Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1289

Allowed

Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product receives an input value that is used as a resource identifier or other type of reference, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is equivalent to a potentially-unsafe value.

55 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5VF8-328M-MXJ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-10 21:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 15:31
VLAI
Details

Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly validate IP address and CIDR mask inputs, which may allow IP ACL bypass.

Inputs containing a trailing newline or non-ASCII digit characters pass the validators but are then re-encoded by the parser to a different address than the input string spelled. find() and bin_find() can match or miss addresses as a result.

Example:

my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite->new(); $cidr->add("::1\n/128"); $cidr->find("::1a"); # incorrectly returns true

See also CVE-2026-45191.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-10T21:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly validate IP address and CIDR mask inputs, which may allow IP ACL bypass.\n\nInputs containing a trailing newline or non-ASCII digit characters pass the validators but are then re-encoded by the parser to a different address than the input string spelled. find() and bin_find() can match or miss addresses as a result.\n\nExample:\n\n  my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite-\u003enew();\n  $cidr-\u003eadd(\"::1\\n/128\");\n  $cidr-\u003efind(\"::1a\");  # incorrectly returns true\n\nSee also CVE-2026-45191.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vf8-328m-mxj5",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-10T21:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stigtsp/Net-CIDR-Lite/commit/ca9542adec87110556601d7ce48381ea8d13e692.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/STIGTSP/Net-CIDR-Lite-0.24/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45191"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6C87-G9PW-78FX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:43 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:43
VLAI
Summary
Contrast's Imagepuller registryFor uses unanchored suffix matching, leaking auth credentials and trusted CA configuration to sibling-domain registries
Details

Summary

Config.registryFor selected a per-registry credential / CA / mirror block by checking strings.HasSuffix(name, fqdn) after stripping a single trailing dot.  The match has no boundary between the configured FQDN and any preceding characters in the request hostname. A registry configured as [registries."ghcr.io."] is therefore also applied to any image pulled from a host whose name happens to end in the literal byte sequence ghcr.io,  including attacker-registered domains such as evilghcr.io.  The imagepuller would then send the configured Authorization header (basic auth, registry token, or identity token), trust the configured custom CA bundle, follow the configured mirror, or honour insecure-skip-verify, on requests to that hostname.

Prerequisites

For this to be applicable, an image or layer must be pulled from a "sibling" domain ending in one of the FQDNs configured in the imagepuller config. This may occur due to malicious intent or coincidentally.

Impact

  • Authentication header leaks to the sibling registry.
  • If insecure-skip-verify is set on an FQDN, TLS will also not be verified for the sibling registry.
  • Mirrors configured for an FQDN will also be used with the sibling registry.

Not impacted

Image integrity is not impacted. Image bytes remain pinned by digest in the policy and are validated after the pull. This advisory does not allow code substitution.

Workaround

  • If possible, configure explicit subdomains in the imagepuller config. A configuration for [registries.".example.registry"] is unaffected, only [registries."example.registry"] is potentially affected.
  • Audit images and layers configured in the deployment for the existence of sibling domains.

Patches

After this patch, registry matches are determined by exact label equality instead of suffix matching. Each .-separated part of the FQDN must be an exact match with the corresponding label in the image reference.

