rustsec-2026-0111
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2026-04-24 12:00
Modified
2026-04-24 13:03
Summary
Possible UTF-8 corruption in Diesels SQLite backend
Details

Diesel uses the sqlite3_value_text function to receive strings from SQLite while deserializing query results. We misinterpreted the corresponding SQLite documentation that this function always returns a UTF-8 encoded string values as *const c_char. Based on that we used str::from_utf8_unchecked to construct a Rust string slice without any additional UTF-8 checks in place. It turned out that this function doesn't always return correct UTF-8 strings. For field of the SQLite side storage type BLOB this pointer can contain arbitrary bytes, which makes the usage of str::from_utf8_unchecked unsound as this violates the safety contract of str to only contain valid UTF-8 encoded Strings.

Mitigation

The preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to a Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.

Resolution

Diesel now correctly checks whether the provides byte buffer is actually valid UTF-8, instead of relying on SQLite's documentation. This fix is included in the 2.3.8 release.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": "unsound"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "diesel::deserialize::FromSql::\u003cText,Sqlite\u003e::from_sql",
            "diesel::sqlite::SqliteValue::read_str"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "diesel",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/diesel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Diesel uses the `sqlite3_value_text` function to receive strings from SQLite while deserializing query results. We misinterpreted the corresponding [SQLite](https://sqlite.org/c3ref/value_blob.html) documentation that this function always returns a UTF-8 encoded string values as `*const c_char`. Based on that we used `str::from_utf8_unchecked` to construct a Rust string slice without any additional UTF-8 checks in place. It turned out that this function doesn\u0027t always return correct UTF-8 strings. For field of the SQLite side storage type `BLOB` this pointer can contain arbitrary bytes, which makes the usage of `str::from_utf8_unchecked` unsound as this violates the safety contract of `str` to only contain valid UTF-8 encoded Strings.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nThe preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to a Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.\n\n## Resolution\n\nDiesel now correctly checks whether the provides byte buffer is actually valid UTF-8, instead of relying on SQLite\u0027s documentation. This fix is included in the `2.3.8` release.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0111",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T13:03:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/diesel"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0111.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/diesel-rs/diesel/pull/5042"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Possible UTF-8 corruption in Diesels SQLite backend"
}


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