GHSA-X288-3778-4HHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:42 – Updated: 2026-02-25 22:42A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and X-Forwarded-* family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain.
Specifically, the framework didn't have checks for the following:
- Host Domain: The Host and X-Forwarded-Host headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the "base" of the application to an arbitrary external domain.
- Path & Character Sanitization: The X-Forwarded-Host header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs.
- Port Validation: The X-Forwarded-Port header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.
This vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:
- Implicit Relative URL Resolution: Angular's
HttpClientresolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can "steer" these requests to an external server or internal service. - Explicit Manual Construction: Developers injecting the
REQUESTobject to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing theHost/X-Forwarded-*headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.
Impact
When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to:
- Credential Exfiltration: Stealing sensitive Authorization headers or session cookies by redirecting them to an attacker's server.
- Internal Network Probing: Accessing and transmitting data from internal services, databases, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) not exposed to the public internet.
- Confidentiality Breach: Accessing sensitive information processed within the application's server-side context.
Attack Preconditions
- The victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering).
- The application must perform
HttpClientrequests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidatedHost/X-Forwarded-*headers using theREQUESTobject. - Direct Header Access: The application server is reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy.
- Lack of Upstream Validation: The infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) does not sanitize or validate incoming headers.
Patches
- 21.2.0-rc.1
- 21.1.5
- 20.3.17
- 19.2.21
Workarounds
- Use Absolute URLs: Avoid using
req.headersfor URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for your base API paths. - Implement Strict Header Validation (Middleware): If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement a middleware in your
server.tsto enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['your-domain.com']);
app.use((req, res, next) => {
const hostHeader = (req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] ?? req.headers['host'])?.toString();
const portHeader = req.headers['x-forwarded-port']?.toString();
if (hostHeader) {
const hostname = hostHeader.split(':')[0];
// Reject if hostname contains path separators or is not in allowlist
if (/^[a-z0-9.:-]+$/i.test(hostname) ||
(!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(hostname) && hostname !== 'localhost')) {
return res.status(400).send('Invalid Hostname');
}
}
// Ensure port is strictly numeric if provided
if (portHeader && !/^\d+$/.test(portHeader)) {
return res.status(400).send('Invalid Port');
}
next();
});
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 21.2.0-rc.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/ssr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.2.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.2.0-rc.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/ssr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/ssr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.3.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/ssr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "19.2.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nguniversal/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "16.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nguniversal/express-engine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "16.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27739"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T18:23:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A [Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular\u2019s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and `X-Forwarded-*` family to determine the application\u0027s base origin without any validation of the destination domain.\n\nSpecifically, the framework didn\u0027t have checks for the following:\n- **Host Domain**: The `Host` and `X-Forwarded-Host` headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the \"base\" of the application to an arbitrary external domain.\n- **Path \u0026 Character Sanitization**: The `X-Forwarded-Host` header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs.\n- **Port Validation**: The `X-Forwarded-Port` header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.\n\n\nThis vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:\n\n- **Implicit Relative URL Resolution**: Angular\u0027s `HttpClient` resolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can \"steer\" these requests to an external server or internal service.\n- **Explicit Manual Construction**: Developers injecting the `REQUEST` object to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing the `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to:\n- **Credential Exfiltration**: Stealing sensitive `Authorization` headers or session cookies by redirecting them to an attacker\u0027s server.\n- **Internal Network Probing**: Accessing and transmitting data from internal services, databases, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., `169.254.169.254`) not exposed to the public internet.\n- Confidentiality Breach: Accessing sensitive information processed within the application\u0027s server-side context.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n- The victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering).\n- The application must perform `HttpClient` requests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidated `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers using the `REQUEST` object.\n- **Direct Header Access**: The application server is reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy.\n- **Lack of Upstream Validation**: The infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) does not sanitize or validate incoming headers.\n\n### Patches\n\n- 21.2.0-rc.1\n- 21.1.5\n- 20.3.17\n- 19.2.21\n\n\n### Workarounds\n- **Use Absolute URLs:** Avoid using `req.headers` for URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for your base API paths.\n- **Implement Strict Header Validation (Middleware)**: If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement a middleware in your `server.ts` to enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.\n\n```ts\nconst ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set([\u0027your-domain.com\u0027]);\n\napp.use((req, res, next) =\u003e {\n const hostHeader = (req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-host\u0027] ?? req.headers[\u0027host\u0027])?.toString();\n const portHeader = req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-port\u0027]?.toString();\n\n if (hostHeader) {\n const hostname = hostHeader.split(\u0027:\u0027)[0];\n // Reject if hostname contains path separators or is not in allowlist\n if (/^[a-z0-9.:-]+$/i.test(hostname) || \n (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(hostname) \u0026\u0026 hostname !== \u0027localhost\u0027)) {\n return res.status(400).send(\u0027Invalid Hostname\u0027);\n }\n }\n\n // Ensure port is strictly numeric if provided\n if (portHeader \u0026\u0026 !/^\\d+$/.test(portHeader)) {\n return res.status(400).send(\u0027Invalid Port\u0027);\n }\n\n next();\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516)\n- [Docs](https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf)",
"id": "GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx",
"modified": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
"published": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Angular SSR is vulnerable to SSRF and Header Injection via request handling pipeline"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.