GSD-2024-26670
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-02-20 06:02Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't
quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit
memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.
The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to
handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,
which are described in:
* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en
* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en
In both cases the workaround is described as:
| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the
| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected
| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:
|
| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including
| unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.
|
| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.
The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all
explicit memory accesses".
Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by
an LDR, as we have:
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| tlbi vale1, xzr
| dsb nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
| eret
| alternative_else_nop_endif
|
| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]
This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB
immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.
The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives
cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for
ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch
to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:
| alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]
| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@:
|
| ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
|
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| tlbi vale1, xzr
| dsb nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| eret
The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is
not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the
erratum:
| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the
| issue from occurring.
... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround
is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26670"
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n\nCurrently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn\u0027t\nquite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit\nmemory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.\n\nThe ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to\nhandle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,\nwhich are described in:\n\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en\n\nIn both cases the workaround is described as:\n\n| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the\n| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected\n| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:\n|\n| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including\n| unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.\n|\n| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.\n\nThe important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed \"after all\nexplicit memory accesses\".\n\nUnfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by\nan LDR, as we have:\n\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n| \teret\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n|\n| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n\nThis patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB\nimmediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.\n\nThe ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives\ncannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for\nARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch\nto skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:\n\n| alternative_insn \"b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@\", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \t[ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@:\n|\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n|\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| \teret\n\nThe new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is\nnot in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the\nerratum:\n\n| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the\n| issue from occurring.\n\n... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround\nis only necessary \"If pagetable isolation is disabled\".",
"id": "GSD-2024-26670",
"modified": "2024-02-20T06:02:29.146023Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
"ID": "CVE-2024-26670",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "Linux",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "471470bc7052",
"version_value": "58eb5c07f417"
},
{
"version_value": "not down converted",
"x_cve_json_5_version_data": {
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.15",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.7.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.7.3",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.8",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
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}
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"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
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"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n\nCurrently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn\u0027t\nquite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit\nmemory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.\n\nThe ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to\nhandle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,\nwhich are described in:\n\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en\n\nIn both cases the workaround is described as:\n\n| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the\n| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected\n| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:\n|\n| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including\n| unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.\n|\n| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.\n\nThe important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed \"after all\nexplicit memory accesses\".\n\nUnfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by\nan LDR, as we have:\n\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n| \teret\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n|\n| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n\nThis patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB\nimmediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.\n\nThe ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives\ncannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for\nARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch\nto skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:\n\n| alternative_insn \"b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@\", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \t[ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@:\n|\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n|\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| \teret\n\nThe new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is\nnot in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the\nerratum:\n\n| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the\n| issue from occurring.\n\n... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround\nis only necessary \"If pagetable isolation is disabled\"."
}
]
},
"generator": {
"engine": "bippy-b4257b672505"
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"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
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"lang": "eng",
"value": "n/a"
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"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0"
},
{
"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477"
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{
"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f"
}
]
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n\nCurrently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn\u0027t\nquite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit\nmemory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.\n\nThe ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to\nhandle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,\nwhich are described in:\n\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en\n* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en\n\nIn both cases the workaround is described as:\n\n| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the\n| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected\n| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:\n|\n| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including\n| unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.\n|\n| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.\n\nThe important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed \"after all\nexplicit memory accesses\".\n\nUnfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by\nan LDR, as we have:\n\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n| \teret\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n|\n| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n\nThis patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB\nimmediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.\n\nThe ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives\ncannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for\nARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch\nto skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:\n\n| alternative_insn \"b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@\", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0\n| \t[ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]\n| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@:\n|\n| \tldr\tlr, [sp, #S_LR]\n| \tadd\tsp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE\t\t// restore sp\n|\n| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD\n| \ttlbi\tvale1, xzr\n| \tdsb\tnsh\n| alternative_else_nop_endif\n| \teret\n\nThe new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is\nnot in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the\nerratum:\n\n| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the\n| issue from occurring.\n\n... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround\nis only necessary \"If pagetable isolation is disabled\"."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: arm64: entrada: arreglar ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD Actualmente, la soluci\u00f3n alternativa ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD no es del todo correcta, ya que se supone que debe aplicarse despu\u00e9s del \u00faltimo acceso expl\u00edcito a la memoria, pero va seguida inmediatamente por un LDR. La soluci\u00f3n alternativa ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD se utiliza para manejar las erratas Cortex-A520 2966298 y Cortex-A510 erratas 3117295, que se describen en: * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en * https:// desarrollador.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en En ambos casos, la soluci\u00f3n se describe como: | Si el aislamiento de la tabla de p\u00e1ginas est\u00e1 deshabilitado, la l\u00f3gica de cambio de contexto en | El kernel se puede actualizar para ejecutar la siguiente secuencia en los afectados | n\u00facleos antes de salir a EL0 y despu\u00e9s de todos los accesos expl\u00edcitos a la memoria: | | 1. Un TLBI que no se puede compartir en cualquier contexto y/o direcci\u00f3n, incluido | contextos o direcciones no utilizados, como `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`. | | 2. Un OSD NSH para garantizar la finalizaci\u00f3n del TLBI. La parte importante es que el TLBI+DSB debe colocarse \"despu\u00e9s de todos los accesos expl\u00edcitos a la memoria\". Desafortunadamente, tal como se implement\u00f3, el TLBI+DSB es seguido inmediatamente por un LDR, como tenemos: | Alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternativa_else_nop_endif | alternativa_si_no ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | agregar sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restaurar sp | eremita | alternativa_else_nop_endif | | [... Ruta de retorno de excepci\u00f3n KPTI...] Este parche soluciona este problema reelaborando la l\u00f3gica para colocar TLBI+DSB inmediatamente antes de ERET, despu\u00e9s de todos los accesos expl\u00edcitos a la memoria. El ERET se encuentra actualmente en un bloque alternativo separado y las alternativas no se pueden anidar. Para tener en cuenta esto, el bloque alternativo para ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 se reemplaza con una \u00fanica rama alternativa para omitir la l\u00f3gica KPTI, siendo la nueva forma de la l\u00f3gica: | Alternative_insn \"b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@\", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | [... Ruta de retorno de excepci\u00f3n KPTI...] | .L_skip_tramp_exit_\\@: | | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | agregar sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restaurar sp | | Alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternativa_else_nop_endif | eret La nueva estructura significa que la soluci\u00f3n alternativa s\u00f3lo se aplica cuando KPTI no est\u00e1 en uso; esto est\u00e1 bien, como se indica en las implicaciones documentadas de la fe de erratas: | El aislamiento de la tabla de paginaci\u00f3n entre EL0 y los EL de nivel superior evita que | que ocurra el problema. ... y seg\u00fan la descripci\u00f3n de la soluci\u00f3n citada anteriormente, la soluci\u00f3n s\u00f3lo es necesaria \"si el aislamiento de la tabla de p\u00e1ginas est\u00e1 deshabilitado\"."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-26670",
"lastModified": "2024-04-02T12:50:42.233",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2024-04-02T07:15:43.760",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58eb5c07f41704464b9acc09ab0707b6769db6c0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baa0aaac16432019651e0d60c41cd34a0c3c3477"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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