VAR-201107-0083
Vulnerability from variot - Updated: 2025-04-11 23:15Cisco IOS 12.4MDA before 12.4(24)MDA5 on the Cisco Content Services Gateway - Second Generation (CSG2) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted ICMP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtl79577. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtl79577. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of crafted ICMP packets to an affected device. Exploitation could cause the device to reload.
There are no workarounds available to mitigate exploitation of this vulnerability other than blocking ICMP traffic destined to the affected device.
Determining Cisco CSG Software Versions
To determine the version of Cisco IOS Software that is running on the Cisco CSG2, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software on the switch on which the Cisco CSG2 module is installed to identify what modules and sub-modules are installed on the system. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3BXL JAF1226ARQS 2 1 SAMI Module (csgk9) WS-SVC-SAMI-BB-K9 SAD113906P1 4 48 CEF720 48 port 10/100/1000mb Ethernet WS-X6748-GE-TX SAL1127T6XY
Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status
--- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ -------
1 001e.be6e.a018 to 001e.be6e.a01b 5.6 8.5(2) 12.2(33)SRC5 Ok
2 001d.45f8.f3dc to 001d.45f8.f3e3 2.1 8.7(0.22)FW1 12.4(2010040 Ok
4 001c.587a.ef20 to 001c.587a.ef4f 2.6 12.2(14r)S5 12.2(33)SRC5 Ok
Mod Sub-Module Model Serial Hw Status
---- --------------------------- ------------------ ----------- ------- -------
1 Policy Feature Card 3 WS-F6K-PFC3BXL JAF1226BNQM 1.8 Ok
1 MSFC3 Daughterboard WS-SUP720 JAF1226BNMC 3.1 Ok
2 SAMI Daughterboard 1 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114400L9 1.1 Other
2 SAMI Daughterboard 2 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114207FU 1.1 Other
4 Centralized Forwarding Card WS-F6700-CFC SAL1029VGFK 2.0 Ok
Mod Online Diag Status
---- -------------------
1 Pass
2 Pass
4 Pass
C7600#
After locating the correct slot, issue the "session slot processor <3-9>" command to open a console connection to the respective Cisco Content Services Gateway: Second Generation. For example: session slot 2 processor 3. The number 3 is the control processor (CP) number for the CSG2.
Note: Other SAMI-based applications are not affected. The Cisco Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), the Cisco Mobile Wireless Home Agent (HA), the Cisco Wireless Security Gateway (WSG), the Cisco Broadband Wireless Gateway and Cisco IP Transfer Point (ITP), and the Cisco Long Term Evolution (LTE) Gateway are not affected.
The Cisco 7600 Series Router is not affected by this vulnerability, only the Cisco CSG (2nd generation) module is affected.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
The Cisco Content Services Gateway: Second Generation provides intelligent network capabilities such as flexible policy management and billing based on deep-packet inspection, as well as subscriber and application awareness capabilities that enable mobile operators to quickly and easily offer value-added, differentiated services over their mobile data networks.
Note: The Cisco Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), the Cisco Mobile Wireless Home Agent (HA), the Cisco Wireless Security Gateway (WSG), the Cisco Broadband Wireless Gateway and Cisco IP Transfer Point (ITP), and the Cisco Long Term Evolution (LTE) Gateway are not affected.
Vulnerability Scoring Details +----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
- CSCtl79577 - Crafted ICMP Packets may cause CSG2 to reload
CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause an affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerability at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
+---------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired | | Release | Releases | |------------+--------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.x-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |------------+--------------------------| | 12.0 - | 12.0 through 12.3 based | | 12.3 | releases are not | | | affected | |------------+--------------------------| | Affected | | | 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |------------+--------------------------| | 12.4MD | Not vulnerable | |------------+--------------------------| | | All 12.4MDA releases | | 12.4MDA | prior to 12.4(24)MDA5 | | | are affected. First | | | fixed in 12.4(24)MDA5 | |------------+--------------------------| | 12.4MDB | Not vulnerable | |------------+--------------------------| | Affected | | | 15.X-Based | First Fixed Release | | Releases | | |------------+--------------------------| | 15.0 - | 15.0 through 15.1 based | | 15.1 | releases are not | | | affected | +---------------------------------------+
Workarounds
There are no available workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability other than applying infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) on the Cisco 7600 router to block ICMP traffic destined to the IP address of the Cisco CSG. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The iACL policy denies unauthorized ICMP packet types, including echo request, echo-reply, host-unreachable, traceroute, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, and unreachable, that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.
