GHSA-XXH7-FCF3-RJ7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 21:27 – Updated: 2026-03-05 21:27
VLAI?
Summary
The Eclipse Jetty Server Artifact has a Gzip request memory leak
Details

Description (as reported)

There is a memory leak when using GzipHandler in jetty-12.0.30 that can cause off-heap OOMs. This can be used for DoS attacks so I'm reporting this as a vulnerability.

The leak is created by requests where the request is inflated (Content-Encoding: gzip) and the response is not deflated (no Accept-Encoding: gzip). In these conditions, a new inflator will be created by GzipRequest and never released back into GzipRequest.__inflaterPool because gzipRequest.destory() is not called.

In heap dumps one can see thousands of java.util.zip.Inflator objects, which use both Java heaps and native memory. Leaking native memory causes of off-heap OOMs.

Code path in GzipHandler.handle(): 1. Line 601: GzipRequest is created when request inflation is needed. 2. Lines 611-616: The callback is only wrapped in GzipResponseAndCallback when both inflation and deflation are needed. 3. Lines 619-625: If the handler accepts the request (returns true), gzipRequest.destroy() is only called in the "request not accepted" path (returns false)

When deflation is needed, GzipResponseAndCallback (lines 102 and 116) properly calls gzipRequest.destroy() in its succeeded() and failed() methods. But this wrapper is only created when deflation is needed.

Possible fix: The callback should be wrapped whenever a GzipRequest is created, not just when deflation is needed. This ensures gzipRequest.destroy() is always called when the request completes.

Impact

The leak causes the JVM to crash with OOME.

Patches

No patches yet.

Workarounds

Disable GzipHandler.

References

https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/issues/14260

https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/issues/79

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.1.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.0.31"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.32"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-401"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T21:27:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T10:15:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Description (as reported)\n\nThere is a memory leak when using `GzipHandler` in jetty-12.0.30 that can cause off-heap OOMs. This can be used for DoS attacks so I\u0027m reporting this as a vulnerability.\n\nThe leak is created by requests where the request is inflated (`Content-Encoding: gzip`) and the response is not deflated (no `Accept-Encoding: gzip`). In these conditions, a new inflator will be created by `GzipRequest` and never released back into `GzipRequest.__inflaterPool` because `gzipRequest.destory()` is not called.\n\nIn heap dumps one can see thousands of `java.util.zip.Inflator` objects, which use both Java heaps and native memory. Leaking native memory causes of off-heap OOMs.\n\nCode path in `GzipHandler.handle()`:\n1. Line 601: `GzipRequest` is created when request inflation is needed.\n2. Lines 611-616: The callback is only wrapped in `GzipResponseAndCallback` when both inflation and deflation are needed.\n3. Lines 619-625: If the handler accepts the request (returns true), `gzipRequest.destroy()` is only called in the \"request not accepted\" path (returns false)\n\nWhen deflation is needed, `GzipResponseAndCallback` (lines 102 and 116) properly calls `gzipRequest.destroy()` in its `succeeded()` and `failed()` methods. But this wrapper is only created when deflation is needed.\n\nPossible fix:\nThe callback should be wrapped whenever a `GzipRequest` is created, not just when deflation is needed. This ensures `gzipRequest.destroy()` is always called when the request completes.\n\n\n### Impact\nThe leak causes the JVM to crash with OOME.\n\n### Patches\nNo patches yet.\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable `GzipHandler`.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/issues/14260\n\nhttps://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/issues/79",
  "id": "GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T21:27:59Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T21:27:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/issues/14260"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/issues/79"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "The Eclipse Jetty Server Artifact has a Gzip request memory leak "
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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