Severity

  • AV:N because the leak is over the network to a registry under the attacker's control. 
  • AC:H because exploitation requires the operator to have configured a registry FQDN without a leading . AND the attacker to control a sibling-suffix domain that the deployment will pull from.
  • PR:N for the eventual recipient. 
  • S:U because impact stays in the imagepuller. 
  • C:L for credential leak (no integrity / availability impact).
Severity
3.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T18:43:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\n`Config.registryFor` selected a per-registry credential / CA / mirror block by checking `strings.HasSuffix(name, fqdn)` after stripping a single trailing dot.\u00a0\nThe match has no boundary between the configured FQDN and any preceding characters in the request hostname.\nA registry configured as `[registries.\"ghcr.io.\"]` is therefore also applied to any image pulled from a host whose name happens to end in the literal byte sequence `ghcr.io`,\u00a0\nincluding attacker-registered domains such as `evilghcr.io.`\u00a0\nThe imagepuller would then send the configured `Authorization` header (basic auth, registry token, or identity token), trust the configured custom CA bundle,\nfollow the configured mirror, or honour `insecure-skip-verify`, on requests to that hostname.\n\n# Prerequisites\n\nFor this to be applicable, an image or layer must be pulled from a \"sibling\" domain ending in one of the FQDNs configured in the imagepuller config.\nThis may occur due to malicious intent or coincidentally.\n\n# Impact\n\n- Authentication header leaks to the sibling registry.\n- If `insecure-skip-verify` is set on an FQDN, TLS will also not be verified for the sibling registry.\n- Mirrors configured for an FQDN will also be used with the sibling registry.\n\n## Not impacted\n\nImage integrity is **not** impacted. Image bytes remain pinned by digest in the policy and are validated after the pull.\nThis advisory does not allow code substitution.\n\n# Workaround\n\n- If possible, configure explicit subdomains in the imagepuller config. A configuration for `[registries.\".example.registry\"]` is unaffected, only `[registries.\"example.registry\"]` is potentially affected.\n- Audit images and layers configured in the deployment for the existence of sibling domains.\n\n# Patches\n\nAfter this patch, registry matches are determined by exact label equality instead of suffix matching.\nEach `.`-separated part of the FQDN must be an exact match with the corresponding label in the image reference.\n\n# Severity\n\n- `AV:N` because the leak is over the network to a registry under the attacker\u0027s control.\u00a0\n- `AC:H` because exploitation requires the operator to have configured a registry FQDN without a leading `.` AND the attacker to control a sibling-suffix domain that the deployment will pull from.\n- `PR:N` for the eventual recipient.\u00a0\n- `S:U` because impact stays in the imagepuller.\u00a0\n- `C:L` for credential leak (no integrity / availability impact).",
  "id": "GHSA-6c87-g9pw-78fx",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T18:43:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T18:43:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-6c87-g9pw-78fx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/commit/10826b1d82613025767fb094e8aa51a7dcfbd2a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/releases/tag/v1.21.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Contrast\u0027s Imagepuller registryFor uses unanchored suffix matching, leaking auth credentials and trusted CA configuration to sibling-domain registries"
}

GHSA-86QP-5C8J-P5MR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 13:15 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:30
VLAI
Summary
Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks
Details

Summary

In affected versions, the HTTP Host request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct request.url. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while request.url is rebuilt from the Host header, a malformed header could make request.url.path differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on request.url (rather than the raw scope path) could therefore be bypassed.

Details

When a client requests http://example.com/foo, it sends:

GET /foo HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com

Affected versions reconstructed the URL by concatenating http://{host}{path} and re-parsing the result. The Host value is only valid as a uri-host [ ":" port ] per RFC 9112 §3.2, where uri-host follows the restricted host grammar of RFC 3986 §3.2.2. When it contains characters outside that grammar - notably /, ?, or # - those characters move the path/query/fragment boundaries during re-parsing, so the parsed request.url.path no longer matches the path the server actually received. For example:

GET /foo HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com/abc?bar=

reconstructs to http://example.com/abc?bar=/foo, whose parsed path is /abc - even though routing used the real path /foo. The router still dispatches to /foo and the endpoint executes, but any middleware or code that reads request.url.path sees /abc, so path-based authorization checks can be bypassed.

Impact

Any application running an affected version that relies on request.url (or request.url.path) for security-sensitive decisions is affected. The most common case is middleware that gates access to certain path prefixes based on request.url.path. Deployments fronted by a proxy or load balancer are mitigated only if that proxy rejects or normalizes the malformed Host header before forwarding and the application does not trust attacker-controlled host headers (e.g. X-Forwarded-Host) elsewhere.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version, which validates the Host header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing request.url and falls back to scope["server"] for malformed values.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "starlette"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48710"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-444"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T13:15:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T22:16:44Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn affected versions, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed.\n\n### Details\nWhen a client requests `http://example.com/foo`, it sends:\n\n```http\nGET /foo HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n```\n\nAffected versions reconstructed the URL by concatenating `http://{host}{path}` and re-parsing the result. The `Host` value is only valid as a `uri-host [ \":\" port ]` per [RFC 9112 \u00a73.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#section-3.2-6), where `uri-host` follows the restricted `host` grammar of [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.2.2). When it contains characters outside that grammar - notably `/`, `?`, or `#` - those characters move the path/query/fragment boundaries during re-parsing, so the parsed `request.url.path` no longer matches the path the server actually received. For example:\n\n```http\nGET /foo HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com/abc?bar=\n```\n\nreconstructs to `http://example.com/abc?bar=/foo`, whose parsed `path` is `/abc` - even though routing used the real path `/foo`. The router still dispatches to `/foo` and the endpoint executes, but any middleware or code that reads `request.url.path` sees `/abc`, so path-based authorization checks can be bypassed.\n\n### Impact\nAny application running an affected version that relies on `request.url` (or `request.url.path`) for security-sensitive decisions is affected. The most common case is middleware that gates access to certain path prefixes based on `request.url.path`. Deployments fronted by a proxy or load balancer are mitigated only if that proxy rejects or normalizes the malformed `Host` header before forwarding and the application does not trust attacker-controlled host headers (e.g. `X-Forwarded-Host`) elsewhere.\n\n### Mitigation\nUpgrade to a patched version, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of [RFC 9112 \u00a73.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#section-3.2-6) / [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.2.2) when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope[\"server\"]` for malformed values.",
  "id": "GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:30:59Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T13:15:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/764dab0dcfb9033d75442d7a359645c9f94648c6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-002-starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.secwest.net/starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48710.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ostif.org/disclosing-the-badhost-vulnerability-in-starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/starlette/PYSEC-2026-161.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2481742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://badhost.org"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51357"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:44696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34526"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22993"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22992"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks"
}