Additional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocol
!
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo-reply
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host-unreachable
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 traceroute
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 packet-too-big
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 time-exceeded
permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 unreachable
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo-reply
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host-unreachable
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 traceroute
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 packet-too-big
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 time-exceeded
deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 unreachable
!
!-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured within
!-- the infrastructure address space
!
deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory, which is available at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110706-csg.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was found during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110706-csg.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
- comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-July-06 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
+-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +--------------------------------------------------------------------
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TITLE: Cisco Content Services Gateway ICMP Messages Denial of Service Vulnerability
SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45148
VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45148/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45148
RELEASE DATE: 2011-07-08
DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45148/#comments
AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s)
http://secunia.com/advisories/45148/
ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS
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DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Cisco Content Services Gateway (CSG2), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service).
Please see the vendor's advisory for a list of affected IOS Software.
SOLUTION: Apply fixes (please see the vendor's advisory for details).
PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor.
ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110706-csg.shtml
OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/
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"data": "Cisco IOS 12.4MDA before 12.4(24)MDA5 on the Cisco Content Services Gateway - Second Generation (CSG2) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted ICMP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtl79577. \nThis issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtl79577. An unauthenticated, remote\nattacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of\ncrafted ICMP packets to an affected device. Exploitation could cause\nthe device to reload. \n\nThere are no workarounds available to mitigate exploitation of this\nvulnerability other than blocking ICMP traffic destined to the\naffected device. \n\nDetermining Cisco CSG Software Versions\n\nTo determine the version of Cisco IOS Software that is running on the\nCisco CSG2, issue the \"show module\" command from Cisco IOS Software\non the switch on which the Cisco CSG2 module is installed to identify\nwhat modules and sub-modules are installed on the system. \n --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ -----------\n 1 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3BXL JAF1226ARQS\n 2 1 SAMI Module (csgk9) WS-SVC-SAMI-BB-K9 SAD113906P1\n 4 48 CEF720 48 port 10/100/1000mb Ethernet WS-X6748-GE-TX SAL1127T6XY\n \n Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status\n --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ -------\n 1 001e.be6e.a018 to 001e.be6e.a01b 5.6 8.5(2) 12.2(33)SRC5 Ok\n 2 001d.45f8.f3dc to 001d.45f8.f3e3 2.1 8.7(0.22)FW1 12.4(2010040 Ok\n 4 001c.587a.ef20 to 001c.587a.ef4f 2.6 12.2(14r)S5 12.2(33)SRC5 Ok\n \n Mod Sub-Module Model Serial Hw Status\n ---- --------------------------- ------------------ ----------- ------- -------\n 1 Policy Feature Card 3 WS-F6K-PFC3BXL JAF1226BNQM 1.8 Ok\n 1 MSFC3 Daughterboard WS-SUP720 JAF1226BNMC 3.1 Ok\n 2 SAMI Daughterboard 1 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114400L9 1.1 Other\n 2 SAMI Daughterboard 2 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114207FU 1.1 Other\n 4 Centralized Forwarding Card WS-F6700-CFC SAL1029VGFK 2.0 Ok\n \n Mod Online Diag Status\n ---- -------------------\n 1 Pass\n 2 Pass\n 4 Pass\n C7600#\n\nAfter locating the correct slot, issue the \"session slot \u003cmodule\nnumber\u003e processor \u003c3-9\u003e\" command to open a console connection to the\nrespective Cisco Content Services Gateway: Second Generation. For\nexample: session slot 2 processor 3. The number 3 is the control\nprocessor (CP) number for the CSG2. \n\nNote: Other SAMI-based applications are not affected. The Cisco\nGateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), the Cisco Mobile Wireless Home\nAgent (HA), the Cisco Wireless Security Gateway (WSG), the Cisco\nBroadband Wireless Gateway and Cisco IP Transfer Point (ITP), and the\nCisco Long Term Evolution (LTE) Gateway are not affected. \n\nThe Cisco 7600 Series Router is not affected by this vulnerability,\nonly the Cisco CSG (2nd generation) module is affected. \n\nNo other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this\nvulnerability. