GHSA-X9P5-W45C-7FFC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:50 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58
VLAI?
Summary
Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests
Details

Summary

The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.

Details

A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:

  • internal/context/auth.go reads c.Query("token")
  • internal/context/auth.go falls back to c.Query("access_token")
  • internal/context/auth.go only checks the Authorization header when the query token is empty
  • internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated

Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through c.IsTokenAuth checks: - internal/route/api/v1/api.go

Impact

If tokens are sent in URLs such as /api/v1/user?token=..., they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.

Recommended Fix

  • Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
  • Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
  • Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
  • A strict referrer policy should be set.

Remediation

A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.13.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26196"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.\n\n### Details\n\nA static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:\n\n  - internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query(\"token\")`\n  - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query(\"access_token\")`\n  - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty\n  - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated\n\nToken-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks:\n  - internal/route/api/v1/api.go\n\n### Impact\n\nIf tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.\n- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.\n- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.\n- A strict referrer policy should be set.\n\n### Remediation\n\nA fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:07Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/295bfba72993c372e7b338438947d8e1a6bed8fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests"
}


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