GHSA-X9P5-W45C-7FFC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:50 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58Summary
The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.
Details
A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:
- internal/context/auth.go reads
c.Query("token") - internal/context/auth.go falls back to
c.Query("access_token") - internal/context/auth.go only checks the
Authorizationheader when the query token is empty - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated
Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through c.IsTokenAuth checks:
- internal/route/api/v1/api.go
Impact
If tokens are sent in URLs such as /api/v1/user?token=..., they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.
Recommended Fix
- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
- A strict referrer policy should be set.
Remediation
A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.13.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-598"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.\n\n### Details\n\nA static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:\n\n - internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query(\"token\")`\n - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query(\"access_token\")`\n - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty\n - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated\n\nToken-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks:\n - internal/route/api/v1/api.go\n\n### Impact\n\nIf tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.\n- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.\n- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.\n- A strict referrer policy should be set.\n\n### Remediation\n\nA fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.",
"id": "GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc",
"modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:07Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/295bfba72993c372e7b338438947d8e1a6bed8fd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.