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nThe Cisco Content Services Gateway: Second Generation provides\nintelligent network capabilities such as flexible policy management\nand billing based on deep-packet inspection, as well as subscriber\nand application awareness capabilities that enable mobile operators\nto quickly and easily offer value-added, differentiated services over\ntheir mobile data networks. \n\nNote: The Cisco Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), the Cisco Mobile\nWireless Home Agent (HA), the Cisco Wireless Security Gateway (WSG),\nthe Cisco Broadband Wireless Gateway and Cisco IP Transfer Point\n(ITP), and the Cisco Long Term Evolution (LTE) Gateway are not\naffected. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n+----------------------------\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at:\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss \n\n* CSCtl79577 - Crafted ICMP Packets may cause CSG2 to reload\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause an affected\ndevice to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained\nDoS condition. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt \nand any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade \nsolution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nEach row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS\nrelease train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the\nearliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the\nanticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed\nin the \"First Fixed Release\" column of the table. The \"Recommended\nRelease\" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the\npublished vulnerability at the time of this Advisory. A device\nrunning a release in the given train that is earlier than the release\nin a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to\nbe vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or\nlater than the release in the \"Recommended Releases\" column of the\ntable. \n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| Major | Availability of Repaired |\n| Release | Releases |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| Affected | |\n| 12.x-Based | First Fixed Release |\n| Releases | |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| 12.0 - | 12.0 through 12.3 based |\n| 12.3 | releases are not |\n| | affected |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| Affected | |\n| 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release |\n| Releases | |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| 12.4MD | Not vulnerable |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| | All 12.4MDA releases |\n| 12.4MDA | prior to 12.4(24)MDA5 |\n| | are affected. First |\n| | fixed in 12.4(24)MDA5 |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| 12.4MDB | Not vulnerable |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| Affected | |\n| 15.X-Based | First Fixed Release |\n| Releases | |\n|------------+--------------------------|\n| 15.0 - | 15.0 through 15.1 based |\n| 15.1 | releases are not |\n| | affected |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nThere are no available workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability\nother than applying infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) on\nthe Cisco 7600 router to block ICMP traffic destined to the IP\naddress of the Cisco CSG. Administrators can construct an iACL by\nexplicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at\ningress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the\nnetwork in accordance with existing security policies and\nconfigurations. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection\nagainst these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a\ntrusted source address. \n\nThe iACL policy denies unauthorized ICMP packet types, including echo\nrequest, echo-reply, host-unreachable, traceroute, packet-too-big,\ntime-exceeded, and unreachable, that are sent to affected devices. In\nthe following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that\nis used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is\nconsidered a trusted source that requires access to the affected\ndevices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing\nand administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. \nWhenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct\nfrom the address space used for user and services segments. Using\nthis addressing methodology will assist with the construction and\ndeployment of iACLs. \n\nAdditional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core:\nInfrastructure Protection Access Control Lists. \n\n ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy\n \n !\n !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources \n !-- that require access on the vulnerable protocol \n !\n \n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo-reply\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host-unreachable\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 traceroute\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 packet-too-big\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 time-exceeded\n permit icmp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 unreachable\n \n !\n !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries\n !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks\n !\n \n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 echo-reply\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host-unreachable\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 traceroute\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 packet-too-big\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 time-exceeded\n deny icmp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 unreachable\n \n !\n !-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured within\n !-- the infrastructure address space\n !\n \n deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255\n \n !\n !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance\n !