GHSA-XV97-C62V-4587
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-02 18:00 – Updated: 2022-08-11 22:13Impact
next-auth users who are using the EmailProvider either in versions before 4.10.3 or 3.29.10 are affected.
If an attacker could forge a request that sent a comma-separated list of emails (eg.: attacker@attacker.com,victim@victim.com) to the sign-in endpoint, NextAuth.js would send emails to both the attacker and the victim's e-mail addresses. The attacker could then login as a newly created user with the email being attacker@attacker.com,victim@victim.com. This means that basic authorization like email.endsWith("@victim.com") in the signIn callback would fail to communicate a threat to the developer and would let the attacker bypass authorization, even with an @attacker.com address.
Patches
We patched this vulnerability in v4.10.3 and v3.29.10 by normalizing the email value that is sent to the sign-in endpoint before accessing it anywhere else. We also added a normalizeIdentifier callback on the EmailProvider configuration, where you can further tweak your requirements for what your system considers a valid e-mail address. (E.g.: strict RFC2821 compliance)
To upgrade, run one of the following:
npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest
(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change latest to 3 if you want to stay on v3. This is not recommended. v3 is unmaintained.)
Workarounds
If for some reason you cannot upgrade, you can normalize the incoming request like the following, using Advanced Initialization:
// pages/api/auth/[...nextauth].ts
function normalize(identifier) {
// Get the first two elements only,
// separated by `@` from user input.
let [local, domain] = identifier.toLowerCase().trim().split("@")
// The part before "@" can contain a ","
// but we remove it on the domain part
domain = domain.split(",")[0]
return `${local}@${domain}`
}
export default async function handler(req, res) {
if (req.body.email) req.body.email = normalize(req.body.email)
return await NextAuth(req, res, {/* your options */ })
}
References
- EmailProvider: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email
- Normalize the email address: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email#normalizing-the-email-address
- Email syntax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Local-part
signIncallback: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#sign-in-callback- Advanced Initialization: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/initialization#advanced-initialization
nodemaileraddress: https://nodemailer.com/message/addresses
For more information
If you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability
Timeline
The issue was reported 26th of July, a response was sent out in less than 1 hour and after identifying the issue a patch was published within 5 working days.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Socket for disclosing this vulnerability in a responsible manner and following up until it got published.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.29.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-35924"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-02T18:00:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-02T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`next-auth` users who are using the `EmailProvider` either in versions before `4.10.3` or `3.29.10` are affected.\n\nIf an attacker could forge a request that sent a comma-separated list of emails (eg.: `attacker@attacker.com,victim@victim.com`) to the sign-in endpoint, NextAuth.js would send emails to both the attacker and the victim\u0027s e-mail addresses. The attacker could then login as a newly created user with the email being `attacker@attacker.com,victim@victim.com`. This means that basic authorization like `email.endsWith(\"@victim.com\")` in the `signIn` callback would fail to communicate a threat to the developer and would let the attacker bypass authorization, even with an `@attacker.com` address.\n\n### Patches\nWe patched this vulnerability in `v4.10.3` and `v3.29.10` by normalizing the email value that is sent to the sign-in endpoint before accessing it anywhere else. We also added a `normalizeIdentifier` callback on the `EmailProvider` configuration, where you can further tweak your requirements for what your system considers a valid e-mail address. (E.g.: strict RFC2821 compliance)\n\nTo upgrade, run one of the following:\n```sh\nnpm i next-auth@latest\n```\n```sh\nyarn add next-auth@latest\n```\n```sh\npnpm add next-auth@latest\n```\n\n(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change `latest` to `3` if you want to stay on v3. This is not recommended. v3 is unmaintained.)\n\n### Workarounds\nIf for some reason you cannot upgrade, you can normalize the incoming request like the following, using Advanced Initialization:\n```ts\n// pages/api/auth/[...nextauth].ts\n\nfunction normalize(identifier) {\n // Get the first two elements only,\n // separated by `@` from user input.\n let [local, domain] = identifier.toLowerCase().trim().split(\"@\")\n // The part before \"@\" can contain a \",\"\n // but we remove it on the domain part\n domain = domain.split(\",\")[0]\n return `${local}@${domain}`\n}\n\nexport default async function handler(req, res) {\n if (req.body.email) req.body.email = normalize(req.body.email)\n return await NextAuth(req, res, {/* your options */ })\n}\n```\n\n### References\n- EmailProvider: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email\n- Normalize the email address: https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email#normalizing-the-email-address\n- Email syntax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Local-part\n- `signIn` callback: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#sign-in-callback\n- Advanced Initialization: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/initialization#advanced-initialization\n- `nodemailer` address: https://nodemailer.com/message/addresses\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability\n\n### Timeline\n\nThe issue was reported 26th of July, a response was sent out in less than 1 hour and after identifying the issue a patch was published within 5 working days.\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nWe would like to thank [Socket](https://socket.dev) for disclosing this vulnerability in a responsible manner and following up until it got published.",
"id": "GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587",
"modified": "2022-08-11T22:13:10Z",
"published": "2022-08-02T18:00:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-xv97-c62v-4587"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/afb1fcdae3cc30445038ef588e491d139b916003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Local-part"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#sign-in-callback"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/initialization#advanced-initialization"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email#normalizing-the-e-mail-address"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/providers/email#normalizing-the-email-address"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nodemailer.com/message/addresses"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NextAuth.js before 4.10.3 and 3.29.10 sending verification requests (magic link) to unwanted emails"
}
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