GHSA-95P8-CCJW-3G7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-11 12:30 – Updated: 2026-02-11 12:30
VLAI
Details

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.8 before 18.8.4 that could have allowed an authenticated developer to hide specially crafted file changes from the WebUI.

Severity
4.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T12:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.8 before 18.8.4 that could have allowed an authenticated developer to hide specially crafted file changes from the WebUI.",
  "id": "GHSA-95p8-ccjw-3g7f",
  "modified": "2026-02-11T12:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-02-11T12:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3502519"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/02/10/patch-release-gitlab-18-8-4-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/586483"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9RFG-V8G9-9367

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 23:38 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:30
VLAI
Summary
Fedify has an LD-Signature Bypass via JSON-LD Named-Graph Restructuring
Details

As told on Discord earlier, multiple projects are affected, and we would like to coordinate. For now, we are aiming at a May 6th release date, but this is not set in stone yet.

Summary

An attacker can make use of JSON-LD features to restructure a JSON-LD document that would change how Fedify interprets it without changing its Linked Data Signature, allowing them to alter a third-party signed activity they have received.

Details

The vulnerability essentially boils down to the signature being on the canonical RDF graph representation of the JSON-LD document, and JSON-LD offering many ways to represent the same graph.

One of the issues is that by taking a signed Activity with an embedded object, an attacker can move the top-level Activity to a @graph property and move the activity's object to the top-level. Such a transformation preserves the signature and changes how the payload is interpreted by pretty much all ActivityPub implementations, making them process the object and ignore the formely-top-level activity. This can be used when the graph contains an embedded activity. In Mastodon, that is the case of { "type": "Undo", "object": { "type": "Announce" } }, but other implementations may sign other activities that can be exploited in the same way.

The @reverse keyword can also be used to change the shape of a JSON-LD document without changing the underlying graph, and could be used in a similar way to reverse an Activity and its object.

Another problematic feature is @included, which can be used to “move” properties outside of the normal tree, effectively making them invisible to most ActivityPub implementations, while, again, preserving the signature. This allows removing statuses or actor properties once a signed Create or Update activity is received.

Given that we have seen no use of @graph, @included or @reverse in ActivityPub payloads and that they are very complex to handle correctly (the only JSON-LD API functions that “normalize” @included and @reverse are flattening and framing, which both lose the root node), we have decided to reject them, and recommend you do so as well.

Detection of @graph, @included and @reverse should happen after compacting the incoming activity to your context, as aliases can be used for those keywords.

Additionally, after a quick scan of Fedify's source code, I could not verify that JSON-LD documents with a verified Linked Data Signature were compacted against your local JSON-LD context. Not doing that allows an attacker to rename aliases to non-standard names and use non-mapped aliases to replace existing values, while still leaving the signature intact. This allows an attacker to essentially replace arbitrary portions of any signed JSON-LD document and completely forge any activity while still passing verification. A similar issue was fixed in Mastodon a few years ago: https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/pull/17426.

Impact

The impact is difficult to assess as this depends on the types of activities that are actually signed and processed in the wild.

The @included keyword allows “removing” arbitrary attributes, thus allowing replaying Create and Update activities while stripping away any attribute, such as content or metadata, which can lead to integrity and availability issues, although confidentiality issues are unlikely.