-- with existing security policies and configurations\n !\n !-- Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction\n !\n \n interface GigabitEthernet0/0\n ip access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in\n\nAdditional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within\nthe network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin\ncompanion document for this advisory, which is available at the\nfollowing link: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110706-csg.shtml\n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that address this\nvulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult\ntheir maintenance provider or check the software for feature set\ncompatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\nby the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html \nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml \n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\nis deployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through\ntheir point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco\nTechnical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to\na free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be\nrequested through the TAC. \n\nRefer to: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html \nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone \nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory. \n\nThis vulnerability was found during internal testing. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an\nuncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain\nfactual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at :\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110706-csg.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on\nmailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are\nencouraged to check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| Revision | | Initial |\n| 1.0 | 2011-July-06 | public |\n| | | release. |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html\nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. \nAll Cisco security advisories are available at: \nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\n\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\nCopyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. \n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS)\n\niFcDBQFOFH2OQXnnBKKRMNARCAqmAP9fvGEVMGbceYlLdKOUdF56bWsbDLEerSIM\nMASXq1IfLwD/VVBOZhprC1czwhOPulRma0Iw5Y2rfcErfqQdBhZiTCw=\n=cKiB\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n. ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe Secunia Vulnerability Intelligence Manager (VIM) enables you to handle vulnerability threats in a simple, cost effective way. \n\nRead more and request a free trial:\nhttp://secunia.com/products/corporate/vim/\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nTITLE:\nCisco Content Services Gateway ICMP Messages Denial of Service\nVulnerability\n\nSECUNIA ADVISORY ID:\nSA45148\n\nVERIFY ADVISORY:\nSecunia.com\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/45148/\nCustomer Area (Credentials Required)\nhttps://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory\u0026vuln_id=45148\n\nRELEASE DATE:\n2011-07-08\n\nDISCUSS ADVISORY:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/45148/#comments\n\nAVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA:\n * Last Update\n * Popularity\n * Comments\n * Criticality Level\n * Impact\n * Where\n * Solution Status\n * Operating System / Software\n * CVE Reference(s)\n\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/45148/\n\nONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA:\n * Authentication Level\n * Report Reliability\n * Secunia PoC\n * Secunia Analysis\n * Systems Affected\n * Approve Distribution\n * Remediation Status\n * Secunia CVSS Score\n * CVSS\n\nhttps://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory\u0026vuln_id=45148\n\nONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI:\n * AUTOMATED SCANNING\n\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/\n\nDESCRIPTION:\nA vulnerability has been reported in Cisco Content Services Gateway\n(CSG2), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS\n(Denial of Service). \n\nPlease see the vendor\u0027s advisory for a list of affected IOS Software. \n\nSOLUTION:\nApply fixes (please see the vendor\u0027s advisory for details). \n\nPROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY:\nReported by the vendor. \n\nORIGINAL ADVISORY:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110706-csg.shtml\n\nOTHER REFERENCES:\nFurther details available in Customer Area:\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/\n\nDEEP LINKS:\nFurther details available in Customer Area:\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/\n\nEXTENDED DESCRIPTION:\nFurther details available in Customer Area:\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/\n\nEXTENDED SOLUTION:\nFurther details available in Customer Area:\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/\n\nEXPLOIT:\nFurther details available in Customer Area:\nhttp://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nAbout:\nThis Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help\nprivate users keeping their systems up to date against the latest\nvulnerabilities. \n\nSubscribe:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/\n\nDefinitions: (Criticality, Where etc.)\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/\n\n\nPlease Note:\nSecunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by\nclicking the link. \nSecunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. \nSecunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only\nuse those supplied by the vendor. \n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nUnsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories\nhttp://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.