GHSA-WXRW-GVG8-FQJP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 22:52 – Updated: 2026-02-09 22:39
VLAI?
Summary
Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service
Details

Summary

The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated TOTP bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when EnforceOTP is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.

Vulnerable Component

  • server/c2/dns.go:84-90 (EnforceOTP stored but not enforced in bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:378-390 (TOTP requests routed directly to bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:490-521 (handleHello allocates session without OTP validation)
  • server/c2/dns.go:495 (sessions.Store with no lifecycle control in this path)
  • client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52 (operator-facing EnforceOTP control implies auth gate)
  • implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900 (otpMsg sends TOTP with ID=0)
  • protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22 (documents TOTP in ID field)

Attack Vector

  • Network-accessible DNS listener
  • No authentication required
  • Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop
  • Trigger path: DNSMessageType_TOTP bootstrap handling

Proof of Concept

Preconditions

  • DNS listener is reachable
  • DNS C2 job is active

Reproduction Steps

  1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type TOTP.
  2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.
  3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.

Example

while true; do
  dig +short @<DNS_C2_IP> baa8.<parent-domain> A >/dev/null
done

baa8 is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.

Observable Indicators

  • Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from handleHello
  • Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process
  • Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume

Impact

  • Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)
  • Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path
  • Estimated CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5 High)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25791"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T21:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated `TOTP` bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when `EnforceOTP` is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.\n\n## Vulnerable Component\n- `server/c2/dns.go:84-90` (`EnforceOTP` stored but not enforced in bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:378-390` (`TOTP` requests routed directly to bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:490-521` (`handleHello` allocates session without OTP validation)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:495` (`sessions.Store` with no lifecycle control in this path)\n- `client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52` (operator-facing `EnforceOTP` control implies auth gate)\n- `implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900` (`otpMsg` sends `TOTP` with `ID=0`)\n- `protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22` (documents TOTP in `ID` field)\n\n## Attack Vector\n- Network-accessible DNS listener\n- No authentication required\n- Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop\n- Trigger path: `DNSMessageType_TOTP` bootstrap handling\n\n## Proof of Concept\n### Preconditions\n- DNS listener is reachable\n- DNS C2 job is active\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type `TOTP`.\n2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.\n3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.\n\n### Example\n```bash\nwhile true; do\n  dig +short @\u003cDNS_C2_IP\u003e baa8.\u003cparent-domain\u003e A \u003e/dev/null\ndone\n```\n\n`baa8` is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.\n\n### Observable Indicators\n- Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from `handleHello`\n- Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process\n- Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume\n\n## Impact\n- Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)\n- Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path\n- Estimated CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` (**7.5 High**)",
  "id": "GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp",
  "modified": "2026-02-09T22:39:50Z",
  "published": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25791"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/2b65089b27c553e79e69f1067cad1339e4f3d937"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service"
}


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