VAR-200903-0267
Vulnerability from variot - Updated: 2025-04-10 23:18Unspecified vulnerability in the Session Border Controller (SBC) before 3.0(2) for Cisco 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (SBC card reload) via crafted packets to TCP port 2000. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload. Repeated attacks can result in a denial-of-service condition. This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq18958. Versions prior to Cisco SBC software 3.0(2) are vulnerable. This issue affects SBC for Cisco 7600 series routers. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available.
To determine the version of the Cisco SBC software running on a system, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner.
card_A/Admin# show version
system image file: [LCP] disk0:c76-sbck9-mzg.3.0.1_AS3_0_00.bin
<output truncated>
Cisco SBC software version 3.0.1 is running in the device used in this example. Additionally, the Cisco ACE Module, Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine, Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
The Session Border Controller (SBC) enables direct IP-to-IP interconnect between multiple administrative domains for session-based services providing protocol interworking, security, and admission control and management. The SBC is a multimedia device that sits on the border of a network and controls call admission to that network.
Note: Only the Cisco SBC module reloads after successful exploitation.
Note: TCP port 2000 is typically used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications. However, the Cisco SBC module uses TCP port 2000 for high availability (redundancy) communication, but does not use the SCCP for this purpose.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCsq18958 ( registered customers only) ; and has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2009-0619.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device.
Cisco SBC software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/sbc-7600-crypto
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
As a workaround, configure an access control list (ACL) in the signaling / media VLAN on the Route Processor (RP). The following examples show how VLAN 140 is configured as the signaling / media VLAN. A separate VLAN (VLAN 77) is configured as Fault Tolerance (FT). An ACL is added to the signaling/media VLAN on the RP filtering all TCP port 2000 packets to the alias IP address.
Cisco SBC configuration
interface vlan 140
ip address 10.140.1.90 255.255.255.0
alias 10.140.1.100 255.255.255.0
peer ip address 10.140.1.8 255.255.255.0
!
ft interface vlan 77
ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
peer ip address 192.168.1. 255.255.255.0
RP Configuration
!- ACL blocking all TCP port 2000 traffic to the 10.140.1.0 internal network
!
access-list 100 deny tcp any host 10.140.1.100 eq 2000
access-list 100 permit ip any any
!
interface Vlan140
ip address 10.140.1.1 255.255.255.0
!- ACL is applied to the VLAN interface to egress traffic
ip access-group 100 out
!
The alias command under VLAN 140 is configured with an IP address that floats between active and standby modules when using high availability. Only TCP port 2000 traffic destined to this IP address may trigger this vulnerability. An access control list (ACL) is configured to deny TCP port 2000 destined to the alias IP address (10.140.1.100). The ACL is applied egress in the RP.
Note: TCP port 2000 is used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications; however, in this case it is used by the SBC for internal communications. The previous ACL only blocks TCP port 2000 traffic to the alias IP address. TCP port 2000 is not used by the alias IP address. This ACL should not cause any collateral damage.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090304-sbc.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was found during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090304-sbc.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
- comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-March-04 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin)
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"data": "Unspecified vulnerability in the Session Border Controller (SBC) before 3.0(2) for Cisco 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (SBC card reload) via crafted packets to TCP port 2000. \nA remote attacker may exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload. Repeated attacks can result in a denial-of-service condition. \nThis issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq18958. \nVersions prior to Cisco SBC software 3.0(2) are vulnerable. This issue affects SBC for Cisco 7600 series routers. Cisco has\nreleased free software updates that address this vulnerability. \nWorkarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. \n\nTo determine the version of the Cisco SBC software running on a\nsystem, log in to the device and issue the show version command to\ndisplay the system banner. \n\n card_A/Admin# show version\n system image file: [LCP] disk0:c76-sbck9-mzg.3.0.1_AS3_0_00.bin\n \u003coutput truncated\u003e\n\n\nCisco SBC software version 3.0.1 is running in the device used in\nthis example. Additionally, the\nCisco ACE Module, Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine, Cisco\nACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco\nACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series are not affected by this\nvulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be\naffected by this vulnerability. