CVE-2026-55736 (GCVE-0-2026-55736)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-23 18:21 – Updated: 2026-07-10 04:34- CWE-915 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash/security/advis… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-55736.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-55736 | related |
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash/commit/d9b3100… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 3.29.3
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| ash-project | ash |
Affected:
5967ed3a483ab949866e6d7b043b043e61703f17 , < d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Ash.Changeset\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash-project/ash",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/ash-project/ash",
"product": "ash",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash/changeset/changeset.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Ash.Changeset\u0027:cast_params/4"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Ash.Changeset\u0027:get_action_argument/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Ash.Changeset\u0027:atomic_params/4"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Ash.Changeset\u0027:has_argument?/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash",
"vendor": "ash-project",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5967ed3a483ab949866e6d7b043b043e61703f17",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn action must declare a private argument (one defined with \u003ctt\u003epublic?: false\u003c/tt\u003e) whose value is meant to be set only by trusted server-side code, and the application must build the changeset from untrusted user-supplied parameters, passing them straight into \u003ctt\u003eAsh.Changeset.for_create/3\u003c/tt\u003e, \u003ctt\u003efor_update/3\u003c/tt\u003e, \u003ctt\u003efor_destroy/3\u003c/tt\u003e, or into an atomic or bulk update.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "An action must declare a private argument (one defined with public?: false) whose value is meant to be set only by trusted server-side code, and the application must build the changeset from untrusted user-supplied parameters, passing them straight into Ash.Changeset.for_create/3, for_update/3, for_destroy/3, or into an atomic or bulk update."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "3.29.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Alfred Vi\u00e9"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "Zach Daniel"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code.\u003cp\u003eAction arguments declared with \u003ctt\u003epublic?: false\u003c/tt\u003e are meant to be set internally (for example via \u003ctt\u003eAsh.Changeset.set_private_argument/3\u003c/tt\u003e) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the regular changeset path (\u003ctt\u003efor_create\u003c/tt\u003e, \u003ctt\u003efor_update\u003c/tt\u003e, \u003ctt\u003efor_destroy\u003c/tt\u003e), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (\u003ctt\u003eAsh.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4\u003c/tt\u003e, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an \u003ctt\u003eacting_user_id\u003c/tt\u003e driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code.\n\nAction arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete.\n\nIn the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary.\n\nAn attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.\n\nThis issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-77",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-915",
"description": "CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T04:34:23.070Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/security/advisories/GHSA-f4hc-ppw9-4hhw"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-55736.html"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-55736"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/commit/d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Private action arguments can be set by user input in Ash",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-55736",
"datePublished": "2026-06-23T18:21:13.033Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-17T10:44:34.365Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T04:34:23.070Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.