GHSA-X2FF-J5C2-GGPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 18:55 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:48Impact
In shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (allowFrom, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (block_action, view_submission, view_closed) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.
In that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.24 - Patched version:
2026.2.25(planned next npm release)
Fix Commit(s)
ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.
Trust Model Scope Note
OpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:55:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nIn shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (`allowFrom`, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (`block_action`, `view_submission`, `view_closed`) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.\n\nIn that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.25` (planned next npm release)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.\n\n## Trust Model Scope Note\n\nOpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-x2ff-j5c2-ggpr",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:48:03Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T18:55:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-x2ff-j5c2-ggpr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-in-interactive-callbacks-via-sender-check-skip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Slack interactive callbacks could skip configured sender checks in some shared-workspace flows"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.