GHSA-W6QP-J494-G32C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-14 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/vmalloc: prevent RCU stalls in kasan_release_vmalloc_node

When CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is enabled, freeing KASAN shadow pages during vmalloc cleanup triggers expensive stack unwinding that acquires RCU read locks. Processing a large purge_list without rescheduling can cause the task to hold CPU for extended periods (10+ seconds), leading to RCU stalls and potential OOM conditions.

The issue manifests in purge_vmap_node() -> kasan_release_vmalloc_node() where iterating through hundreds or thousands of vmap_area entries and freeing their associated shadow pages causes:

rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P6229/1:b..l ... task:kworker/0:17 state:R running task stack:28840 pid:6229 ... kasan_release_vmalloc_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299 purge_vmap_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299

Each call to kasan_release_vmalloc() can free many pages, and with page_owner tracking, each free triggers save_stack() which performs stack unwinding under RCU read lock. Without yielding, this creates an unbounded RCU critical section.

Add periodic cond_resched() calls within the loop to allow: - RCU grace periods to complete - Other tasks to run - Scheduler to preempt when needed

The fix uses need_resched() for immediate response under load, with a batch count of 32 as a guaranteed upper bound to prevent worst-case stalls even under light load.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/vmalloc: prevent RCU stalls in kasan_release_vmalloc_node\n\nWhen CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is enabled, freeing KASAN shadow pages during\nvmalloc cleanup triggers expensive stack unwinding that acquires RCU read\nlocks.  Processing a large purge_list without rescheduling can cause the\ntask to hold CPU for extended periods (10+ seconds), leading to RCU stalls\nand potential OOM conditions.\n\nThe issue manifests in purge_vmap_node() -\u003e kasan_release_vmalloc_node()\nwhere iterating through hundreds or thousands of vmap_area entries and\nfreeing their associated shadow pages causes:\n\n  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:\n  rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P6229/1:b..l\n  ...\n  task:kworker/0:17 state:R running task stack:28840 pid:6229\n  ...\n  kasan_release_vmalloc_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299\n  purge_vmap_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299\n\nEach call to kasan_release_vmalloc() can free many pages, and with\npage_owner tracking, each free triggers save_stack() which performs stack\nunwinding under RCU read lock.  Without yielding, this creates an\nunbounded RCU critical section.\n\nAdd periodic cond_resched() calls within the loop to allow:\n- RCU grace periods to complete\n- Other tasks to run\n- Scheduler to preempt when needed\n\nThe fix uses need_resched() for immediate response under load, with a\nbatch count of 32 as a guaranteed upper bound to prevent worst-case stalls\neven under light load.",
  "id": "GHSA-w6qp-j494-g32c",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T21:30:37Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1afe45f89d54b7183768ebbbbf14238ec187ab5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2efa9c02c9b4c0d6866aa445f11056809b25ca28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5747435e0fd474c24530ef1a6822f47e7d264b27"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b351fbe71091f7c8676c8ba597653d08b6719447"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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