GHSA-XP7R-J8R6-J9H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 16:43 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:50Summary
parseFormData() walks bracket and dot-notation FormData field names into nested objects without filtering reserved property keys. A single FormData field whose name begins with __proto__, or contains .__proto__. mid-path, causes the parser to traverse onto Object.prototype and assign properties there, polluting the prototype chain of every plain object in the running process.
Details
The vulnerability is in handlePathPart in src/index.ts, which performs currentObject[pathPart.path] and currentObject[pathPart.path] = val for object-type path segments without rejecting reserved keys. When the segment is __proto__, the read returns Object.prototype, which then becomes the next traversal target, and the next assignment lands on the prototype.
Reproduction on a fresh install of parse-nested-form-data@1.0.0:
import { parseFormData } from 'parse-nested-form-data';
const fd = new FormData();
fd.append('__proto__.polluted', 'yes');
parseFormData(fd);
console.log(({}).polluted); // -> 'yes'
console.log(([]).polluted); // -> 'yes'
Equivalent vectors:
__proto__[polluted]=yesa.__proto__.polluted=yes(mid-path traversal)a[0].__proto__.polluted=yes(mid-path through an array element)
constructor.prototype.x was incidentally blocked by an existing duplicate-key guard (because Object is a function and failed the JSON-object check), but relying on that was fragile, so the fix denylists constructor and prototype as well as __proto__. The array branch (a[0], a[]) was not exploitable in practice - the regex restricts array-index segments to digit characters - but the forbidden-key check is applied before the object/array type branching as defense in depth, so any future change to the regex cannot reintroduce the issue.
Impact
Any application that passes attacker-controlled FormData (or any Iterable<[string, string | File]>) to parseFormData() - typically an HTTP server processing form submissions - allows an unauthenticated remote client to mutate Object.prototype of the running process via a single field name. Concrete consequences depend on the host application and may include corrupted application state, altered control flow in code that reads ambient properties off objects, and denial of service.
Patches
Fixed in 1.0.1. handlePathPart now throws a new ForbiddenKeyError (also exported) when any path segment is __proto__, constructor, or prototype, regardless of whether the segment would be used as an object key or an array index. The check runs before object/array type branching for defense in depth.
Upgrade:
npm install parse-nested-form-data@^1.0.1
Workarounds
If upgrading is not possible, validate field names before calling parseFormData():
const FORBIDDEN = /(^|\.)(__proto__|constructor|prototype)($|[.[])/;
for (const [name] of formData.entries()) {
if (FORBIDDEN.test(name)) throw new Error('Unsafe field name');
}
Resources
- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
- Fix commit: 527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-nested-form-data"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45302"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T16:43:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T19:16:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`parseFormData()` walks bracket and dot-notation FormData field names into nested objects without filtering reserved property keys. A single FormData field whose name begins with `__proto__`, or contains `.__proto__.` mid-path, causes the parser to traverse onto `Object.prototype` and assign properties there, polluting the prototype chain of every plain object in the running process.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `handlePathPart` in `src/index.ts`, which performs `currentObject[pathPart.path]` and `currentObject[pathPart.path] = val` for object-type path segments without rejecting reserved keys. When the segment is `__proto__`, the read returns `Object.prototype`, which then becomes the next traversal target, and the next assignment lands on the prototype.\n\nReproduction on a fresh install of `parse-nested-form-data@1.0.0`:\n\n```js\nimport { parseFormData } from \u0027parse-nested-form-data\u0027;\nconst fd = new FormData();\nfd.append(\u0027__proto__.polluted\u0027, \u0027yes\u0027);\nparseFormData(fd);\nconsole.log(({}).polluted); // -\u003e \u0027yes\u0027\nconsole.log(([]).polluted); // -\u003e \u0027yes\u0027\n```\n\nEquivalent vectors:\n\n- `__proto__[polluted]=yes`\n- `a.__proto__.polluted=yes` (mid-path traversal)\n- `a[0].__proto__.polluted=yes` (mid-path through an array element)\n\n`constructor.prototype.x` was incidentally blocked by an existing duplicate-key guard (because `Object` is a function and failed the JSON-object check), but relying on that was fragile, so the fix denylists `constructor` and `prototype` as well as `__proto__`. The array branch (`a[0]`, `a[]`) was not exploitable in practice - the regex restricts array-index segments to digit characters - but the forbidden-key check is applied before the object/array type branching as defense in depth, so any future change to the regex cannot reintroduce the issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that passes attacker-controlled `FormData` (or any `Iterable\u003c[string, string | File]\u003e`) to `parseFormData()` - typically an HTTP server processing form submissions - allows an unauthenticated remote client to mutate `Object.prototype` of the running process via a single field name. Concrete consequences depend on the host application and may include corrupted application state, altered control flow in code that reads ambient properties off objects, and denial of service.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.0.1**. `handlePathPart` now throws a new `ForbiddenKeyError` (also exported) when any path segment is `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`, regardless of whether the segment would be used as an object key or an array index. The check runs before object/array type branching for defense in depth.\n\nUpgrade:\n\n```\nnpm install parse-nested-form-data@^1.0.1\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not possible, validate field names before calling `parseFormData()`:\n\n```js\nconst FORBIDDEN = /(^|\\.)(__proto__|constructor|prototype)($|[.[])/;\nfor (const [name] of formData.entries()) {\n if (FORBIDDEN.test(name)) throw new Error(\u0027Unsafe field name\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)\n- Fix commit: 527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792",
"id": "GHSA-xp7r-j8r6-j9h3",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:50:53Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T16:43:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/security/advisories/GHSA-xp7r-j8r6-j9h3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/commit/527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/releases/tag/v1.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "parse-nested-form-data has Prototype Pollution via `__proto__` in FormData field names"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.