GHSA-WXRW-GVG8-FQJP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 22:52 – Updated: 2026-02-09 22:39Summary
The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated TOTP bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when EnforceOTP is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.
Vulnerable Component
server/c2/dns.go:84-90(EnforceOTPstored but not enforced in bootstrap)server/c2/dns.go:378-390(TOTPrequests routed directly to bootstrap)server/c2/dns.go:490-521(handleHelloallocates session without OTP validation)server/c2/dns.go:495(sessions.Storewith no lifecycle control in this path)client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52(operator-facingEnforceOTPcontrol implies auth gate)implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900(otpMsgsendsTOTPwithID=0)protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22(documents TOTP inIDfield)
Attack Vector
- Network-accessible DNS listener
- No authentication required
- Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop
- Trigger path:
DNSMessageType_TOTPbootstrap handling
Proof of Concept
Preconditions
- DNS listener is reachable
- DNS C2 job is active
Reproduction Steps
- Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type
TOTP. - Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.
- Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.
Example
while true; do
dig +short @<DNS_C2_IP> baa8.<parent-domain> A >/dev/null
done
baa8 is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.
Observable Indicators
- Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from
handleHello - Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process
- Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume
Impact
- Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)
- Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path
- Estimated CVSS v3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H(7.5 High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25791"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T21:15:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated `TOTP` bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when `EnforceOTP` is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.\n\n## Vulnerable Component\n- `server/c2/dns.go:84-90` (`EnforceOTP` stored but not enforced in bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:378-390` (`TOTP` requests routed directly to bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:490-521` (`handleHello` allocates session without OTP validation)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:495` (`sessions.Store` with no lifecycle control in this path)\n- `client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52` (operator-facing `EnforceOTP` control implies auth gate)\n- `implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900` (`otpMsg` sends `TOTP` with `ID=0`)\n- `protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22` (documents TOTP in `ID` field)\n\n## Attack Vector\n- Network-accessible DNS listener\n- No authentication required\n- Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop\n- Trigger path: `DNSMessageType_TOTP` bootstrap handling\n\n## Proof of Concept\n### Preconditions\n- DNS listener is reachable\n- DNS C2 job is active\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type `TOTP`.\n2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.\n3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.\n\n### Example\n```bash\nwhile true; do\n dig +short @\u003cDNS_C2_IP\u003e baa8.\u003cparent-domain\u003e A \u003e/dev/null\ndone\n```\n\n`baa8` is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.\n\n### Observable Indicators\n- Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from `handleHello`\n- Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process\n- Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume\n\n## Impact\n- Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)\n- Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path\n- Estimated CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` (**7.5 High**)",
"id": "GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp",
"modified": "2026-02-09T22:39:50Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25791"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/2b65089b27c553e79e69f1067cad1339e4f3d937"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service"
}
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