GHSA-W7XF-WP34-J8RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-28 09:30 – Updated: 2024-12-06 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/mediatek: Always enable the clk on resume
In mtk_iommu_runtime_resume always enable the clk, even if m4u_dom is null. Otherwise the 'suspend' cb might disable the clk which is already disabled causing the warning:
[ 1.586104] infra_m4u already disabled [ 1.586133] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 121 at drivers/clk/clk.c:952 clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8 [ 1.594391] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 18001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops) [ 1.598108] Modules linked in: [ 1.598114] CPU: 0 PID: 121 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #69 [ 1.609246] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 14027000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops) [ 1.617487] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT) [ 1.617491] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 1.620545] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 19001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)
[ 1.627229] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 1.659297] pc : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8 [ 1.663475] lr : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8 [ 1.667652] sp : ffff800011b9bbe0 [ 1.670959] x29: ffff800011b9bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 1.676267] x27: ffff800011448000 x26: ffff8000100cfd98 [ 1.681574] x25: ffff800011b9bd48 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 1.686882] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff8000106fad90 [ 1.692189] x21: 000000000000000a x20: ffff0000c0048500 [ 1.697496] x19: ffff0000c0048500 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 1.702804] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 1.708112] x15: ffff800011460300 x14: fffffffffffe0000 [ 1.713420] x13: ffff8000114602d8 x12: 0720072007200720 [ 1.718727] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720 [ 1.724035] x9 : ffff800011b9bbe0 x8 : ffff800011b9bbe0 [ 1.729342] x7 : 0000000000000009 x6 : ffff8000114b8328 [ 1.734649] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.739956] x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : ffff800011460298 [ 1.745263] x1 : 1af1d7de276f4500 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.750572] Call trace: [ 1.753010] clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8 [ 1.756840] clk_core_disable_lock+0x24/0x40 [ 1.761105] clk_disable+0x20/0x30 [ 1.764501] mtk_iommu_runtime_suspend+0x88/0xa8 [ 1.769114] pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x2c/0x48 [ 1.773815] __rpm_callback+0xe0/0x178 [ 1.777559] rpm_callback+0x24/0x88 [ 1.781041] rpm_suspend+0xdc/0x470 [ 1.784523] rpm_idle+0x12c/0x170 [ 1.787831] pm_runtime_work+0xa8/0xc0 [ 1.791573] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x360 [ 1.795580] worker_thread+0x44/0x478 [ 1.799237] kthread+0x150/0x158 [ 1.802460] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 [ 1.806034] ---[ end trace 82402920ef64573b ]--- [ 1.810728] ------------[ cut here ]------------
In addition, we now don't need to enable the clock from the function mtk_iommu_hw_init since it is already enabled by the resume.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-28T09:15:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/mediatek: Always enable the clk on resume\n\nIn mtk_iommu_runtime_resume always enable the clk, even\nif m4u_dom is null. Otherwise the \u0027suspend\u0027 cb might\ndisable the clk which is already disabled causing the warning:\n\n[ 1.586104] infra_m4u already disabled\n[ 1.586133] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 121 at drivers/clk/clk.c:952 clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8\n[ 1.594391] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 18001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)\n[ 1.598108] Modules linked in:\n[ 1.598114] CPU: 0 PID: 121 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #69\n[ 1.609246] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 14027000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)\n[ 1.617487] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT)\n[ 1.617491] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work\n[ 1.620545] mtk-iommu 10205000.iommu: bound 19001000.larb (ops mtk_smi_larb_component_ops)\n\n[ 1.627229] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)\n[ 1.659297] pc : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8\n[ 1.663475] lr : clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8\n[ 1.667652] sp : ffff800011b9bbe0\n[ 1.670959] x29: ffff800011b9bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000\n[ 1.676267] x27: ffff800011448000 x26: ffff8000100cfd98\n[ 1.681574] x25: ffff800011b9bd48 x24: 0000000000000000\n[ 1.686882] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff8000106fad90\n[ 1.692189] x21: 000000000000000a x20: ffff0000c0048500\n[ 1.697496] x19: ffff0000c0048500 x18: ffffffffffffffff\n[ 1.702804] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000\n[ 1.708112] x15: ffff800011460300 x14: fffffffffffe0000\n[ 1.713420] x13: ffff8000114602d8 x12: 0720072007200720\n[ 1.718727] x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720\n[ 1.724035] x9 : ffff800011b9bbe0 x8 : ffff800011b9bbe0\n[ 1.729342] x7 : 0000000000000009 x6 : ffff8000114b8328\n[ 1.734649] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000\n[ 1.739956] x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : ffff800011460298\n[ 1.745263] x1 : 1af1d7de276f4500 x0 : 0000000000000000\n[ 1.750572] Call trace:\n[ 1.753010] clk_core_disable+0xb0/0xb8\n[ 1.756840] clk_core_disable_lock+0x24/0x40\n[ 1.761105] clk_disable+0x20/0x30\n[ 1.764501] mtk_iommu_runtime_suspend+0x88/0xa8\n[ 1.769114] pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x2c/0x48\n[ 1.773815] __rpm_callback+0xe0/0x178\n[ 1.777559] rpm_callback+0x24/0x88\n[ 1.781041] rpm_suspend+0xdc/0x470\n[ 1.784523] rpm_idle+0x12c/0x170\n[ 1.787831] pm_runtime_work+0xa8/0xc0\n[ 1.791573] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x360\n[ 1.795580] worker_thread+0x44/0x478\n[ 1.799237] kthread+0x150/0x158\n[ 1.802460] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30\n[ 1.806034] ---[ end trace 82402920ef64573b ]---\n[ 1.810728] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n\nIn addition, we now don\u0027t need to enable the clock from the\nfunction mtk_iommu_hw_init since it is already enabled by the resume.",
"id": "GHSA-w7xf-wp34-j8rv",
"modified": "2024-12-06T21:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-02-28T09:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5cad9e2caa9613fdcd246bd4ebf0ffbec1cba2ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b34ea31fe013569d42b7e8681ef3f717f77c5b72"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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