GHSA-VJP8-WPRM-2JW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 18:56 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:42Summary
OpenClaw had account-scope gaps in pairing-store access for DM pairing policy, which could let a pairing approval from one account authorize the same sender on another account in multi-account setups.
Impact
This is an authorization-boundary weakness in multi-account channel deployments. A sender approved in one account could be accepted in another account before explicit approval there.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published version affected:
2026.2.25 - Vulnerable range:
<= 2026.2.25 - Patched version (planned next release):
>= 2026.2.26
Fix
OpenClaw now enforces account-scoped pairing reads/writes consistently across core and extension message channels, with stricter runtime/SDK helpers and shared policy wiring to prevent cross-account pairing bleed.
Fix Commit(s)
a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcfbce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32067"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:56:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nOpenClaw had account-scope gaps in pairing-store access for DM pairing policy, which could let a pairing approval from one account authorize the same sender on another account in multi-account setups.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authorization-boundary weakness in multi-account channel deployments. A sender approved in one account could be accepted in another account before explicit approval there.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version affected: `2026.2.25`\n- Vulnerable range: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `\u003e= 2026.2.26`\n\n### Fix\nOpenClaw now enforces account-scoped pairing reads/writes consistently across core and extension message channels, with stricter runtime/SDK helpers and shared policy wiring to prevent cross-account pairing bleed.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcf`\n- `bce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-vjp8-wprm-2jw9",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:42:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T18:56:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vjp8-wprm-2jw9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32067"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/bce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-cross-account-authorization-bypass-in-dm-pairing-store"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has cross-account DM pairing authorization bypass via unscoped pairing store access"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.