The @graph and @reverse keywords allow changing the root activity, which in the case of Mastodon allows sending an Announce from a Undo { Announce }, but might have wider consequences depending on what various servers sign.

The lack of compacting can allow rewriting any activity arbitrarily, thus leading to major integrity, availability, and possibly confidentiality issues (e.g. by replacing an actor's inbox).

Severity
7.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42462"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-180",
      "CWE-347",
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-26T23:38:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "As told on Discord earlier, multiple projects are affected, and we would like to coordinate. For now, we are aiming at a May 6th release date, but this is not set in stone yet.\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker can make use of JSON-LD features to restructure a JSON-LD document that would change how Fedify interprets it without changing its Linked Data Signature, allowing them to alter a third-party signed activity they have received.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability essentially boils down to the signature being on the canonical RDF graph representation of the JSON-LD document, and JSON-LD offering many ways to represent the same graph.\n\nOne of the issues is that by taking a signed `Activity` with an embedded `object`, an attacker can move the top-level `Activity` to a `@graph` property and move the activity\u0027s `object` to the top-level. Such a transformation preserves the signature and changes how the payload is interpreted by pretty much all ActivityPub implementations, making them process the object and ignore the formely-top-level activity. This can be used when the graph contains an embedded activity. In Mastodon, that is the case of `{ \"type\": \"Undo\", \"object\": { \"type\": \"Announce\" } }`, but other implementations may sign other activities that can be exploited in the same way.\n\nThe `@reverse` keyword can also be used to change the shape of a JSON-LD document without changing the underlying graph, and could be used in a similar way to reverse an `Activity` and its `object`.\n\nAnother problematic feature is `@included`, which can be used to \u201cmove\u201d properties outside of the normal tree, effectively making them invisible to most ActivityPub implementations, while, again, preserving the signature. This allows removing statuses or actor properties once a signed `Create` or `Update` activity is received.\n\nGiven that we have seen no use of `@graph`, `@included` or `@reverse` in ActivityPub payloads and that they are very complex to handle correctly (the only JSON-LD API functions that \u201cnormalize\u201d `@included` and `@reverse` are flattening and framing, which both lose the root node), we have decided to reject them, and recommend you do so as well.\n\nDetection of `@graph`, `@included` and `@reverse` should happen after compacting the incoming activity to your context, as aliases can be used for those keywords.\n\nAdditionally, after a quick scan of Fedify\u0027s source code, I could not verify that JSON-LD documents with a verified Linked Data Signature were compacted against your local JSON-LD context. Not doing that allows an attacker to rename aliases to non-standard names and use non-mapped aliases to replace existing values, while still leaving the signature intact. This allows an attacker to essentially replace arbitrary portions of any signed JSON-LD document and completely forge any activity while still passing verification. A similar issue was fixed in Mastodon a few years ago: https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/pull/17426.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact is difficult to assess as this depends on the types of activities that are actually signed and processed in the wild.\n\nThe `@included` keyword allows \u201cremoving\u201d arbitrary attributes, thus allowing replaying `Create` and `Update` activities while stripping away any attribute, such as content or metadata, which can lead to integrity and availability issues, although confidentiality issues are unlikely.\n\nThe `@graph` and `@reverse` keywords allow changing the root activity, which in the case of Mastodon allows sending an `Announce` from a `Undo { Announce }`, but might have wider consequences depending on what various servers sign.\n\nThe lack of compacting can allow rewriting any activity arbitrarily, thus leading to major integrity, availability, and possibly confidentiality issues (e.g. by replacing an actor\u0027s `inbox`).",
  "id": "GHSA-9rfg-v8g9-9367",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T13:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T23:38:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify/security/advisories/GHSA-9rfg-v8g9-9367"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42462"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify/releases/tag/2.2.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fedify has an LD-Signature Bypass via JSON-LD Named-Graph Restructuring"
}

GHSA-CRV5-9VWW-Q3G8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 17:32 – Updated: 2026-04-27 16:32
VLAI
Summary
DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode
Details

Summary

Field Value
Severity Medium
Affected DOMPurify main at 883ac15, introduced in v1.0.10 (7fc196db)

SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES strips {{...}} expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.

Technical Details

DOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:

  1. Per-node — each text node is checked during the tree walk (purify.ts:1179-1191):
// pass #1: runs on every text node during tree walk
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
  content = currentNode.textContent;
  content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');  // {{...}} -> ' '
  content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, ' ');        // <%...%> -> ' '
  content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, ' ');      // ${...  -> ' '
  currentNode.textContent = content;
}
  1. Final string scrub — after serialization, the full HTML string is scrubbed again (purify.ts:1679-1683). This is the safety net that catches expressions that only form after the DOM settles.

