GHSA-WQVH-63MV-9W92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:50 – Updated: 2026-03-13 13:35
VLAI?
Summary
@backstage/plugin-auth-backend: OAuth redirect URI allowlist bypass
Details

Impact

The experimental OIDC provider in @backstage/plugin-auth-backend is vulnerable to a redirect URI allowlist bypass. Instances that have enabled experimental Dynamic Client Registration or Client ID Metadata Documents and configured allowedRedirectUriPatterns are affected.

A specially crafted redirect URI can pass the allowlist validation while resolving to an attacker-controlled host. If a victim approves the resulting OAuth consent request, their authorization code is sent to the attacker, who can exchange it for a valid access token.

This requires victim interaction and that one of the experimental features is explicitly enabled, which is not the default.

Patches

Upgrade to @backstage/plugin-auth-backend version 0.27.1 or later.

Workarounds

Disable experimental Dynamic Client Registration and Client ID Metadata Documents features if they are not required.

References

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@backstage/plugin-auth-backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.27.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32235"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:50:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe experimental OIDC provider in `@backstage/plugin-auth-backend` is vulnerable to a redirect URI allowlist bypass. Instances that have enabled experimental Dynamic Client Registration or Client ID Metadata Documents and configured `allowedRedirectUriPatterns` are affected.\n\nA specially crafted redirect URI can pass the allowlist validation while resolving to an attacker-controlled host. If a victim approves the resulting OAuth consent request, their authorization code is sent to the attacker, who can exchange it for a valid access token.\n\nThis requires victim interaction and that one of the experimental features is explicitly enabled, which is not the default.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@backstage/plugin-auth-backend` version 0.27.1 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable experimental Dynamic Client Registration and Client ID Metadata Documents features if they are not required.\n\n### References\n\n- [RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2 - Redirection Endpoint](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2)",
  "id": "GHSA-wqvh-63mv-9w92",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T13:35:42Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T14:50:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/security/advisories/GHSA-wqvh-63mv-9w92"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/6042dd0c7f0706e0f473dafa92799ecf19c825ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@backstage/plugin-auth-backend: OAuth redirect URI allowlist bypass"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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