GHSA-VXCH-4R45-JHW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31A stack-use-after-return issue exists in the Arduino_Core_STM32 library prior to version 1.7.0. The pwm_start() function allocates a TIM_HandleTypeDef structure on the stack and passes its address to HAL initialization routines, where it is stored in a global timer handle registry. After the function returns, interrupt service routines may dereference this dangling pointer, resulting in memory corruption.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-562",
"CWE-825"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T18:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A stack-use-after-return issue exists in the Arduino_Core_STM32 library prior to version 1.7.0. The pwm_start() function allocates a TIM_HandleTypeDef structure on the stack and passes its address to HAL initialization routines, where it is stored in a global timer handle registry. After the function returns, interrupt service routines may dereference this dangling pointer, resulting in memory corruption.",
"id": "GHSA-vxch-4r45-jhw9",
"modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T18:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Acen28/CVE-2026-26399-Disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stm32duino/Arduino_Core_STM32/releases/tag/1.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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