GHSA-XMH9-RG6F-J3MR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 22:39 – Updated: 2021-03-10 04:01
VLAI?
Summary
Verification flaw in Solid identity-token-verifier
Details

Impact

Severity

Any Pod on a Solid server using a vulnerable version of the identity-token-verifier library is at risk of a spoofed Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) token binding. This vulnerability could give total and complete access to a targeted Pod.

Summary

A verification flaw in the implementation of the identity token verifier library (https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier) allows DPoP proofs to be spoofed.

DPoP proofs are used to bind access tokens to a private key meant to be in sole possession of a specific user. Instead of verifying against the hash of an embedded public key, the library instead verifies against a field that an attacker can modify to spoof another user’s DPoP.

A stolen DPoP proof, when used in the right context, therefore allows the rebinding of a DPoP-bound access token. Any attacker in possession of a targeted access token could build an attack environment to replay it on any Pod service with this vulnerability.

Patches

A new version 0.5.2 of identity-token-verifier fixes the verification: https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/blob/7e18d86d65ee681e8ae912b6a032a1bae3cae570/src/lib/DPoP.ts#L25-L35

Workarounds

None

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the identity-token-verifier repository. * Email: info@solidproject.org

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@solid/identity-token-verifier"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-10T04:01:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n#### Severity\nAny Pod on a Solid server using a vulnerable version of the identity-token-verifier library is at risk of a spoofed Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) token binding. This vulnerability could give total and complete access to a targeted Pod.\n\n#### Summary\nA verification flaw in the implementation of the identity token verifier library (https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier) allows DPoP proofs to be spoofed. \n\nDPoP proofs are used to bind access tokens to a private key meant to be in sole possession of a specific user. Instead of verifying against the hash of an embedded public key, the library instead verifies against a field that an attacker can modify to spoof another user\u2019s DPoP. \n\nA stolen DPoP proof, when used in the right context, therefore allows the rebinding of a DPoP-bound access token. Any attacker in possession of a targeted access token could build an attack environment to replay it on any Pod service with this vulnerability.  \n\n\n### Patches\nA new version 0.5.2 of identity-token-verifier fixes the verification: https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/blob/7e18d86d65ee681e8ae912b6a032a1bae3cae570/src/lib/DPoP.ts#L25-L35\n\n### Workarounds\nNone\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in the [identity-token-verifier](https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/) repository.\n* Email: info@solidproject.org",
  "id": "GHSA-xmh9-rg6f-j3mr",
  "modified": "2021-03-10T04:01:48Z",
  "published": "2021-03-12T22:39:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-xmh9-rg6f-j3mr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/commit/fbdeb4aa8c12694b3744cd0454acb826817d9e6c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solid/identity-token-verifier/releases/tag/0.5.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@solid/identity-token-verifier"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Verification flaw in Solid identity-token-verifier"
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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