GHSA-W47F-J8RH-WX87

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 21:34 – Updated: 2026-04-17 21:34
VLAI?
Summary
Flowise: Public chatflow endpoints return unsanitized flowData including plaintext API keys, passwords, and credential IDs
Details

Summary

The GET /api/v1/public-chatflows/:id endpoint returns the full chatflow object without sanitization for public chatflows. Docker validation revealed this is worse than initially assessed: the sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint function does NOT exist in the released v3.0.13 Docker image. Both public-chatflows AND public-chatbotConfig return completely raw flowData including credential IDs, plaintext API keys, and password-type fields.

Root Cause

// packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts:218-220
const chatflow = await chatflowsService.getChatflowById(req.params.id)
if (!chatflow) return res.status(StatusCodes.NOT_FOUND).json(...)
if (chatflow.isPublic) return res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(chatflow) // ← NO sanitization!

Docker Validation (v3.0.13)

Created public chatflow with credential IDs and passwords in flowData:

{
  "flowData": "{\"nodes\":[{\"data\":{\"credential\":\"e92a39bf-...\",\"inputs\":{\"password\":\"sk-supersecretkey123\",\"apiKey\":\"should-not-leak\"}}}]}"
}

The sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint function only exists in unreleased HEAD, and even there, only public-chatbotConfig calls it — public-chatflows never does.

Impact

  • Credential IDs leaked — enables OAuth2 token theft chain (Finding 1)
  • Plaintext API keys and passwords leaked — direct third-party account compromise
  • Node configurations leaked — reveals internal architecture and endpoint URLs
  • Both public-chatflows and public-chatbotConfig are affected in the released version

Suggested Fix

Apply sanitization to both public endpoints:

const sanitized = sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint(chatflow)
return res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(sanitized)

Ensure the sanitization function strips all credential, password, apiKey, and secretKey fields from flowData.

References

  • packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts lines 209-236
  • packages/server/src/utils/sanitizeFlowData.ts lines 11-34 (exists only in unreleased HEAD)

Credits

  • Shinobi Security - https://github.com/shinobisecurity
Severity ?
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T21:34:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `GET /api/v1/public-chatflows/:id` endpoint returns the full chatflow object **without sanitization** for public chatflows. Docker validation revealed this is worse than initially assessed: the `sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint` function does NOT exist in the released v3.0.13 Docker image. Both `public-chatflows` AND `public-chatbotConfig` return completely raw flowData including credential IDs, plaintext API keys, and password-type fields.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts:218-220\nconst chatflow = await chatflowsService.getChatflowById(req.params.id)\nif (!chatflow) return res.status(StatusCodes.NOT_FOUND).json(...)\nif (chatflow.isPublic) return res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(chatflow) // \u2190 NO sanitization!\n```\n\n### Docker Validation (v3.0.13)\n\nCreated public chatflow with credential IDs and passwords in flowData:\n```json\n{\n  \"flowData\": \"{\\\"nodes\\\":[{\\\"data\\\":{\\\"credential\\\":\\\"e92a39bf-...\\\",\\\"inputs\\\":{\\\"password\\\":\\\"sk-supersecretkey123\\\",\\\"apiKey\\\":\\\"should-not-leak\\\"}}}]}\"\n}\n```\n\nThe `sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint` function only exists in unreleased HEAD, and even there, only `public-chatbotConfig` calls it \u2014 `public-chatflows` never does.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Credential IDs** leaked \u2014 enables OAuth2 token theft chain (Finding 1)\n- **Plaintext API keys and passwords** leaked \u2014 direct third-party account compromise\n- **Node configurations** leaked \u2014 reveals internal architecture and endpoint URLs\n- Both `public-chatflows` and `public-chatbotConfig` are affected in the released version\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nApply sanitization to both public endpoints:\n\n```typescript\nconst sanitized = sanitizeFlowDataForPublicEndpoint(chatflow)\nreturn res.status(StatusCodes.OK).json(sanitized)\n```\n\nEnsure the sanitization function strips all `credential`, `password`, `apiKey`, and `secretKey` fields from `flowData`.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- `packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts` lines 209-236\n- `packages/server/src/utils/sanitizeFlowData.ts` lines 11-34 (exists only in unreleased HEAD)\n\n## Credits\n- Shinobi Security - https://github.com/shinobisecurity",
  "id": "GHSA-w47f-j8rh-wx87",
  "modified": "2026-04-17T21:34:30Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T21:34:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-w47f-j8rh-wx87"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flowise: Public chatflow endpoints return unsanitized flowData including plaintext API keys, passwords, and credential IDs"
}


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