GHSA-XH43-G2FQ-WJRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:41 – Updated: 2026-02-25 22:41
VLAI?
Summary
Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix
Details

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com).

  1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router redirectTo or i18n locale switch).
  2. Angular receives ///evil.com as the prefix.
  3. It strips one slash, leaving //evil.com.
  4. The resulting string is used in the Location header.
  5. Modern browsers interpret // as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from https://your-app.com to https://evil.com.

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking: - Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires. - SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains. - Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Attack Preconditions

  • The application must use Angular SSR.
  • The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.
  • The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the SSR process without sanitization.
  • The cache must not vary on the X-Forwarded-Prefix header.

Patches

  • 21.2.0-rc.1
  • 21.1.5
  • 20.3.17
  • 19.2.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in theirserver.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();
  if (prefix) {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

Resources

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 21.2.0-rc.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.2.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.0-rc.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "19.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "19.2.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27738"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T17:25:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.\n\nWhen an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`).\n\n1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch).\n2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix.\n3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`.\n4. The resulting string is used in the `Location` header.\n5. Modern browsers interpret `//` as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from `https://your-app.com` to `https://evil.com`.\n\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:\n- **Scale:** A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.\n- **SEO Poisoning:** Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.\n- **Trust:** Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n- The application must use Angular SSR.\n- The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.\n- The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without sanitization.\n- The cache must not vary on the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header.\n\n### Patches\n- 21.2.0-rc.1\n- 21.1.5\n- 20.3.17\n- 19.2.21\n\n### Workarounds\nUntil the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their`server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request:\n\n```ts\napp.use((req, res, next) =\u003e {\n  const prefix = req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-prefix\u0027]?.trim();\n  if (prefix) {\n    // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes\n    req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-prefix\u0027] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\\\]+/, \u0027/\u0027);\n  }\n  next();\n});\n\n```\n\n### Resources\n- [Report](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/32501)\n- [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32521)",
  "id": "GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/32501"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32521"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/f086eccc36d10cf01c426e35864bc32e1e292323"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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