GHSA-X34H-54CW-9825

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 19:35 – Updated: 2026-03-31 18:41
VLAI?
Summary
act: actions/cache server allows malicious cache injection
Details

act's built-in actions/cache server listens to connections on all interfaces and allows anyone who can connect to it — including someone anywhere on the internet — to create caches with arbitrary keys and retrieve all existing caches. If one can predict which cache keys will be used by local actions, one can create malicious caches containing whatever files one pleases, most likely allowing arbitrary remote code execution within the Docker container.

Discovery

Discovered while discussing forgejo/runner#294.

Proposed Mitigation

It was discussed to append a secret to ACTIONS_CACHE_URL to retain compatibility with GitHub's cache action and still allow authorization. Forgejo is considering also encoding which repo is currently being run in CI into the secret in the URL to prevent unrelated repos using the same (probably global) runner from seeing each other's caches.

Severity ?
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.85"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nektos/act"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.86"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34042"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T19:35:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T03:15:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "act\u0027s built-in actions/cache server listens to connections on all interfaces and allows anyone who can connect to it \u2014 including someone anywhere on the internet \u2014 to create caches with arbitrary keys and retrieve all existing caches. If one can predict which cache keys will be used by local actions, one can create malicious caches containing whatever files one pleases, most likely allowing arbitrary remote code execution within the Docker container.\n\n## Discovery\n\nDiscovered while discussing [forgejo/runner#294](https://code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner/issues/294).\n\n## Proposed Mitigation\n\nIt was discussed to append a secret to `ACTIONS_CACHE_URL` to retain compatibility with GitHub\u0027s cache action and still allow authorization. Forgejo is considering also encoding which repo is currently being run in CI into the secret in the URL to prevent unrelated repos using the same (probably global) runner from seeing each other\u0027s caches.",
  "id": "GHSA-x34h-54cw-9825",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T18:41:01Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T19:35:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/security/advisories/GHSA-x34h-54cw-9825"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34042"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/commit/c28c27e141e8b54f9853de82f421ee09846751f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner/issues/294"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/releases/tag/v0.2.86"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "act: actions/cache server allows malicious cache injection"
}


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