GHSA-WV46-V6XC-2QHF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 19:08 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:46
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw: Synology Chat reply delivery could be rebound through username-based user resolution.
Details
Summary
Synology Chat reply delivery could rebind to a mutable username match instead of the stable numeric user_id recorded by the webhook event.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected: < 2026.3.22
- Fixed: >= 2026.3.22
- Latest released tag checked:
v2026.3.23-2(630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87) - Latest published npm version checked:
2026.3.23-2
Fix Commit(s)
7ade3553b74ee3f461c4acd216653d5ba411f455
Release Status
The fix shipped in v2026.3.22 and remains present in v2026.3.23 and v2026.3.23-2.
Code-Level Confirmation
- extensions/synology-chat/src/webhook-handler.ts now keeps replies bound to the stable webhook user identifier unless an explicit dangerous opt-in is enabled.
- extensions/synology-chat/src/config-schema.ts contains the explicit dangerous opt-in seam instead of silent username rebinding.
OpenClaw thanks @nexrin for reporting.
Severity ?
5.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-706",
"CWE-807"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T19:08:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nSynology Chat reply delivery could rebind to a mutable username match instead of the stable numeric user_id recorded by the webhook event.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: \u003c 2026.3.22\n- Fixed: \u003e= 2026.3.22\n- Latest released tag checked: `v2026.3.23-2` (`630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87`)\n- Latest published npm version checked: `2026.3.23-2`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `7ade3553b74ee3f461c4acd216653d5ba411f455`\n\n## Release Status\nThe fix shipped in `v2026.3.22` and remains present in `v2026.3.23` and `v2026.3.23-2`.\n\n## Code-Level Confirmation\n- extensions/synology-chat/src/webhook-handler.ts now keeps replies bound to the stable webhook user identifier unless an explicit dangerous opt-in is enabled.\n- extensions/synology-chat/src/config-schema.ts contains the explicit dangerous opt-in seam instead of silent username rebinding.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @nexrin for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-wv46-v6xc-2qhf",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:46:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T19:08:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wv46-v6xc-2qhf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7ade3553b74ee3f461c4acd216653d5ba411f455"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-webhook-reply-rebinding-via-username-resolution-in-synology-chat"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Synology Chat reply delivery could be rebound through username-based user resolution."
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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