GHSA-VVMV-WRVP-9GJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-15 17:46 – Updated: 2024-07-15 21:38Summary
When trying to add a BLOCK_LIST feature when the maintainer noticed they didn't sanitize the ImageId in the code, which leads to path traversal vulnerability. Now, this is different from a traditional path traversal issue, because as of NOW you can store the image in any place arbitrarily, and given enough time they might be able to come up with a working exploit BUT for the time being they am reporting this.
Details
@jmondi/url-to-png does not sanitizing the ImageID as in not removing special chars from the params (extract_query_params.ts#l75)
const imageId = dateString + "." + slugify(validData.url) +configToString(params);
This when fed to other parts of the code such as (filesystem.ts#L34)
return path.join(this.storagePath, imageId) + ".png";
Would result in path traversal issue.
PoC
# Configuration for filesystem storage provider (optional)
STORAGE_PROVIDER=filesystem
IMAGE_STORAGE_PATH=poc
Set this in your .env file and use this as your payload.
http://localhost:3089/?url=http://example.com&width=400&isDarkMode=../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/hack
This will create a .png file in the /tmp section of the system.
Loom POC: https://www.loom.com/share/bd7b306cdae7445c97e68f0626e743a6
This is valid for pretty much all the arguments (except for numeric values)
A simple fix would be to use the slugify for the params as well like so (#L75)
- const imageId = dateString + "." + slugify(validData.url) + configToString(params);
+ const imageId = dateString + "." + slugify(validData.url) + slugify(configToString(params));
Impact
This would be path traversal vulnerability which allows arbitrary write as of now.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@jmondi/url-to-png"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39918"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-15T17:46:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-15T20:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen trying to add a `BLOCK_LIST` feature when the maintainer noticed they didn\u0027t sanitize the `ImageId` in the code, which leads to path traversal vulnerability. Now, this is different from a traditional path traversal issue, because as of NOW you can store the image in any place arbitrarily, and given enough time they might be able to come up with a working exploit BUT for the time being they am reporting this. \n\n### Details\n\n@jmondi/url-to-png does not sanitizing the `ImageID` as in not removing special chars from the params [(extract_query_params.ts#l75)](https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/blob/e43098e0af3a380ebc044e7f303a83933b94b434/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts#L75)\n\n```js\nconst imageId = dateString + \".\" + slugify(validData.url) +configToString(params);\n```\n\nThis when fed to other parts of the code such as ([filesystem.ts#L34](https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/blob/8afc00247c1d7e6c7b37356a5f6282b486e596fa/src/lib/storage/filesystem.ts#L34))\n\n```js\nreturn path.join(this.storagePath, imageId) + \".png\";\n```\n\nWould result in path traversal issue. \n\n### PoC\n\n```\n# Configuration for filesystem storage provider (optional)\nSTORAGE_PROVIDER=filesystem\nIMAGE_STORAGE_PATH=poc\n```\n\nSet this in your `.env` file and use this as your payload. \n\n```\nhttp://localhost:3089/?url=http://example.com\u0026width=400\u0026isDarkMode=../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/hack\n```\n\nThis will create a `.png` file in the `/tmp` section of the system.\n\nLoom POC: https://www.loom.com/share/bd7b306cdae7445c97e68f0626e743a6 \n\n\n\nThis is valid for pretty much all the arguments (except for numeric values)\n\nA simple fix would be to use the `slugify` for the params as well like so ([#L75](https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/blob/e43098e0af3a380ebc044e7f303a83933b94b434/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts#L75))\n\n```diff\n- const imageId = dateString + \".\" + slugify(validData.url) + configToString(params);\n+ const imageId = dateString + \".\" + slugify(validData.url) + slugify(configToString(params));\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nThis would be path traversal vulnerability which allows arbitrary write as of now. \n",
"id": "GHSA-vvmv-wrvp-9gjr",
"modified": "2024-07-15T21:38:34Z",
"published": "2024-07-15T17:46:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/security/advisories/GHSA-vvmv-wrvp-9gjr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39918"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/commit/e4eaeca6493b21cd515b582fd6c0af09ede54507"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/blob/e43098e0af3a380ebc044e7f303a83933b94b434/src/middlewares/extract_query_params.ts#L75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jasonraimondi/url-to-png/releases/tag/v2.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@jmondi/url-to-png contains a Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.