GHSA-XMH9-RG6F-J3MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 22:39 – Updated: 2021-03-10 04:01Impact
Severity
Any Pod on a Solid server using a vulnerable version of the identity-token-verifier library is at risk of a spoofed Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) token binding. This vulnerability could give total and complete access to a targeted Pod.
Summary
A verification flaw in the implementation of the identity token verifier library (https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier) allows DPoP proofs to be spoofed.
DPoP proofs are used to bind access tokens to a private key meant to be in sole possession of a specific user. Instead of verifying against the hash of an embedded public key, the library instead verifies against a field that an attacker can modify to spoof another user’s DPoP.
A stolen DPoP proof, when used in the right context, therefore allows the rebinding of a DPoP-bound access token. Any attacker in possession of a targeted access token could build an attack environment to replay it on any Pod service with this vulnerability.
Patches
A new version 0.5.2 of identity-token-verifier fixes the verification: https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/blob/7e18d86d65ee681e8ae912b6a032a1bae3cae570/src/lib/DPoP.ts#L25-L35
Workarounds
None
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the identity-token-verifier repository. * Email: info@solidproject.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@solid/identity-token-verifier"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-10T04:01:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n#### Severity\nAny Pod on a Solid server using a vulnerable version of the identity-token-verifier library is at risk of a spoofed Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) token binding. This vulnerability could give total and complete access to a targeted Pod.\n\n#### Summary\nA verification flaw in the implementation of the identity token verifier library (https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier) allows DPoP proofs to be spoofed. \n\nDPoP proofs are used to bind access tokens to a private key meant to be in sole possession of a specific user. Instead of verifying against the hash of an embedded public key, the library instead verifies against a field that an attacker can modify to spoof another user\u2019s DPoP. \n\nA stolen DPoP proof, when used in the right context, therefore allows the rebinding of a DPoP-bound access token. Any attacker in possession of a targeted access token could build an attack environment to replay it on any Pod service with this vulnerability. \n\n\n### Patches\nA new version 0.5.2 of identity-token-verifier fixes the verification: https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/blob/7e18d86d65ee681e8ae912b6a032a1bae3cae570/src/lib/DPoP.ts#L25-L35\n\n### Workarounds\nNone\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in the [identity-token-verifier](https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/) repository.\n* Email: info@solidproject.org",
"id": "GHSA-xmh9-rg6f-j3mr",
"modified": "2021-03-10T04:01:48Z",
"published": "2021-03-12T22:39:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-xmh9-rg6f-j3mr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/commit/fbdeb4aa8c12694b3744cd0454acb826817d9e6c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/releases/tag/0.5.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@solid/identity-token-verifier"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Verification flaw in Solid identity-token-verifier"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.