GHSA-XWFJ-JGWM-7WP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 20:33 – Updated: 2025-09-02 16:35Impact
Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:
- Manipulate terminal title bars
- Clear screens or modify terminal display
- Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation
In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.
Patches
tracing-subscriber version 0.3.20 fixes this vulnerability by escaping ANSI control characters in when writing events to destinations that may be printed to the terminal.
Workarounds
Avoid printing logs to terminal emulators without escaping ANSI control sequences.
References
https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/weaponizing-ansi-escape-sequences/
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank zefr0x who responsibly reported the issue at security@tokio.rs.
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in any tokio-rs project, please email us at security@tokio.rs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tracing-subscriber"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-29T20:33:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T22:15:32Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nPrevious versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:\n\n- Manipulate terminal title bars\n- Clear screens or modify terminal display\n- Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation\n\nIn isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.\n\n### Patches\n\n`tracing-subscriber` version 0.3.20 fixes this vulnerability by escaping ANSI control characters in when writing events to destinations that may be printed to the terminal.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAvoid printing logs to terminal emulators without escaping ANSI control sequences.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://www.packetlabs.net/posts/weaponizing-ansi-escape-sequences/\n\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nWe would like to thank [zefr0x](http://github.com/zefr0x) who responsibly reported the issue at `security@tokio.rs`.\n\nIf you believe you have found a security vulnerability in any tokio-rs project, please email us at `security@tokio.rs`.",
"id": "GHSA-xwfj-jgwm-7wp5",
"modified": "2025-09-02T16:35:51Z",
"published": "2025-08-29T20:33:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing/security/advisories/GHSA-xwfj-jgwm-7wp5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58160"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0055.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Tracing logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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