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nThe Session Border Controller (SBC) enables direct IP-to-IP\ninterconnect between multiple administrative domains for\nsession-based services providing protocol interworking, security, and\nadmission control and management. The SBC is a multimedia device that\nsits on the border of a network and controls call admission to that\nnetwork. \n\nNote: Only the Cisco SBC module reloads after successful\nexploitation. \n\nNote: TCP port 2000 is typically used by Skinny Call Control Protocol\n(SCCP) applications. However, the Cisco SBC module uses TCP port 2000\nfor high availability (redundancy) communication, but does not use\nthe SCCP for this purpose. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCsq18958 (\nregistered customers only) ; and has been assigned the Common\nVulnerability and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2009-0619. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n=============================\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\nAccess Vector - Network\nAccess Complexity - Low\nAuthentication - None\nConfidentiality Impact - None\nIntegrity Impact - None\nAvailability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\nExploitability - Functional\nRemediation Level - Official-Fix\nReport Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability may cause a reload of\nthe affected device. \n\nCisco SBC software can be downloaded from:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/sbc-7600-crypto\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult \nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to \ndetermine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nAs a workaround, configure an access control list (ACL) in the\nsignaling / media VLAN on the Route Processor (RP). The following\nexamples show how VLAN 140 is configured as the signaling / media\nVLAN. A separate VLAN (VLAN 77) is configured as Fault Tolerance\n(FT). An ACL is added to the signaling/media VLAN on the RP filtering\nall TCP port 2000 packets to the alias IP address. \n\nCisco SBC configuration\n\n interface vlan 140\n ip address 10.140.1.90 255.255.255.0\n alias 10.140.1.100 255.255.255.0\n peer ip address 10.140.1.8 255.255.255.0\n !\n ft interface vlan 77\n ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0\n peer ip address 192.168.1. 255.255.255.0\n\n\nRP Configuration\n\n !- ACL blocking all TCP port 2000 traffic to the 10.140.1.0 internal network\n !\n access-list 100 deny tcp any host 10.140.1.100 eq 2000\n access-list 100 permit ip any any\n !\n interface Vlan140\n ip address 10.140.1.1 255.255.255.0\n !- ACL is applied to the VLAN interface to egress traffic\n ip access-group 100 out\n !\n\nThe alias command under VLAN 140 is configured with an IP address\nthat floats between active and standby modules when using high\navailability. Only TCP port 2000 traffic destined to this IP address\nmay trigger this vulnerability. An access control list (ACL) is\nconfigured to deny TCP port 2000 destined to the alias IP address\n(10.140.1.100). The ACL is applied egress in the RP. \n\nNote: TCP port 2000 is used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP)\napplications; however, in this case it is used by the SBC for\ninternal communications. The previous ACL only blocks TCP port 2000\ntraffic to the alias IP address. TCP port 2000 is not used by the\nalias IP address. This ACL should not cause any collateral damage. \n\nAdditional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within\nthe network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion\ndocument for this Advisory:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090304-sbc.shtml\n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that address this\nvulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult\ntheir maintenance provider or check the software for feature set\ncompatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\nby the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html\nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml\n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\nis deployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through\ntheir point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco\nTechnical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to\na free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be\nrequested through the TAC. \n\nRefer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html \nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various \nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory. \n\nThis vulnerability was found during internal testing. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an\nuncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain\nfactual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n \nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at :\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090304-sbc.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on\nmailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are\nencouraged to check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| Revision | | Initial |\n| 1.0 | 2009-March-04 | public |\n| | | release |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html\nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco \nsecurity notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin)\n\niEYEARECAAYFAkmurgEACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBrwwCfbQxCcSz4S4X3UpH4Mccg0Df1\nKMoAn11BqKmRhw5mUuJOl3D/RrVxVrc7\n=m2di\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.