The RETURN_DOM path returns before pass #2 ever runs (purify.ts:1637-1661):

// purify.ts (simplified)

if (RETURN_DOM) {
  // ... build returnNode ...
  return returnNode;        // <-- exits here, pass #2 never runs
}

// pass #2: only reached by string-mode callers
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
  serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, ' ');
}
return serializedHTML;

The payload {<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}<foo></foo>} exploits this:

  1. Parser creates: TEXT("{") → <foo> → TEXT("{payload}") → <foo> → TEXT("}") — no single node contains {{, so pass #1 misses it
  2. <foo> is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text
  3. The three text nodes are now adjacent — .outerHTML reads them as {{payload}}, which Vue 2 compiles and executes

Reproduce

Open the following html in any browser and alert(1) pops up.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>

<body>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.3.3/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/vue@2.7.16/dist/vue.min.js"></script>
  <script>
    var dirty = '<div id="app">{<foo></foo>{constructor.constructor("alert(1)")()}<foo></foo>}</div>';
    var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });
    document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);
    new Vue({ el: '#app' });
  </script>
</body>

</html>

Impact

Any application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.

Recommendations

Fix

normalize() merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both RETURN_DOM and RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT.

     if (RETURN_DOM) {
+      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+        body.normalize();
+        let html = body.innerHTML;
+        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
+          html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
+        });
+        body.innerHTML = html;
+      }
+
       if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
         returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.10"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41239"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:32:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T16:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n| Field | Value |\n|:------|:------|\n| **Severity** | Medium |\n| **Affected** | DOMPurify `main` at [`883ac15`](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/tree/883ac15d47f907cb1a3b5a152fe90c4d8c10f9e6), introduced in v1.0.10 ([`7fc196db`](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/7fc196db0b42a0c360262dba0cc39c9c91bfe1ec)) |\n\n`SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES` strips `{{...}}` expressions from untrusted HTML. This works in string mode but not with `RETURN_DOM` or `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT`, allowing XSS via template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nDOMPurify strips template expressions in two passes:\n\n1. **Per-node** \u2014 each text node is checked during the tree walk ([`purify.ts:1179-1191`](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/883ac15d47f907cb1a3b5a152fe90c4d8c10f9e6/src/purify.ts#L1179-L1191)):\n\n```js\n// pass #1: runs on every text node during tree walk\nif (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES \u0026\u0026 currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {\n  content = currentNode.textContent;\n  content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, \u0027 \u0027);  // {{...}} -\u003e \u0027 \u0027\n  content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR, \u0027 \u0027);        // \u003c%...%\u003e -\u003e \u0027 \u0027\n  content = content.replace(TMPLIT_EXPR, \u0027 \u0027);      // ${...  -\u003e \u0027 \u0027\n  currentNode.textContent = content;\n}\n```\n\n2. **Final string scrub** \u2014 after serialization, the full HTML string is scrubbed again ([`purify.ts:1679-1683`](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/883ac15d47f907cb1a3b5a152fe90c4d8c10f9e6/src/purify.ts#L1679-L1683)). This is the safety net that catches expressions that only form after the DOM settles.\n\nThe `RETURN_DOM` path returns before pass #2 ever runs ([`purify.ts:1637-1661`](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/883ac15d47f907cb1a3b5a152fe90c4d8c10f9e6/src/purify.ts#L1637-L1661)):\n\n```js\n// purify.ts (simplified)\n\nif (RETURN_DOM) {\n  // ... build returnNode ...\n  return returnNode;        // \u003c-- exits here, pass #2 never runs\n}\n\n// pass #2: only reached by string-mode callers\nif (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {\n  serializedHTML = serializedHTML.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR, \u0027 \u0027);\n}\nreturn serializedHTML;\n```\n\nThe payload `{\u003cfoo\u003e\u003c/foo\u003e{constructor.constructor(\u0027alert(1)\u0027)()}\u003cfoo\u003e\u003c/foo\u003e}` exploits this:\n\n1. Parser creates: `TEXT(\"{\")` \u2192 `\u003cfoo\u003e` \u2192 `TEXT(\"{payload}\")` \u2192 `\u003cfoo\u003e` \u2192 `TEXT(\"}\")` \u2014 no single node contains `{{`, so pass #1 misses it\n2. `\u003cfoo\u003e` is not allowed, so DOMPurify removes it but keeps surrounding text\n3. The three text nodes are now adjacent \u2014 `.outerHTML` reads them as `{{payload}}`, which Vue 2 compiles and executes\n\n## Reproduce\n\nOpen the following html in any browser and `alert(1)` pops up.\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\n\u003cbody\u003e\n  \u003cscript src=\"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.3.3/dist/purify.min.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003cscript src=\"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/vue@2.7.16/dist/vue.min.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003cscript\u003e\n    var dirty = \u0027\u003cdiv id=\"app\"\u003e{\u003cfoo\u003e\u003c/foo\u003e{constructor.constructor(\"alert(1)\")()}\u003cfoo\u003e\u003c/foo\u003e}\u003c/div\u003e\u0027;\n    var dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, { SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true, RETURN_DOM: true });\n    document.body.appendChild(dom.firstChild);\n    new Vue({ el: \u0027#app\u0027 });\n  \u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true` and `RETURN_DOM: true` (or `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true`), then mounts the result into a template-evaluating framework, is vulnerable to XSS.\n\n## Recommendations\n\n### Fix\n\n`normalize()` merges the split text nodes, then the same regex from the string path catches the expression. Placed before the fragment logic, this fixes both `RETURN_DOM` and `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT`.\n\n```diff\n     if (RETURN_DOM) {\n+      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {\n+        body.normalize();\n+        let html = body.innerHTML;\n+        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) =\u003e {\n+          html = stringReplace(html, expr, \u0027 \u0027);\n+        });\n+        body.innerHTML = html;\n+      }\n+\n       if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {\n         returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T16:32:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T17:32:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-crv5-9vww-q3g8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41239"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify has a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass in RETURN_DOM mode"
}

