GHSA-VQJC-M5XH-JHX3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 12:32 – Updated: 2026-04-20 12:32
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head

SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2 value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.

However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller (e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then slab_build_skb() -> ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:

kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k

Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification for KFENCE objects.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31429"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T10:16:16Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head\n\nSKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2\nvalue (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc\nbucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use\nskb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from\nskb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.\n\nHowever, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact\nrequested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller\n(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the\nrequested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then\nslab_build_skb() -\u003e ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting\nskb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching\nSKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free\nthe object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original\nkmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:\n\n  kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected\n  skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k\n\nFix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps\nthe free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification\nfor KFENCE objects.",
  "id": "GHSA-vqjc-m5xh-jhx3",
  "modified": "2026-04-20T12:32:00Z",
  "published": "2026-04-20T12:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d64618ea846d8d033477311f805ca487d6a6696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/474e00b935db250cac320d10c1d3cf4e44b46721"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60313768a8edc7094435975587c00c2d7b834083"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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