and earlier versions, 2015.006.30355 and earlier versions, and 11.0.22 and earlier versions. The vulnerability is a result of untrusted input that is used to calculate an array index; the calculation occurs in the printing functionality. The vulnerability leads to an operation that can write to a memory location that is outside of the memory addresses allocated for the data structure. The specific scenario leads to a write access to a memory location that does not belong to the relevant process address space.",
"id": "GHSA-p9jj-jrc5-wm74",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:14:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:14:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb17-36.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039791"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P9VM-X975-JQJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:11In the camera driver, an out-of-bounds access can occur due to an error in copying region params from user space in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-15857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-12T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the camera driver, an out-of-bounds access can occur due to an error in copying region params from user space in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-p9vm-x975-jqjv",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:11:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:11:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2018-05-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/05/11/may-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC36-946P-693J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 06:34 – Updated: 2026-07-02 06:34GeoWebPlayer (also called "Web Plugin" in the GV-VMS documentation and "WS Player" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly.
The Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an index value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the index value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound.
snapshot command index-out-of-bound
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T04:17:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "GeoWebPlayer (also called \"Web Plugin\" in the GV-VMS documentation and \"WS Player\" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly.\n\nThe Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an `index` value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the `index` value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound.\n\n\n\n#### snapshot command index-out-of-bound",
"id": "GHSA-pc36-946p-693j",
"modified": "2026-07-02T06:34:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T06:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2026-2373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.geovision.com.tw/cyber_security.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC5Q-2X89-W436
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-20 00:30 – Updated: 2026-09-20 00:30vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly validate bad_words token indices against the model's generation output width in SamplingParams.update_from_tokenizer(). Attackers can supply out-of-bounds token indices that corrupt logits memory of concurrent requests, causing different in-flight HTTP requests to return incorrect tokens.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-19T23:17:10Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly validate bad_words token indices against the model\u0027s generation output width in SamplingParams.update_from_tokenizer(). Attackers can supply out-of-bounds token indices that corrupt logits memory of concurrent requests, causing different in-flight HTTP requests to return incorrect tokens.",
"id": "GHSA-pc5q-2x89-w436",
"modified": "2026-09-20T00:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-20T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/48824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/98dff2a81d747d1dba01a47f939f48c3526d4206/vllm/sampling_params.py#L694-L753"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/98dff2a81d747d1dba01a47f939f48c3526d4206/vllm/v1/worker/gpu/sample/bad_words.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-cross-request-logits-corruption-via-bad-words"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PCH8-R8W2-4HXJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:32Out-of-bounds Write and Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability in Samsung Open Source TizenFX Samsung/TizenFX allows Overflow Buffers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85084"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T13:06:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Out-of-bounds Write and Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability in Samsung Open Source TizenFX Samsung/TizenFX allows Overflow Buffers.",
"id": "GHSA-pch8-r8w2-4hxj",
"modified": "2026-09-03T15:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T15:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85084"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Samsung/TizenFX/pull/7814"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Samsung/TizenFX/pull/7815"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PCJ9-7356-67R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-24 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-24 21:30Array index error in tls_verify_call_back() in src/coap_openssl.c in OISM libcoap 4.3.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DTLS handshake that triggers SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() to return -1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65499"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-24T14:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Array index error in tls_verify_call_back() in src/coap_openssl.c in OISM libcoap 4.3.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DTLS handshake that triggers SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() to return -1.",
"id": "GHSA-pcj9-7356-67r5",
"modified": "2025-11-24T21:30:58Z",
"published": "2025-11-24T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/obgm/libcoap/issues/1747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/obgm/libcoap/pull/1750"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PF6M-G48C-C4PX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:09 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:09In all android releases (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) from CAF using the linux kernel, lack of length validation check for value received from firmware can lead to OOB access in WLAN HOST.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-19T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In all android releases (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) from CAF using the linux kernel, lack of length validation check for value received from firmware can lead to OOB access in WLAN HOST.",
"id": "GHSA-pf6m-g48c-c4px",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:09:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:09:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=e6298b787b3510c295dd0c9276194b3578f3cf09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/09/04/september-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107770"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-7
Strategy: Input Validation
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Mitigation MIT-15
- For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Mitigation MIT-3
Strategy: Language Selection
- Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.
Mitigation MIT-11
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Mitigation MIT-12
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.
Mitigation MIT-35
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an adversary. As a consequence, an adversary is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the adversaries' choice.