GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 20:14 – Updated: 2026-03-04 20:14
VLAI?
Summary
Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher
Details

Summary

In the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user’s cipher_id and call:

PUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial

Even though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns 200 OK and exposes cipherDetails (including name, notes, data, secureNote, etc.).

Description

put_cipher_partial retrieves the target Cipher but does not perform ownership or access control checks before returning to_json. Authorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here. src/api/core/ciphers.rs:717

let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {
    err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
};

if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {
    if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await.is_none() {
        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
    }
}

// Move cipher
cipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;

// Update favorite
cipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;

Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))

By comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check: src/api/core/ciphers.rs:688

if !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await {
    err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
}

The to_json method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response. src/db/models/cipher.rs:175

let (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {
    match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {
        Some((ro, hp, mn)) => (ro, hp, mn),
        None => {
            error!("Cipher ownership assertion failure");
            (true, true, false)
        }
    }
} else {
    (false, false, false)
};

src/db/models/cipher.rs:335

let mut json_object = json!({
    "object": "cipherDetails",
    "id": self.uuid,
    "type": self.atype,
    ...
    "name": self.name,
    "notes": self.notes,
    "fields": fields_json,
    "data": data_json,
    ...
});

Preconditions

  • The attacker possesses a valid regular-user JWT (Bearer token).
  • The attacker knows the target (victim) cipher_id.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Prepare the attacker JWT and victim cipher_id (preconditions).

  2. Baseline check: confirm that standard retrieval is denied. image

  3. Execute the vulnerable API. Confirm that 200 OK is returned and that cipherDetails includes fields such as id, name, notes, secureNote, etc. image

Potential Impact

  • Unauthorized disclosure of other users’ cipher information (confidentiality breach).
  • Creation of unauthorized associations within the attacker’s user context (e.g., favorite or folder operations).
  • The response from /api/ciphers/<cipher_id>/partial includes attachments[].url.

In filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:

/attachments/<cipher>/<file>?token=...

In object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.

As a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.

This can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.

Severity ?
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.35.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "vaultwarden"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27898"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user\u2019s `cipher_id` and call:\n\n```\nPUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial\n```\n\nEven though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns **200 OK** and exposes `cipherDetails` (including `name`, `notes`, `data`, `secureNote`, etc.).\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n`put_cipher_partial` retrieves the target Cipher but does **not perform ownership or access control checks** before returning `to_json`.\nAuthorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here.\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:717\n\n```rust\nlet Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(\u0026cipher_id, \u0026conn).await else {\n    err!(\"Cipher doesn\u0027t exist\")\n};\n\nif let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {\n    if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await.is_none() {\n        err!(\"Invalid folder\", \"Folder does not exist or belongs to another user\");\n    }\n}\n\n// Move cipher\ncipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await?;\n\n// Update favorite\ncipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await?;\n\nOk(Json(cipher.to_json(\u0026headers.host, \u0026headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, \u0026conn).await?))\n```\n\nBy comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check:\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:688\n\n```rust\nif !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(\u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await {\n    err!(\"Cipher is not write accessible\")\n}\n```\n\nThe `to_json` method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response.\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:175\n\n```rust\nlet (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {\n    match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {\n        Some((ro, hp, mn)) =\u003e (ro, hp, mn),\n        None =\u003e {\n            error!(\"Cipher ownership assertion failure\");\n            (true, true, false)\n        }\n    }\n} else {\n    (false, false, false)\n};\n```\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:335\n\n```rust\nlet mut json_object = json!({\n    \"object\": \"cipherDetails\",\n    \"id\": self.uuid,\n    \"type\": self.atype,\n    ...\n    \"name\": self.name,\n    \"notes\": self.notes,\n    \"fields\": fields_json,\n    \"data\": data_json,\n    ...\n});\n```\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker possesses a valid regular-user JWT (Bearer token).\n* The attacker knows the target (victim) `cipher_id`.\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Prepare the attacker JWT and victim `cipher_id` (preconditions).\n2. Baseline check: confirm that standard retrieval is denied.\n\u003cimg width=\"2014\" height=\"855\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/32b12cc9-3672-4a88-afd0-ef7715474662\" /\u003e\n\n\n3. Execute the vulnerable API. Confirm that **200 OK** is returned and that `cipherDetails` includes fields such as `id`, `name`, `notes`, `secureNote`, etc.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"1113\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/341b330c-8d55-4f06-a622-0d7da28f62fd\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* Unauthorized disclosure of other users\u2019 cipher information (confidentiality breach).\n* Creation of unauthorized associations within the attacker\u2019s user context (e.g., `favorite` or folder operations).\n* The response from `/api/ciphers/\u003ccipher_id\u003e/partial` includes `attachments[].url`.\n\nIn filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:\n\n```\n/attachments/\u003ccipher\u003e/\u003cfile\u003e?token=...\n```\n\nIn object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.\n\nThis can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User\u2019s Cipher"
}


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