GHSA-FFF7-GX98-VR3G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

Net::CIDR::Set versions through 0.20 for Perl did not validate network masks.

The mask portion of a network mask could contain Unicode digits such as the Arabic-Indic One (U+0661), or non-digits, which were ignored. This could allow network masks to accept larger networks.

Leading zeros were also accepted, but treated as decimal instead of octal. This could lead to confusion about what networks are acceptable.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49942"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T17:16:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Net::CIDR::Set versions through 0.20 for Perl did not validate network masks.\n\nThe mask portion of a network mask could contain Unicode digits such as the Arabic-Indic One (U+0661), or non-digits, which were ignored.   This could allow network masks to accept larger networks.\n\nLeading zeros were also accepted, but treated as decimal instead of octal.  This could lead to confusion about what networks are acceptable.",
  "id": "GHSA-fff7-gx98-vr3g",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T18:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40911"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45191"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49942"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-CIDR-Set-0.21/changes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FRQ3-H54X-6725

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-06 21:30 – Updated: 2024-08-08 15:31
VLAI
Details

1Password 8 before 8.10.38 for macOS allows local attackers to exfiltrate vault items by bypassing macOS-specific security mechanisms.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-42218"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-06T21:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "1Password 8 before 8.10.38 for macOS allows local attackers to exfiltrate vault items by bypassing macOS-specific security mechanisms.",
  "id": "GHSA-frq3-h54x-6725",
  "modified": "2024-08-08T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2024-08-06T21:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://app-updates.agilebits.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.1password.com/kb/202408"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FV83-X2XW-2J55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 03:32 – Updated: 2026-08-27 15:31
VLAI
Details

When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33810"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T02:16:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.",
  "id": "GHSA-fv83-x2xw-2j55",
  "modified": "2026-08-27T15:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T03:32:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33810"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49703"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47952"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42051"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42050"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42049"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42047"
    },
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}

GHSA-FW62-67J2-4WMC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-10 21:30 – Updated: 2026-05-11 18:31
VLAI
Details

Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly consider extraneous zero characters in CIDR mask values, which may allow IP ACL bypass.

Mask forms like "/00" and "/01" pass validation and parse to the same prefix as their unpadded value.

See also CVE-2026-45190.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45191"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-10T21:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly consider extraneous zero characters in CIDR mask values, which may allow IP ACL bypass.\n\nMask forms like \"/00\" and \"/01\" pass validation and parse to the same prefix as their unpadded value.\n\nSee also CVE-2026-45190.",
  "id": "GHSA-fw62-67j2-4wmc",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T18:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-05-10T21:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45191"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
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      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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