GHSA-VQJC-M5XH-JHX3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 12:32 – Updated: 2026-05-20 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2 value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.
However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller (e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then slab_build_skb() -> ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:
kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k
Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification for KFENCE objects.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31429"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T10:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head\n\nSKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2\nvalue (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc\nbucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use\nskb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from\nskb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.\n\nHowever, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact\nrequested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller\n(e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the\nrequested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then\nslab_build_skb() -\u003e ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting\nskb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching\nSKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free\nthe object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original\nkmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:\n\n kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected\n skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k\n\nFix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps\nthe free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification\nfor KFENCE objects.",
"id": "GHSA-vqjc-m5xh-jhx3",
"modified": "2026-05-20T21:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T12:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/128b03ccb2582a643983a48a37fda58df80edbde"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d64618ea846d8d033477311f805ca487d6a6696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/474e00b935db250cac320d10c1d3cf4e44b46721"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60313768a8edc7094435975587c00c2d7b834083"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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