GHSA-XW8C-RRVX-F7XQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 22:17 – Updated: 2026-05-05 22:17Summary
Both SCA HTTP clients (src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/osv.py and src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/endoflife.py) call payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode('utf-8')) without a maximum-bytes cap. A hostile or compromised endoflife.date / OSV.dev (or a successful TLS MITM) could return a multi-GB response, exhausting the ciguard process's memory.
Threat scenario
ciguard process memory exhaustion → OOM kill or system swap thrash. Realistic when ciguard runs in CI with a limited memory budget (typical: 4-8 GB). No data integrity or confidentiality impact.
Realism caveat: both URLs are hardcoded HTTPS, so this is a low-realism threat (HTTPS prevents MITM unless the attacker controls a trusted CA or hijacks DNS in a way that doesn't trigger cert validation). The unbounded read is structural defence-in-depth, not a directly exploitable bug today.
Patch
- New
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024(5 MB) constant in both modules. body = resp.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)with overflow check returnsNone(caller falls back to stale cache).- 3 regression tests in
tests/test_sca_rules.py::TestSCAResponseSizeCap.
Discovery
Found during ciguard's first self-conducted pentest cycle, 2026-04-26.
CVSS Scoring
- CVSS v3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L— 3.7 (Low) - CVSS v4.0:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N— first.org calc 3.1 (Low); GitHub's calc 6.3 (Medium). Vector is correct — choosing v3.1 as the structured score keeps the consistent Low rating across consumers.
Reproduction
Monkey-patch urllib.request.urlopen to return a fake 50 MB response; observe memory growth before/after the call. Pre-fix: process memory grows by ~50 MB. Post-fix: _fetch returns None, memory growth bounded to MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ciguard"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T22:17:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBoth SCA HTTP clients (`src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/osv.py` and `src/ciguard/analyzer/sca/endoflife.py`) call `payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027))` without a maximum-bytes cap. A hostile or compromised endoflife.date / OSV.dev (or a successful TLS MITM) could return a multi-GB response, exhausting the ciguard process\u0027s memory.\n\n## Threat scenario\n\nciguard process memory exhaustion \u2192 OOM kill or system swap thrash. Realistic when ciguard runs in CI with a limited memory budget (typical: 4-8 GB). No data integrity or confidentiality impact.\n\n**Realism caveat:** both URLs are hardcoded HTTPS, so this is a low-realism threat (HTTPS prevents MITM unless the attacker controls a trusted CA or hijacks DNS in a way that doesn\u0027t trigger cert validation). The unbounded read is structural defence-in-depth, not a directly exploitable bug today.\n\n## Patch\n\n- New `MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024` (5 MB) constant in both modules.\n- `body = resp.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)` with overflow check returns `None` (caller falls back to stale cache).\n- 3 regression tests in `tests/test_sca_rules.py::TestSCAResponseSizeCap`.\n\n## Discovery\n\nFound during ciguard\u0027s first self-conducted pentest cycle, 2026-04-26.\n\n## CVSS Scoring\n\n- CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` \u2014 3.7 (Low)\n- CVSS v4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` \u2014 first.org calc 3.1 (Low); GitHub\u0027s calc 6.3 (Medium). Vector is correct \u2014 choosing v3.1 as the structured score keeps the consistent Low rating across consumers.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nMonkey-patch `urllib.request.urlopen` to return a fake 50 MB response; observe memory growth before/after the call. Pre-fix: process memory grows by ~50 MB. Post-fix: `_fetch` returns `None`, memory growth bounded to MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix released in [v0.8.2](https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.2)\n- CI regression gate added in [v0.8.3](https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.3)",
"id": "GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq",
"modified": "2026-05-05T22:17:43Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T22:17:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/security/advisories/GHSA-xw8c-rrvx-f7xq"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ciguard: SCA HTTP client reads response body without size cap"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.